People v. Johnson CA2/4

Filed 8/29/24 P. v. Johnson CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B331996

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. GA030918) v.

LA’MIN JOHNSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed. William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND1 In 1999, a jury convicted defendant of numerous crimes, including one count of first degree murder, and found true special circumstance allegations that the murder was committed during the commission of a burglary. Defendant was 23 years old at the time of the murder. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), plus 19 years. In April 2023, defendant filed a motion under Penal Code2 section 1203.1 for a proceeding under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, seeking to make a record of mitigating evidence for a future youth offender parole hearing under section 3051. The trial court denied the motion, finding section 3051 excluded individuals, such as defendant, serving LWOP sentences for offenses committed after reaching 18 years of age.3 The court also rejected defendant’s equal protection claim based on the separate treatment of juvenile and non-juvenile, youthful offenders sentenced to LWOP. The court did not address defendant’s contention that section 3051, by rendering him ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing, made his sentence cruel or unusual punishment.