California Court of Appeal Jul 15, 2013 No. D062978Unpublished
Filed 7/15/13 In re Billy D. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re BILLY D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D062978 THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J231471)
v.
BILLY D.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Browder A. Willis, III, Judge. Affirmed.
Lillian Y. Lim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General,
Melissa Mandel and Charles C. Ragland, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Following a contested jurisdictional hearing on a petition under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 602 concerning Billy D., the juvenile court made a true finding
he had made a criminal threat to a classmate, a felony. (Pen. Code,1 § 422.) Billy was
placed on probation.
Billy appeals, contending no sufficient evidence supports the true finding that the
classmate ever heard or was told that Billy made a threatening statement toward him that
Billy, however, argues it would be speculation "to conclude that unidentified
students attributed specific threatening statements to Billy in sharing their conclusion
Billy was going to try and stab Christopher." He also points out that Gregory testified
that Billy said he would use a knife only if Christopher tried to fight him, and so that
language arguably did not convey a direct threat. Also, Gregory said he never told
Christopher about that conversation with Billy.
Other equally relevant circumstances were proven by testimony from Christopher
and also by the admissions made by Billy to the investigating officer, that he told two
friends in particular, Kyle and "Chris," that he was going to stab Christopher and he
wanted them to spread the threat around. This conclusion is consistent with the court's
views in Felix, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th 905, that an out-of-court conversation (between a
defendant's therapist and defendant's former girlfriend), could have been offered and
admitted not for the truth of the matter asserted (i.e., that a threat was made to the
girlfriend), but to show whether in fact a communication of the threat occurred: "The
trial judge could have determined the relevance of this disputed preliminary fact by way
of an Evidence Code section 402 hearing where [defendant's therapist] could have
testified out of the presence of the jury, about what he said to [the former girlfriend]."
(Felix, supra, at p. 912.) The out-of-court statements were properly used to show this
communication occurred.
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There was additional relevant and probative evidence from the investigating
officer, who observed when talking with Christopher that he appeared physically to be in
a state of fearfulness, as a result of what the fellow students told him about the knife use
threat. (Felix, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th 905, 912.) All of this amounted to sufficient
evidence outlining the factual setting in which a defendant's remarks were made, to show
the context in which his words were uttered and conveyed. "The prosecution must prove
sufficient facts to show that the defendant's words fell squarely within section 422."
(Felix, supra, at p. 915.) With respect to the successful communication of an
unconditional threat, the trial court had a reasonable basis in the evidence to make a true
finding on the charge.
Moreover, we reject Billy's claim there is insufficient evidence, apart from his own
statements, to show the corpus delicti of the criminal threat. The standard of review
applicable to such a challenge is the " 'slight or prima facie' " standard. (People v.
Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 368.) The main issues are whether there is some
independent indication in the evidence as a whole that the charged crime actually
happened, and therefore, "that the accused is not admitting to a crime that never
occurred." (Ibid.; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 405.)
Here, the prosecution did not rely solely on Billy's extrajudicial statements, and
supplied other evidence raising an inference of his criminal conduct. In addition to the
admissions that Billy made to the investigating officer, Christopher testified about how
his friend Chris and "some other students that I didn't know came up to me, saying that
Billy was going to try to--that Billy was going to try to stab me after school, on my way
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home." Christopher reacted with visible fear symptoms and by calling his brother to pick
him up from school or changing his route. There was sufficient evidence that
Christopher was led to understand the "gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of
execution" of Billy's threat. (Stanfield, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157.)
Moreover, the court was entitled to make credibility determinations in the case and
to give the evidence the weight it deemed appropriate. (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13
Cal.4th 1073, 1088-1089.) There were no hearsay rule violations, and the nontestimonial
evidence was properly admitted. The evidence in this record is sufficient to support the
true finding.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
HALLER, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that the defendant made a criminal threat, as the threat was communicated to the victim through third parties and the victim reasonably experienced sustained fear. The court further held that the out-of-court statements were admissible as non-hearsay operative facts and did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights.
Issues
Whether sufficient evidence supports the finding that the defendant made an unconditional criminal threat communicated to the victim.
Whether the admission of out-of-court statements by unidentified students violated hearsay rules.
Whether the admission of out-of-court statements violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We find there is sufficient evidence to establish that Billy made a criminal threat that was communicated, it was unconditional in nature, and there was no prejudicial evidentiary error.”
“The kind of threat contemplated by section 422 may as readily be conveyed by the threatener through a third party as personally to the intended victim.”