California Court of Appeal Dec 27, 2024 No. E082173Unpublished
Filed 12/27/24 In re L.L. CA4/2 See dissenting opinion NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re L.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E082173
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. SWJ1900526)
v. OPINION
B.L.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sean P. Crandell, Judge.
Dismissed in part; reversed in part with directions.
Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Prabhath Shettigar,
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
I. INTRODUCTION
B.L. (Father) is the father of L.L. In February 2023, the Riverside County
Department of Public Social Services (the department) filed a petition pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300 et seq., on behalf of L.L., alleging that
(1) Father had committed acts of sexual abuse against L.L., and (2) Father was unable to
adequately supervise, protect, or provide for L.L. On August 25, 2023, the juvenile court
held a jurisdictional hearing, sustained the jurisdictional allegations against Father, but
set the matter for a further hearing to consider disposition. At the same hearing, the
juvenile court granted a request by L.L.’s mother (Mother)2 to issue a restraining order
against Father.
On September 19, 2023, Father filed a notice of appeal purporting to appeal the
“jurisdictional finding pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300[,
subdivision] (b) and 300[, subdivision] (d)” as well as the restraining order. On appeal,
Father argues that (1) the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings should be reversed for
insufficient evidence, and (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion when it issued a
five-year restraining order in favor of Mother. We conclude that Father is entitled to
reversal of the restraining order but that Father’s challenge to the jurisdictional findings
should be dismissed.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 Mother is not a party to this appeal.
2
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mother and Father are the parents of L.L. They were previously involved in a
juvenile dependency proceeding in Los Angeles County, which resulted in the issuance
of family law orders granting Mother physical custody of L.L., providing Father with
visitation rights, and providing for shared legal custody of L.L. In January 2023, a social
worker interviewed L.L. at school in response to a referral received by the department.
During the interview, L.L. made statements that the social worker believed suggested
Father was touching L.L. in an inappropriately sexual manner, as well as causing physical
injury to L.L. during visits. As a result, the department detained L.L. from Father3 and
filed a petition pursuant to section 300 et seq. on L.L.’s behalf.
At the detention hearing, Mother requested the juvenile court issue a restraining
order against Father naming Mother and L.L. as protected persons. In response, the
juvenile court issued a temporary restraining order but set the matter for a hearing.
The department filed a first amended petition, which alleged jurisdiction pursuant
to section 300, subdivision (b), as the result of Father’s inability to adequately supervise,
protect, or provide for L.L., and pursuant to section 300, subdivision (d), as the result of
Father’s alleged acts of sexual abuse. The juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional
hearing over the course of multiple days in which the parties presented the live testimony
of numerous witnesses, including Father, Mother, L.L.’s older sibling, multiple social
workers, multiple medical experts, a staff member from L.L.’s school, and a professional
3 L.L. remained in Mother’s physical custody.
3
visitation monitor. At the conclusion of the hearing on August 25, 2023, the juvenile
court found true the jurisdictional allegations of the amended petition, granted a five-year
restraining order in favor of Mother and L.L. against Father, and set the matter for a
future dispositional hearing.
On September 19, 2023, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing, at which
time the department recommended that the juvenile court terminate the dependency
proceeding upon the filing of family law orders granting Mother sole physical and sole
legal custody of L.L. with Father holding only the right to supervised visits with L.L.
Father did not object to the department’s recommendation.4 As a result, the juvenile
court made a dispositional order formally removing L.L. from Father’s physical custody
and indicated its intent to terminate the dependency proceeding upon the filing of formal,
written family law orders submitted by the parties, which would include an order granting
Mother sole legal and sole physical custody. That same day, Father filed a notice of
appeal, purporting to appeal from the “jurisdictional finding pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300[, subdivision] (b) and 300[, subdivision] (d),” as well as the
restraining order issued by the juvenile court on August 25.
On September 29, 2023, the juvenile court entered formal, written family law
orders and dismissed the juvenile dependency proceeding.
4 Instead, Father requested only minor changes to the proposed order, such as specific terms for visitations and a provision granting him access to L.L.’s education and medical records.
4
III. DISCUSSION
A. We Dismiss the Portion of the Appeal Challenging the Jurisdictional Findings
The primary issue raised in Father’s appeal is a challenge to the jurisdictional
findings made by the juvenile court. Specifically, Father challenges each of the findings
as unsupported by substantial evidence. We conclude that this portion of Father’s appeal
must be dismissed.
