California Court of Appeal Jan 30, 2025 No. E082960Unpublished
Filed 1/30/25 P. v. Archuleta CA4/2 See dissenting opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E082960
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1605083)
RAYMOND ANTHONY ARCHULETA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.
Affirmed and remanded with directions.
William D. Farber, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa A. Mandel and Joseph C.
Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Raymond Anthony Archuleta appeals from the trial court’s order
denying his request for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 after the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) notified the trial court
that his judgment includes a now-invalid prior prison term enhancement.1 The trial court
struck defendant’s enhancements but declined to recall his sentence and resentence him
under section 1172.75, subdivision (d).
On appeal, defendant argues that section 1172.75’s resentencing procedure applies
to any defendant who is serving prison or jail time on a judgment that includes a now-
invalid prior prison term enhancement, regardless of whether the enhancement was
originally stayed, or its punishment was stricken. We disagree. If the punishment on a
now-invalid prison prior was stricken when the defendant was originally sentenced, then
the defendant is ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.75, subdivision (d). We
affirm.
BACKGROUND2
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty in April 2017 to a criminal
threat (§ 422), and he admitted personal use of a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)), a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), also referred to as a
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 Because defendant pled guilty and based on the nature of the issue raised on appeal, consideration of the underlying facts of this case is not necessary to determine the issue on appeal.
District]; People v. Renteria (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276, 1281-1283 [Sixth District].)
However, the fact that the section 667.5 enhancement could be used in a potential
resentencing does not add to the sentence imposed in this case. Section 1172.75 does not
address any collateral consequences of a prior prison term enhancement.
6
In People v. Espino (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188, review granted October 23,
2024, S286987, the Sixth District Court of Appeal held that the term “imposed” as used
in section 1172.75 also included prior prison term enhancements for which punishment
had been stricken. Espino held that defendants with stricken punishment for prior prison
term enhancements are entitled to full resentencing, reasoning that the Legislature
intended the phrase “[a]ny sentence enhancement” in section 1172.75 to be applied
broadly, whether the punishment was executed, stayed, or stricken. (Espino, supra, at
pp. 196-197.)
The punishment for both the enhancements in this case was stricken. Therefore,
they were not “imposed and executed” as required by section 1172.75, to qualify for a
resentencing hearing. In fact, because the punishment was previously stricken, there was
nothing more the trial court could do to impose a lesser sentence. (§ 1172.75, subd.
(d)(1).)
However, the abstract of judgment must be corrected because (a) it does not
conform to the oral pronouncement of judgment, and (b) section 1172.75 states that an
enhancement imposed pursuant to section 667.5 is “legally invalid” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (a)).3
3 Our dissenting colleague suggests that the abstract does not need to be amended because although it includes reference to the prison priors, it notes that the enhancements were stricken or stayed (dis. opn., post, at pp. 2-3). However, the mere inclusion of the reference to the enhancements—irrespective of their effect on the length of the sentence—is erroneous where the legislative intent was “to remove any invalid sentence enhancements.” (Sen. Bill No. 483 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.) In other words, merely indicating that punishment for a prison prior was stayed or stricken
7
Respecting the disparity between the clerk’s minutes and the oral pronouncement
of sentence, the court’s pronouncement of sentence struck the punishment for both
enhancements, but stayed the imposition of the enhancements, whereas the minutes
reflect that the court imposed the enhancements but stayed the punishment. “When there
is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order, the
Because there is a distinction between striking and staying, the sentencing minute order
and the abstract of judgment do not conform to the court’s oral pronouncement and are
therefore erroneous. (People v. Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248, 256.)
Respecting the validity of an enhancement for which punishment has been stayed
or stricken, it is important to recognize there is a legal distinction between striking and
in the abstract of judgment is insufficient, because striking or staying the punishment will not remove the enhancement.
When a defendant is convicted and sentenced to state prison, she or he goes to a reception center for classification and assignment to a particular level of incarceration. All aspects of the sentence, as well as information about the defendant taken from the probation report and sentencing memoranda, are used in the calculus of the defendant’s classification: the number of counts of conviction, as well as the number of enhancements found, whether the victim was a peace officer, etc., and information about the actual sentence imposed, referring to the executed judgment that the CDCR will have to facilitate. (See Cal. Dept. of Corrections and Rehab., Operations Manual, § 61030.5.2 Legal Status; https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/regulations/cdcr-regulations/dom-toc/ (updated through January 1, 2024).)
The inmate’s classification score determines what level of institutional security is required for the inmate’s placement, which, in turn, affects the programs (educational or vocational) in which the inmate may participate, ranging from Level I (least serious/lowest level of security) to Level IV (most serious/highest level of security), and this, in turn, affects the amount of credit the inmate may earn.
8
staying. (In re Pacheco (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1444-1445.) A legally invalid
enhancement is a nullity and may not be indicated on the abstract of judgment. As an
invalid enhancement, a court cannot just stay or strike the punishment, but must vacate
the enhancement itself.
The Legislative Counsel’s Digest of Senate Bill No. 483 states the intent that the
court should “resentence the individual to remove any invalid sentence enhancements.”
Merely striking or staying the punishment for an enhancement does not remove it. Thus,
where the enhancement itself must be vacated, as is the case pursuant to section 1172.75,
it should not appear on the abstract of judgment and should not be subject to use in the
future. “If a judge strikes the enhancement, it’s as if the fact of the enhancement never
existed—it will not remain on the defendant’s criminal record nor will it affect them in
any potential future sentencing.” (People v. Flores (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 368, 383.)
