Federal National Mortgage Association v. DeSmidt CA4/2 (2025) · DecisionDepot
Federal National Mortgage Association v. DeSmidt CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Jan 22, 2025 No. E082682Unpublished
Filed 1/22/25 Federal National Mortgage Association v. DeSmidt CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, E082682 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SWC1701138) v. OPINION CAMERON RICHARD DESMIDT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Daniel A. Ottolia, Judge.
Affirmed.
Law Offices of Ronald H. Freshman, Ronald H. Freshman, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Aldridge Pite, Laurel I. Handley, Diala Debbas, and Timothy R. Pomeroy, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
In this unlawful detainer action, defendant and appellant, Cameron DeSmidt
appeals the trial court’s orders (1) denying his request for restitution, (2) denying his
motion for a new trial, and (3) dismissing with prejudice this action filed against him.
We find no error and affirm.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2007, DeSmidt took out a mortgage for about $367,000, for a property in
Murrieta. DeSmidt stopped making payments on the mortgage in December 2008. The
property was eventually foreclosed on in a trustee’s sale in February 2017. By that time,
DeSmidt was nearly $600,000 in arrears on the loan, yet he remained in possession of the
property.
Plaintiff and respondent, Federal National Mortgage Association aka “Fannie
Mae” thus filed this unlawful detainer action against DeSmidt in July 2017. Not long
after DeSmidt answered the complaint, Fannie Mae moved for summary judgment. The
trial court granted the motion, entered a judgment of possession for Fannie Mae, and then
issued a writ of possession, which was enforced by a Sheriff’s lockout in February 2019.
DeSmidt vacated the property and Fannie Mae took possession of it. DeSmidt appealed
to the Appellate Division of the Riverside Superior Court, but he did not move to stay the
judgment.
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In November 2020, the Appellate Division reversed the judgment of possession
for Fannie Mae. The court held that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether Fannie
Mae was “the rightful beneficiary with authority to foreclose” and pursue the unlawful
detainer action. The court therefore found the case had to be “remanded for trial.”
On remand, DeSmidt filed a motion for restitution in July 2021. DeSmidt sought
possession of the property and nearly $130,000 in damages allegedly caused by his 1 eviction from the property. The trial court denied the motion.
After the case was reclassified as an unlimited civil matter, DeSmidt moved again
for restitution in November 2021, this time seeking only possession of the property. The
trial court denied the motion on the ground that “it would be inequitable to reinstate the
possession of the property to [DeSmidt].” The court so found because DeSmidt “was
over half a million dollars in arrears on the property before the foreclosure sale” and “had
not made a mortgage payment since November 1, 2008.”
Fannie Mae then moved again for summary judgment. The trial court denied the
motion as moot because “[t]he only issues in an unlawful detainer action are possession
and holdover damages and/or unpaid rent,” but Fannie Mae already had possession of the
property and was no longer seeking damages. The court noted that “possession is no
longer at issue” because Fannie Mae obtained a judgment of possession for the property
that, although later reversed, DeSmidt did not move to stay. The trial court thus directed
1 The record is silent as to the court’s reasons for denying the motion. The record only includes a minute order stating the motion is denied without prejudice.
3
Fannie Mae to move to dismiss the case since possession and damages were no longer at
issue. A few weeks later, the trial court entered an order dismissing the case with
prejudice.
DeSmidt then moved for a new trial under Code of Civil Procedure section 657
(section 657), challenging the trial court’s order denying him restitution. DeSmidt argued
the trial court erred by finding “possession is not at issue.” According to DeSmidt,
possession remained at issue and had to be decided at trial given the Appellate Division’s
opinion reversing and remanding the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to 2 Fannie Mae. The trial court denied the motion, and DeSmidt timely appealed.
III.
DISCUSSION
DeSmidt contends the trial court erroneously denied his motion for restitution,
dismissed the case with prejudice, and denied his motion for a new trial. We disagree.
A. Restitution
In general, when a judgment is reversed on appeal, the appellant is entitled to
restitution for all things lost by reason of the judgment, unless restitution would be
inequitable. (Levy v. Drew (1935) 4 Cal.2d 456, 459; Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo
2 The trial court did not enter a signed, written order dismissing the case until we ordered DeSmidt to file a copy of a signed order of dismissal after he appealed. DeSmidt timely complied with our order by requesting and obtaining a signed dismissal order from the trial court and filing it in this court. We liberally construe DeSmidt’s notice of appeal as timely appealing from the trial court’s signed dismissal order.
