California Court of Appeal Aug 2, 2013 No. D063284Unpublished
Filed 8/2/13 In re Ava H. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re AVA H., a Minor. D063284 FRANCISCO M. et al.,
Petitioners and Respondents, (Super. Ct. No. A58238)
v.
PHILLIP M.,
Objector and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Cynthia
Bashant, Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher R. Booth, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and
Appellant.
Stocks & Colburn and Janis K. Stocks for Petitioners and Respondents.
Lelah S. Fisher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.
Phillip M. appeals the judgment declaring his daughter, Ava H., free from his
custody and control (Fam. Code, § 7822, subd. (a)(2))1 upon the petition of Ava's
maternal grandmother and stepgrandfather, Lisa M. and Francisco M. (individually,
grandmother and grandfather; together, the grandparents). Phillip contends there is not
substantial evidence to support the finding that he left Ava with the grandparents with the
In March 2007, Ava was born to Emily H. Phillip was present at the birth, as were
the grandparents, and Phillip's name is on Ava's birth certificate. After being released
from the hospital, Emily and Ava went to live with the grandparents. Phillip stayed with
friends and had sporadic contact with Ava. In April or May, Phillip was arrested and
incarcerated for a drug offense. In July or August, he was released and began living in an
apartment with Emily and Ava. Emily and Ava spent every day at the grandparents'
home.
In December 2008, the grandparents suspected Phillip was using drugs or alcohol,
and Emily and Ava began spending more time at the grandparents' home. By April 2009,
it was clear that Phillip was using drugs or alcohol. In May, Emily and Phillip ended
their relationship, and Emily and Ava moved in with the grandparents. Phillip had
sporadic contact with Ava.
1 Further statutory references are to the Family Code. 2
In December 2009, Phillip appeared at the grandparents' home under the influence
of drugs or alcohol. They asked him to leave. In March 2010, Phillip had one visit with
Ava2 and his whereabouts became unknown. On July 16, the family court granted legal
and physical custody of Ava to Emily and ordered supervised visitation for Phillip upon
proof of 60 days' sobriety. Phillip received actual notice of the family court case but
decided not to appear after reading declarations that said "horrible things" about him.
In August 2010, Phillip entered a drug rehabilitation program in Vista. He was
released from the program in May 2011. The grandmother did not know Phillip was in
the program and had no communication with him during that time. Phillip testified that
while he was in the program, Emily brought Ava to see him twice, once in December
2010 and once in March 2011.3 While he was in the program, Phillip did not seek a
change in the visitation order because he believed he "needed to graduate first and gain
some stability first." Later, he "[j]ust wasn't prepared yet to be there for [Ava]." In
December 2010, Phillip's mother wrote to the grandparents that Phillip "calls me every
few weeks, is doing well."
In June 2011, Emily moved out of the grandparents' home and the grandparents
had no further contact with her. In July, Phillip went to the grandparents' home and
began monthly visits with Ava. According to the grandparents, this was Phillip's first
contact with Ava in at least 15 months. Phillip said he would like to see Ava from time
2 Phillip also attended a couple of Ava's T-ball or soccer games when she was three to five years old.
3 The grandmother testified this was "highly unlikely." 3
to time. Between July and October, there were five visits.4 There were no visits in
November or December. In November, Phillip went to Alaska to work for several
months. He returned to San Diego for a month, then visited relatives and friends in other
states. While he was gone, the grandmother had no communication with him, although
Phillip might have called the grandfather once.
In March 2012, the grandparents filed a petition to declare Ava free from Emily's
custody and control. In April, when Phillip returned to San Diego, the grandparents met
with him. In April or May, Phillip had a visit with Ava. His behavior led the
grandparents to suspect he was using drugs, but Phillip claimed he had not used drugs
since completing the rehabilitation program. In April or May, Phillip failed to show up
for a visit. In June, he told the grandparents he was going to Maine for a month. He was
gone four months.
On June 26, 2012, the grandparents filed their petition to declare Ava free from
Phillip's custody and control, alleging the following: Phillip left Ava in the grandparents'
care "since her birth, and off and on, for more than six (6) months during her lifetime. . . .
