California Court of Appeal Nov 15, 2024 No. E082788Unpublished
Filed 11/15/24 P. v. Mendoza CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E082788
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF149675)
VICTOR JULIAN MENDOZA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.
Reversed with directions.
Christopher Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, Warren J.
Williams and Felicity Senoski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
In 2019, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the
Department) recommended that the superior court resentence Victor Julian Mendoza
under former Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) (former § 1170(d)(1)).
(Unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.) The court declined to follow the
existing law is a question of statutory interpretation, which we independently review.
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.)
In McMurray, the trial court summarily denied the Department’s recommendation
to recall and resentence under former section 1170(d)(1). (McMurray, supra, 76
Cal.App.5th at p. 1037.) The defendant appealed from that denial, and Assembly Bill
1540 became effective while the appeal was pending. (McMurray, at p. 1038.) The
1 “Section 1170.18, subdivision (c), defines an ‘“unreasonable risk of danger to public safety”’ as meaning ‘an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of’ subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv) of section 667. The eight felonies listed in that provision are referred to ‘as “super strikes.”’” (People v. Lewis (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 401, 409.)
6
Court of Appeal concluded that Assembly Bill 1540 applied to the defendant’s case
because it clarified former section 1170(d)(1). (McMurray, at pp. 1041-1042.)
Analyzing the legislative history of Assembly Bill 1540, McMurray reasoned that
“the Legislature repeatedly indicated that Assembly Bill 1540 was intended to ‘make
clarifying changes’ to former section 1170(d)(1), including specifying the required
procedure and guidelines when the [the Department] recommends recall and
resentencing.” (McMurray, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 1041.) McMurray noted that
various passages in the legislative history demonstrated that Assembly Bill 1540 was
enacted in part to clarify the Legislature’s intent regarding former section 1170(d)(1),
specifically “that trial courts should accept [the Department’s] resentencing
recommendations.” (McMurray, at p. 1040.) McMurray further explained that the
legislative history indicated that Assembly Bill 1540 also was enacted for the additional
purpose of “clarify[ing] certain aspects of former section1170(d)(1) that the appellate
courts had incorrectly interpreted, including that, ‘when a sentence is recalled or
reopened for any reason, in resentencing the defendant trial courts must apply [“]any
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion.”’” (McMurray, at
p. 1041.)
We agree with McMurray’s analysis of the legislative history of Assembly Bill
1540 and therefore also agree with the conclusion that Assembly Bill 1540 was enacted
to clarify former section 1170(d)(1). (McMurray, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1040-
1041; People v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1089-1090 [same]; People v. Braggs
7
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 809, 817 [same]; People v. Pierce (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1074,
1078 [same].) We therefore accept the People’s concession and conclude that the
amendments to former section 1170(d)(1) apply to the trial court’s consideration of the
Department’s recall and resentencing recommendation even though the court’s ruling
predated those amendments. (Carter, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 922.) We accordingly
reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider the Department’s recommendation
under the current version of section 1172.1. (McMurray, at p. 1039.)
In addition, as the People correctly acknowledge, the abstract of judgment dated
December 20, 2018 (the most recent version included in the limited record on appeal)
indicates that Mendoza’s sentence is 30 years four months. That differs from the
sentencing minute order and the prior versions of the abstract of judgment, all of which
reflect a sentence of 30 years three months. It is possible that the discrepancy is a clerical
error that has already been corrected while this appeal has been pending, and it is also
possible that Mendoza will be resentenced on remand, resulting in a new abstract of
judgment and rendering the issue moot. In any event, on remand the trial court should
ensure that the operative abstract of judgment is free of clerical errors. (People v.
Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [appellate court may order the correction of clerical
errors on its own motion]; see also People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855 [“Any
discrepancy between the judgment as orally pronounced and as recorded in the clerk’s
minutes or abstract of judgment is presumed to be the result of clerical error”].)
8
DISPOSITION
The order denying recall and resentencing is reversed, and the matter is remanded
to the trial court to consider whether to recall Mendoza’s sentence and resentence him in
accordance with section 1172.1.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
CODRINGTON J.
9
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that amendments to former Penal Code section 1170(d)(1), now codified as section 1172.1, clarify existing law and therefore apply to the trial court's consideration of a resentencing recommendation even if the initial ruling predated the amendments. The case was remanded for the trial court to reconsider the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's recommendation under the current statutory framework.
Issues
Whether amendments to former Penal Code section 1170(d)(1) (now section 1172.1) apply retroactively or clarify existing law regarding resentencing recommendations.
Whether the trial court must reconsider a denied resentencing recommendation in light of the procedural and substantive requirements of section 1172.1.
Disposition. Reversed and remanded
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“A statute that merely clarifies, rather than changes, existing law is properly applied to transactions predating its enactment.”
“We agree with the People, reverse the order rejecting the recommendation to resentence, and remand for reconsideration of the Department’s recommendation under section 1172.1.”