People v. Collins (2025) · DecisionDepot

People v. Collins

Name: California Superior Court Tentative Rulings
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California Supreme Court Jan 6, 2025 No. S279737Published

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRITTNEY COLLINS, Defendant and Appellant.

S279737

Second Appellate District, Division Five B322744

Kern County Superior Court MF013183B

January 6, 2025

Justice Evans authored the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Liu, Groban, and Jenkins concurred.

Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Groban and Evans concurred.

Justice Kruger filed a concurring opinion.

Chief Justice Guerrero filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Corrigan concurred.

PEOPLE v. COLLINS S279737

Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

This case concerns implied malice murder liability based on a parent’s failure to act — specifically, their failure to protect their child from another person’s fatal act. Defendant Brittney Collins was convicted of second degree murder for the death of her two-month-old son, Abel James Norwood, who was killed by his father, Matthew Norwood. Norwood committed the fatal act while Abel was under Norwood’s care and Collins was in another room. Given the facts established at trial, we recognize this is a close case. We hold, however, that the evidence was insufficient to convict Collins of second degree murder. Applying the law governing implied malice murder in the distinct context of a prosecution based on a failure-to-protect theory, the evidence fails to establish Collins harbored the requisite mens rea to convict her of second degree murder under either a direct aider and abettor theory or a direct perpetrator theory. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Collins and Norwood began their romantic relationship in 2017. Both Collins and Norwood used methamphetamine, and Norwood also used heroin. In early 2018, Collins became pregnant with their child. While Collins stopped using drugs during her pregnancy, Norwood’s drug use continued. When Collins was pregnant, Norwood made several comments, including in Collins’s presence, that he did not want

PEOPLE v. COLLINS Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

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The dissent contends that facts about the inability of women who are victims of domestic violence to leave their abusers were “not before the jury” and are thus “irrelevant to our substantial evidence review.” (Dis. opn., post, at p. 44, fn. 11.) Appellate review for sufficiency of the evidence, the dissent says, “ ‘is limited to considering the evidence actually presented to the jury.’ ” (Id. at p. 45, fn. 11.) No one disagrees with this hornbook rule. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7, fn. 2.) But substantial evidence review requires us to determine what inferences from the evidence are “reasonable,” and what is “reasonable” is a legal question informed by “[c]ommon sense . . . and an appropriate sensitivity to social context.” (Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. (1998) 523 U.S. 75, 82.) This is no less true here than in other contexts. (See, e.g., id. at p. 81 [severity of workplace harassment is “judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position” and “requires careful consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target”]; People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1044–1046 [making numerous sociological and behavioral observations, without citation to evidence, about what conduct is “ ‘odd,’ ” “ordinary,” “noteworthy,” or a “deviation from perceived social convention” when a person is approached by police]; id. at p. 1049 [noting in dicta that courts have taken into account a racial “group’s experience with law enforcement . . . in evaluating the objective reasonableness of any asserted suspicion of criminality”].) The dissent ultimately concedes that “[t]he severe burdens suffered by victims of domestic or intimate partner violence are widely known” and “may be considered . . . by a reviewing court,” but says it is improper to consider the studies that have made those burdens widely known. (Dis. opn., post, at p. 44, fn. 11.)

6 The majority also cites the nurse practitioner’s testimony regarding her examination of Abel. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 26– 27, fn. 7, 32; see id. at p. 37, fn. 10.) But, as explained above, it was for the jury to determine whether to believe this testimony. It was plainly self-serving, since the nurse could be subject to discipline or criticism for failing to conduct a comprehensive examination or failing to notice an injury on Abel. The nurse’s testimony was also directly contradicted by Collins’s statement to police that the nurse recognized Abel’s swollen leg. The majority apparently concludes the jury was required to believe the nurse practitioner’s testimony in the absence of evidence that she “abrogated her duties while repeatedly examining Abel and lied while testifying.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 26–27, fn. 7.) The implications of the majority’s conclusion are startling. Juries are commonly called upon to consider the credibility of medical professionals. Under the majority’s reasoning, a jury would be required to credit the testimony of a medical professional, no matter how self-serving, unless specific evidence of lying or other breach of duty were presented. That is not the law. A jury may disbelieve a witness for any rational reason, including the witness’s “demeanor while testifying” and the “existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive.” (Evid. Code, § 780, subds. (a), (f); see Lopez, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 591.) The jury here was so instructed. (See CALCRIM No. 226; see also CALJIC No. 2.20.) The majority’s contrary conclusion rests on its misapplication of authorities considering the evidentiary support for affirmative findings, rather than credibility determinations. The two are not the same. In any event, even if the jury had accepted the nurse practitioner’s testimony at face value, the jury could reasonably have given this evidence little or no weight in determining Collins’s state of mind. It could reasonably believe that the nurse failed to notice external injuries on Abel, either through negligence or because Collins failed to disclose the abuse she had

evidence was not before the jury, so it is irrelevant to our substantial evidence review. (See In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405.) As the majority itself states, “Our command as a reviewing court in evaluating a sufficiency of the evidence claim is to consider the actual evidence before the jury and reasonable inferences favorable to the prosecution that the jury could have drawn from that evidence.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7, fn. 2.) Our concurring colleague writes that “facts about the inability of women who are victims of domestic violence to leave their abusers” informs his view of what was reasonable for the jury to infer from the evidence. (Conc. opn. of Liu, J., ante, at p. 10.) As a general matter, I do not disagree. The severe burdens suffered by victims of domestic or intimate partner violence are widely known. Just like other matters of common sense and experience, these burdens may be considered by the jury and by a reviewing court. (See, e.g., People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1414; People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 162.) But our consideration of common sense and experience is quite different from accepting the truth of findings in social science evidence that is identified by the parties or the members of this court for the first time on appeal. The concurring opinion suggests there is precedent for such an approach (conc. opn. of Liu, J., ante, at p. 11), but the cited precedents — both original writ proceedings in this court, not appeals — used social science evidence to evaluate whether burdens on fundamental constitutional rights or unequal treatment under the law were adequately justified. These inquiries and their procedural postures are not analogous to our consideration of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict here. Nor is it clear that those precedents involved evidence raised for the first time by the court or its members, without notice or opportunity for briefing by the parties, as occurred here. (Cf. Evid. Code, § 459, subd. (c); cf. also Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, and the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage (2008) 96 Cal. L.Rev. 839, 849 [describing evidence cited by the parties in their briefing].) In any event, whatever the merits of such an approach in constitutional cases, there is no precedent for considering

People v. Collins

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

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