Since [Ava's] birth, [Phillip] has only had token communication with the [grandparents],
for a period of over six (6) months, all with the intent on [Phillip's] part . . . to abandon
[Ava] for more than six months."
In August 2012, Phillip returned from out of state and contacted the grandparents.
At the grandparents' invitation, Phillip had dinner with them and Ava at the grandparents'
4 Phillip testified that he visited Ava on Halloween 2011. 4
home. In August or September, Phillip hired an attorney in an effort to obtain
unsupervised visitation. After that, Phillip was served with the grandparents' petition. In
September, Phillip visited Ava once. In October, the court found that Emily had failed to
communicate with and support Ava for at least one year.
At the conclusion of trial in December 2012, the court stated that viewing the
"time line . . . even in kind of the best case scenario for [Phillip] from the time Ava has
been two he really has been completely out of the picture." The court cited three periods
during which Phillip had no contact with Ava, or only token communication: eight
months preceding Phillip's appearance at the grandparents' home in December 2009; 12
months preceding December 2010; and seven months between Halloween 2011 and May
2012. The court found that Phillip had left Ava in the custody and control of others; he
had had no contact with her for at least one year; and his failure to communicate with
Ava demonstrated he had abandoned her. The court declared Ava free from Phillip's and
Emily's custody and control.
DISCUSSION
A child may be declared free from parental custody and control if "[t]he child has
been left by both parents or the sole parent in the care and custody of another person for a
period of six months without any provision for the child's support, or without
communication from the parent or parents, with the intent on the part of the parent or
5
parents to abandon the child."5 (§§ 7822, subd. (a)(2) & 7820.) The petitioner must
establish these elements by clear and convincing evidence. (§ 7821.) The purpose of
section 7822 "is to promote the child's best interest 'by providing the stability and security
of an adoptive home.' (§ 7800.) The statute is to 'be liberally construed to serve and
protect the interests and welfare of the child.' (§ 7801.)" (Adoption of Allison C. (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1009-1010.) On appeal, "[w]e simply determine whether there is
substantial evidence, believed by the trial court, that supports the court's findings.
[Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Jill & Victor D. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 491, 503 (Jill &
Victor D.).)
Phillip first contends section 7822, subdivision (a)(2) is inapplicable here. He
argues the grandparents should have proceeded under section 7822, subdivision (a)(3),
which applies when "[o]ne parent [Phillip] has left the child in the care and custody of the
other parent [Emily] for a period of one year . . . ." Here, "both parents," Phillip and
Emily, left Ava "in the care and custody of [the grandparents]" within the meaning of
section 7822, subdivision (a)(2). The grandparents, not Emily, are the petitioners, and
they correctly proceeded under section 7822, subdivision (a)(2).
Phillip next contends he did not leave Ava, as required by section 7822,
subdivision (a)(2), because the family court order deprived him of custody. Phillip is
incorrect.
5 Here, the petition alleged that Phillip failed to support Ava, but the court found that Phillip did provide support. The statute does not require both a failure to support and a failure to communicate; we discuss only whether there is substantial evidence that Phillip failed to communicate with Ava. 6
"[A] parent 'leaves' a child by ' "voluntarily surrender[ing]" ' the child to another
person's care and custody." (In re Amy A. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 63, 69 (Amy A.).) "[A]
parent will not be found to have voluntarily left a child in the care and custody of another
where the child is effectively 'taken' from the parent by court order [citation]; however,
the parent's later voluntary inaction may constitute a leaving with intent to abandon the
child." (Jill & Victor D., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 504.) "[T]he leaving-with-intent-
to-abandon-the-child requirement of section 7822 can be established by evidence of a
parent's voluntary inaction after an order granting primary care and custody to the other
parent. [Citations.] [¶] Simply stated, 'nonaction of the parent after a judicial decree
removing the child may convert a [judicial] "taking" into a "leaving" [of a child by the
parent].' [Citations.]" (Ibid.)
