California Court of Appeal Apr 8, 2025 No. E082832Unpublished
Filed 4/8/25 P. v. Marez CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E082832
v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV037241)
VICTOR MAREZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Bridgid M.
McCann, Judge. Affirmed with directions.
Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, James M. Toohey and
Andrew Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant Victor Marez appeals from the trial court’s summary
denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 As the high
court has just recently explained, contrary to defendant’s contentions, a trial court may
“rely on,” as the lower court did here, “unchallenged, relief-foreclosing facts within a
So it is here. Defendant’s conclusory allegation in his petition that he could not
now be convicted of murder under current law was insufficient to make his prima facie
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showing for an evidentiary hearing and resentencing relief. This bare assertion was
unbolstered by any specific facts to rebut the prosecution’s contrary showing. The
prosecution’s contrary showing was properly founded in the preliminary hearing
transcript to indicate that defendant was the victims’ actual killer and indeed sole shooter.
As such, defendant, contrary to his assertion, could properly be subject to prosecution and
conviction for murder under current law. In view of defendant’s failure to present
anything in his petition or his attorney’s supplemental brief in rebuttal, and indeed
lacking any rebuttal whatsoever of the prosecution’s showing, the trial court did not err in
concluding defendant failed to meet his prima facie burden. As the Supreme Court
explained, while this burden “is a ‘ “bar” ’ that is set ‘ “very low,” ’ ” it is not nonexistent.
(Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 607.) By statute, “a ‘petitioner’ must nonetheless ‘make[]
a prima facie showing’ (§ 1172.6, subd. (c)) to frame a disputed issue that entitles that
petitioner to an evidentiary hearing.” (Ibid.)
In Patton, the defendant at oral argument in the Supreme Court requested “to be
permitted to plead additional facts on remand,” in the event the court—as it did—
affirmed denial of his section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. (Patton, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 609.) Despite upholding the trial court’s ruling, the Supreme Court ordered
remand based on the defendant’s request. (Ibid.) Remand no doubt was also informed
by: (1) the uncertainty of the law reflected in divergent Court of Appeal decisions up to
that point on the relevant issues (see id. at p. 603), and (2) the Supreme Court’s new
reminder and endorsement that “[c]ourts should . . . implement section 1172.6 so that
petitioners have ‘meaningful’ opportunities to present their petitions” (id. at p. 608),
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including by way of pleading additional facts with specificity as in the habeas and
demurrer contexts. (Id. at p. 609.) Thus, the Patton court held there that: “out of an
abundance of caution—[we] will order a remand to the superior court with directions for
that court to consider an amended petition should Patton, within 30 days of that remand,
seek to file one.” (Ibid.)
Here, we see no need to hold oral argument simply for defendant to make a
request for remand, if he so desires. Instead, the Supreme Court’s example informs our
disposition ordering remand, but leaving it for defendant to decide, as in Patton, whether
to seek to file an amended petition.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to the superior court with directions to consider an
amended petition if defendant, within 30 days of our remittitur, seeks to file one. We
otherwise affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s resentencing petition.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
McKINSTER J.
10
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a trial court may rely on an unchallenged preliminary hearing transcript to refute conclusory allegations in a resentencing petition and deny the petition for failure to make a prima facie showing.
Issues
Whether a trial court may rely on a preliminary hearing transcript to deny a Penal Code section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage.
Whether the defendant made a sufficient prima facie showing to warrant an evidentiary hearing.
Disposition. Affirmed with directions to remand for the filing of an amended petition.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“a trial court may “rely on,” as the lower court did here, “unchallenged, relief-foreclosing facts within a preliminary hearing transcript to refute conclusory, checkbox allegations” in a resentencing petition.”
“the record of conviction the parties [and the trial court] may consult at the prima facie stage includes a preliminary hearing transcript preceding a guilty plea.”