Assuming we have appellate jurisdiction to reach the merits of Father’s challenge
to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings5, the record shows that the issue is now
moot. “A court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide actual controversies by a judgment
which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in
issue in the case before it.” ’ [Citation] A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render it
impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any
effect[ive] relief.” ’ [Citation] [¶]. . . This rule applies in the dependency context.” (In
re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.)
5 Generally, “ ‘ “[o]ur jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the notice of appeal and the judgment or order appealed from.” . . . We have no jurisdiction over an order not mentioned in the notice of appeal.’ ” (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 75.) And the notice of appeal in this case is far from clear. The notice purports to appeal from the “jurisdictional findings” and the restraining order issued on August 25, 2023. While Father also checked a box indicating an intent to appeal from an order made under “Section 360 (declaration of dependency)” that included “[r]emoval of custody from parent or guardian” with “review of section 300 jurisdictional findings,” the juvenile court made no order pursuant to section 360 because it expressly declined to declare a dependency in this case.
5
In this case, the record shows that 10 days after the filing of Father’s notice of
appeal, the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction and entered family law
orders (alternatively referred to as “exit orders”6). As is widely recognized, “[a]n order
terminating juvenile court jurisdiction generally renders an appeal from an earlier order
moot.” (In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163.) This includes appeals
seeking to challenge erroneous jurisdictional findings. (Id. at pp. 164-165; In re N.S.
moot by juvenile court’s subsequent order dismissing dependency jurisdiction]; In re
D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 273, 278, 283 [dismissal of juvenile dependency renders
appeal from jurisdictional findings moot absent a “specific legal or practical consequence
that would be avoided upon reversal of the jurisdictional findings”].) In In re D.P., our
Supreme Court clarified the appropriate test to determine whether appeal of a
jurisdictional finding is moot, explaining that the question of mootness turns on
“[w]hether or not a parent has demonstrated a specific legal or practical consequence that
would be avoided upon reversal of the jurisdictional findings.” (14 Cal.5th at p. 283.)
Here, Father has not identified any legal or practical consequence that would be
avoided by reversing the jurisdictional findings in this appeal. Notably, while the
6 Section 362.4 “authorizes a juvenile court to make ‘exit orders’ regarding custody and visitation upon terminating dependency jurisdiction over a child.” (In re J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112; § 362.4, subd. (a).) The exit order is filed in any pending family law case involving the parties or, if no family law case is pending, it can form the basis of a new family law case. The order is enforced by the family court and is subject to modification or termination based on the family court’s own statutory authority and procedures. (Heidi S. v. David H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1169-1170.)
6
juvenile court removed L.L. from Father’s physical custody at the time of the
dispositional hearing, the order that now governs Father’s custodial rights is the exit order
entered at the time the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction. While both orders purport
to remove L.L. from Father’s custody, these are different orders.7 The exit order cannot
be set aside based solely on an appeal from a dispositional order challenging jurisdiction.
(See In re Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 164 [“[T]o the extent an appellant
argues . . . that the challenged jurisdiction finding resulted in an adverse juvenile custody
order and seeks to have that custody order set aside, in addition to the appeal from the
jurisdiction finding, an appeal from the orders terminating jurisdiction and awarding
custody is necessary for [an appellate court] to be able to provide effective relief.”].)
Thus, because reversal of the jurisdictional findings would not result in reversal of the
exit order, Father has not shown what legal or practical consequence could be achieved
by reaching the merits of his claim.
Additionally, while Father asserts in a conclusory fashion that reversal of the
jurisdictional findings could result in an award of joint physical and legal custody, Father
has not suggested on appeal how the jurisdictional findings he seeks to reverse served as
7 A dispositional order of removal is issued pursuant to section 361, while an order determining custody made at the time the juvenile court terminates jurisdiction is issued pursuant to section 362.4. (§§ 361, 362.4.) In fact, the juvenile court specifically noted at the time of disposition that its intended family law order granting Mother sole physical and sole legal custody of L.L. was intended to be a different order than its dispositional order removing L.L. from Father’s custody.
7
the basis of the exit orders now in effect.8 The custody determination made as part of an
exit order “does not require a finding of detriment under any circumstances” and is,
instead, based upon the juvenile court’s determination of what is “in the best interest of
the chil[d], considering the totality of the circumstances.” (In re J.M., supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 113, 115; In re N.M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1094.) The
status of a parent as “ ‘offending’ ” or “ ‘nonoffending’ ” may be relevant, “but not
necessarily outcome determinative,” and “does not categorically disqualify [a parent]
from custody or otherwise limit the court’s ability to issue orders necessary to further [the
child’s] best interest.” (In re Destiny D. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 197, 209.) In fact, the
decision to terminate jurisdiction is based upon a determination that “terminating
jurisdiction [is] appropriate because the dangerous conditions justifying assumption of
jurisdiction under section 300 no longer exist[s] . . . .” (In re J.M., at p. 114.)
