California Court of Appeal Jan 15, 2025 No. E082525Unpublished
Filed 1/15/25 Parrilla v. Devalk CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THOMAS RUSSELL PARRILLA,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E082525
v. (Super.Ct.No. CVSW2306029)
MARK E. DEVALK, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Albert J. Wojcik, Judge.
Affirmed.
Law Offices of David Mayberry and David P. Mayberry for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant Mark E. Devalk appeals the grant of a civil harassment
restraining order issued against him pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.61
requiring he keep away from plaintiff and respondent Thomas Russell Parrilla, Parrilla’s
wife, and Parrilla’s daughter, for a period of two years expiring on October 19, 2025.
On appeal, Devalk essentially contends the granting of the civil harassment
restraining order was not supported by the evidence. Parrilla has not filed a response.
provides, “A person who has suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek
a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as
provided in this section.” Section 527.6, subdivision (b)(3), defines harassment as
“unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of
conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person,
and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would
cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually
cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.” The statute defines course of
8
conduct as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time,
however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an
individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing
correspondence to an individual by any means, including, but not limited to, the use of
public or private mails, interoffice mail, facsimile, or email. Constitutionally protected
activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct.’ ” (§ 527.6, subd.
(b)(1).) The statute further defines “ ‘Credible threat of violence’ [as] a knowing and
willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for the
person’s safety or the safety of the person’s immediate family, and that serves no
legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(2).)
“[A] single act of harassment alone cannot justify a restraining order. An
injunction restraining future conduct is only authorized when it appears that harassment is
likely to recur in the future.” (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 499
(Harris).)
“ ‘[W]hen presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence associated
with a finding requiring clear and convincing evidence, the court must determine whether
the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by this standard of
proof.’ [Citation.] ‘Consistent with well-established principles governing review for
sufficiency of the evidence, in making this assessment the appellate court must view the
record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give due deference to
how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in
9
the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.’ ” (Hansen v. Volkov
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 94, 104.) When ascertaining the reasonable probability that
harassment will be repeated in the future, it “ ‘rests upon the nature of the unlawful
violent act evaluated in the light of the relevant surrounding circumstances of its
commission and whether precipitating circumstances continue to exist so as to establish
the likelihood of future harm.’ ” (Harris, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at pp. 499-500.)
Initially, Devalk did not provide the petition to this court. On appeal, “ ‘A
judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; see also Gee v. American Realty & Construction Inc. (2002) 99
Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.) On appeal, a “plaintiff has the burden of providing an adequate
record.” (Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498,
502.) “ ‘Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be
resolved against [the appellant].‘ ” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609, fn.
omitted.)
It does appear to this court that Parrilla detailed the incidents supporting the civil
harassment restraining order in his petition. The trial court asked on the record if the
statements in the petition were true, and Parrilla attested they were true. While the
petition is missing from the record, it does not appear that the trial court relied solely on
the allegations in the petition in determining whether to grant the civil harassment
restraining order. Instead, it appears the trial court relied predominantly on the testimony
at the hearing. As such, rather than find that Devalk has failed to meet his burden of
10
providing an adequate record on appeal, we will review the evidence at the hearing to
determine whether it supported the issuance of the civil harassment restraining order.
There was substantial evidence of a credible threat of violence within the meaning
of section 527.6 to support the issuance of the civil harassment restraining order.2
Devalk essentially is asking this court to reweigh the credibility of witnesses. “ ‘[I]t is
not our role to reweigh the evidence, redetermine the credibility of the witnesses, or
resolve conflicts in the testimony, and we will not disturb the judgment if there is
evidence to support it.’ ” (Williamson v. Brooks (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1294, 1300.)
“[W]e must defer to the trial court’s determinations of credibility.” (Harris, supra, 248
Cal.App.4th at p. 498.) “The testimony of a single witness may provide sufficient
evidence.” (Sabbah v. Sabbah (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 818, 823.)
The trial court credited Parrilla’s testimony that Devalk started the interaction
between Devalk and Parrilla. The trial court also believed Parrilla that Devalk had a
hostile demeanor by puffing out his chest and balling up his fists while approaching him.
Valenzuela had to intervene. It also found that Devalk knew Parrilla was a law
enforcement officer and threatened to show Parrilla what he thought about cops. The
trial court reasonably determined that this was a credible threat of violence.
Moreover, the trial court impliedly determined that the harassment would likely
recur in the future. (See Harris, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 500 [“[W]e must presume
2 Devalk on appeal erroneously states that the factor “credible threat of violence” is not relevant. The trial court specifically relied on criminal threats of violence in its ruling.
11
that the trial court followed the applicable law and understood that it was required to find
that future harm was reasonably probable”].)3 The trial court noted that after the
incident, Devalk continued to “mad dog” Parrilla by staring at him. The trial court found
that Parrilla could reasonably interpret these actions as credible threats of violence.
There was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s implied finding that harassment
was likely to recur in the future absent the civil harassment restraining order. Substantial
evidence supports the issuance of the civil harassment restraining order.
DISPOSITION
The civil harassment restraining order issued on October 19, 2023, is affirmed in
full. Appellant is to bear his own costs on appeal.4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
MENETREZ J.
3 Devalk simply states in his appellant’s opening brief that there was no implied finding of an ongoing threat of future harm, with no argument or legal authority. There clearly was a threat of ongoing harm.
4 Parrilla has not made an appearance at this court. Therefore, we do not award him costs on appeal.
12
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the issuance of a civil harassment restraining order, finding substantial evidence supported the trial court's determination that the defendant made a credible threat of violence and that harassment was likely to recur.
Issues
Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding of a credible threat of violence under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6.
Whether the trial court's finding that harassment was likely to recur in the future was supported by substantial evidence.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“There was substantial evidence of a credible threat of violence within the meaning of section 527.6 to support the issuance of the civil harassment restraining order.”
“The trial court reasonably determined that this was a credible threat of violence.”
“Substantial evidence supports the issuance of the civil harassment restraining order.”