California Court of Appeal Aug 2, 2013 No. E057001Unpublished
Filed 8/2/13 P. v. Hasan CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E057001
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1104391)
OMAR ABDULLAH HASAN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Becky Dugan, Judge.
Affirmed.
Lewis A. Wenzell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Alana Cohen Butler and James D.
Dutton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant Omar Abdullah Hasan pled guilty to grand theft (Pen.
conduct; it does not alter the penalty for any particular crime and that exception is not
applicable here. (People v. Ellis (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1551 (Ellis); see also
Brown, at p. 325.)
Defendant points out that, in deciding a 2010 amendment to section 4019 should
be applied prospectively only, our Supreme Court in Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th 314
surmised that to apply the amendment in that fashion would result in defendants whose
custody overlapped the statute’s operative date earning conduct credit at two different
rates. (Id. at p. 322.) That conclusion is inapplicable here, as the court was addressing
the amendment to section 4019 that became effective January 25, 2010, not the current
section 4019. (Brown, supra, at p. 318; Stats. 2009, 3d Ex.Sess. 2009-2010, ch. 28,
§ 50.) The former statute did not contain an express provision regarding prospective
application, as it does now; and Brown did not hold, as defendant’s argument suggests,
that any subsequent amendment to section 4019, regardless of express language or
legislative intent, would result in two accrual rates if it became effective during a
defendant’s incarceration. (See Rajanayagam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 52, fn. 4.)
Consistent with that expression, we interpret section 4019 and the enhanced credit
provisions contained therein as applying only to defendants who commit a crime on or
after October 1, 2011. Given that defendant committed his crime before October 1, 2011,
he does not come within the scope of those provisions.
5
The Court of Appeal in Ellis, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th 1546 similarly concluded:
“In our view, the Legislature’s clear intent was to have the enhanced rate apply only to
those defendants who committed their crimes on or after October 1, 2011. [Citation.]
The second sentence does not extend the enhanced rate to any other group, but merely
specifies the rate at which all others are to earn conduct credits. So read, the sentence is
not meaningless, especially in light of the fact the October 1, 2011, amendment to section
4019, although part of the so-called realignment legislation, applies based on the date a
defendant’s crime is committed, whereas section 1170, subdivision (h), which sets out the
basic sentencing scheme under realignment, applies based on the date a defendant is
sentenced.” (Ellis, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1553.)
We agree with the reasoning of the Rajanayagam and Ellis courts and reach the
same conclusion. The plain language of section 4019, subdivision (h), makes clear the
amendment’s new credit calculation rate applies only to individuals who are confined for
a crime committed on or after October 1, 2011. Reasonably read, the second sentence
does not permit a court to ignore this plain language. We thus reject defendant’s
contention he is statutorily entitled to conduct credits at the increased rate provided in the
amended version of section 4019 from October 1 to the date he was sentenced.
II
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
6
RAMIREZ P. J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST J.
MILLER J.
7
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the enhanced presentence conduct credit rate under the amended Penal Code section 4019 applies only to defendants who committed their crimes on or after October 1, 2011.
Issues
Whether a defendant who committed a crime before October 1, 2011, is entitled to the enhanced presentence conduct credit rate for time served after that date.
Disposition. affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The plain language of section 4019, subdivision (h), makes clear the amendment’s new credit calculation rate applies only to individuals who are confined for a crime committed on or after October 1, 2011.”
“Consistent with that expression, we interpret section 4019 and the enhanced credit provisions contained therein as applying only to defendants who commit a crime on or after October 1, 2011.”