California Court of Appeal Feb 14, 2025 No. E083078Unpublished
Filed 2/14/25 P. v. Yost CA4/2
See dissenting opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E083078
v. (Super.Ct.No. CR67330)
AARON CLAUDE YOST, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.
Affirmed.
Cindi B. Mishkin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Alana Butler and Daniel Rogers, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant Aaron Claude Yost was found guilty in 1997 of
manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of ephedrine along with quantity and
prior conviction enhancements, including having served two prior prison terms pursuant
to Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). At sentencing, the trial court ordered the
punishment on the Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), priors to run concurrent to
his 35-years-to-life sentence. In a previous appeal, People v. Aaron Yost (April 6, 1999,
E020779) [nonpub. opn.] (Opinion), the judgment was affirmed. In 2017, the abstract of
judgment was amended to reflect that punishment on the prison priors was stayed.
In 2023, defendant was identified by the secretary of the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) as a defendant serving time in prison who may
be eligible for recall and resentencing relief under Penal Code section 1172.75. The trial
court denied him relief finding that the prison prior was not “imposed” within the
meaning of Penal Code section 1172.75, so he was not entitled to relief. Defendant
appeals the order of the trial court and insists that he is entitled to recall and resentencing.
We affirm the trial court’s ruling.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
On May 2, 1997, defendant was found guilty after a jury trial of one count of
possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.6; count 1) and one count
1 We derive the factual and procedural history from the clerk’s transcript in this case and from the Opinion. We additionally granted defendant’s request for judicial notice of the list of individuals identified by the CDCR who may be eligible for section 1172.75 relief. We also augmented the record with the Opinion and two minute orders. We need not provide the facts of the underlying crime as they are not relevant to the issues on appeal.
2
of unlawful possession of ephedrine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11383, subd. (c); count 2).
The jury also found true two enhancements for count 1 that defendant manufactured 10
gallons of liquid and three pounds of solid substances containing methamphetamine
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.8, subd. (a)(2)), and that he manufactured a substance in an
amount exceeding 25 gallons of liquid and 10 pounds of solid substances containing
methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)). In a bifurcated court trial,
the trial court found true that defendant had suffered two prior convictions within the
meaning of Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (c), and (e)(1), and 1170.12,
subdivision (c). The trial court also found true that he served two prior prison terms
within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). At defendant’s sentencing hearing
on June 27, 1997, the trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life plus 10 years.
The trial court also imposed one-year enhanced terms for defendant’s prison priors, but
ordered them to run concurrent to the 35-years-to-life sentence.
Defendant appealed and a panel of this court ordered the trial court to amend the
abstract of judgment to strike the Health and Safety Code section 11379.8, subdivision
(a)(2), enhancement, which had been stayed by the trial court. A new abstract of
judgment was filed on April 27, 1999. On November 30, 2017, a new abstract of
judgment was filed reflecting that the two prior prison terms found true under section
667.5, subdivision (b) were stayed.2
2 There is nothing in the record to reflect the reason the abstract of judgment was amended on November 30, 2017, but both parties agree that it was amended.
3
Defendant was identified by the secretary of the CDCR as being in custody
serving a judgment that included an enhancement described in Penal Code section
1172.75,3 subdivision (a). On December 21, 2023, the trial court denied that defendant
was entitled to relief under section 1172.75. The minute order stated that the trial court
had considered Rhodius (People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, review granted
February 21, 2024, S283169 (Rhodius)), Renteria (People v. Renteria (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 1276), Christianson (People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300,
311, rev. granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189) and Saldana (People v. Saldana (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 1270, rev. granted Mar. 12, 2024, S283547), and found that, relying on
Rhodius, defendant was ineligible for resentencing. Defendant filed a notice of appeal on
January 19, 2024.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in finding him ineligible for recall and
resentencing under section 1172.75.
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a), states that “[a]ny sentence enhancement that was
imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b), of Section 667.5, except
for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is
Cal.App.5th at p. 314.) The court noted that the resentencing procedures set forth in the
statutory scheme promoted this legislative goal insofar as they “require that the trial court
conduct a full resentencing for those defendants impacted by the now invalid
enhancement in light of all associated sentencing reform.” (Ibid.) Given this legislative
objective, the Christianson court inferred that the Legislature presumably “intended to
provide broad relief to all defendants impacted by the now invalid section 667.5,
subdivision (b) enhancements.” (Ibid.)
I respectfully disagree with one portion of Christianson. Acknowledging that
section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), requires a trial court to impose a lesser sentence than
originally imposed, Christianson rejected the notion that removing a stayed term does not
result in a lesser sentence. (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312.) Rather, the
court concluded that even a stayed term has potential consequences to a sentence since
the trial court “retains the ability to lift the stay and impose the term under certain
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circumstance[s], such as if an alternately imposed term is invalidated.” (Ibid.; accord,
Saldana, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1278 [stayed enhancement is part of
sentence and remains available if its execution becomes necessary].) I disagree with this
conclusion since a prison prior that was imposed before 2020, and was not for a sexually
violent offense, is now legally invalid under section 1172.75, subdivision (a); thus, a
court has no ability to lift a stay and impose such a prison prior in the future.
In any event, in the instant case, there is no dispute defendant was serving time on
a judgment which includes a section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement that was not for
a sexually violent offense. Section 1172.75 expressly provides that if a “current
judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall the
sentence and resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) Applying Christianson
here, defendant is entitled to a full resentencing under section 1172.75. (§ 1172.75,
subds. (a), (c); see Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 314-315.) “By its plain
terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike
the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.” (People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402
(Monroe); see People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“[W]hen part of a sentence is
stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is
appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed
circumstances.’ ”].) At resentencing, the court shall “apply any other changes in law that
reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2)) and shall
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consider any “postconviction factors” militating against continued incarceration
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3)).
