California Court of Appeal Jul 25, 2024 No. E082777Unpublished
Filed 7/25/24 P. v. Rockwell CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E082777
v. (Super.Ct.No. INF1600287)
JEREMY JAY ROCKWELL, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Dean Benjamini, Judge.
Dismissed.
Jeremy Jay Rockwell, in pro. per.; and Charles Thomas Anderson, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant Jeremy Jay Rockwell appeals from certain postjudgment
orders that we discuss post. Appointed counsel found no issues of arguable merit to raise on
appeal, filed a brief stating as much under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo), and notified defendant of the opportunity to file a supplemental brief, as did
this court. Defendant filed a supplemental brief that raises a new issue unrelated to his
postjudgment sentencing challenges that the trial court denied. This new challenge is
1544.) As we explain, counsel correctly determined a no-issue brief was warranted because
the orders defendant challenges were not appealable or, even assuming they might be,
defendant is not entitled to relief on the motions he made.
More specifically, as to defendant’s appeal challenging denial of increased
presentence custody credits, counsel aptly identified competing authority about whether
such matters are appealable years after a defendant’s conviction and sentence are final and
the defendant has been serving his or her prison term, as here. (Compare People v. Codinha
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 990 [“unauthorized sentence” rationale may afford avenue for
appellate challenge] with People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 641-642 [unauthorized
sentence doctrine may relieve initial waiver of a sentencing challenge, but inapplicable if
sentencing court no longer has jurisdiction].)
This court recently aligned with King, explaining in a case involving presentence
custody credits under sections 2933.1 and 4019, as here, that because the defendant “began
serving his prison sentence years ago,” the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear his
recalculation request, rendering the resentencing order it issued “void, not simply voidable.”
(People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 71 (Boyd).) As Boyd reiterated: “‘Under the
general common law rule, a trial court is deprived of jurisdiction to resentence a criminal
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defendant once execution of the sentence has commenced.’” (Id. at p. 65.) In Boyd, as here
and unlike in Delgadillo or analogous postjudgment cases, the defendant’s underlying
conviction and sentence were not only long since final, but “no law allowing for recall of his
sentence applie[d].” (Boyd, at p. 74; compare, e.g., Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216
[decided in context of section 1172.6’s recall and resentencing procedure].)
Boyd further explained that the bare passage of time does not leave the defendant
without a remedy in meritorious cases. (Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 71 [quoting
King: “‘A defendant who is serving a longer sentence than the law allows may challenge
the sentence in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus’”].) Boyd treated the defendant’s
appeal as an appellate petition for habeas corpus where it was clear the defendant was
entitled to the presentence custody credits he sought, even though the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to award them. (Boyd, at p. 72.)
Not so here. There is no reason for us to wade into the complex issues of
appealability discussed in Codinha, King, and Boyd, or to request briefing on those issues in
the context of a no-issue Delgadillo brief. Whether we were to find defendant’s custody
credits claim appealable or nonappealable, he would not be entitled to appellate relief or
relief by habeas corpus. Instead, as the trial court explained in its order denying relief,
section 2933.1 applies to limit his credits because of his violent GBI offense. (See, e.g.,
In re Pacheco (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1441-1442 [GBI enhancement limits custody
credits to 15 percent].) Counsel’s no-issue brief thus succinctly cut the Gordian knot of
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merits questions bound up with appealability ones: no hope of success on the former moots
the latter here.
The same is true regarding defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s denial of his
request to serve his misdemeanor sentence in prison as opposed to jail. As in Boyd and
unlike in Delgadillo, there does not appear to be any “law allowing for recall of
[defendant’s] sentence” to consider this question. (Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 74.)
Defendant’s motion referenced the enactment of Senate Bill 132 but identified no sentence
recall provision in it, and we are aware of none.
