Jane Doe vs. Dignity Health

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list. Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away.

Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form

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to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff’s motion to compel the deposition of defendant Dignity Health’s (“DH”) person most qualified (“PMQ”) re: Gregory Harms was continued to this date to permit the parties to further meet-and-confer on various issues and to submit a Joint Statement identifying those remaining disputes which require judicial resolution. The Court has received the parties’ Joint Statement filed on 10/15/2025 and now rules as follows.

Factual Background

In this action, plaintiff seeks to recover damages resulting from a sexual assault allegedly committed by now-dismissed defendant Gregory Harms in December 2016, when the latter was a nurse employed by defendant DH. In her complaint, plaintiff alleges inter alia that defendant Dignity Health negligently hired, supervised and/or retained defendant Harms. Trial is currently set for 2/23/2026.

In 2021, Harms was convicted of the rape of two other women, one in 2011 while he was employed by Kaiser and the other in 2019 while he was employed by Vibra Hospital of Sacramento, but he was not convicted of raping plaintiff in 2016. Harms is currently appealing the convictions.

On 2/7/2025, plaintiff served a Second Amended Notice of Deposition of defendant DH’s PMQ on 30 different topics all of which relate to defendant Harms, along with 32 different requests for production of documents relating to defendant Harms. The PMQ deposition was noticed for 2/18/2025 and on 2/11/2025, DH timely served written objections to the deposition notice, not only to the 30 different topics but also the accompanying requests for production. Nevertheless, DH agreed to produce witnesses on several of the specified topics and the deposition commenced on 2/18/2025 but was ultimately suspended.

On 5/1/2025, plaintiff filed a motion to compel DH’s PMQ testimony relating to topic Nos. 1-25 and 29 as well as the documents responsive to requests for production Nos. 1, 3-19 and 26-31 and to have this Court “overrule the objections of [DH] as to these areas of inquiry, order the production of the requested documents, and order that the deposition be reconvened at the expense of the party being deposed.”

Defendant DH’s opposition takes issue with plaintiff’s “unorthodox approach” to this deposition and maintains that DH’s “efforts to complete appropriate discovery have been genuine and designed to deliver competent witnesses to discuss discoverable,

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relevant, and admissible evidence about this lawsuit,” ultimately arguing plaintiff’s motion to compel should be denied.

Based on the Joint Statement filed on 10/15/2025, the parties “made significant headway on a plan that included an orderly production of witnesses and documents” but “two general categories of dispute regarding what information is discoverable” remain. (Jt. Stm., p.8:1-5) These relate to the following:

(1) Complaints, concerns, investigation, reporting, and/or employment action regarding defendant Harms which do not involve sexual misconduct; and (2) Complaints, concerns, investigation, reporting, and/or employment action about narcotics misappropriation/misuse by defendant Harms. (Jt. Stm., p.8:6-9.)

Plaintiff’s Position. According to plaintiff, she is merely attempting “to do precisely what the Court [in its 8/13/2024 Order] left open the door for Plaintiff to do – pursue discovery through depositions and more particular document requests.” (Jt. Stm., p.8:13-15.) More specifically, plaintiff contends she is “entitled to explore through deposition the information which may be contained within the personnel file” and furthermore, she “is now entitled to Harm’s personnel file.” (Id., at p.8:15-19.) With respect to the latter, plaintiff insists that newly-discovered information “seems to conflict with the verified discovery responses provided by [DH], which the Court relied on in its August 2024 Order” on plaintiff’s earlier motion to compel DH’s further responses to Requests for Production, Set Two. (Id., at p.8:19-22.)

In particular, DH previously indicated that defendant Harms was not identified as a potential suspect when plaintiff first reported in January 2017 she had been raped and that the first time DH learned Harms might have acted inappropriately toward plaintiff was when plaintiff filed this litigation in 2021. Then, on this basis, DH “withheld documents and information claiming it had neither investigated Harms nor placed him on leave in connection with allegations of sexual misconduct, including those by Plaintiff” but plaintiff now insists “[t]his is not true.” (Jt.