At the original sentencing in the instant case, the sentencing court sentenced
defendant to one-year punishment on each of the prior prison enhancements but ordered
the two prison priors to run concurrent with his 35-years-to-life sentence. In 2017, the
abstract of judgment was amended to reflect that the punishment on the prison priors was
stayed. Accordingly, the enhancements were part of the sentence and were included in
the abstract of judgment.
The CDCR presumably identified defendant as eligible for relief because the
enhancement was included in the abstract of judgment. (Christianson, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312 [“[A]ll that is required for the CDCR to identify an inmate
under section 1172.75, subdivision (b) is for the enhancement to be included in the
abstract of judgment . . . .”].)1
The People ask us to follow Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 38, which held that
the express language in section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), requiring the resentencing to
“ ‘result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result [of] the
elimination of the repealed enhancement,’ ” combined with the legislative history behind
1 Notably, since the filing of Christianson, the Sixth Appellate District has published an opinion agreeing with Christianson and further concluding that section 1172.75 “applies whenever a prison prior is included in a judgment, whether the prior is executed, stayed, or punishment is struck.” (People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188, 194 (Espino), review granted Oct. 23, 2024, S286987.)
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the enactment of Senate Bill Nos. 136 and 483, require the conclusion that section
1172.75 does not invalidate prior prison term enhancements that were imposed but
stayed. (Rhodius, at pp. 42-49.) Rhodius reasoned as follows: “Section 1172.75
subdivision (d)(1)’s requirement that the resentencing shall result in a lesser sentence than
the one originally imposed necessitates the conclusion that the repealed enhancement
increased the length of the sentence. The only way for the repealed enhancement to have
increased the length of a sentence is for the enhancement to have been imposed and
executed. If the repealed enhancement was imposed and stayed, the sentence would not
have been increased, as was the case here.” (Id. at p. 44.)
Although Rhodius was thoughtfully decided, I respectfully disagree with it.
Rather, I agree with Christianson’s conclusion that section 1172.75 applies to cases in
which the inmate’s abstract of judgment includes a section 667.5, subdivision (b)
enhancement “regardless of whether it is imposed or stayed.” (Christianson, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 305, 312.)
Under Rhodius, the word “imposed” in section 1172.75, subdivision (a), means
“imposed and executed.” Thus, the “imposed and stayed” prior convictions in that case
were not “imposed” within the meaning of section 1172.75, subdivision (a). If that
interpretation is correct, then the prison prior convictions in that case would not be
legally invalid, and the trial court in Rhodius should not have struck them.2 Yet, the trial
2 This assumes the judgment was final as of January 1, 2020, as SB 136 on its own is not retroactive to final judgments.
7
court in Rhodius did strike them, strongly inferring their invalidity, and the Rhodius court
affirmed the trial court’s action. In my view, section 1172.75 either applies or does not
apply. The authority to strike the prior convictions comes only where section 1172.75
applies.
I also note that in Rhodius, the trial court “vacated the sentence for defendant’s
two section 667.5 [subdivision] (b) priors and ordered them stricken.” (Rhodius, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 41.) Thus, the only issue was whether the court was required to give
the defendant “a full resentencing hearing going beyond striking his two priors.” (Ibid.)
Similarly, here, the trial court hearing the resentencing petition struck the prison prior
conviction, but only after ruling that defendant was ineligible for relief under section
1172.75. In my view, if section1172.75 applies such that the court felt compelled to
strike the prison prior conviction, then the prior is legally invalid and defendant is entitled
to a full resentencing. Thus, the matter must be remanded for the court to vacate the
prison prior and fully resentence defendant pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivisions (c)
and (d).
Although the length of sentence does not change when a trial court vacates a now
invalid prior conviction that had previously been stayed, the defendant, nevertheless,
receives a significant benefit. To the extent the abstract of judgment will no longer show
the prison prior conviction, the consequences of defendant’s plea are reduced. As result
of the court’s action, the case will no longer reflect the prior conviction if a court
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assesses the appropriate disposition in any future case or on a violation of parole on the
current case.
Finally, a careful review of the statute reveals that the statute contains language
favorable to an interpretation consistent with that taken by Rhodius, and it also contains
language favorable to an interpretation consistent with that taken in Christianson. I agree
with the court in Espino, supra, 104 Cal. App. 5th at p. 198, that under the rule of lenity,
where the Legislature’s intent cannot be determined, courts must prefer the interpretation
that is most favorable to defendants.
In sum, I conclude that the trial court erred in finding defendant ineligible for
relief. The CDCR properly identified him as a person in custody “currently serving a
term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in [section 1172.75,]
subdivision (a).” (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) He was therefore entitled to a recall of his
sentence and a full resentencing under the terms of section 1172.75, which would include
the application of “any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2)) and consideration of “postconviction factors”
militating against continued incarceration (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3)). I would reverse the
denial order and remand to the trial court for a full resentencing hearing pursuant to
section 1172.75, subdivisions (c) and (d).
FIELDS J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that Penal Code section 1172.75 does not apply to prior prison term enhancements that were imposed and stayed, as the term "imposed" in the statute refers only to enhancements that were "imposed and executed."
Issues
Whether the term "imposed" in Penal Code section 1172.75, subdivision (a), includes sentencing enhancements that were imposed and stayed.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Section 1172.75 thus reserves resentencing for when a section 667.5, subdivision (b), penalty enhancement has been executed.”
“defendant was not entitled to a full resentencing hearing under section 1172.75 because the court imposed but struck punishment on the enhancement.”