California Court of Appeal Mar 28, 2025 No. E083666Unpublished
Filed 3/28/25 In re M.M. CA4/2
See dissenting opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re M.M. et al, Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E083666
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.Nos. J295412 & J295413) v. OPINION C.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes,
Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part with directions.
Mansi Thakkar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
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Tom Bunton, County Counsel, David Guardado, Deputy County Counsel for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
In December 2022 plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino County Children and
Family Services (the Department) detained the two children of defendant and
respondent C.M. (Mother). In April 2024, at the 12-month review hearing, the juvenile
court found that the Department had provided Mother with reasonable services. Mother
contends substantial evidence does not support the finding that she was provided with
fine. I’ll proceed with argument.” Mother’s attorney argued that the Department failed
to provide Mother with reasonable services in that Mother “completed the case plan in
November 2023, [but] domestic violence was still an issue.”
The juvenile court said, “I think in part why I’m ruling against your request,
[Mother’s attorney], the Department slowly recogniz[ed] Mother needs assistance to get
out of the control of Father and his family. So they have been doing that. They did that.
Mom has a new lease somewhere. It’s going to take place in a couple weeks, so I would
do counseling, DV/victim, and specific[ally] to address these control issues.”
The juvenile court continued, “So the Court’s going to find for [Mother] and
[Father], [Mother] had her opportunities. She blew it, and [Father] also had
opportunities. The services may not have been perfect. . . . Looking at where we were
with the case, you know, not perfect, but reasonable services for the parents by clear and
convincing evidence. I’ll find that.”
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DISCUSSION
Mother contends substantial evidence does not support the finding that the
Department provided her with reasonable services.
“[W]hen family reunification services have been ordered, the court is required
expressly to make a finding at each subsequent hearing as to whether reasonable
services have been provided during each review period.” (Melinda K. v. Superior Court
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1153.) The Department “ ‘must make a good faith effort
to develop and implement a family reunification plan. [Citation.] “[T]he record should
show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody,
offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with
the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist
the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult.” ’ ” (In re T.G. (2010) 188
Cal.App.4th 687, 697.) We apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (Ibid.)
At the jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found Mother and Father engaged
in domestic violence. Thus, domestic violence is the problem that led to the loss of
custody. We examine whether the Department offered services designed to remedy that
problem. Mother did not want to be in a relationship with Father but could not escape
Father and the pressure to be in a relationship with him due to her inability to afford a
separate residence. Therefore, the primary obstacle facing Mother in this case was a
lack of affordable housing.
During the 12-month review period, the children were placed in Mother’s care,
which meant the children had to reside with Mother in the house that Mother repeatedly
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said she needed to leave. No provisions were made for where Father would live during
the children’s extended visit. This was a recipe for disaster. Any reasonable person
looking at the history of this case could predict that threats or domestic violence would
ensue due to the instability caused by Father wanting to live at the house but being
prohibited from doing so. Placing Mother, who is a domestic violence victim, in the
position of having to keep Father—her abuser—out of the house that is owned by his
parents was untenable and could only have furthered the domestic violence—not
resolved it. Thus, the services offered were not designed to resolve the problem of
domestic violence.
At the 12-month review hearing, the Department social worker testified that
Mother “has gotten an apartment. She has not signed the lease, but she has been
updated on that. She has worked with the housing navigator closely.” There is no
evidence as to (1) whether the housing navigator is associated with the Department; (2)
if the Department provided Mother with contact information for the housing navigator,
or if Mother found that service on her own; (3) when Mother began working with the
housing navigator; and (4) when Mother was due to sign the lease for the apartment.
Nevertheless, the juvenile court found that the Department “slowly recogniz[ed]
Mother needs assistance to get out of the control of Father and his family. So they have
been doing that. They did that. Mom has a new lease somewhere. It’s going to take
place in a couple weeks.” We see no evidence supporting the juvenile court’s
comments that the lease would be signed “in a couple weeks,” perhaps that
representation was made to the juvenile court off-the-record. If we give the Department
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the benefit of the doubt by assuming everything in the juvenile court’s comment to be
true—the Department realized Mother needed housing assistance and provided housing
assistance late in the case—there is no evidence as to why the housing assistance
occurred so late in the case.
The Department’s delay in providing Mother with housing assistance was
inexplicable when housing was the primary obstacle to Mother being able to safely
reside with her children. No one provided evidence as to why housing assistance was
not a priority or could not happen earlier in the case. One cannot conclude based on this
record that the services were reasonable because there is no evidence for why the
Department delayed so long when housing was the one service Mother urgently needed
in order to regain custody of her children. (See In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th
962, 973 (Alvin R.) [delay in providing services can cause services to be unreasonable].)
Accordingly, we conclude substantial evidence does not support the reasonable services
finding.
The Department contends the services it offered were reasonable because Mother
did not inform the Department that Father’s domestic violence was an ongoing issue.
We reject the Department’s claim of ignorance. In the Department’s February 2024
report, in which it recommended the children be placed with Mother on a 29-day
extended visit, the Department social worker wrote: “The undersigned had a
conversation with both parents. This interaction became confrontational between both
parents. The mother told the father that he still needs to work on his anger issues and
that he would need to leave the home. The father denied having anger issues . . . . The
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mother refused to continue the conversation and went to her room.” The social worker
personally witnessed Mother and Father becoming confrontational on the issue of
housing. Instead of helping Mother to find alternate housing, the Department placed
Mother in a situation in which Mother was responsible for keeping Father out of the
house, which, over a 29-day period, was sure to involve threats or violence at some
point. The Department had the information it needed to realize that Mother needed
housing assistance.