Stm., p.8:23-p.9:2.) Plaintiff claims she has in the interim learned not only that DH’s ICU manager, Ms. Connie Barnes, reported to the Sacramento Police on 1/19/2017 Mr. Harms had been identified as one of two male nurses who tended to plaintiff on the dates the rapes occurred but also that by the next day, DH had interviewed Harms about Plaintiff’s rape allegations and placed him on administrative leave pending investigation. (Id., at p.9:3-9.)

Plaintiff adds that through deposition testimony, she has learned DH has kept “diligent records of its investigation into Plaintiff’s allegations” including (1) DH’s identification of the two male nurse suspects; (2) witness interviews; (3) the decision to place the male nurse suspects on leave pending investigation; and (4) the investigatory findings. (Jt.

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Stm., p.9:10-14.) Although the Joint Statement does not expressly say this, plaintiff appears to be suggesting not only that documents on these four matters are contained in defendant Harms’ personnel file but also that she is now entitled to all documents on these four matters.

Defendant’s Position. DH maintains it has not prevented discovery or testimony relating to complaints against Harms about sexual misconduct but DH’s prior Risk Manager, Ms. Erin Weeden, testified there were none, something which was previously disclosed in discovery back in 2023. (Jt. Stm., p.9:23-p.10:2.) While conceding that the Court’s 8/13/2024 Order on plaintiff’s Requests for Production, Set Two indicated some of the information sought by plaintiff in those requests for production could be pursued through deposition, DH “does not read the [8/13/2024] order to require a designated [DH] PMQ make an inquiry to Human Resources about what is in [Harms’] personnel file” which either pertains to narcotics misappropriation/misuse or does not involve sexual misconduct and “then reveal that private information at deposition,” as this would be “tantamount to turning over the personnel file” (Id., at p.10:3-11) and which the 8/13/2024 Order explained is protected under the constitutional right to privacy.

More specifically, DH claims the 8/13/2024 Order determined that any documents within Harms’ personnel file on the topic of narcotics were not discoverable and plaintiff had failed to explain how misconduct related to such medications had any relevance to the sexual misconduct allegations at issue in this case but nevertheless permitted plaintiff to inquire whether witnesses were aware of information acquired from nonprivate or nonprivileged/nonconfidential means (i.e., other than through “a protected process under Evidence Code section 1157, Business & Professions Code section 805, or the Patient Safety Work Product Privilege). (Jt. Stm., p.10:12-18.) According to DH, plaintiff deposed defendant Harms and obtained answers on many of these topics, including suspensions and termination. (Id., at p.10:19-22.)

DH adds that the present discovery dispute is a result of counsel’s “dramatically different[]” view of the existing evidence. Plaintiff claims DH and/or its counsel have been dishonest about whether defendant Harms was in January 2017 considered a suspect in plaintiff’s rape but this “accusation is simply false,” as even the investigating police testified that Harms was not initially considered a “suspect.” Similarly, while plaintiff asserts newly discovered information “seems to conflict with discovery responses provided by [DH]” about when the latter first learned Harms may have acted inappropriately towards Plaintiff,” DH’s earlier response (which was not cited by plaintiff) remains accurate. (Jt.

Stm., p.11:4-24.) Moreover, plaintiff’s reference to “new” evidence relating to DH’s initial efforts to investigate plaintiff’s January 2017 rape allegations having been uncovered since the Court issued the 8/13/2024 Order is likewise misleading inasmuch as plaintiff has long had access to information on this

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investigation including but not limited to Miss Weeden’s 1/20/2017 incident report sent to the California Department of Public Health (“CDPH”), which was produced to plaintiff in 2022 and subsequently cited in 2023. (Id., at p.11:25-p.13:9.) In short, contrary to plaintiff’s characterization, “the fact that Mr. Harms and another male nurse worked as Plaintiff’s nurse during the time period of the alleged rapes has been around since long before the Court’s August 2024 Order, and there are no new facts necessitating an upending of the prior Court order,” nor is the pending discovery motion the appropriate vehicle to change the 8/13/2024 Order. (Id., at p.13:10-p.14:16.)

