Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) · DecisionDepot

Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc.

Name: California Superior Court Tentative Rulings
Creator: DecisionDepot
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

California Supreme Court Aug 1, 2024 No. S271721Published

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

TINA TURRIETA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LYFT, INC., Defendant and Respondent; MILLION SEIFU et al., Movants and Appellants.

S271721

Second Appellate District, Division Four B304701

Los Angeles County Superior Court BC714153

August 1, 2024

Justice Jenkins authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, and Groban concurred.

Justice Kruger filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Groban concurred.

Justice Liu filed a dissenting opinion in which, Justice Evans concurred.

TURRIETA v. LYFT, INC. S271721

Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

The California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) has statutory authority to collect civil penalties from employers that violate certain provisions of the Labor Code. The Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.)1 authorizes “aggrieved” employees (§ 2699, subd. (a)) — defined in part as “any person who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed” (§ 2699, subd. (c)(1)) — to bring an action to recover the civil penalties on the state’s behalf after the LWDA, having been notified of the alleged violations, declines to pursue them (id., subd. (a); § 2699.3). In such actions, the LWDA generally receives the majority of any recovered penalties and “the aggrieved employees” receive the remaining amount. This case involves what has become a common scenario in PAGA litigation: multiple persons claiming to be an “aggrieved employee” within the meaning of PAGA file separate and independent lawsuits seeking recovery of civil penalties from the same employer for the same alleged Labor Code violations. Tina Turrieta, Brandon Olson, and Million Seifu each worked as a driver for Lyft, Inc. (Lyft) and each filed a separate action seeking civil penalties under PAGA for Lyft’s alleged failure to

1 All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Labor Code.

TURRIETA v. LYFT, INC. Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J.

Related research

state in a single suit,” the dissent states that “our trial courts” have faced — and therefore are “equipped” to deal with — “such complexity arising from multiparty litigation.” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 14–15.) But in matters involving the statutes the dissent cites, courts will not face the type of complex intervention question presented here: may multiple private plaintiffs who have filed separate actions asserting identical claims, all representing the same state interest, intervene in the action of another private plaintiff. The qui tam statutes the dissent cites, by their terms, preclude this scenario, by providing that once a private person files an action, no other private person may do so based on the same underlying facts. (Gov. Code, § 12652, subd. (c)(10) [“When a person brings an action under this subdivision, no other person may bring a related action based on the facts underlying the pending action”]; Ins. Code, § 1871.7, subd. (e)(5) [“When a person . . . brings an action under this section, no person other than the district attorney or [insurance] commissioner may . . . bring a related action based on the facts underlying the pending action unless that action is authorized by another statute or common law”].) In actions under these other qui tam statutes, the only other potential litigants will be government officials. (Gov. Code, § 12652, subds. (a)(1) [authorizing “the Attorney General” to “bring a civil action”], (b)(1) [authorizing the “prosecuting authority of [the affected] political subdivision” to “bring a civil action”]; Ins. Code, § 1871.7, subd. (d) [authorizing “The district attorney or [insurance] commissioner” to “bring a civil action”].) Perhaps more importantly, unlike PAGA, which is silent as to intervention, the qui tam statutes the dissent cites contain extensive and detailed provisions expressly addressing this subject. These provisions specify, among other things, who may

The dissent alternatively argues that “making PAGA litigation more difficult” by allowing plaintiffs in overlapping actions to intervene and “disrupt[] settlements” is “entirely consistent with” the Legislature’s “intent.” (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at pp. 16–17.) For this proposition, the dissent relies on the Legislature’s expansion of the judicial approval requirement to all proposed PAGA settlements in order to “ ‘make it far more difficult for parties to settle’ ” based “ ‘exclusively on’ ” their own interests and “ ‘to the exclusion of’ ” others “ ‘whose interests’ ” the plaintiff “ ‘purportedly’ ” represents. (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 17.) From this, the dissent reasons, it follows that the Legislature would happily sacrifice the “expedien[t]” resolution of PAGA claims for “appropriately valued agreements.” (Ibid.) For several reasons, we are unpersuaded by the dissent’s analysis of the Legislature’s intent. First, insofar as intervening plaintiffs and their counsel seek to take over and control another plaintiff’s PAGA action — which, as earlier noted, is what Olson requested here in his proposed complaint in intervention — their participation would create delay and complexity of an entirely different order than would the statutory judicial approval requirement. Second, the dissent’s analysis ignores the financial interest that intervening plaintiffs and their counsel — but not courts — have in the original plaintiff’s action and its settlement. In light of this financial interest, we do not share the dissent’s view that the Legislature’s decision to require approval of all PAGA settlements by neutral judges indicates or in any way suggests a legislative “goal of” allowing financially interested PAGA plaintiffs in overlapping actions — represented by financially interested counsel — to “disrupt[] settlements” through intervention on behalf of the state. (Dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 17.)

