Sunline Transit Agency v. Raeck CA4/2 (2024) · DecisionDepot
Sunline Transit Agency v. Raeck CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Oct 9, 2024 No. E081735Unpublished
Filed 10/9/24 Sunline Transit Agency v. Raeck CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
SUNLINE TRANSIT AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E081735
v. (Super.Ct.No. CVPS2301604)
JOSEPH RAECK, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Arthur C. Hester,
Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art VI, §21.) Reversed with directions.
Joseph Raeck, in pro. per. for Defendant and Appellant.
Palmer Kazanjian Wohl Hodson, Christopher F. Wohl, Hallie R. Spaulding,
Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, and H. Mae G. Alberto for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
1
Plaintiff and respondent SunLine Transit Agency (SunLine) petitioned for a
workplace violence restraining order protecting Gloria Salazar (Salazar) from defendant
and appellant Joseph Raeck (Raeck). (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.8.) Following an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the restraining order through June 7, 2026.
Raeck raises three issues on appeal. First, Raeck contends the trial court erred by not
to permit me to cross-examine the petitioner during the evidentiary hearing egregiously
violated [due process]. By constraining my ability to challenge the petitioner’s
assertions and scrutinize the veracity of their testimony, the court effectively deprived
me of a critical mechanism for defending myself against baseless accusations . . . .” In
sum, Raeck provided the basic information needed for an appellate argument.
Therefore, we reject SunLine’s assertion that Raeck forfeited the contention.
“ ‘Not every instance in which a cross-examiner’s question is disallowed will
[the] defendant’s right to a fair hearing be abridged, since the matter may be too
unimportant [citations], or there may be no prejudice [citation], or the question may
involve issues which can be brought up at a more appropriate time [citation]. However,
where the subject of cross-examination concerns the matter at issue there can be no
doubt that the refusal to permit such question[ing] results in a denial of a fair hearing.’ ”
(McCarthy v. Mobile Cranes, Inc. (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 500, 507.)
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When arguing in the trial court, Garcia asserted that SunLine sought the
restraining order as “a form of retaliation” for past workplace disagreements, such as
Garcia advocating for better working conditions. Raeck joined in Garcia’s arguments.
If cross-examination had been permitted, Garcia and/or Raeck could have asked
SunLine’s witnesses if they had motives to lie when testifying, e.g., retaliatory motives.
Thus, cross-examination likely would have concerned the matter at issue. As a result,
the error requires reversal. (CSV, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th 125 [“Because we cannot
know what [the witnesses] would have said on cross-examination, or the effect such
testimony might have had on the trial court’s decision, [so] the error requires
reversal”].)
SunLine contends the error was harmless because Raeck “was provided ample
opportunity to be heard by the court and present contradictory evidence at the hearing.”
Contrary to SunLine’s position, opportunities to provide direct evidence and argument
are not substitutes for cross-examination. Indeed, “[t]he importance of cross-
examination cannot be doubted: ‘Cross-examination is the principal means by which
the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.’ ” (In re Brenda
M. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 772, 777.) For example, “ ‘the cross-examiner has
traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness.’ ” (Ibid.) We have no
means of knowing what relevant information, if any, Raeck would have produced if
given the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. Therefore, the error is prejudicial.
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B. REMAINING ISSUES
Because we are reversing and ordering a new hearing, Raeck’s remaining
contentions have been rendered moot. (Schoshinski v. City of Los Angeles (2017) 9
Cal.App.5th 780, 791 [issue is moot when no further relief can be provided].)
Therefore, we will not address the merits of whether the trial court erred by admitting
hearsay and proceeding without the former general manager’s testimony.
DISPOSITION
The restraining order is reversed. The trial court is directed to hold a new
evidentiary hearing within 30 days of the issuance of the remittitur. (Hall v. Superior
Court (1955) 45 Cal.2d 377, 381 [“ ‘[A]n unqualified reversal remands the cause for a
new trial . . . and places the parties in the trial court in the same position as if the cause
had never been tried, with the exception that the opinion of the court on appeal must be
followed so far as applicable’ ”]; Heinfelt v. Arth (1935) 4 Cal.App.2d 381, 383 [same
rule].) The trial court shall notify the parties of the scheduled hearing. The restraining
order shall remain effective until the conclusion of the new hearing or 30 days after
issuance of the remittitur if no hearing takes place.1 If a hearing occurs, and the trial
court again grants the restraining order, it may issue a permanent restraining order
through June 7, 2026, or for a lesser period. (In re Marriage of D.S. and A.S. (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 926, 937-938.) If the trial court denies the petition for a restraining order,
1 The trial court previously denied SunLine’s request for a temporary restraining order, so we cannot order that the temporary restraining order be reinstated pending a new hearing.
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or if no hearing takes place, then the trial court shall issue an order terminating the
three-year restraining order. Raeck is awarded his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
FIELDS J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court's failure to permit the respondent to cross-examine witnesses during an evidentiary hearing for a workplace violence restraining order violated his due process rights and requires reversal.
Issues
Did the trial court err by denying the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses at a workplace violence restraining order hearing?
Did the defendant forfeit the right to challenge the denial of cross-examination on appeal?
Are the defendant's remaining claims regarding hearsay and witness testimony moot?
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“the trial court never invited Raeck to cross-examine SunLine’s witnesses.”
“the respondent has a due process right to cross-examine the witness with respect to those allegations.”
“opportunities to provide direct evidence and argument are not substitutes for cross-examination.”