In any event, whether we were to conclude the court’s denial of defendant’s letter
request was not appealable under King and Boyd, or alternately that it is appealable under
Codinha or somehow under Senate Bill 132 or otherwise, there is no arguable issue with a
“reasonable potential for success” in defendant’s appeal (Johnson, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at
p. 109). Simply put, the trial court correctly concluded there was no basis for it to grant
defendant sentencing relief—at least at the time defendant made his motion. Defendant’s
motion demonstrated neither that the court erred at the original sentencing hearing in
ordering the misdemeanor portion of the sentence to be served in jail, nor, in the event of
changed circumstances since then, that the question of what happens at the end of
defendant’s lengthy prison sentence has in fact become ripe.
Further, defendant did not identify basic prerequisites for the trial court to grant
relief, such as: a source of authority for the court to order that his misdemeanor sentence be
served in prison rather than jail; a mechanism for the court to recall his sentence for
8
resentencing to do so; defendant’s administrative efforts, if any, to remain in CDCR custody
at the end of his sentence (e.g., asking CDCR, the county jail administrator, or the district
attorney to request recall and sentencing to that effect, see § 1172.1, subd. (a)(1)) or, as
grounds for habeas relief, that defendant has no adequate remedy at law. At a more granular
level, defendant also did not assert or show, for instance, that CDCR has classified
defendant as a transgender person or that Senate Bill 132 does not apply to require county
jail measures or accommodations a transgender person may seek to pursue if placed in a
county facility. Counsel’s no-issue brief silently but correctly cut through all of these
omissions. In sum, any question of appealability that we might ordinarily address outside
the no-issue briefing context is mooted by the absence of merit in defendant’s appeal. There
is no reason to request additional briefing or to treat defendant’s appeal of the order as a
habeas petition.
One issue remains. In defendant’s supplemental brief, defendant argues the trial
court erred at sentencing by “imposing the 364 days for the misdemeanor battery” in count 7
because section 242 “only carries a maximum of six months.” (Citing § 243, subds. (a),
(b).) Defendant’s plea agreement provided for the year term minus a day, but he asserts he
“was not fully advised that the 364 days imposed carries more time than prescribed by
statute.” (But see § 243, subd. (e)(1) [misdemeanor battery term in circumstances of
domestic violence is “not more than one year”].) Defendant does not seek to withdraw his
plea. He does not identify any change in the punishment for battery since he was sentenced
that would provide for recall and resentencing. (See, e.g., § 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).)
9
Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that defendant’s new challenge is cognizable
because defendant claims the 364-day term was unauthorized at the time it was imposed, the
challenge fails. “[T]he ‘unauthorized sentence’ concept constitutes a narrow exception to
the general requirement that only those claims properly raised and preserved by the parties
are reviewable on appeal.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354.) “[A] sentence is
generally ‘unauthorized’ where it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in
the particular case.” (Ibid.) Defendant has not made that showing here. (§ 243,
subd. (e)(1).)
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s contentions for postconviction relief are without merit, including in
defendant’s supplemental brief. There is no reason to treat defendant’s appeal of the trial
court’s denial of defendant’s postjudgment resentencing requests as a habeas petition. The
appeal is therefore dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
RAPHAEL J.
10
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court dismissed the appeal because the defendant's challenges to postjudgment orders regarding custody credits and sentencing location lacked merit and failed to establish a basis for relief. The court further held that the defendant's supplemental claim regarding the length of his misdemeanor sentence was meritless under the applicable statute.
Issues
Whether the trial court's denial of a request to modify presentence custody credits was an appealable order and whether the denial was erroneous.
Whether the trial court's denial of a request to serve a misdemeanor sentence in state prison rather than county jail was an appealable order and whether the denial was erroneous.
Whether the defendant's 364-day sentence for misdemeanor battery was unauthorized under the law.
Disposition. dismissed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The appeal is therefore dismissed.”
“Defendant’s contentions for postconviction relief are without merit, including in defendant’s supplemental brief.”