In the end, DH contends plaintiff “has failed to carry her burden to overcome the important protections applicable to the disputed issues, i.e., privacy, privileges, and confidentiality,” thereby warranting denial of this motion as it pertains to those issues remaining in dispute. (Jt. Stm., p.14:17-21.)

Discussion

As noted above, the 10/15/2025 Joint Statement indicates the parties have “made significant headway on a plan that included an orderly production of witnesses and documents” but confirms that “two general categories of dispute regarding what information is discoverable” remain. (Jt. Stm., p.8:1-5.) (The Court greatly appreciates all counsel’s meet-and-confer efforts which has helped conserve finite judicial resources.) The Joint Statement characterizes the remaining dispute as relating to the following subject matters:

(1) Complaints, concerns, investigation, reporting, and/or employment action regarding defendant Harms which do not involve sexual misconduct; and (2) Complaints, concerns, investigation, reporting, and/or employment action about narcotics misappropriation/misuse by defendant Harms. (Jt. Stm., p.8:6-9)

Curiously, little of plaintiff’s rather limited argument on Pages 8-9 of the Joint Statement seems to directly address either of these two general areas of dispute. As such, either the Joint Statement fails to accurately summarize the true nature of the dispute remaining between the parties relative to this PMQ deposition or plaintiff has not meaningfully advanced arguments germane to the disposition of the two broad categories of dispute cited in the Joint Statement. Nevertheless, the Court shall proceed in order to provide clarity and resolution of this matter.

A. First, while plaintiff insists she is merely attempting “to do precisely what the Court [in its 8/13/2024 Order] left open the door for Plaintiff to do” and is “entitled to explore through deposition the information which may be contained within the personnel file” (Jt. Stm., p.8:13-18), this is a largely inaccurate oversimplification of what the 8/13/2024

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Order does (and does not) say. Contrary to plaintiff’s suggestion, the 8/13/2024 Order did not either explicitly or implicitly authorize plaintiff to refine and transform the requests for production at issue in August 2024 into a multiplicity of topics for a deposition of DH’s PMQ relating to the contents of defendant Harms’ personnel file and/or other documents which may pertain to him. Instead, the 8/13/2024 Order was, first and foremost, directed at the specific issues presented by the parties in their papers and the Court therein determined whether plaintiff had met her burden of showing entitlement to further responses to any of the subject requests for production.

In doing so, each individual request or group of related requests was considered and the Court then analyzed the parties’ respective arguments. The end result was that the motion was denied as to most of the requests and granted as to request Nos. 77-83 [generally seeking documents provided to or obtained from the California Department of Public Health] but “only to the extent that [DH] is indeed not withholding any documents on the basis or privacy or privilege ”

But particularly significant here, given plaintiff’s current claim of being “entitled to explore through deposition the information contained within [Harms’] personnel file,” is the Court’s discussion relating to request Nos. 69, 71 and 85-84, which requests seek the following:

[D]ocuments related to investigations of any misconduct by Harms, a complete investigation file regarding allegations Harms misappropriated and/or misused medication during his employment, interviews regarding any misconduct by Harms, complaints regarding any misconduct by Harms, documents related to discipline of Harms at any time, documents related to termination, paid and unpaid leave, documents related to “medical paraphernalia” found in Harms’ locker, and Harms’ complete personnel file.” (8/13/2024 Order, p.4.)

The Court continued, stating in pertinent part:

Here, there is no question that employment records are protected by the right to privacy. “It is clear personnel records and employment history are within the [privacy] protection provided by the state and federal Constitutions.” [Citations omitted.] “A showing of relevancy may be enough to cause the court to balance the compelling public need for discovery against the fundamental right of privacy. [citation] However, the balance will favor privacy for confidential information in third party personnel files unless the litigant can show a compelling need for the particular documents and that the information cannot reasonably be obtained through depositions or from nonconfidential sources.” [Citations omitted.]

