Aldaco v. York Enterprises South CA4/2 (2024) · DecisionDepot
Aldaco v. York Enterprises South CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Nov 15, 2024 No. E080850Unpublished
Filed 11/15/24 Aldaco v. York Enterprises South CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
MARTHA ALDACO et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, E080850
v. (Super.Ct.No. CIVDS2011352)
YORK ENTERPRISES SOUTH, INC. et OPINION al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Janet M. Frangie,
Judge. Affirmed.
Knight Law Group, Roger Kirnos, Amy-Lyn Morse; Greines, Martin, Stein &
Richland, Cynthia E. Tobisman, Joseph V. Bui, Rachel A. Beyda, and Kent W. Toland
for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Horvitz & Levy, Lisa Perrochet, Shane H. McKenzie; Mortenson Taggart Adams,
Craig A. Taggart, and Michael Donn Mortenson for Defendants and Respondents.
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Martha Aldaco and Nayeli Hernandez sued Ford Motor Company (Ford) for
violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the Act). (Civ. Code, § 1790 et
seq.; unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code.) Plaintiffs primarily allege that Ford
failed to comply with the Act’s special remedial provisions after plaintiffs’ used Ford
Explorer could not be repaired. Specifically, the Act “requires a manufacturer to replace
LEXIS 6016, at pp. [4], 25] (Rodriguez II).) In light of Rodriguez II, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. The complaint
According to the allegations of the complaint, plaintiffs bought a used 2018 Ford
Explorer in August 2019. They purchased the car from Surf City Auto Group with
37,812 miles on the odometer. The Explorer came with express, written warranties from
Ford, as well as implied warranties of fitness and merchantability. The car was delivered
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to plaintiffs with serious defects and nonconformities that manifested during the express
warranty period. Plaintiffs took the car to an authorized Ford service representative, and
Ford was unable to conform the car to the express warranty after a reasonable number of
repair attempts. Ford also did not promptly replace the car or make restitution in
accordance with the Act.
On the basis of the foregoing allegations, the complaint alleges three causes of
action under the Act: breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, and
violation of section 1793.2 (the refund-or-replace provision). The complaint also alleges
a fourth cause of action for negligent repair against the authorized Ford service
representative, York Enterprises South Inc. That cause of action is not involved in this
appeal; the three causes of action at issue are alleged solely against Ford.
II. Ford’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
The Act’s refund-or-replace provision for motor vehicles applies to “a new motor
vehicle, as that term is defined in paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 1793.22.”
(§ 1793.2, subd. (d)(2).) Under section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2), a “‘[n]ew motor
vehicle’ includes . . . a dealer-owned vehicle and a ‘demonstrator’ or other motor vehicle
sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty.” In Rodriguez I, we held that the phrase
“‘other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty’” does not cover
“sales of previously owned vehicles with some balance remaining on the manufacturer’s
express warranty.” (Rodriguez I, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 215.) Rather, the phrase
refers to “essentially new” cars sold with a full manufacturer’s warranty. (Id. at pp. 215,
225.)
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We decided Rodriguez I in April 2022. (Rodriguez I, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
p. 209.) In May 2022, Ford moved for judgment on the pleadings as to all three causes of
action against it, arguing that Rodriguez I barred the causes of action as a matter of law.
Ford further argued that the Act did not permit implied warranty claims concerning used
vehicles against the manufacturer. Plaintiffs’ opposition argued that Rodriguez I was
wrongly decided and urged the trial court not to follow it.
The court ruled that Rodriguez I barred the causes of action against Ford and
granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court granted plaintiffs leave to
amend so that they could allege claims under the Commercial Code.
Plaintiffs apparently filed a first amended complaint, which is not part of the
record on appeal. The court sustained Ford’s demurrer to the first amended complaint
with leave to amend. Plaintiffs later agreed to dismiss their claims against Ford with
prejudice. The court entered judgment in favor of Ford and against plaintiffs.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We apply de novo review to the court’s order granting the motion for judgment on
the pleadings. (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515.) A motion
for judgment on the pleadings “is equivalent to a demurrer and is governed by the same
standard of review.” (Pang v. Beverly Hospital, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 986, 989
(Pang).) The moving defendant must show that the complaint fails to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).)
