People v. Gonzales CA6
Filed 12/5/24 P. v. Gonzales CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H050612 (Santa Clara County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C2017737)
v.
FRANK RAYMOND GONZALES,
Defendant and Appellant.
After a jury convicted Frank Raymond Gonzales of various domestic violence offenses, Gonzales admitted a prior strike conviction. (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5, subd. (c), 1192.7, subd. (c).) Gonzales’s sole claim on appeal is that his admission must be vacated because the trial court did not advise him of each of his trial rights under Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 (Boykin) and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 (Tahl), so he could not have intelligently and voluntarily waived them. We conclude that Gonzales’s admission of the strike prior allegation was “intelligent and voluntary in light of the totality of circumstances.” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 361 (Mosby).) We affirm the judgment. I. BACKGROUND
The Santa Clara County District Attorney charged Gonzales with inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or coparent with a prior conviction for domestic violence (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (f)(2); count 1), threats to commit a crime resulting in death or
great bodily injury (§ 422, subd. (a); counts 2 & 5), assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 3), violating domestic violence-related protective orders with prior conviction for the same (§ 166, subd. (c)(4); counts 4 & 7), and vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(1); count 6).1 The information further alleged that Gonzales sustained a prior conviction for a strike offense—specifically, assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1). (§§ 667.5, subd. (c), 1192.7, subd. (c).) Gonzales exercised his right to a jury trial on the substantive offenses and allegations. Gonzales did not testify at trial, and the court instructed the jury that he had “an absolute constitutional right not to testify.” Before the close of evidence, the parties stipulated that between 1987 and 2018, Gonzales had “pled no contest” in 10 separate criminal cases admissible under Evidence Code section 1109.2 The jury found Gonzales guilty of two counts of violating protective order (counts 4 and 7), found true the allegation that Gonzales had sustained a conviction for the same violation within the last seven years, and found true, with respect to one of the violations, that Gonzales had engaged in conduct involving an act or credible threat of violence. The jury acquitted Gonzales of the remaining counts but found him guilty of three lesser included misdemeanor offenses. Moments before the jury returned verdicts on these substantive offenses, Gonzales informed the trial court that if convicted, he would waive jury trial on the bifurcated strike allegation. The court then advised Gonzales of his trial rights: Court: “You have the right to have a jury decide the truth of that [strike prior] allegation. [¶] Do you understand that?”
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