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The subject requests are broadly worded and seek essentially the entirety of Harms’ personnel file. The requests cover such topics as discipline and leave with no limitation on the reasons for the discipline or leave, any investigation regarding any misconduct whatsoever, pictures of “medical paraphernalia” in Harms’ locker, and even Harms’ complete personnel file. Plaintiff argues that any privacy interest is slight and outweigh her interest in obtaining the documents, which her own papers concede are “in [Harms’] personnel file, and nowhere else.” Plaintiff cites to a case stating that “the compelling social interests in disclosure of information relating to sexual predators of children outweigh the Individual Friars’ privacy interests.” (In re The Clergy Cases I (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1235.)

To the extent that Plaintiff cites this case for the proposition that any time sexual misconduct is at issue that a privacy interest is outweighed, the Court disagrees. The information to be released therefore went directly to the specific misconduct which was at issue in the underlying action. Here, however, the requests at issue relate to matters that may have nothing whatsoever to do with the sexual misconduct at issue in the action and are not directly relevant to the claims at issue. Plaintiff does not explain how any compelling interest supports disclosure of documents which do not directly relate to any sexual misconduct and implicate an obvious invasion of privacy given that at least some of the requests seek the entirety of Harms’ personnel file.

Plaintiff simply argues that she “must obtain the documents in order to facilitate the ascertainment of truth in this legal proceeding.” But Plaintiff draws no connection to the specific requests, none of which are tailored to any allegation of sexual misconduct, and how disclosure facilitates her stated goal. The Court would acknowledge that if Dignity was attempting to avoid disclosure of documents which were related to any investigation into Harms’ sexual misconduct, then the analysis would be different.

But Dignity agreed to produce such documents and there is no claim that it is withholding anything with respect to any sexual misconduct.

Plaintiff fails entirely to explain how evidence regarding misconduct related to medications has anything to do with the sexual misconduct at issue in this case such that any information contained in Harms’ file related to medications are essential to a fair resolution of this lawsuit. There are no allegations that Plaintiff was injured by any conduct related to any claimed misconduct related to medications, and no explanation as to how that medication misconduct could relate to Dignity’s knowledge of the alleged unfitness of Harms which allegedly harmed Plaintiff.

In addition, even if Plaintiff had showed the direct relevance of the requested documents (e.g. documents other than anything related to sexual misconduct)

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despite the conclusory claim, Plaintiff has not established that the requested information “cannot reasonably be obtained through depositions or from nonconfidential sources.” [Citations omitted.] In the moving papers, Plaintiff simply asserts that the documents are not available through less intrusive means. (Mot. 6:19-21.) But Plaintiff has made no showing that the information Plaintiff seeks to obtain can only be located in Harms’ employment file and cannot be obtained through nonconfidential sources. There is no evidence that Plaintiff has sought to take the deposition of any Dignity employee (or even Harms himself) and asked directed questions regarding Harms. The Court sees no reason why interrogatories or depositions cannot be used, or at a minimum, attempted, as opposed to the broad requests above.

As a result, the motion is denied as to the subject requests and no further response is required. The Court need not, and does not, address any other objections asserted in response to the requests, including the objection based on Evidence Code §1157. The Court expresses no opinion as to whether any more narrowly tailored requests for production might by appropriate.

(8/13/2024 Order, pp.4-6.)

Although it is true that this 8/13/2024 Order certainly did not preclude plaintiff from pursuing depositions in an attempt to obtain some of the information otherwise encompassed by the broad array of documents sought by the second set of requests for production at issue in the 2024 motion to compel, the Court simply did not necessarily “open the door” for plaintiff then to obtain through depositions any or all of the information which may be reflected in Harms’ personnel file. After all, the 8/13/2024 Order definitively found that plaintiff’s requests for production relating to matters like discipline and leave with no limitations or qualifications, investigations regarding any type of misconduct, “medical paraphernalia” in Harms’ locker, and his complete personnel file were not justified because such matters have no direct correlation with the specific sexual misconduct at issue in this case and plaintiff had failed to show how such unrelated issues would be essential to a fair resolution of this lawsuit, meaning that plaintiff had fallen short of the heightened burden necessary to overcome the privacy rights found applicable to Harms’ personnel file.