action,” “to intervene as a named party in [Uribe’s] lawsuit to oppose the settlement.” (Uribe, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 989.) Garibay, who “opted out of the class action component of Uribe’s lawsuit” (id. at p. 990), thereafter filed a complaint in intervention in Uribe’s action that “expressly stated” an overlapping PAGA claim (id. at p. 1001). After the trial court approved the settlement and entered a judgment confirming it, Garibay appealed. (Id. at p. 989.) The Court of Appeal held that she had “standing” on appeal “to challenge the settlement’s PAGA component” (id. at p. 991) because (1) by intervening, she had officially “becom[e] a party of record” (id. at p. 1000), and (2) the “PAGA cause of action” she had asserted “in [Uribe’s] lawsuit” by filing the complaint in intervention “was resolved against her” by “the other parties’ settlement of Uribe’s PAGA claim” (id. at p. 1001). Of significance to our analysis, the Court of Appeal in Uribe declared the Court of Appeal’s decision in Turrieta to be “distinguishable.” (Uribe, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 1002.) The Uribe court expressly “decline[d] to” consider whether “the trial court’s intervention rulings” were correct. (Id. at p. 1002, fn. 4.) Instead, it “presume[d]” those rulings were “correct” (id. at p. 1002) because no one had challenged them on appeal. Thus, Uribe simply did not consider whether a PAGA plaintiff’s authority includes the right to intervene in another aggrieved employee’s separate PAGA action. Moreover, the lynchpin of the Uribe court’s standing analysis was that (1) Garibay formally asserted a “PAGA cause of action in [Uribe’s] lawsuit” by filing a complaint in intervention and becoming a named party (id. at p. 1001, italics added), (2) the PAGA cause of action “was resolved against her” by “the other parties’ settlement of Uribe’s PAGA claim” (ibid.), and (3) the cause of action would be

“does not limit the right to intervene to any particular kind or class of actions or proceedings” and that a plaintiff who is “the real party in interest” was therefore “clearly interested in the matter in litigation” and thus could intervene].) In PAGA suits, like other qui tam actions, “[t]he government entity on whose behalf the plaintiff files suit is always the real party in interest.” (Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 382 (Iskanian), abrogated in part on other grounds by Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639.) Further, the basic premise that a real party in interest is nevertheless a “nonparty” who can intervene under section 387 is consistent with federal precedent. In United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. New York City (2009) 556 U.S. 928, a federal False Claims Act case, the high court held that the United States, despite being the “ ‘real party in interest’ ” in the action, was not a “ ‘party’ ” to a qui tam action for the purpose of determining notice of appeal filing timelines. (Id. at p. 934.) The high court explained, “[T]he United States’ status as a ‘real party in interest’ in a qui tam action does not automatically convert it into a ‘party.’ ” (Ibid.) “The phrase, ‘real party in interest,’ is a term of art utilized in federal law to refer to an actor with a substantive right whose interests may be represented in litigation by another.” (Id. at pp. 934–935.) Plaintiff Tina Turrieta and defendant Lyft, Inc. argue that because analogous qui tam actions, such as suits under the California False Claims Act, include express provisions for state intervention (see Gov. Code, § 12652, subds. (a)(3), (f)(2)(A)), while PAGA does not, we can infer from PAGA’s silence the Legislature’s intent to disallow state intervention in the PAGA context under section 387. But the various provisions for state intervention in the California False Claims Act are designed to

Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

More from California Supreme Court

Related research

AI Brief