The Department asserts that, when the social worker made an unannounced visit
to the house, she saw no evidence of Father residing in the house, for example, she did
not see Father’s clothing in a bedroom. The evidence that Father was continuing to visit
the house was that Father answered the door when the social worker knocked.
Accordingly, we reject the Department’s assertion that it was ignorant of Father’s
presence in the house.
The Department asserts that it “provided Mother with opportunities for
reunification, but she simply failed in her efforts.” The Department provided Mother
with classes and counseling but what Mother needed was housing assistance. Mother
repeatedly told the Department that she could not afford alternate housing, that
Grandmother was using housing to pressure Mother into a relationship with Father, and
that Father had anger issues. For example, in October 2023 the Department social
worker wrote in a report to the juvenile court: “The mother stated that [Grandmother] is
wanting [F]ather to return to live with [Mother]. The mother feels that the paternal
grandparents are forcing her to reunite with the father. . . . The father calls the mother
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approximately four (4) times a week. She stated that about three out of the four times,
the father tends to lose his temper. He yells at her, easily gets irritated by anything, and
she is unable to hold a conversation with him.” The Department’s delay in assisting
Mother with housing was unreasonable when housing was the primary obstacle to
Mother being able to safely care for the children.
The Department contends Mother’s contention is moot because Mother was
provided further reunification services at the 12-month review hearing and, after
Mother’s appeal was filed, the juvenile court returned the children to Mother’s custody
on a plan of family maintenance.2 When a parent has been denied reasonable services,
the juvenile court may order an extra six months of services, if doing so is in the
children’s best interests. (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 632-
635; see also Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at pp. 973-974 [when reasonable services
have not been provided, “the remedy is to extend the reunification period, and order
continued services”]; Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1167
[“[T]he SSA provided inadequate services at least from June 1994, a time roughly
coinciding with the six-month review hearing. Therefore, when the remittitur issues,
the case will resume its six-month status” (fn. omitted.)]; Carolyn R. v. Superior Court
(1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 159, 167 [“A court may extend the 18-month maximum for
reunification efforts only under very limited circumstances, that is, when: . . . the court
2 On October 28, 2024, we granted the Department’s October 24, 2024, request for judicial notice.
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finds reasonable services were not offered”].) Because this case is ongoing, and Mother
could be granted an additional six months of services, the issue is not moot.
In the future, if problems should arise while Mother’s parenting continues to be
supervised by the Department, then the record must accurately reflect the lack of
reasonable services so that Mother can pursue an additional six months of services if
needed. (See Michael G. v. Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 634-635.) We
reverse the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order of March 11, 2024, is reversed only as to the finding
that the Department provided reasonable services to Mother. The juvenile court is
directed to vacate its finding that reasonable services were provided to Mother and enter
a new finding that the services provided to Mother were unreasonable. In all other
respects the March 11, 2024, order is affirmed. (See Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at
p. 975 [similar disposition].)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER J.
I concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
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[In re M.M., E083666]
MENETREZ, J., Dissenting.
At the six-month review hearing under subdivision (e) of Welfare and Institutions
Code section 366.21, the juvenile court continued reunification services for appellant
C.M. (Mother) and found that reasonable services had been provided to her. (Unlabeled
statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Mother did not appeal.
At the 12-month review hearing under subdivision (f) of section 366.21, the
juvenile court continued reunification services for Mother and found that reasonable
services had been provided to her. Mother appeals, arguing that the reasonable services
finding is not supported by substantial evidence.
Any such error was harmless. If at the 12-month review hearing the juvenile court
had found that reasonable services had not been provided, Mother would be no better off.
Rather, her reunification services would have been continued and an 18-month review
hearing would have been set. That is what actually happened in this case, so Mother was
not harmed by the putatively erroneous finding.
Mother’s argument to the contrary is based on In re Alvin R. (2003) 108
Cal.App.4th 962, but that case is distinguishable because it involved an appeal from the
findings and orders at the six-month review hearing. (Id. at pp. 967-970.) Parental rights
cannot be terminated if the juvenile court has never found that reasonable services were
provided. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(2)(A).) An erroneous reasonable services finding at the
six-month review hearing (which is the first family reunification review hearing) is
therefore prejudicial even if the parent’s reunification services are continued at that
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hearing—the finding would satisfy the requirements of subdivision (c)(2)(A) of section
366.26, thereby opening the door to termination of parental rights, even if the court at
every subsequent hearing finds that reasonable services have not been provided. Thus,
the erroneous reasonable services finding in In re Alvin R. was straightforwardly
prejudicial.
The present case is distinguishable because this is an appeal from the findings and
orders at the 12-month review hearing, and Mother did not appeal from the findings and
orders at the six-month review hearing. The juvenile court’s reasonable services finding
at the six-month review is therefore final and satisfies the requirements of subdivision
(c)(2)(A) of section 366.26, regardless of whether reasonable services are found at any
subsequent hearing.
In sum, neither Mother nor the majority opinion identifies any way in which the
putatively erroneous reasonable services finding was prejudicial. We should therefore
affirm, and accordingly I respectfully dissent.
MENETREZ J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the Department failed to provide reasonable reunification services to the mother because it delayed providing necessary housing assistance, which was the primary obstacle to her regaining custody.
Issues
Whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that the Department provided reasonable reunification services to the mother.
Disposition. Affirmed in part; reversed in part with directions.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The Department’s delay in providing Mother with housing assistance was inexplicable when housing was the primary obstacle to Mother being able to safely reside with her children.”
“We reverse the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided.”