California Court of Appeal Nov 19, 2024 No. E083933Unpublished
Filed 11/19/24 P. v. Karas CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E083933
v. (Super.Ct.No. SWF027168)
MAGED LABIB KARAS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Joshlyn R. Pulliam,
Judge. Affirmed.
Maged Labib Karas, in pro. per.; James M. Kehoe, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
At a hearing in June 2024, the trial court denied defendant and appellant Maged
Labib Karas resentencing relief under Penal Code section 1172.75 after his attorney
acknowledged defendant was ineligible because his five prior prison term enhancements
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(Pen. Code,1 § 667.5, subd. (b)) had been stricken on his appeal from his underlying
conviction. (See People v. Karas (Mar. 16, 2011, E049583 [nonpub. opn.] (Karas).)
Defendant appealed the denial of resentencing relief and, after reviewing the record and
resentencing under this section may be initiated by the original sentencing judge, a judge
designated by the presiding judge, or any judge with jurisdiction in the case.” (Italics
added.)
Section 1172.1 confers broad authority on the trial court to initiate recall and
resentencing. A prior version of the statute, former section 1170, subdivision (d)(1),
allowed a trial court, on its own motion, to recall a sentence within 120 days of
commitment and resentence a defendant. (Stats. 2020, ch. 29, § 14, eff. Aug. 6, 2020.)
Effective January 1, 2024, a few months before the hearing below in April 2024,
Assembly Bill No. 600 amended section 1172.1, subdivision (a), to provide that a trial
court may now, “on its own motion, within 120 days of the date of commitment or at any
time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently
changed by new statutory authority or case law” recall the sentence and commitment
previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if he or she had
not previously been sentenced. (Stats. 2023, ch. 446, § 2, italics added.)
Defendant concedes, as his attorney recognized below, that section 1172.1,
subdivision (c), expressly provides that a defendant “is not entitled” to ask for
resentencing relief “under this section.” Indeed, the statute states: “If a defendant
requests consideration for relief under this section, the court is not required to respond.”
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(Ibid.) Defendant nevertheless argues that this did not prevent the court from considering
him for resentencing under the statute on its own motion.
None of this lengthy preamble aids defendant given that, as set forth in section
1172.1, subdivision (c), the trial court’s decision is entirely discretionary. The statutory
language reflects a clear intent to leave to the trial court the decision whether to initiate
recall and resentencing on its own motion. Accordingly, the fact that the trial court could
do so does not provide grounds for defendant to assert error. The court recognized it had
that authority, but declined to exercise it. Any instruction from us on how to exercise
such discretion would be superfluous at best and, worse, an impermissible intrusion into
the trial court’s broad discretion.
Moreover, the abuse of discretion standard is a high bar, requiring the appellant to
show the court’s decision fell outside the bounds of reason (People v. Johnson (2022) 12
Cal.5th 544, 605-606), and defendant does not meet that burden. His supplemental brief
reflects only his belief that his Three Strikes, 36-year sentence constitutes
disproportionate, cruel and unusual punishment, particularly given his age now (63).
Such habeas-style claims are necessarily fact-intensive and thus, as the court explained,
well outside the scope of “what I’m hearing today, which is very limited as it relates to
your eligibility” under section 1172.75. Defendant did not and does not, suggest he had
no other avenues to have his claim heard. The court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to take up the matter on its own motion.
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order finding defendant ineligible for recall and resentencing
under section 1172.75, and denying him other relief, is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
FIELDS J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court correctly denied the defendant's request for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 because his prior prison term enhancements had been previously stricken, and the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to initiate a discretionary recall of the sentence under Penal Code section 1172.1.
Issues
Whether the defendant was eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 when his prior prison term enhancements had been stricken.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by declining to initiate a recall and resentencing of the defendant's sentence on its own motion under Penal Code section 1172.1.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Because defendant’s current judgment does not include a prison prior enhancement, the trial court did not err in concluding he did not qualify for recall and resentencing under the express terms of the statute.”
“The statutory language reflects a clear intent to leave to the trial court the decision whether to initiate recall and resentencing on its own motion.”
“The court recognized it had that authority, but declined to exercise it.”