Leibrand v. Superior Court CA1/2

Filed 7/24/24 Leibrand v. Superior Court CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

JOHN LEIBRAND, Petitioner, A170134 v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF (San Francisco County THE CITY AND COUNTY OF Super. Ct. Nos. 23010138, SAN FRANCISCO, 23012495 & 23018799; App. Div. Nos. Respondent; APP-24-008753, THE PEOPLE, APP-24-008754 & Real Party in Interest. APP-24-008757)

BY THE COURT:*

Petitioner John Leibrand challenges orders denying his motions to dismiss misdemeanor charges against him on the ground his statutory speedy trial rights were violated. (Pen. Code,1 § 1382.) As explained below, petitioner is entitled to have the charges dismissed.

* Stewart, P. J., Richman, J., and Mayfield, J. (Judge of the

Mendocino County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution). 1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

1

The San Francisco County District Attorney filed three misdemeanor complaints against petitioner that include charges of battery and contempt of court. In each of the cases, petitioner declined to waive his right to a speedy trial. It is undisputed that trial did not commence in any of the three cases before the statutory last day to do so under section 1382. Petitioner filed motions to dismiss in each of the cases contending that his statutory speedy trial rights had been violated. In response, the People filed a memorandum conceding that no good cause existed for the delay in bringing the matters to trial. The court denied the three motions in lengthy but identical orders that justified the delay due to “exceptional and extraordinary circumstances” related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Petitioner thereafter sought writ relief in the appellate division of the superior court, which denied his petitions in a single order. Following that denial, petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition in this court along with a request for a stay of an imminent trial. We issued an immediate stay of trial and requested preliminary briefing. We also gave notice that we might issue a peremptory writ in the first instance. (See Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 177–180 (Palma).) In response to our briefing request, the People filed a letter brief agreeing with petitioner that there was no good cause shown to continue the cases beyond the last statutory day to commence trial. The People concede the superior court should have dismissed the cases under section 1382.