Thus, there is no basis for this court to presume that the juvenile court considered
the jurisdictional findings in assessing the best interests of L.L. when fashioning the exit
orders now in effect.9 And Father has not presented any substantive argument explaining
8 The fact that jurisdictional findings are necessary to assert dependency jurisdiction cannot alone be the basis for concluding that a subsequent dependency order is “based on” the jurisdictional finding. If that were true, an appeal from a dispositional order challenging jurisdiction could be used to collaterally attack and unravel any other separately appealable order subsequently issued by the juvenile court.
9 In fact, the record shows that the family orders were based upon the stipulation of all parties—including Father. At the outset of the dispositional hearing, counsel for the department represented that counsel held a conference prior to the hearing and “father’s counsel . . . indicated that father would be submitting on the case closed and the family law orders,” but would make a request for modification of the visitation and [footnote continued on next page]
8
why we should draw that conclusion. Given this record, even assuming we have
appellate jurisdiction to review the merits of Father’s challenge under a liberal
construction of his notice of appeal, Father’s challenge to the jurisdictional findings are
now moot, and dismissal of this portion of Father’s appeal would still be the appropriate
disposition.10
B. Father Is Entitled to Reversal of the Restraining Order
Father also challenges the juvenile court’s issuance of a restraining order in favor
of Mother pursuant to section 213.5. Specifically, Father argues that (1) substantial
evidence does not support the issuance of a restraining order listing Mother as a protected
person, and (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion by providing that the term of the
restraining order would last for five years. We agree with Father that the juvenile court
abused its discretion by providing that the term of the restraining order would last for five
therapy provisions of the proposed order. Consistent with this representation, Father’s counsel stated that he understood that the family law order would involve granting Mother sole legal custody, and requested only modifications related to the terms of visitation, authorization for cojoint therapy, and access to records. Finally, the proposed written family law orders were jointly submitted to the juvenile court by all parties.
10 While we have discretion to reach an otherwise moot challenge to jurisdictional findings (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 284-287), Father has not suggested why the exercise of such discretion would be appropriate in this case. Reversal of the jurisdictional findings would not appear to alleviate any perceived stigma, since the record shows that jurisdictional allegations involving sexual abuse were already sustained against Father in a prior juvenile dependency proceeding. Father has not appealed from the family law orders now in effect and has not suggested which aspects of the family law orders he believes should be reversed or modified. And the jurisdictional findings were not necessary for issuance of the restraining order that Father has challenged on appeal. (See In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 670 [It is sufficient to show that the restrained person “disturbed the peace” of the petitioner to support issuance of a restraining order under section 213.5.].)
9
years and, as a result, need not reach Father’s alternative arguments challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the order.
“Section 213.5 governs the issuance of restraining orders by the juvenile court.
Thereunder, the juvenile court may issue . . . an order ‘enjoining any person from
. . . contacting, . . . coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of . . .
any parent . . . of the child [who is the subject of dependency proceedings], regardless of
whether the child resides with that parent, . . . upon application . . . .” (In re S.G., supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at p. 670.)11 “Issuance of a restraining order under section 213.5 does not
require ‘evidence that the restrained person has previously molested, attacked, struck,
sexually assaulted, stalked or battered the [petitioner or person to be protected].’
[Citation.] It may be sufficient to show that the person be restrained ‘disturbed the peace’
of the petitioner [citation], meaning he or she engaged in conduct that destroyed the
petitioner’s ‘ “ ‘mental or emotional calm.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 671.)
“A restraining order under section 213.5 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”
(In re A.M. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 614, 619.) However, “ ‘[t]he abuse of discretion
11 While section 213.5 refers to the issuance of a restraining order upon the filing of petitions under section 311 by a probation officer, the Court of Appeal has clarified that the juvenile court also has authority to issue protective orders pursuant to this provision following the filing of a petition under section 300 by a social worker. (In re H.D. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 814, 818-820; In re Lilianna C. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 638, 646 [noting that the statute contains a drafting error and it is a “long-standing and consistent reading of section 213.5” that the statute “empowers juvenile courts to issue restraining orders to protect the dependent child even when it is a social worker who files the initial petition”].)
