People v. Duenas CA2/1

Filed 11/25/24 P. v. Duenas CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B334536

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. KA088870) v.

CUTHBERT EMANUEL DUENAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jacqueline H. Lewis, Judge. Reversed. Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ____________________________

In 2009, “[o]ver the course of more than 18 hours, defendant Cuthbert E. Duenas raped Veronica twice, beat her numerous times, and kidnapped her with the intent to rape her.” (People v. Duenas (June 18, 2019, B288392) [nonpub. opn.].) Duenas’s conviction included one Penal Code1 section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancement. The Legislature subsequently deemed invalid enhancements “imposed” pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b) unless imposed for a sexually violent offense. Section 1172.75 creates a procedure for resentencing persons sentenced to the now invalid enhancements. In 2023, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified Duenas as potentially eligible for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivision (a) which provides in relevant part: “(a) Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) The trial court found Duenas was ineligible for resentencing. On appeal, the parties agree we must remand for resentencing albeit for different reasons. We agree with respondent that the original sentencing court did not have discretion to stay the prior prison enhancement, and thus the original sentence was unauthorized. We thus do not decide whether Duenas was entitled to relief under section 1172.75, as Duenas posits. We reverse the trial court’s order finding Duenas ineligible for resentencing and remand for resentencing.