This remains true here as plaintiff has again failed to provide sufficient justification for such a wide-ranging invasion of Harms’ privacy rights applicable to any and all matters in his personnel file which have still not been shown to have direct relevance to the allegations of Harms’ sexual misconduct in this case and/or DH’s knowledge of Harms being unfit for employment or otherwise essential to a fair resolution of this lawsuit. Thus, the Court must reject plaintiff’s broad and conclusory assertion that the Court’s

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8/13/2024 Order left the door open for her to explore through deposition any and all of the information contained in Harms’ personnel file. Plaintiff’s claim of now being “entitled to explore through deposition the information contained within the personnel file” (Jt. Stm., p.8:17-18) seems to disregard entirely the protection afforded by the constitutional right to privacy and the heightened burden plaintiff must overcome to invade this zone of privacy. As explained in the 8/13/2024 Order, a party seeking discovery of private matters must show more than the typical relevance of the information sought and must demonstrate not only that the private matters are “directly relevant” to the claims at issue and essential to a fair resolution of the lawsuit but also that the information is not available from nonconfidential sources and there is no less intrusive means to obtain the information. (See, e.g., Alch v.

Superior Court (Time Warner Entertainment Co.) (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1432-1433 [party seeking discovery of private matters must show that the information sought is “directly relevant” to the parties’ claims and “essential” to a fair resolution of the lawsuit]; Tien v. Superior Court (Tenet Healthcare Corp.) (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 528, 539-540 [discovery must be “narrowly tailored” and there is no less intrusive means to obtain the information].) Unless and until plaintiff can satisfy these prerequisites for the Court to consider before determining whether her proposed invasion of Harms’ constitutional right to the privacy of his personnel file is warranted, plaintiff’s conclusory and unqualified claim of being “entitled to explore through deposition the information contained within the personnel file” remains legally infirm.

In light of the foregoing, the Court is inclined to agree with defendant DH’s suggestion that it is not obliged to designate a person to review the entirety of Harms’ personnel file and then to testify orally as to all of its contents, as this would essentially render moot the entirety of the privacy protections on which the 8/13/2024 Order was at least in part based. This would, in turn, effectively preclude plaintiff from using this PMQ deposition as a means to inquire into matters contained in Harms’ personnel file which generally relate to any narcotics misappropriation/misuse by him and to any other misconduct not of a sexual nature insofar as such matters would not be “directly relevant” to the issues presented in this case or essential to a fair resolution of the lawsuit.

However, as DH appears to concede, plaintiff remains free to explore whether there may be information from other non-privileged and/or non-confidential sources bearing on such topics since the privacy rights already found specifically applicable to Harms’ personnel file would not be implicated.

Finally, it is worth adding here that the 8/13/2024 Order did not address the application of the protections afforded by Evidence Code §1157 [peer review], Business & Professions Code §805 [peer review], or the Patient Safety Work Product Privilege which defendant DH suggests would preclude plaintiff from obtaining other information relating to any narcotics misappropriation/misuse by Harms and/or other misconduct not

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of a sexual nature. Notably, plaintiff did not address any of these privileges/protections in the Joint Statement and as such, defendant DH remains free to assert objections based on any or all of these provisions if and when implicated by deposition questions but again, plaintiff is entitled to explore whether the PMQ witnesses may have information relating to complaints, concerns, investigations, reports and/or employment actions regarding defendant Harms which are not based solely on what is contained in his personnel file or in other documents subject to some privilege or protection from disclosure.

