Another Corporate ISP v. Creely CA1/2

Filed 9/19/24 Another Corporate ISP v. Creely CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

ANOTHER CORPORATE ISP LLC, Plaintiff and Respondent, A169280 v. ELIZABETH CREELY et al., (San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. CCH23585730) Defendants and Appellants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 On October 9, 2023, the trial court entered workplace violence protective orders against Jay Edward Martin and Elizabeth Creely under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.82 at the request of respondent Another Corporate ISP, LLC, DBA MonkeyBrains (MonkeyBrains), protecting two MonkeyBrains employees, Rudy Rucker and Alejandro Menendez. In relevant part, section 527.8 authorizes the issuance of an injunction at the request of “[a]ny employer, whose employee has suffered unlawful violence or

1We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) We do not recite the factual and procedural background because our opinion is unpublished and the parties know, or should know, “the facts of the case and its procedural history.” (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851 [unpublished opinion merely reviewing correctness of trial court’s decision “does not merit extensive factual or legal statement”].) 2 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

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a credible threat of violence from any individual, that can reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace, . . . on behalf of the employee and, at the discretion of the court, any number of other employees at the workplace . . . .” (§ 527.8, subd. (a), italics added.) Martin now appeals, raising a single issue.3 He states, “The case law cited by Monkeybrains, as we read it, doesn’t support workplace violence restraining orders in this case. Appellant [asks] this court to review the arguments made to the trial court.” As we understand his position, as clarified by his reply brief, section 527.8 does not apply because the violence, threats and harassment that Marin, Creely and others directed at MonkeyBrains’ employees were carried out by them on a vacant parcel abutting MonkeyBrains’ property (i.e., a warehouse) and not within the actual perimeter of MonkeyBrains’ property lines. We reject this argument, for several reasons. First, Martin has not persuaded us of any error. We presume that the trial court’s ruling is correct, and it is an appellant’s burden to persuade us both of an error and that the appellant was prejudiced as a result. (See Grappo v. McMills (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1006 [calling such framework “[t]he most fundamental principle of appellate review”].) To do this, “ ‘an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.’ ” (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146 (United Grand