California Court of Appeal Sep 12, 2024 No. E074012BUnpublished
Filed 9/12/24 P. v. Reaza CA4/2 Opinion following order vacating prior opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E074012
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF113648)
RONNIE CRUZ REAZA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Lynda A. Romero, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, and Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant Ronnie Cruz Reaza filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code former section 1170.95,1 which the superior court summarily
denied. On appeal, defendant contended the court erred in summarily denying his
petition without affording him the opportunity to file a reply to the People’s opposition.
In an unpublished opinion filed October 8, 2021, we affirmed, holding that the
jury’s true finding on the gang murder special circumstance rendered defendant per se
ineligible for resentencing on his murder conviction.2 By order dated April 24, 2024, the
California Supreme Court ordered the matter transferred to this court with directions to
vacate our decision and reconsider the matter in light of People v. Curiel (2023) 15
Cal.5th 433, 448 (Curiel).
In his supplemental brief on remand, defendant contends the holding in Curiel that
a jury’s true finding on a gang murder special circumstance is insufficient alone to find a
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
Effective June 30, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended and renumbered Penal Code section 1170.95 as section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
2 We also held that the superior court properly denied defendant’s petition as to his attempted murder conviction because then existing legislation did not extend relief to convictions for attempted murder. On December 22, 2021, the California Supreme Court granted review of our decision and transferred the matter back to us with directions to vacate our opinion and reconsider the cause in light of Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2021, ch. 551), which extended former section 1170.95 relief to those convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter effective January 1, 2022. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 223, fn. 3.) On March 18, 2022, we issued a new opinion in which we reversed in part and remanded the matter for reconsideration by the trial court as to whether defendant was entitled to relief solely on this attempted murder conviction.
2
defendant ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law, requires that we reverse
and remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing. The People concede the matter must
be reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. We agree with the parties.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
Defendant was the driver involved in a drive-by shooting committed with a
shotgun; one person was killed and another injured. Officers recovered a shotgun in a
vehicle driven by someone who testified that defendant had given him the shotgun. The
witness testified defendant told him to keep the shotgun because they had used it to shoot
at rival gang members. Defendant admitted to police that he drove the vehicle that night
and that his passenger had fired shots at the victims; however, defendant denied knowing
in advance that his passenger intended to shoot. (People v. Reaza, supra, E038773.)
On October 21, 2004, the People charged defendant by felony information with
personally discharging a firearm from a moving vehicle (§ 12034, subd. (c), count 3),
personally discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house (§ 246, count 4), and
being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1), count 5). As to the count
1 offense, the People further alleged that the murder was intentional and perpetrated by
the discharge of a firearm at another person from a motor vehicle (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21));
that defendant intentionally killed the victim to further the criminal activities of a
3 By order dated December 31, 2019, we took judicial notice of the record in defendant’s appeal from the original judgment. (People v. Reaza (Oct. 11, 2006, E038773) [nonpub. opn.]; see Evid. Code, § 459.)
3
criminal street gang while an active participant in a criminal street gang (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(22)); and that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)).
As to the count 2 offense, the People additionally alleged that a principal
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death.
(§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1).) As to counts 1 through 4, the People alleged that
defendant committed the offenses for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association
with a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b).) Finally, the People alleged defendant
had suffered a prior strike conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).)
The court instructed the jury with aiding and abetting principles (CALJIC
No. 3.01) and the natural and probable consequences doctrine (CALJIC No. 3.02).4 The
court gave the jury “special” instructions that “[a]iding and abetting the perpetrator of a
specific intent crime requires that the defendant share the specific intent of the
perpetrator. However, an aider and abettor will ‘share’ the perpetrator’s specific intent
when he or she knows the full extent of the preparator’s criminal purpose and gives aid or
encouragement with the intent or purpose of facilitating the perpetrator’s commission of
the crime.” “If you find the defendant guilty of Murder as charged in Count 1, or
Attempted Murder as charged in Count 2, as an aider and abettor, you need not find the
defendant personally premediated and deliberated, provided you find that the shooter did
4 The court identified the target crime of the natural and probable consequences instruction as discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling. (People v. Reaza, supra, E038773.)