We accept as true all properly pled material facts but not contentions, deductions, or
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conclusions of fact or law. (Pang, at p. 989.) We affirm the judgment “if it is proper on
any grounds raised in the motion even if the court did not rely on those grounds.” (Ibid.)
DISCUSSION
I. Express warranty claims
Plaintiffs argue that the court erred by granting judgment on the pleadings with
respect to the causes of action for breach of express warranty and violation of section
1793.2. We disagree.
Under section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2), a manufacturer or its representative must
service or repair a “new motor vehicle” so that the vehicle conforms to the express
warranty. If the manufacturer or its representative is unable to do so after a reasonable
number of attempts, then the manufacturer shall promptly replace the new motor vehicle
or make restitution to the buyer. (§ 1793.2, subd. (d)(2).) The definition of new motor
vehicle for those purposes includes “a dealer-owned vehicle and a ‘demonstrator’ or other
motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty . . . . A demonstrator is a
vehicle assigned by a dealer for the purpose of demonstrating qualities and characteristics
common to vehicles of the same or similar model and type.” (§ 1793.22, subd. (e)(2).)
The text of the statute thus makes clear that dealer-owned vehicles and
demonstrators qualify as new motor vehicles for purposes of the refund-or-replace
provision. (Rodriguez II, supra, 2024 Cal. LEXIS 6016, at p. [8].) “‘What makes these
vehicles unique is that even though they aren’t technically new, manufacturers (or their
dealer-representatives) treat them as such upon sale by providing the same type of
manufacturer’s warranty that accompany new cars.’ [Citation.] In other words, they are
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vehicles for which a new car warranty ‘was issued with the sale.’” (Ibid.) “[T]he phrase
‘other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty’ is most naturally
understood to mean other vehicles for which such a warranty is issued with the sale.” (Id.
at p. [11].) Accordingly, that phrase does not apply to used cars “purchased with an
unexpired manufacturer’s new car warranty” unless that new car warranty was issued
with the sale of the used car. (Id. at p. [4].) “[I]f the Legislature had intended to define
‘“new motor vehicle” to include a potentially vast category of used cars’ with unexpired
new car warranties, ‘it would have been done so more clearly and explicitly than tucking
it into a reference to demonstrators and dealer-owned vehicles.’” (Id. at pp. [10]-11.)
In Rodriguez II, our Supreme Court interpreted the definition of new motor
vehicle in the foregoing manner. The court thus affirmed our decision that the Act’s
refund-or-replace provision did not cover the plaintiffs’ used Dodge Ram, which had a
balance remaining on the original five-year/100,000-mile limited powertrain warranty
when the plaintiffs bought the car. (Rodriguez II, supra, 2024 Cal. LEXIS 6016, at
pp. [4]-5.)
Like the used Dodge Ram in Rodriguez II, plaintiffs’ used Ford Explorer does not
qualify as a new motor vehicle for purposes of the refund-or-replace provision of the Act.
The complaint does not allege that Ford issued a new car warranty with the sale of the
Ford Explorer to plaintiffs. The circumstance that the car may have had a balance
remaining on an unexpired new car warranty did not render it a new motor vehicle for
purposes of the refund-or-replace provision. The trial court therefore did not err by
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granting Ford’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the express warranty and
section 1793.2 causes of action.1
II. Implied warranty claim
Plaintiffs argue that the court erred by granting judgment on the pleadings on the
implied warranty cause of action. They assert that the meaning of “new motor vehicle”
in the refund-or-replace provision is irrelevant (§§ 1793.2, subd. (d)(2), 1793.22, subd.
(e)(2)), because that provision concerns only express warranties, not implied warranties.
It is true that the refund-or-replace provision does not expressly concern implied
warranties, but it does not follow that the trial court erred.
