People v. Sanchez CA4/3

Filed 11/18/24 P. v. Sanchez CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063888

v. (Super. Ct. No. INF1100417)

JESSE DANIEL SANCHEZ, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Riverside County, John D. Molloy, Judge. Affirmed. Request for judicial notice granted. James R. Bostwick, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, James M. Toohey, and Randall D. Einhorn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. * * * In 2012, a jury convicted Jesse Daniel Sanchez of second degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm; it also found he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. In 2023, Sanchez petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6, which limits accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. During the prima facie hearing on Sanchez’s petition, counsel for the prosecution and the defense agreed the jury was not instructed on the felony-murder rule, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other imputed malice theory. Based on counsels’ representations, the trial court denied Sanchez’s petition. Sanchez argues the trial court erred because the record did not contain a copy of the jury instructions, and the court improperly relied on counsels’ representations about those instructions. We are not persuaded. Sanchez cites no authority barring the court from relying on counsels’ representations about the instructions given. And to the extent the court erred, any alleged error was harmless. We have reviewed the jury instructions and confirmed the jury was not instructed on any imputed malice theory, so it is not reasonably probable there would be a different outcome if the court had personally reviewed the instructions.