People v. Ammar CA1/4

Filed 7/24/24 P. v. Ammar CA1/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A168658 v. SHEHAB AMMAR, (Lake County Super. Ct. No. CR967082) Defendant and Appellant.

Shehab Ammar pled no contest to stalking his former girlfriend. He now appeals two conditions of his probation, arguing that they are so open- ended that they constitute an improper delegation of judicial authority. The first, labeled Condition 6, states that Ammar is to “participate effectively in those programs of counseling in which they are directed to participate by the probation officer,” and the second, enumerated as Condition 24, states that he is to participate effectively “in any program addressing employment, education, or other rehabilitative services as directed by the probation officer and/or jail staff.”1 We agree that some clarification is warranted and therefore remand to the trial court.

1We use the numbering in the court’s sentencing minutes rather than

the numbering in the probation report (cited by Ammar).

BACKGROUND Over several months, Ammar repeatedly sent his former girlfriend Facebook messages threatening her and her family’s safety. Ammar later showed up at her place of work, a hair salon, prompting her to lock the door and shut the blinds while she worked. Ammar pled no contest on count I of felony stalking. (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a).)2 The trial court suspended Ammar’s sentence and placed him on three years of probation subject to a number of conditions, including the two challenged in this appeal.

DISCUSSION As an initial matter, although Ammar concedes that he did not object to either condition in the trial court, the Attorney General acknowledges that the claims are not forfeited because they raise a facial constitutional challenge that does not depend on scrutiny of the facts developed below. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887.) A constitutional challenge to a probation condition presents a question of law that we review de novo. (In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143.) Under the separation of powers doctrine, executive or administrative officers cannot exercise or interfere with judicial authority. (In re Danielle W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1227, 1235.) “[C]ourts may not delegate the exercise of their discretion to probation officers.” (In re Pedro Q. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1368, 1372.) “[I]t is the court’s duty to determine the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer.” (People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902 (Smith).) “By leaving key determinations to be decided ad hoc, a vague probation condition may . . . result in an impermissible delegation of authority to the probation officer.” (Ibid.) When