10
standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect
of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for
substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of
the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ ” (In re Miguel R.
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 165, quoting Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43
Cal.4th 706, 711-712.)
Here, it is undisputed that the juvenile court issued a restraining order against
Father for a term of five years. As the department concedes on appeal, section 213.5
expressly provides that “[a] restraining order granted pursuant to this subdivision shall
remain in effect, in the discretion of the court, no more than three years . . . .” (§ 213.5,
subd. (d)(1).) The issuance of a restraining order beyond the maximum term permitted
by statute constitutes an act in excess of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction12 and, as a result,
an arbitrary and capricious application of the law to the facts of the case. Given this
conclusion, reversal of the restraining order is required regardless of whether there was
substantial evidence in the record to support issuance of the restraining order at the time
it was made, and we need not reach Father’s alternative argument regarding whether
substantial evidence supported issuance of the order.
12 “A court acts in excess of jurisdiction ‘where, though the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in the fundamental sense, it has no “jurisdiction” (or power) to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites.’ ” (In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 624.)
11
We are left only with the question of the appropriate disposition in this case.
Generally, “[i]f the record affirmatively shows the trial court misunderstood the proper
scope of its discretion, remand to the trial court is required to permit that court to exercise
informed discretion with awareness of the full scope of its discretion and applicable law.”
(F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 26.) Thus, contrary to the department’s
suggestion, we do not believe that modification of the juvenile court’s order on appeal to
provide for a term of three years is an appropriate disposition.13
We could reverse the order and direct the juvenile court to conduct a new hearing
pursuant to section 213.5. However, the record in this case shows that the juvenile court
has already terminated dependency jurisdiction; and, as a result, the case has proceeded
beyond the point where a restraining order pursuant to section 213.5 is typically issued.
(§ 213.5, subd. (a) [An order under the statute may be issued only “until the time that the
[dependency] petition is dismissed or dependency is terminated.”].) In the usual case,
“once the juvenile court terminates jurisdiction, the family court assumes jurisdiction
over restraining orders issued in the juvenile court” (Garcia v. Escobar (2017)
17 Cal.App.5th 267, 271; § 362.4), and the family court has the authority to renew or
13 This is particularly true where, as here, the juvenile court did not explain its reasoning in issuing the order beyond a general comment that a restraining order was “an appropriate order” “based on the evidence [it] heard,” without specifying a term. The term was only specified in the written order filed after the hearing, such that the parties had no opportunity to argue an appropriate length of time for the order. The juvenile court made no comments, and thus we have no reason to believe that the juvenile court intended to select the maximum term permissible for a restraining order.
12
modify any prior restraining orders. (Garcia, at p. 267; Priscila N. v. Leonardo G.
As recently explained in In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, the dismissal of the
juvenile dependency proceedings does not necessarily prevent a reviewing court from
issuing a limited remand directing the juvenile court to conduct a new hearing pursuant to
section 213.5 because an appellate court has general authority to reverse an order and
direct further proceedings under Code of Civil Procedure sections 43 and 906. (Id. at
p. 668.) Nevertheless, we are unpersuaded that a limited remand to the juvenile court to
conduct a new hearing under section 213.5 is appropriate in this case. Notably, no party
has requested a remand for the juvenile court to conduct a new hearing under section
213.5. In fact, Mother has not made herself a party in this appeal. And we discern at
least one significant reason why she would not: unlike the juvenile court, the family
court does have authority to issue a restraining order for a period of up to five years.
(Fam. Code, § 6345, subd. (a).) Thus, Mother can obtain the very protection she was
originally granted in the juvenile court by making a new request in the family court,
whereas remand to the juvenile court for a new proceeding under section 213.5 could
never result in that relief.
Absent a request for a new hearing by any party, we see no reason to remand the
matter to the juvenile court with directions to conduct a new hearing pursuant to section
213.5. This is especially true where the party protected by the restraining order has a
superior means to obtain the protection she was originally granted and has not requested a
13
remand to obtain a new order under section 213.5.14 Instead, we believe the appropriate
disposition is to reverse the restraining order and remand with directions to vacate the
order. And we leave to the parties whether to seek renewed protection in the family court
proceedings as they deem appropriate.
IV. DISPOSITION
The portion of the appeal challenging the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings is
dismissed. The juvenile court’s restraining order issued on August 25, 2023 is reversed,
and the matter is remanded with directions for the juvenile court to vacate the order.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J.
I concur:
CODRINGTON Acting P. J.