B. As noted above, plaintiff further contends in her portion of the Joint Statement that she is now actually “entitled to Harm’s personnel file” (Jt. Stm., p.8:19) but the Court finds no legitimate legal or factual basis for such a contention. As detailed above, the Court has already determined that Harms’ personnel file is entitled to protection under the constitutional right to privacy and as such, plaintiff is not entitled to any portion of the personnel file unless and until she makes the requisite showing not only that the information sought is “directly relevant” to the allegations in this litigation and essential to a fair resolution of the lawsuit but also that the information is not available from nonconfidential sources and there is no less intrusive means to obtain the information.

Plaintiff has not here satisfied this heightened burden to obtain discovery of the private matters contained in Harms’ personnel file and she does not in the Joint Statement even appear to address the relevant considerations for overcoming these privacy rights. In the end, for the same reasons set forth in the 8/13/2024 Order relating to plaintiff’s Requests for Production, Set Two, this Court concludes that plaintiff is not entitled to the production of any particular part of Harm’s personnel file, much less all of it.

While plaintiff insists that newly-discovered information “seems to conflict with the verified discovery responses provided by [DH], which the Court relied on in its August 2024 Order” relating to plaintiff’s earlier motion to compel further responses to Requests for Production, Set Two (Jt. Stm., p.8:19-22), the Court is not persuaded that the purported conflict in DH’s earlier discovery responses which plaintiff has described now justifies the unqualified production of any, much less all, of Harm’s personnel file.

First, aside from the discrepancies which plaintiff has identified in DH’s earlier discovery responses being far from clear and definitive, plaintiff’s suggestion that the 8/13/2024 Order denying her request for production of the entire personnel file for defendant Harms turned on the Court’s ‘reliance on’ the accuracy of DH’s discovery response is not borne out by this Court’s reading of the 8/13/2024 Order. As explained above, the Court in the 8/13/2024 Order determined plaintiff was not entitled to the personnel file because she had failed to make the heightened showing needed to overcome the protections afforded to the personnel file by virtue of the constitutional right to privacy.

Second, plaintiff’s claim of discovering new evidence showing that Harms was placed

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on leave in January 2017 pending DH’s investigation of the former’s rape allegations (Jt. Stm., at p.9:3-9) does not now justify an order compelling production of the personnel file to the extent plaintiff clearly claims to already have evidence Harms being placed on leave in January 2017 and this alone would, in turn, effectively preclude a finding that the information sought from the personnel file cannot be obtained from any other nonconfidential source. In short, because plaintiff already has information that Harms was placed on leave in January 2017, there is no valid legal basis for this Court to here authorize the invasion of Harms’ right to privacy in his personnel file and the information contained therein.

Finally, plaintiff maintains that DH has kept “diligent records of its investigation into Plaintiff’s allegations” including (1) DH’s identification of the two male nurse suspects; (2) witness interviews; (3) the decision to place the two male nurse suspects on leave pending investigation; and (4) the investigatory findings. (Jt. Stm., p.9:10-14.) However, it is not clear to this Court that any or all of the records on these four topics would necessarily be contained in defendant Harms’ personnel file but even if they were, plaintiff has at this point failed to make the heightened showing necessary to justify an order compelling their production.

As discussed above, before the Court will consider compelling production of some or all of Harms’ personnel file which has already been found to be protected from disclosure by virtue of the constitutional right to privacy, plaintiff must demonstrate not only that the information sought is “directly relevant” to the allegations in this litigation and essential to a fair resolution of the lawsuit but also that the information is not available from nonconfidential sources and there is no less intrusive means to obtain the information.

Plaintiff’s portion of the Joint Statement fails to discuss these essential elements and consequently, necessarily fails to establish that the information contained in the records on these four topics is not available from nonconfidential sources or that there is no less intrusive means to obtain the information. Thus, on the present record, the Court will not at this time order production of the personnel file in its entirety or even as to the records on these four topics identified by plaintiff.