4
premediate and deliberate.” The court also instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.81.22
on the requirements for finding true the intentional killing by an active street gang
member special circumstance: “it must be proved: [¶] 1. The defendant intentionally
killed the victim . . . .”
During closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury defendant was not the
shooter. The prosecutor also discussed the natural and probable consequences doctrine:
“But an aider and abettor need not deliberate and premediate. Basically, if the person
who commits the actual killing premediated and deliberated, and therefore, it’s first-
degree murder, and the defendant aided and abetted a premediated and deliberate murder,
a first-degree murder, he is also liable for first-degree murder as an aider and abettor. He
is liable for exactly the same crime as the person who pulls the trigger.”
On May 23, 2005, the jury found defendant guilty on all charges, including first
degree murder in count 1, and found all enhancement allegations true.5 The court
sentenced defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole; a consecutive term
of 25 years to life; a consecutive sentence of life with the possibility of parole, with a
minimum parole eligibility term of 30 years; a consecutive term of 25 years to life; a
consecutive term of 30 years to life; and a consecutive term of 16 years four months.
(People v. Reaza, supra, E038773.)
5 Defendant admitted suffering the prior strike conviction.
5
On appeal, defendant contended that the jury improperly convicted him of
discharging a firearm at another person from a vehicle, that insufficient evidence
supported the gang enhancements, and that the court improperly imposed various aspects
of his sentence. In an opinion filed October 11, 2006, this court affirmed the judgment
but ordered the determinate term vacated; the cause remanded for resentencing; ordered
the court to stay sentence on count 3, including the enhancement; and ordered the court to
strike the parole revocation fine. (People v. Reaza, supra, E038773.)
On January 7, 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to former
section 1170.95. On March 8, 2019, the People filed a response in which they argued, in
part, that defendant was ineligible for relief because he aided and abetted the offenses
with the intent to kill. The People noted that the jury had found true two special
circumstance findings that required an intent to kill: shooting from a motor vehicle
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21)) and active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(22)).6
At the hearing on April 19, 2019, the public defender noted, “We have not filed a
reply. We ask for a 90-day stay.” The court ordered the matter stayed. However, the
People asked to be heard, to which the court acquiesced. The People noted that the jury
had found true two special murder circumstances requiring that defendant had intended to
kill the victim. The court summarily denied the petition.
6 The People attached a copy of this court’s opinion in People v. Reaza, supra, E038773, to their response.
6
II. DISCUSSION
“The Legislature enacted Senate Bill [No.] 1437 ‘to more equitably sentence
offenders in accordance with their involvement in homicides.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§ 1(b).) The Legislature recognized, ‘It is a bedrock principle of the law and of equity
that a person should be punished for his or her actions according to his or her own level
of individual culpability.’ [Citation.] With this purpose in mind, Senate Bill [No.] 1437
‘amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is
not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in
the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ [Citation.]”
(Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 448.)
“‘“[I]f the record, including the court’s own documents, ‘contain[s] facts refuting
the allegations made in the petition,’ then ‘the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.”’” [Citation.] Consequently, ‘[i]f the petition
and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the
trial court may dismiss the petition.’ [Citation.]” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460.)
“While a finding of intent to kill does not, itself, suffice to refute a petitioner’s
allegation under section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3), a trial court does not end its prima
facie inquiry there. Other aspects of the record, such as additional jury findings, might be
relevant to the remaining elements of the relevant homicide offense and conclusively
refute a petitioner’s allegation that he or she could not be convicted of murder under
current law.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463.) A special circumstance finding
7
rendered prior to People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63
Cal.4th 522 likewise does “not have preclusive effect in resentencing proceedings under
section 1172.6.” (Curiel, at p. 464, citing People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 717-
718.)
“[T]he question is not whether it is likely a defendant could have felt and acted in
such a [sufficiently culpable] way, but whether the court’s jury instructions foreclose that
possibility as a matter of law. Only in the latter scenario would a trial court be permitted
to deny a defendant’s section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. [Citation.] In
other words, only in that scenario would the record of conviction ‘establish conclusively
that the defendant is ineligible for relief.’ [Citation.]” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 470.) “‘“This is a purely legal conclusion, which we review de novo.”’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.)