14 For this reason, we find In re S.G. distinguishable and decline to adopt the disposition reached in that case. In that case, both the restrained and protected party were parties to the appeal and presumably asserted their interests with respect to a desired disposition. (In re S.G., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 657.)
14
[In re L.L., E082173]
RAPHAEL, J., concurring and dissenting.
Father’s challenge to the jurisdictional findings in this dependency case is not
moot, so I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion.
I
Father hotly contested the jurisdictional allegations. The court heard 10 witnesses
spread over seven court days and received many documents into evidence. On August
25, 2023, the court found jurisdiction over the case under Welfare & Institutions Code
section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (d).1
A parent cannot appeal directly from a jurisdictional finding in a dependency case.
Rather, they must wait for the dispositional order. “A dispositional order is appealable,
and review on appeal encompasses the court’s jurisdictional findings.” (In re G.C.
(2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1126.)
On September 19, 2023, less than four weeks after it assumed jurisdiction, the
court held a dispositional hearing. This would be the last time the parties appeared in
dependency court. At that hearing, the court found section 361, subdivisions (c)(1) and
(c)(4) applied and removed physical custody of the child from Father. As the parties had
an active family law case, the court said it would terminate the dependency case when the
parties filed orders reflecting the court’s custody ruling. A minute order that day
reflected all the court’s rulings, including its order removing physical custody of his
1 Code citations are to the Welfare & Institutions Code.
1
daughter from Father and its order that the dependency action is terminated upon the
filing of the custody order.
Father appealed the same day. The notice of appeal said he was appealing from
the September 19, 2023, hearing, and he checked boxes to indicate he was appealing the
declaration of dependency and the removal of custody. He checked another box to state
he sought review of the jurisdictional findings. He attached the September 19, 2023,
minute order that reflected all the rulings from the dispositional hearing that day.
A few days later, the parties filed, and the court signed, a form custody order that
reflected the court’s custody ruling at the dispositional hearing. This is sometimes
referred to as an exit order or a family law custody order. That order did not itself state
that the dependency action was terminated. There were no further hearings, orders, or
other judicial actions in the dependency case.
II
This dependency case is not moot if “review of the jurisdictional finding can grant
the parent effective relief.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 277.) Just about two years
ago, in In re D.P., our Supreme Court made clear that we can still grant effective relief in
this case, so it is not moot.
An appellate court can still grant effective relief in a dependency case that has
terminated in trial court, so long as a dependency order “continues to impact a parent’s
rights.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) In particular, “when a juvenile court’s
finding forms the basis for an order that continues to impact a parent’s rights — for
2
instance, by restricting visitation or custody — that jurisdictional finding remains subject
to challenge, even if the juvenile court has terminated its jurisdiction.” (Ibid.)
Because the jurisdictional findings here led to an order removing custody from
Father, this appeal was not rendered moot by the end of the dependency. In this appeal,
Father challenges the jurisdictional findings that were entered after a long, contested
court trial. Because of the jurisdictional findings, the trial court had the ability to declare
the child a dependent of the court and remove custody from Father. Father asks for
reinstatement of the joint custody he had with mother before the dependency case. Father
has challenged a jurisdiction ruling that led to an adverse custody ruling that “continues
to impact” his rights. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.)
The trial court’s termination of the dependency does not moot the appeal because
“review of the jurisdictional finding can grant the parent effective relief.” (In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 277.) That is, “reversal of the jurisdictional finding calls into
question the validity of orders based on that finding.” (Ibid.) Were we to hold that
insufficient evidence supported the jurisdictional findings, we would order reversed not
only those findings, but also the orders that removed custody from Father, as the trial
court had the power to issue those orders only if it had jurisdiction. (See, e.g., In re I.S.
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 918, 933 [“Because we conclude that the jurisdictional findings
must be reversed, the dispositional order removing I.S. from Mother’s custody also must
be reversed”].) The appeal is not moot.
3
The crux of the majority opinion’s reasoning is that Father had to appeal not just
from the dispositional order (which enabled him to challenge the jurisdictional findings)
but also from the exit order (which, purportedly, is a separate custody order that would
render the dispositional challenge ineffective to change custody.) (Maj. opn., ante, at p.
7.) For instance, the majority says the “exit order cannot be set aside based solely on an
appeal from a dispositional order challenging jurisdiction.” (Ibid.) But the exit order,
like the dispositional order, was based on the jurisdictional findings; each was
permissible only if the dependency court had jurisdiction.