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These principles apply in the unlawful detainer context. (See e.g., Stockton
Theatres, supra, 121 Cal.App.2d at p. 619; Munoz v. MacMillan (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th
648, 658 (Munoz).) As relevant here, when a landlord who has secured a writ of
possession evicts a tenant before the appellate rights of the tenant have been exhausted,
the landlord assumes the risk it will be subject to a full accounting and restitution if the
judgment granting the writ of possession is reversed on appeal. (Erickson v. Boothe
(1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 644, 649.) The tenant can recover restitution “in the underlying
unlawful detainer action when a judgment for the landlord is reversed or in a separate
[breach of contract] action instituted to recover losses incurred as a result of a reversed
judgment.” (Munoz, supra, at p. 658.)
Whether the tenant may recover restitution, however, is an equitable determination
that is left to the trial court’s sound discretion. (Munoz, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp.
655-656; Stockton Theatres, supra, 121 Cal.App.2d at p. 632.) We therefore will not
reverse a trial court’s ruling granting or denying restitution unless the ruling is a manifest
abuse of discretion that amounts to a miscarriage of justice. (Munoz, supra, at p. 662;
Wm. R. Clarke Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 355, 359.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion here. By the time DeSmidt moved for
restitution, Fannie Mae had possessed the property for nearly 2.5 years since DeSmidt did
not obtain a stay of the judgment of possession for Fannie Mae while he appealed. The
trial court was well within its discretion in determining that ordering possession of the
property for DeSmidt would be inequitable. (See Munoz, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p.
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658 [“[I]n most [unlawful detainer cases],” courts are loathed “to reinstate a tenant’s right
to possession after years have gone by”].)
The trial court likewise acted well within its discretion by finding DeSmidt was
not entitled to monetary damages as restitution. Although the record is silent as to why
the trial court denied DeSmidt’s request for monetary damages, the trial court could have
reasonably found that awarding him damages would have been inequitable. As the court
later observed in denying him possession of the property as restitution, DeSmidt stopped
making payments on the mortgage in late 2008, meaning that he had not paid a single
mortgage payment for over eight years by the time he was evicted. At that point, he was
nearly $600,000 in arrears on the loan. The trial court thus could have reasonably found
that, although there remained a question as to whether Fannie Mae had the authority to
foreclose on the property and file this unlawful detainer action, there was no question that
DeSmidt was not entitled to remain in the property. As a result, the trial court could have
reasonably found that it would have been inequitable to award DeSmidt damages he
allegedly suffered from being evicted—from a property he had effectively lived in for
free for over eight years.
B. Dismissal
DeSmidt next argues the trial court erred by dismissing the case after finding that
“possession is no longer at issue.” We disagree.
“An unlawful detainer action is a summary proceeding” where “[t]he sole issue
before the court is the right to possession.” (Vasey v. California Dance Co. (1977) 70
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Cal.App.3d 742, 746-747.) It follows that there is nothing left that the court must decide
once possession of the property has been determined. (See ibid.)
DeSmidt was evicted pursuant to a judgment of possession for Fannie Mae, which
DeSmidt did not move to stay while he appealed. Even though the judgment was later
reversed, possession of the property—the only thing at issue in this unlawful detainer
action—had nonetheless been decided for purposes of this case. (See Boyd v. Carter
concerned the right to possession of the premises, a matter that is no longer in issue
because the Carters were forcibly evicted. The judgment having been reversed, the
parties remain free to litigate any claims for damages arising from their lease or
landlord/tenant relationship.”].) Because there was nothing left for the trial court to
decide after Fannie Mae dropped its request for damages, the trial court properly
dismissed the case with prejudice.
C. Motion for New Trial
DeSmidt moved for a new trial on the ground that the court erroneously dismissed
the case with prejudice after finding that “possession is no longer at issue.” Because we
find no error in that decision, we likewise find that the trial court properly denied
DeSmidt’s motion for a new trial.
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IV.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order dismissing this case with prejudice is affirmed. Fannie Mae
may recover its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
FIELDS J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for restitution of property and damages following a reversed judgment, nor did it err in dismissing the unlawful detainer action once possession was no longer at issue.
Issues
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for restitution of possession and monetary damages.
Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the unlawful detainer action after determining that possession was no longer at issue.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Whether the tenant may recover restitution, however, is an equitable determination that is left to the trial court’s sound discretion.”
“The trial court was well within its discretion in determining that ordering possession of the property for DeSmidt would be inequitable.”
“Because there was nothing left for the trial court to decide after Fannie Mae dropped its request for damages, the trial court properly dismissed the case with prejudice.”