Qualified Patients Assn. v. City of Anaheim CA4/3 (2013) · DecisionDepot
Qualified Patients Assn. v. City of Anaheim CA4/3
California Court of Appeal Jul 29, 2013 No. G046875Unpublished
Filed 7/29/13 Qualified Patients Assn. v. City of Anaheim CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
QUALIFIED PATIENTS ASSOCIATION et al., G046875 Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Super. Ct. No. 07CC09524) v. OPINION CITY OF ANAHEIM,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, David R.
Chaffee, Judge. Affirmed.
Anthony Curiale for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Cristina L. Talley, City Attorney, and Moses W. Johnson IV, Assistant City
Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.
* * *
Qualified Patients Association, a former medical marijuana dispensary, and
its owner and operator, Lance Mowdy, (collectively, Qualified Patients) appeal from the
trial court‟s order denying them attorney fees as private attorneys general under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1021.5. (All further undesignated statutory references are to this
code.) Because they were not successful in their underlying declaratory judgment action
to prevent the City of Anaheim (the city) from closing their medical marijuana
dispensary, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Qualified Patients‟
attorney fee request. We therefore affirm the ruling.
The relevant background needs little discussion. Seeking a declaratory
judgment, Qualified Patients challenged the city‟s ordinance barring ownership or
operation of a medical marijuana dispensary. The trial court sustained the city‟s
demurrer, concluding Qualified Patients‟ claim in its first cause of action that state
medical marijuana law preempted the city‟s ordinance was itself preempted by federal
law. We reversed the demurrer, explaining that federal law did not preempt state law
because under basic federalism principles, federal authorities could not compel state criminalization of any activity. (Qualified Patients Assn. v. City of Anaheim (2010)
187 Cal.App.4th 734, 756-765 (Qualified Patients I).) We affirmed the trial court‟s
ruling rejecting plaintiffs‟ second cause of action asserting the ordinance violated their
civil rights under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51), and we remanded for
further proceedings.
On remand, the matter proceeded to trial and Mowdy testified, claiming to
be cultivating and distributing marijuana as part of nonprofit collective, lawful under
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state law. The trial court, however, found Qualified Patients was unlawfully distributing
marijuana for profit to hundreds of patients in a “mass distribution” scheme. The trial
court concluded the city‟s ordinance did not completely ban medical marijuana
distribution lawful under state law because its ban applied only to entities consisting of
more than two people, as stated in the ordinance defining a dispensary as “any facility
where medical marijuana is made available to and/or distributed by or to three or more of
the following: a qualified patient, a person with [a county-issued medical marijuana]
identification card, or a primary caregiver.” As the court phrased it, “Anaheim‟s
ordinance does not completely ban medical marijuana distribution; but it does proscribe
mass distribution of medical marijuana.” The court found the virtual ban constituted a
lawful exercise of the city‟s police power, not preempted by state medical marijuana law.
Qualified Patients has appealed the ruling, which is pending in this court.
But even before Qualified Patients appealed following its loss at trial, it
filed the attorney fee motion now under review. The city opposed the motion on grounds
that Qualified Patients was not a “successful party” within the meaning of section 1021.5,
the trial court agreed and denied the fee motion, and plaintiffs now appeal.
II DISCUSSION
This appeal has nothing to do with medical marijuana, preemption, or other
topics, but rather turns solely on the requirements of section 1021.5. Section 1021.5
authorizes fees for “a successful party against one or more opposing parties,” when the
action “has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public
interest,” provided certain criteria are met. (§ 1021.5, italics added.) Those criteria
include: (1) a significant benefit conferred on the general public or a large class of
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persons; (2) the necessity and financial burden of enforcement, particularly private
enforcement, must make the award appropriate; (3) and the interest of justice precludes
payment of fees out of the successful party‟s recovery, if any. (Ibid.) In any event, the
party seeking fees must be “„“successful,”‟” which is synonymous with “„“prevailing”‟”
or otherwise achieving its litigation objectives. (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 570-571 (Graham).)
The burden is on the claimant to demonstrate it is entitled to fees, including
that its litigation costs transcend its personal interest in the litigation and should be
shifted in the public‟s interest to the other parties. (Save Open Space Santa Monica
Mountains v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 235, 246.) On appeal, we review a
trial court‟s award or denial of attorney fees for abuse of discretion, and we must presume
the trial court acted within its discretion. (Collins v. City of Los Angeles (2012)
205 Cal.App.4th 140, 152-153.)
Qualified Patients argues it is entitled to attorney fees because it was
successful on its initial appeal in overturning the demurrer. Qualified Patients
characterizes our holding in the first appeal that federal law did not trump state medical
marijuana law as a “landmark” decision worthy of attorney fees for its efforts in pursuing the appeal. But as we noted in the opinion, we were not even the first California court to
do so. (See County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 798,
822-823.)
More importantly, however, the Supreme Court, has expressly cautioned
that “[a]ttorney fees should not be awarded for a lawsuit that lacks merit, even if its
pleadings would survive a demurrer.” (Graham, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 576.) We only
determined in Qualified Patients I that the pleadings were sufficient to survive demurrer,
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and only because the city obtained demurrer by invoking federal law, which did not
suffice. Such interim success does not serve as a basis for attorney fees under
section 1021.5. (Ebbets Pass Forest Watch v. California Department of Forestry & Fire
Protection (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 376, 387-388 [“regardless of the expansion of the
law, [plaintiffs] did not have a factually meritorious lawsuit and, when the dust settled,
their only victory was in a statement of the law”]; accord, Karuk Tribe of Northern
California v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd., North Coast Region (2010)
183 Cal.App.4th 330, 334-335 [interim success on writ of mandate insufficient].) In
Miller v. California Com. on Status of Women (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 454, 455, the
appellate court described as “an amazing display of chutzpah” the losing party‟s request
for attorney fees because it enjoyed interim success in having summary judgment
overturned, only to lose the case at trial. Whether the characterization is apt here or not,
it remains true that the party requesting fees must ultimately gain its litigation objectives,
which Qualified Patients manifestly failed to do when it sought attorney fees.
Qualified Patients mistakenly relies on Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d
1281 (Maria P.) and similar cases for the proposition that “„an attorney fee award may be
justified even when plaintiff’s legal action does not result in a favorable final judgment.‟” (Boldface added to quoted italics.) In Maria P., the plaintiffs obtained a
preliminary injunction and only dismissed their case because intervening legislation in
their favor rendered their claims moot. Specifically, they filed suit to prevent a school
district from reporting student immigration status to federal authorities, and the trial court
granted their request for a preliminary injunction, which became moot with repeal of the
statute requiring the district to report the information. Because they had obtained all the
relief they sought, the trial court properly granted their fee request. (Maria P., at
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p. 1291.) That is not the case here. Qualified Patients failed in its primary litigation
objective of preventing the city from closing its dispensary, and therefore the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the fee motion.
III
DISPOSITION
The trial court‟s order denying attorney fees is affirmed. The city is
entitled to its costs on appeal.
ARONSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
FYBEL, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 because the plaintiffs were not successful parties, having failed to achieve their primary litigation objective of preventing the city from closing their dispensary. Interim success in surviving a demurrer does not entitle a party to attorney fees when they ultimately lose the case at trial.
Issues
Whether a party that achieves interim success on appeal but loses the underlying action at trial qualifies as a 'successful party' entitled to attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Because they were not successful in their underlying declaratory judgment action to prevent the City of Anaheim (the city) from closing their medical marijuana dispensary, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Qualified Patients‟ attorney fee request.”
“Qualified Patients failed in its primary litigation objective of preventing the city from closing its dispensary, and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the fee motion.”