People v. Strouth CA4/1

Filed 11/5/24 P. v. Strouth CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082822

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN344793)

DAVID STROUTH,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, David G. Brown, Judge. Affirmed.

Carl Fabian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Rogers, Britton B. Lacy, and Matthew Mulford, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

In 2017, a jury convicted David Strouth of second degree murder (Pen.

Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)). The jury also found true that Strouth personally used a knife in the commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The court sentenced Strouth to prison for an indeterminate term of 15-years-to- life plus a one-year determinate term for the knife enhancement. We affirmed the judgment against Strouth in an unpublished opinion. (See People v. Strouth (Oct. 22, 2019, D073335).) In 2023, Strouth filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.91, subdivision (b), which the trial court denied. Strouth appeals, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in denying his petition. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The underlying facts of Strouth’s offense are not pertinent for resolution of the issues presented. Suffice it to say, Strouth stabbed the victim to death and was convicted of second degree murder. After his conviction, Strouth moved for a new trial wherein he argued that it was undisputed at trial that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and thus, he could not form the requisite mens rea to commit murder. The trial court disagreed, finding the jury was properly instructed and substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict. Strouth also brought a motion based on the Eighth Amendment that his conviction should be reduced to voluntary manslaughter. The court denied this motion as well, but in doing so, considered Strouth’s military service as well as his PTSD diagnosis. The court subsequently sentenced Strouth to prison but not without further discussion of the impact of PTSD on Strouth and his actions.