Glickman v. Krolikowski
Filed 3/7/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
WILLIAM GLICKMAN,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064853
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2019-01049771)
CHARLES S. KROLIKOWSKI et al., OPINION
Defendants and Appellants.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Theodore R. Howard, Judge. Dismissed. Hinshaw & Culbertson, Desmond Hinds, Linda Streeter, and David T. Hayek for Defendants and Appellants. Annigan Ryan, James T. Ryan, Nicholas A. Kurtz; Law Office of Rick Augustini and Rick Augustini for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
THE COURT:* Appellants Charles S. Krolikowski and Newmeyer & Dillion LLP filed a timely notice of appeal from an order overruling various objections to a discovery referee’s report and recommendations. Appellants assert a portion of the order is appealable pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(12),1 i.e., it was an order “directing payment of monetary sanctions” in excess of $5,000. (Ibid.; see, e.g., Lindsey v. Conteh (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1296, 1302 [sanctions order imposed by referee was appealable].) Respondent William Glickman moved to dismiss the appeal. Respondent argues the challenged order apportioned discovery referee fees and did not impose monetary sanctions. This court generally lacks jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders pertaining to discovery; appellate review must await entry of a final judgment. (Deck v. Developers Investment Co., Inc. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 808, 825.) Appellants oppose the motion. They posit the referee chose an unequal allocation of fees based on his view that appellants were the cause of those fees being incurred due to their incomplete and insufficient discovery responses. In appellants’ view, such an order is tantamount to monetary sanctions and should be treated as such for purposes of appealability. Before analyzing the motion to dismiss, a bit of background is necessary. The parties stipulated to the appointment of a discovery referee. (§ 638.) The parties’ stipulation did not include specific fee payment terms (§ 645.1, subd. (a)), but instead referred generally to section 645.1. Section 645.1, subdivision (b) provides for payment of referee fees “in any manner
More from California Court of Appeal
- People v. Hill (1998)
- In Re Autumn H. (1994)
- Nwosu v. Uba (2004)
- In Re Casey D. (1999)
- Santisas v. Goodin (1998)
- Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011)
- People v. Rivera (2015)
- People v. Barnett (1998)
- People v. Serrano (2012)
- Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007)