Here, Phillip's "repeated inaction in the face of the custody order provides
substantial evidence he voluntarily surrendered his parental role and thus 'left' [Ava]
within the meaning of section 7822." (Amy A., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 70.) In Amy
A. the mother and daughter moved out of the father's home at his suggestion. The father
refused to have any contact with his daughter for more than two years. During that time,
the mother obtained a divorce; the court granted her sole legal and physical custody and
granted the father visitation. (Id. at p. 66.) The mother remarried, and the court granted
her husband's section 7822 petition. (Amy A., at pp. 65, 67.) This court rejected the
father's contention that the custody order precluded a finding he had left his daughter,
noting he had not appeared in the divorce proceedings or made any attempt to seek
7
modification of the custody order or exercise his visitation rights. (Id. at p. 70.) Amy A.
is on point here.
Phillip relies on In re Jacklyn F. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 747 (Jacklyn F.), which
is distinguishable from the instant case. There, the grandparents filed a guardianship
petition three days after the mother left the child in their care. The mother filed
opposition, sought the child's return and appeared at a hearing slightly more than a month
after the petition was filed. The reviewing court concluded, "[o]nce the guardianship was
granted, . . . the minor's custody status became a matter of judicial decree, not
abandonment." Thus, the mother's "conduct following the granting of the guardianship—
which included sending 'stacks' of letters to the minor but failing to visit her—did not
constitute 'parental nonaction' amounting to a leaving." The court did "not discount the
possibility that, under different circumstances, it might be proper to conclude that a
parent has 'left' a child within the meaning of section 7822 despite court intervention. . . ."
(Id. at p. 756.) Such circumstances are present in Phillip's case. Unlike the mother in
Jacklyn F., he made little if any effort to communicate with Ava for at least a year after
the family court made its custody order. (Id. at p. 747.)
Finally, Phillip contends the grandparents failed to prove he intentionally
abandoned Ava. He relies largely on his own testimony concerning his contact with Ava
and his unsuccessful attempts at further contact. The grandmother refuted Phillip's
testimony and the court impliedly found it not credible. " 'The questions of abandonment
and of intent . . . are questions of fact for the resolution of the trial court.' [Citation.]"
(Jill & Victor D., supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 506.) "[W]e do not pass on the credibility
8
of witnesses, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or determine the weight of the evidence.
[Citation.]" (Id. at p. 503.)
" 'The controlling issue for a finding of abandonment is the subjective intention of
the parent[,]' " but " '[i]ntent to abandon . . . may be found on the basis of an objective
measurement of conduct, as opposed to stated desire.' " (In re Brittany H. (1988) 198
Cal.App.3d 533, 550.) "In determining a parent's intent to abandon, the trial court may
consider not only the number and frequency of his or her efforts to communicate with the
child, but the genuineness of the effort under all the circumstances [citation], as well as
the quality of the communication that occurs [citation]." (In re B.J.B. (1986) 185
Cal.App.3d 1201, 1212.) "The . . . failure to communicate is presumptive evidence of the
intent to abandon. If the parent or parents have made only token efforts
to . . . communicate with the child, the court may declare the child abandoned by the
parent or parents." (§ 7822, subd. (b).) "The parent need not intend to abandon the child
permanently; rather, it is sufficient that the parent had the intent to abandon the child
during the statutory period." (Amy A., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 68, citing In re
Daniel M. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 878, 885.) Under these criteria, substantial evidence
supports the court's findings that Phillip left Ava in the grandparents' care and custody for
six months, without communication, with the intent to abandon her.
9
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
HALLER, J.
10
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that the appellant abandoned his child under Family Code section 7822, as his voluntary inaction and failure to communicate with the child for the statutory period demonstrated an intent to abandon.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in finding that the appellant 'left' the child in the care of others within the meaning of Family Code section 7822, subdivision (a)(2).
Whether there was substantial evidence to support the finding that the appellant intended to abandon the child.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“[A] parent 'leaves' a child by ' "voluntarily surrender[ing]" ' the child to another person's care and custody.”
“The . . . failure to communicate is presumptive evidence of the intent to abandon.”