C. Plaintiff’s additional suggestion that the 8/13/2024 Order implicitly authorized plaintiff to serve “more particular document requests” (Jt. Stm., p.8:13-15) and DH would be obligated to comply with the revised document requests is similarly unfounded. Although it is true that the 8/13/2024 Order highlighted the unnecessarily broad scope of a number of the Requests for Production, Set Two at issue, this was not the primary justification for denial of plaintiff’s earlier motion. Instead, as explained above, the predominant factor why the motion was denied as to plaintiff’s request for production of Harms’ personnel file and various documents likely to be found there was the constitutional privacy rights associated with those documents and information reflected therein and plaintiff’s failure to make the showing necessary to overcome such

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protections. More to the point, the 8/13/2024 Order specifically stated at the bottom of Page 6:

The Court expresses no opinion as to whether any more narrowly tailored requests for production might by appropriate.

(8/13/2024 Order, p.6 (underline added for emphasis).)

In any event, plaintiff may have included in her PMQ deposition notice a set of revised requests for production but the fact remains that she has still not made a sufficient showing to justify an order compelling the production of any documents which are contained in Harms’ personnel file which is protected by constitutional right to privacy. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate to the Court that other documents sought by the PMQ deposition notice are not protected from disclosure pursuant to any of the protections identified by DH including but not limited to Evidence Code §1157, Business & Professions Code §805 and the Patient Safety Work Product Privilege.

Therefore, this Court is not in a position to issue a blanket order that defendant DH must produce any or all documents responsive to the revised requests for production included in plaintiff’s notice for the deposition of DH’s PMQ re: defendant Harms.

D. Finally, as set forth above, the parties’ Joint Statement indicates there are “two general categories of dispute” about what information relating to Harm is discoverable and these are those “[c]omplaints, concerns, investigation, reporting, and/or employment action regarding defendant Harms” which (1) do not involve sexual misconduct and (2) pertain to narcotics misappropriation/misuse by defendant Harms. (Jt. Stm., p.8:5-9.) Although plaintiff nowhere in the Joint Statement appears to explicitly argue she is entitled to question defendant DH’s PMQ about any documents or information pertaining to Harms aside from that which is included in his personnel file, the Court will add that any attempt by plaintiff to obtain through this PMQ deposition other information relating to complaints, concerns, investigation, reporting, and/or employment action regarding narcotics misappropriation/misuse by defendant Harms and/or other misconduct not of a sexual nature would be questionable insofar as such information about narcotics misappropriation/misuse by defendant Harms and/or other non-sexual conduct not of a sexual nature would have limited probative value in proving that Harms committed the rape as alleged by plaintiff or that defendant DH knew or should have known he was unfit for employment.

Still, the Court acknowledges that in the absence of any valid privacy interests or other protection from disclosure, discovery in civil litigation is generally quite broad and California law does ordinarily permit inquiry into matters which are themselves admissible as evidence as well as those which are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc. §2017.010.) Consequently, in the absence of legitimate claim of privacy or

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other legal protection from disclosure, plaintiff is entitled to some leeway in the questions that may be asked of the witnesses during the course of this PMQ deposition re: defendant Harms.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, plaintiff’s motion to compel the deposition of defendant DH’s PMQ re: Gregory Harms is DENIED to the extent plaintiff claims here that she is “entitled to explore through deposition the information which may be contained within [Harms’] personnel file” and/or is entitled to an order compelling production of any portion of Harms’ personnel file.

Consistent with their representations in their Joint Statement, the parties are directed to resume their meet-and-confer process relating to this PMQ deposition and to proceed with same in accordance with their agreement.

Plaintiff remains free to file and serve an appropriate noticed motion(s) to the extent she may contend defendant DH has unreasonably refused to do any of the following:

(1) To produce a PMQ on a topic which is otherwise in conformity with the limitations set forth in the 8/13/2024 Order and/or this ruling; (2) To answer a specific deposition question which is otherwise in conformity with the limitations set forth in the 8/13/2024 Order and/or this ruling; and/or (3) To produce documents responsive to a request for production which is otherwise in conformity with the limitations set forth in the 8/13/2024 Order and/or this ruling.

Neither side requested monetary sanctions and thus, no sanctions are awarded here.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)