The Act provides for manufacturers’ implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness when “consumer goods” are sold at retail. (§§ 1792, 1792.1.) “‘Consumer goods’
means any new product or part thereof that is used, bought, or leased for use primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes, except for clothing and consumables.” (§ 1791,
subd. (a).) Those implied warranties have a maximum duration of “one year following
the sale of new consumer goods to a retail buyer.” (§ 1791.1, subd. (c).) The one-year
1 Plaintiffs filed two motions for judicial notice. The first motion seeks judicial notice of legislative history materials and the briefs on appeal in Rodriguez I. The second motion seeks judicial notice of appellate briefs in a case that Rodriguez I and Rodriguez II discussed and distinguished, Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112 (Rodriguez I, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 223-224; Rodriguez II, supra, 2024 Cal. LEXIS 6016, at pp. [6], 22-23), and more legislative history materials. Ford also filed a motion for judicial notice. Ford’s motion seeks judicial notice of legislative history materials, former sections of the Vehicle Code, two publications authored by the Department of Consumer Affairs, one of the appellate briefs in Jensen, and the CARFAX ownership history report for plaintiffs’ Ford Explorer. We deny all three motions for judicial notice because the materials are unnecessary to our resolution of this appeal. (County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 613, fn. 29.) 7
implied warranties binding manufacturers thus apply only to sales of new goods, not used
goods like plaintiffs’ used Ford Explorer. (Rodriguez I, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 218.)
The Act “‘provides similar remedies in the context of the sale of used goods,
except that the manufacturer is generally off the hook.’” (Rodriguez II, supra, 2024 Cal.
LEXIS 6016, at p. [14].) Instead, “‘in the sale of used consumer goods, liability for
breach of implied warranty lies with distributors and retailers, not the manufacturer,’
unless the manufacturer issues a new warranty along with the sale of the used good.”
(Rodriguez I, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 218.) The implied warranties binding
distributors and retailers of used consumer goods “are shorter than the implied warranties
for new products; their maximum duration is three months.” (Ibid., citing § 1795.5, subd.
(c).)
“It is evident from these provisions that only distributors or sellers of used
goods—not manufacturers of new goods—have implied warranty obligations in the sale
of used goods.” (Ruiz Nunez v. FCA US LLC (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 385, 399; accord,
Victorino v. FCA US LLC (S.D. Cal. 2018) 326 F.R.D. 282, 300 [the Act imposes implied
warranty obligations for used goods on the distributor or retail seller of the used good
“and ‘not the original manufacturer, distributor, or retail seller’”]; Johnson v. Nissan
North America, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2017) 272 F.Supp.3d 1168, 1179 [the Act does not
impose any implied warranty obligations on the original car manufacturer with respect to
used goods].) According to the complaint, plaintiffs bought their used car from Surf City
Auto Group, not Ford. Surf City Auto Group may owe plaintiffs implied warranty
obligations, but there is no allegation that Ford was the “distributor or retail seller of [the]
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used” good such that Ford owed plaintiffs implied warranty obligations. (§ 1795.5.) The
court therefore did not err by granting Ford’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on
the implied warranty claim.
Plaintiffs contend that the court erred because its order relied only on
Rodriguez I’s interpretation of “new motor vehicle,” which does not concern implied
warranties. But Ford’s moving papers argued that “implied warranty claims concerning
used vehicles cannot be brought against the original manufacturer under” the Act, and its
papers cited relevant authorities for that proposition. We may affirm on any proper
“grounds raised in the motion even if the court did not rely on those grounds” in its order.
(Pang, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 989.) The court’s failure to address the implied
warranty authorities in its order thus does not show that the court erred.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Ford shall recover its costs of appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
MILLER J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a used vehicle purchased with an unexpired manufacturer's warranty does not qualify as a 'new motor vehicle' under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act's refund-or-replace provision, and that manufacturers do not bear implied warranty obligations for used goods.
Issues
Does a used vehicle sold with an unexpired manufacturer's warranty qualify as a 'new motor vehicle' under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act?
Does the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act impose implied warranty obligations on a manufacturer for the sale of a used vehicle?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“a used car like plaintiffs’ is not a new motor vehicle for purposes of the Act’s refund-or-replace provision”
“only distributors or sellers of used goods—not manufacturers of new goods—have implied warranty obligations in the sale of used goods.”