The People v. Sanchez CA4/1 (2013) · DecisionDepot
The People v. Sanchez CA4/1
California Court of Appeal Aug 30, 2013 No. D062685Unpublished
Filed 8/30/13 P. v. Sanchez CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D062685
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD236180)
ABEL SANCHEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Albert T. Harutunian, III, Judge. Affirmed.
Stephen M. Hinkle, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Sean M.
Rodriquez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Abel Sanchez of sodomy of an intoxicated person, assault with
intent to commit rape or sodomy, burglary, and sexual battery. He appeals contending
(1) insufficient evidence supported the sodomy conviction, (2) the court abused its
discretion in admitting a statement made by his daughter to the victim, (3) the trial court
erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, and
Although granting or denying a motion for new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence is a matter that lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, in
ruling on such a motion, the court must consider the following factors: (1) that the
evidence, and not merely its materiality, is newly discovered; (2) that the evidence is not
merely cumulative; (3) that it would render a different result probable on retrial of the cause;
(4) that the party could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced it at
trial; and (5) that these facts have been shown by the best evidence of which the case admits.
(People v. Delgado, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 328.) A new trial motion based on newly
discovered evidence must be supported by an affidavit of the witness through whom the
evidence is to be given. (§ 1181, subd. 8; People v. Ethridge (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 279,
282–283; People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 1005.)
Here, Abel's motion was not supported by an affidavit from Karen and, as such, was
legally insufficient. (§ 1181, subd. 8.) In fact, the motion was not supported by an affidavit
at all. Instead, Abel relied on an unsigned letter from his defense investigator. On that basis
alone, the trial court would have been justified in denying the motion. (People v. Beeler,
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1005.)
In any event, the evidence was not of sufficient strength to show a reasonable
probability that a jury would render a different result on retrial. Karen's statements to the
investigator were merely a variation of her testimony at the preliminary hearing and trial.
Moreover, Karen's statements lacked credibility. Karen was consistent at the preliminary
hearing and at trial by stating that Abel was standing between Rosalinda's legs with his
pants and boxers partially down. Karen did not change her story until after Abel was
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convicted. Even then, she told Lane that Abel's pants were unbuttoned and his boxer shorts
were exposed. Given the strength of the other evidence in this case (see ante, part I), it is
unlikely the jury would have reached a different result.
Lastly, Lane's letter recounting Karen's statements was unreliable. According to
Lane, he needed the assistance of Karen's sister as an interpreter because Karen was not
fluent in English. There is no indication as to whether the translation was accurate or
reliable.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court acted well within its discretion in
denying Abel's new trial motion.
IV. Equal Protection
Abel argues that imposition of mandatory sex offender registration on him for
misdemeanor sexual battery violates his right to equal protection. We reject his argument.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state
shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." A similar
requirement appears in the California Constitution, article I, section 7.
" ' " 'The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a
showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated
groups in an unequal manner.' [Citations.] This initial inquiry is not whether persons are
similarly situated for all purposes, but 'whether they are similarly situated for purposes of
the law challenged.' [Citation.]" ' " (People v. Jeha (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1073
(Jeha), quoting People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1218–1219.)
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Here, Abel was convicted of three offenses requiring him to register as a sex offender
under section 290 (sodomy of an intoxicated person, assault with intent to commit rape or
sodomy, and sexual battery). He contends the registration requirement for sexual battery
violates his right to equal protection of the laws because he is similarly situated to offenders
who commit the crimes of statutory rape, spousal rape where the victim is prevented from
resisting by means of an intoxicating substance or is unconscious, kidnapping by force for
marriage or sex, kidnapping for prostitution, selling victims into sexual slavery, forcing a
wife into prostitution, and abusing a child with female genital mutilation.
Preliminarily, we point out that this is essentially a futile argument because
regardless of the outcome, Abel is required to register as a sex offender for two other
offenses. Abel asks this court to address an argument which provides him no meaningful
relief. Although we find this a wasteful exercise, we address Abel's argument on the merits.
We conclude Abel's equal protection challenge to the registration requirement with
respect to his sexual battery offense fails because he has not met the " ' " 'first prerequisite' " ' "
to a meritorious claim, namely " ' " 'that the state has adopted a classification that affects two
or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.' " ' " (Jeha, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1073.) "Misdemeanor sexual battery (in violation of § 243.4, subd. (e)) requires a
showing that the defendant touched an intimate part of another person, the touching was
against that person's will, and was done with specific intent to cause sexual arousal,
gratification or abuse. [Citation.]" (People v. King (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1319.) In
contrast, the other offenses Abel cited do not require the same specific sexual intent.
(People v. Cavallaro (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 103, 114 ["[A] higher mental state
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require[ment] . . . is a distinction that is meaningful in deciding whether a person convicted
under th[at] statute is similarly situated . . . ."].)
Further, several of the crimes Abel points to, including kidnapping by force for
marriage or sex, kidnapping for prostitution, selling victims into sexual slavery, forcing a
wife into prostitution, and abuse of a child with genital mutilation do not require any sexual
touching of "an intimate part of another person." (People v. King, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1319.) Those crimes do not necessarily have a sexual element and thus are not similarly
situated to the offense of sexual battery.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude Abel has not met his threshold burden of
showing "that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly
situated groups in an unequal manner." (Jeha, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 1073.)
Accordingly, his equal protection argument fails.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MCINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
HUFFMAN, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the defendant's convictions for sodomy, assault, burglary, and sexual battery, finding sufficient evidence supported the verdict, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in evidentiary or new trial rulings, and the sex offender registration requirement did not violate equal protection.
Issues
Whether sufficient evidence supported the sodomy conviction.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting hearsay testimony.
Whether the trial court erred in denying a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
Whether mandatory sex offender registration for sexual battery violates equal protection.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Abel's motion was not supported by an affidavit from Karen and, as such, was legally insufficient.”