Key takeaways
- The Supreme Court of the United States held that federal courts lack the authority to create new causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute for international law violations.
- The Court determined that the Torture Victim Protection Act does not permit liability based on aiding and abetting.
- Justice Barrett authored the slip opinion for the Court during the October Term 2025.
- The decision significantly limits the scope of class action lawsuits brought under both statutes.
The Decision
On June 23, 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its decision in Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe, fundamentally altering the mechanics of international human rights litigation in federal courts. The Court held that federal courts lack the authority to create new causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute for international law violations. Furthermore, the Court determined that the Torture Victim Protection Act does not allow for liability based on aiding and abetting.
Justice Barrett authored the slip opinion for the Court during the October Term 2025. The ruling limits the scope of class action lawsuits brought under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act, closing the door on two of the primary legal theories plaintiffs have used to sue corporate defendants for overseas conduct.
Why It Matters
The decision effectively ends the era of federal judges recognizing implied claims for international human rights violations. By ruling that federal courts lack the authority to create new causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute, the Supreme Court has centralized that power entirely within the legislative branch. This means that unless Congress has explicitly passed a statute creating a civil cause of action for a specific international law violation, plaintiffs cannot sue for it in federal court under the Alien Tort Statute.
Equally significant is the Court's strict interpretation of the Torture Victim Protection Act. Determining that the statute does not allow for liability based on aiding and abetting insulates secondary actors from civil liability in US courts. In the context of class action litigation, plaintiffs frequently name multinational corporations as defendants, arguing that the companies provided technology, funding, or logistical support that aided foreign governments in committing torture. This ruling eliminates that theory of secondary liability, requiring plaintiffs to prove direct perpetration by the defendant to sustain a claim.
Who Should Care
For lawyers
Defense counsel representing technology companies, defense contractors, and other multinational corporations will find immediate utility in this ruling. The elimination of implied causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute provides a categorical defense against novel international law claims. Defense attorneys can now move to dismiss such claims at the pleading stage by pointing to the lack of an explicit statutory cause of action. Similarly, the rejection of aiding-and-abetting liability under the Torture Victim Protection Act offers a clear mechanism to dismiss complaints targeting secondary corporate conduct.
Plaintiffs' attorneys must fundamentally reevaluate their dockets and case strategies. Relying on federal common law to expand actionable international norms is no longer a viable strategy. Class action practitioners will face steep hurdles in certifying classes against corporate defendants, as they must now find explicit statutory authorization for their claims and prove direct, rather than secondary, involvement in the alleged abuses.
For consumers and parties
For individuals and foreign nationals seeking redress for international human rights violations, the avenues for recovery in US courts are now substantially narrower. Plaintiffs can no longer sue corporations in federal court simply by alleging that the company aided or abetted torture overseas under the Torture Victim Protection Act. They also cannot ask judges to recognize new types of international law violations under the Alien Tort Statute. This shifts the burden entirely to Congress to explicitly define what overseas conduct can trigger a lawsuit in the United States. Victims of international abuses will find it exceedingly difficult to hold secondary actors accountable in federal court.
Legal Background
The Alien Tort Statute is a brief jurisdictional provision that grants federal district courts original jurisdiction over civil actions brought by an alien for a tort committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. For decades, a central debate in federal jurisprudence was whether this jurisdictional grant carried an implicit authorization for federal courts to recognize federal common law causes of action for a modest number of international law violations. Plaintiffs frequently utilized the statute to bring class action lawsuits against corporations for alleged complicity in overseas human rights abuses.
The Torture Victim Protection Act, by contrast, provides a specific, explicitly legislated civil cause of action. It allows individuals to sue those who, acting under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation, subject an individual to torture or extrajudicial killing. Before the Supreme Court issued its decision in Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe, a recurring question in federal litigation was whether civil liability under the statute extended to secondary actors who aided and abetted the primary abusers. Plaintiffs often relied on aiding-and-abetting theories to reach corporate defendants with deep pockets, arguing that the companies facilitated the primary actors' conduct.
What the Court Did
In Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe, the Supreme Court dismantled the framework that allowed federal judges to infer new causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute. Justice Barrett's opinion concluded that the authority to create new causes of action rests exclusively with the legislative branch, not the judiciary. Because the Alien Tort Statute is strictly jurisdictional, it does not independently authorize courts to fashion new federal claims for international law violations. The Court emphasized the separation of powers, noting that recognizing new claims requires policy judgments that belong to Congress.
Turning to the Torture Victim Protection Act, the Court analyzed the statutory text to determine the scope of liability. The Court determined that the statute does not allow for liability based on aiding and abetting. The text targets the individuals who directly perpetrate the acts, and the Court declined to read secondary liability into the statute where Congress did not expressly provide it. By strictly adhering to the text, the Court foreclosed the use of aiding-and-abetting theories to hold secondary actors liable for torture or extrajudicial killings.
How It May Be Applied
The immediate effect of the ruling limits the scope of class action lawsuits brought under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act. Lower federal courts will likely dismiss pending claims that rely on implied causes of action or secondary liability theories under these statutes. Corporate defendants facing such claims will undoubtedly cite the June 23, 2026 decision in motions to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs lack a valid cause of action.
An open question remains regarding how plaintiffs might attempt to frame their claims moving forward. Without the ability to allege aiding and abetting under the Torture Victim Protection Act, plaintiffs may try to argue that a corporate defendant's actions constituted direct perpetration. However, establishing direct perpetration by a corporation presents a significantly higher evidentiary burden than proving secondary assistance. Additionally, the complete bar on judicial creation of new Alien Tort Statute claims means plaintiffs must search for other explicit statutory vehicles to bring human rights class actions in federal court, or they may increasingly look to state courts and state law tort claims to seek redress.
Summary of Legal Framework Changes
| Legal Issue | Prior Framework | New Framework Under Cisco v. Doe |
|---|---|---|
| Alien Tort Statute (ATS) | Courts debated whether the ATS allowed judges to recognize new implied claims for international law violations. | Federal courts lack the authority to create new causes of action under the ATS for international law violations. |
| Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) | Plaintiffs frequently argued that secondary actors could be held liable for aiding and abetting primary abusers. | The TVPA does not allow for liability based on aiding and abetting. |
| Corporate Liability | Corporations faced class actions based on theories of secondary liability and implied international law claims. | The ruling limits the scope of class action lawsuits, requiring explicit statutory claims and direct perpetration. |
Plain-English Explanation
In simple terms, the Supreme Court has decided that federal judges cannot invent new types of lawsuits for international human rights violations just because a general law gives them jurisdiction over those cases. If victims want to sue a company for helping someone else commit torture overseas, they cannot use the Torture Victim Protection Act to do so, because the law does not explicitly mention "aiding and abetting." Congress must write a specific law allowing those exact claims if they want them to be heard in US federal courts. This decision makes it much harder to bring class action lawsuits against companies for human rights abuses that happen in other countries.
This article is general legal information and commentary about legal developments. It is not legal advice, does not address your specific situation, and is not a substitute for advice from a licensed attorney. Reading this article and contacting us through this website do not create an attorney-client relationship.
Sources & authorities
- Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe — source
- Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe — source
- Cisco Systems Inc v. Doe — source
Further reading
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