For this reason, even before our Supreme Court decided In re D.P., various Court
of Appeal opinions reversed exit orders as a consequence of reversing jurisdictional
findings. For example, in In re Roger S. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 572, 583, the juvenile
court concluded there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jurisdictional finding that
mother’s neglect placed the child at risk of harm. Though the juvenile court had
terminated dependency jurisdiction with a custody order, the Court of Appeal reversed,
explaining “[b]ecause there was no basis for dependency jurisdiction, we also reverse the
disposition order and the custody order the juvenile court issued.” (Id. at p. 583.) The
Court of Appeal remanded to the family court for a hearing on custody and visitation. (Id.
at pp. 583-584; see also In re G.B. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 475, 483, 489 [reversing the
jurisdictional findings, disposition order, and “[a]ll orders issued after the disposition
hearing,” including an exit order and an order terminating the dependency]; In re Jesus
M. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 104, 114 [“In the absence of jurisdiction, the court had no
4
authority to issue a dispositional order or the family law custody order”]; In re R.M.
(2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 986, 991 [“In light of our determination that the jurisdictional
order must be reversed, the dispositional order placing the children outside Mother’s
home and all subsequent orders as to Mother must be reversed as well”].) The majority’s
view contradicts these cases, which demonstrate the exit order is vulnerable to reversal.
Before In re D.P., it was possible for the Court of Appeal to conclude the
termination of a dependency rendered moot an earlier appeal, even if a custody ruling
that would continue to affect the parent was at issue. That explains why, in In re Rashad
D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 164 (Rashad D.), a case the majority relies on, the court
held that “an appeal from the orders terminating jurisdiction and awarding custody is
necessary for this court to be able to provide effective relief.” Without another appeal,
Rashad D. held, “the juvenile court has no jurisdiction to conduct further hearings in the
now-closed case.” (Ibid.) In re D.P. did not adopt this view. Though it provided an
extensive explanation of how appeals are not rendered moot by a dependency case’s
termination, In re D.P. nowhere required an appeal from the termination order for the
appellate court to provide effective relief.
For instance, In re D.P. cited favorably In re A.R. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 733 for
its holding that a case was not moot. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 276-277.) In In
re A.R., while an appeal from a dispositional hearing was pending, the trial court
terminated jurisdiction over the dependency case. (In re A.R., supra, at p. 740.) With no
indication that the parent filed a notice of appeal from the termination order, the Court of
5
Appeal held the case was not moot because the dependency rulings would affect the
parent in family court. (Ibid.) In re D.P.’s approval of this case shows it does not
support Rashad D.’s conclusion that the failure to appeal from the termination order
precludes effective relief.
Our appeal, however, is not even moot under Rashad D. Here, the termination of
the dependency was ordered at the disposition hearing. According to Rashad D., in that
circumstance an appeal from the disposition order “arguably” would preserve jurisdiction
over the dependency case. (Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) In another
opinion from the same division with the same author, the court ruled on a dependency
challenge even though the notice of appeal was filed on the day of a dispositional hearing
while the order terminating jurisdiction was stayed until counsel filed a custody order on
a later day. (In re Destiny D. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 197, 205 fn. 5.) Here, much the
same thing happened. At the September 19 hearing, the trial court announced two orders
identical in substance, a disposition order and an exit order, but filed the exit order on a
form submitted a few days later. Both orders encompassed the final rulings in the
dependency case, including removing custody from father.
In all, under In re D.P., this case is not moot. If we were to find insufficient
evidence to support the jurisdictional finding, we would order both the dispositional order
and the simultaneously announced exit order vacated, as the juvenile court would have
lacked the power to issue both.
6
For the above reasons, I dissent from the mootness holding and would address the
merits of the challenge to dependency jurisdiction. I agree with the portion of the
majority opinion reversing the restraining order.
RAPHAEL J.
7
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Holding. The court dismissed the father's appeal of jurisdictional findings as moot because the dependency proceedings had terminated and the father failed to show any legal or practical consequence of those findings. The court reversed the five-year restraining order because it exceeded the three-year statutory maximum permitted under Welfare and Institutions Code section 213.5.
Issues
Whether the father's appeal of the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings is moot following the termination of dependency jurisdiction.
Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by issuing a five-year restraining order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 213.5.
Disposition. Dismissed in part; reversed in part with directions.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The issuance of a restraining order beyond the maximum term permitted by statute constitutes an act in excess of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction”
“The juvenile court’s restraining order issued on August 25, 2023 is reversed, and the matter is remanded with directions for the juvenile court to vacate the order.”