Audry H. v. Superior Court CA2/5

Filed 8/30/13 Audry H. v. Superior Court CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

AUDREY H., B249266

Petitioner, (Super. Ct. No. CK79875)

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Real Party in Interest.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING. Extraordinary Writ Petition. Jacqueline H. Lewis, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Petition Denied. Children’s Law Center, Patricia G. Bell and John Kim for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel and Kim Nemoy, Deputy County Counsel for Real Party in Interest.

The child, Audrey H., has filed a mandate petition challenging the order terminating reunification services and setting the matter for a parental termination rights hearing. The mother, Cynthia M., has filed a joinder in the child’s writ petition. We deny the petition and joinder. First, the Department of Children and Family Services (the department) argues that the child has forfeited any contention by not objecting to the juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services. Nor did the child’s counsel ever object to the juvenile court’s analysis as to why reunification services should be terminated. We agree with the department--the child has forfeited all of her contentions. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293-1294; In re Christiana L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 416.) Second, we review the order terminating reunification services for substantial evidence. The juvenile court must order placement of child with the parent unless the youngster’s return would create a substantial risk of detriment. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.22, subd. (a); Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689 703-704.) We review dependency determinations for substantial evidence. (In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329; In re Amy M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 849, 859-860.) We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent court’s findings. (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010; In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.) The primary focus of dependency proceedings is the child’s best interests. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 425-426; In re H.S. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 103, 108-109.) Substantial evidence supports the May 7, 2013 express and implied detriment findings of the juvenile court in deciding to terminate reunification services: when initially detained, the child was only one year old; the child had been subject to dependency jurisdiction nearly four years; after several years of various placements, the child had been placed with the foster parents on August 16, 2012; since then, the child had experienced, for the first time, a loving, nurturing and permanent home; while in the foster home, the child had made “tremendous strides”; a therapist indicated the child became fearful when foster parents were not present; the foster parents had been