Under current law, prison prior enhancements are unlawful; therefore, the abstract of the
judgment imposed may not include them as part of the judgment, irrespective of whether
punishment has been stricken or stayed.
Therefore, the minute order must be amended to reflect that the prison prior
enhancements were vacated pursuant to section 1172.75, but that resentencing was not
required by that statute. (See e.g., People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 770.)
DISPOSITION
The order finding that defendant is ineligible for resentencing is affirmed. The
superior court is directed to amend the minute order of December 27, 2023, to reflect that
9
the prison prior enhancements are vacated pursuant to section 1172.75 and to forward a
certified copy to the CDCR.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ P. J.
I concur:
McKINSTER J.
10
[People v. Archuleta, E082960]
MENETREZ, J., Dissenting.
The reporter’s transcript reflects that at Raymond Anthony Archuleta’s original
sentencing in 2016, the trial court struck the punishment for both prior prison term
enhancements under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). (Unlabeled statutory
references are to this code.) The court also stayed one of the enhancements, apparently to
avoid prohibited dual use, because the same conviction was being used as a strike and
also for a serious felony enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a). (See People v.
Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142, 1144-1145.) But the sentencing minute order and the
abstract of judgment incorrectly state that both prior prison term enhancements were
stayed and do not state that the punishment for those enhancements was struck.
At Archuleta’s hearing on eligibility for relief under section 1172.75 in 2023, the
trial court relied on the abstract of judgment and hence believed that the two prior prison
term enhancements were stayed. The court struck both enhancements nunc pro tunc for
reasons unrelated to section 1172.75, namely, that it was improper to stay rather than
strike them in the first place. The court declined to resentence Archuleta under section
1172.75.
The trial court’s order, though understandable (because the court was misled by
the erroneous abstract of judgment), was erroneous. The court should have corrected the
sentencing minute order and the abstract of judgment nunc pro tunc to conform to the
original sentencing court’s oral pronouncement of judgment, as reflected in the reporter’s
1
transcript: The punishment on both prior prison term enhancements was struck and only
one of them was stayed.
Had the trial court corrected those clerical errors in the sentencing minute order
and the abstract of judgment, the court would have had no basis to strike the prior prison
term enhancements. First, only one of the enhancements was stayed, the punishment for
both was struck, and striking the punishment was authorized by section 1385, subdivision
(b)(1). Second, although I previously was persuaded by People v. Christianson (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 300, review granted February 21, 2024, S283189, I have come to agree with
People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, 44, review granted February 21, 2024,
S283169, that in subdivision (a) of section 1172.75, “imposed” means “imposed and
executed.” Because Archuleta’s prior prison term enhancements were not imposed and
executed, subdivision (a) of section 1172.75 does not apply to them and therefore does
not render them legally invalid. And nothing else renders them legally invalid. The
changes in section 667.5, subdivision (b), that limited prior prison term enhancements to
sexually violent offenses do not of their own accord apply retroactively to final
judgments like Archuleta’s. (In re Rodriguez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 952, 963-964.)
Only section 1172.75 makes those changes retroactive to (some) final judgments. But
again, section 1172.75 does not apply to Archuleta, because “imposed” in subdivision (a)
of section 1172.75 means “imposed and executed,” and Archuleta’s prior prison term
enhancements were never executed. For all of these reasons, the trial court had no legal
basis to strike those enhancements, so the court’s order striking them was erroneous.
2
The majority opinion’s direction to the trial court to vacate the prior prison term
enhancements is somewhat puzzling. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 8-9.) It is not clear what
the point of vacating enhancements that have already been stricken might be. The trial
court at the section 1172.75 proceeding struck the enhancements in their entirety; it did
not merely strike the punishment. The majority opinion gives no reason for directing the
trial court to vacate them in addition (or instead?). Moreover, for the reasons already
given, there is no legal basis to vacate (or strike) Archuleta’s prior prison term
enhancements. Section 1172.75 does not apply to them, so it does not render them
legally invalid.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I believe that the correct disposition of this appeal
is straightforward: We should vacate the trial court’s order entered at the section 1172.75
proceeding and direct the court to enter a new and different order (1) correcting the
clerical errors in the sentencing minute order and the abstract of judgment nunc pro tunc
to reflect that only one prior prison term enhancement was stayed and that the
punishment on both prior prison term enhancements was struck, and (2) denying all relief
under section 1172.75. I therefore respectfully dissent.
MENETREZ J.
3
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. A defendant is ineligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 if the punishment for their prior prison term enhancements was previously stricken or stayed, as such enhancements were not 'imposed and executed.'
Issues
Whether a defendant is eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 when prior prison term enhancements were previously stayed or stricken.
Whether the trial court must correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that prison prior enhancements are vacated as legally invalid under section 1172.75, even if the defendant is ineligible for a full resentencing hearing.
Disposition. Affirmed and remanded with directions.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“If the punishment on a now-invalid prison prior was stricken when the defendant was originally sentenced, then the defendant is ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.75, subdivision (d).”
“We therefore held that section 1172.75 did not apply to prior prison term enhancements that had been stayed because the sentence would not be reduced at resentencing.”
“The punishment for both the enhancements in this case was stricken. Therefore, they were not “imposed and executed” as required by section 1172.75, to qualify for a resentencing hearing.”