Here, like in Curiel, the court instructed the jury on aiding and abetting principles,
an underlying target offense, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and special
murder circumstance allegations. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 466-467.) Thus,
although “[t]he jury found [defendant] guilty of first degree murder and found true the
gang-murder special circumstance, . . . it was not required to identify which theory it
found persuasive.” (Id. at p. 467.) For section 1172.6 purposes, “Assuming the jury
relied on the then-available natural and probable consequences doctrine to convict
[defendant] of murder, . . . the jury’s factual findings [are] insufficient under current law
based on the absence of the last element of direct aiding and abetting, the aider and
abettor’s actus reus.” (Curiel, at p. 467.)
8
In other words, for a court to summarily deny a section 1172.6 petition, it must be
able to find that “the aider and abettor must have [had] ‘knowledge of the unlawful
purpose of the perpetrator’ and ‘the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or
facilitating’ the commission of the offense. [Citation.] Alternatively, in the context of
implied malice murder, the aider and abettor must know the perpetrator intends to
commit a life-endangering act, intend to aid the perpetrator in the commission of that act,
know the act is dangerous to human life, and act in conscious disregard for human life.”
(Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 468.)
“Under the court’s instructions, the jury was not required to make these findings.
Because the jury was instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the
jury was required to find only that [defendant] knew that [the shooter] intended to
commit one of the underlying target offenses and that [defendant] intended to aid him in
that offense, not murder. Nor was the jury required to find that the underlying target
offenses, themselves, were dangerous to human life. While the jury separately found
[defendant] intended to kill, such an intent standing alone is insufficient to establish the
requisite mens rea for aiding and abetting murder.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 468.)
“Indeed, a defendant could act with intent to kill but at the same time believe the actual
perpetrator could never risk harm to another human being—and be genuinely surprised
when the actual perpetrator commits a life-endangering act.”7 (Id. at 470, fn. omitted.)
7 Although the Curiel court noted, “We have characterized this scenario—where a defendant is liable for murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and acts with malice aforethought, but is not liable as a direct aider and abettor—as ‘quite [footnote continued on next page]
9
“Although intent to kill is certainly blameworthy, it is insufficient standing alone
to render a person culpable for another’s acts. The aider and abettor must know the direct
perpetrator intends to commit the murder or life-endangering act and intend to aid the
direct perpetrator in its commission. It is this mental relationship to the perpetrator’s acts
that confers liability on the aider and abettor.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 468.)
Thus, again, “under the jury instructions here, the findings the jury must have
made are insufficient to conclusively establish that [defendant] is liable for murder under
current law. The jury could have relied on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine to convict [defendant] of murder, and the findings required under that theory—
even when combined with the finding of intent to kill required by the gang-murder
special circumstance—do not encompass all of the elements of any theory of murder
under current law. These findings were therefore insufficient to rebut [defendant’s]
allegation that he could not be convicted of murder under current law, and the trial court
erred by denying [defendant’s] petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage.”
(Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 471.)
narrow’ and relevant only to a ‘very small set of cases.’ [Citation.] But the question is not whether it is likely a defendant could have felt and acted in such a way, but whether the court’s jury instructions foreclose that possibility as a matter of law. Only in the latter scenario would a trial court be permitted to deny a defendant’s section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. [Citation.] In other words, only in that scenario would the record of conviction ‘establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief.’ [Citation.]” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 470.)
10
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s petition is reversed. The matter is remanded with
directions to issue an order to show cause under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), and to
hold a hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(1). We express no opinion on
whether defendant would be entitled to relief following the hearing.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
RAPHAEL J.
11
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a jury's true finding on a gang murder special circumstance is insufficient as a matter of law to establish a defendant's ineligibility for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, necessitating an evidentiary hearing.
Issues
Whether a gang murder special circumstance finding conclusively refutes a defendant's eligibility for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law.
Whether the trial court erred in summarily denying the resentencing petition at the prima facie stage.
Disposition. Reversed and remanded
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“the trial court erred by denying [defendant’s] petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage.”