MOTION – SET ASIDE/VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT; MOTION – OTHER: TO EXPUNGE LIEN
2) MOTION – OTHER: TO EXPUNGE LIEN
Defendant Elisabeth Thieriot’s motion to vacate default and default judgment and “motion to expunge lien, vacate judgement, declare void orders, and order restitution” are both DENIED.
Defendant appears in court as an unrepresented litigant, in pro per.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this suit against Defendant (individually and in her capacity as trustee) and Lions Gate Corporation, for breach of contract alleging that Defendant was the president and sole shareholder of the latter. (FAC, ¶ 3.) The FAC alleged that Plaintiff began making business loans to the defendants in 2016 and eventually loaned them a total of $2,925,000.00. (Id. at ¶ 12.) The parties documented their agreement in an Amended and Restated Promissory Note (“Third Thieriot Note”) dated November 10, 2022. (Ibid.) The Third Thieriot Note provided that the defendants would pay Plaintiff the full $2,925,000 owed on or before April 15, 2023. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.)
Plaintiff further alleged that through four separate security agreements, Defendant granted Plaintiff security interests in various property to secure the debt. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-20.) The collateral included:
• a pair of diamond earrings; • a promissory note in favor of Defendant for $1,451,612.90; • a 16.68-carat diamond engagement ring; and, • a 1986 blonde mahogany Steinway piano. (Ibid.)
Defendants allegedly defaulted on the debt. (FAC, ¶ 15.) Plaintiff asserted causes of action for breach of contract (the Third Thieriot Note) and foreclosure of the four security agreements.
Defendant’s argument is concerning, raising the issue of gold and silver coin as currency as opposed to the dollar. She argues that the Court has no jurisdiction over her or this matter. There are discussions of criminal activity against judges and court personnel, repeated vague references to “commerce,” and other generally incomprehensible statements made by her filings that give the court pause. (See, e.g., Thieriot’s “Notice of Federal Jurisdiction, Supremacy, and Judicial Impossibility Date Now Time Now” [filed Oct. 15, 2025]; “Norice [sic] of Federal Supremacy and Removal Stay” [filed Oct. 15, 2025]; “Supplemental Points and Authority” [filed Apr. 29, 2026], pp. 25-30.) As to many of these arguments, the court is unable to address them as they are not grounded in law.
Between September 23 and November 12, 2025, Defendant submitted to the Court what Plaintiff’s counsel characterizes as “a deluge of meritless and retaliatory motions and other filings.” (Haevernick Dec., ¶ 14.) Defendant failed to appear for her deposition on July 22, 2025, resulting in Plaintiff filing a motion to compel her appearance. It was granted and Defendant was ordered to sit for deposition by October 3 and to pay $4,500 in sanctions. (Id. at ¶ 5 & Ex. A.)
Looking for case law or statutes not cited here? Search published authorities
Examples: “Why did the court rule this way?” · “What were the procedural grounds?” · “Is appearance required?”
When Defendant indicated that she did not plan to appear for her deposition as noticed on October 3, the Court advised her that it would consider entering her default for disobedience of court orders if she did not show. (Id. at ¶ 8.) Thieriot still chose not to appear for her deposition. (Id. at ¶ 9.) She also did not appear for the conference that had been set to discuss whatever happened at her deposition. (Id. at ¶ 10.) At this point, the Court issued an order to show cause why it should not enter Plaintiff’s default for failure to comply with the order compelling her to sit for deposition. (See Oct. 10, 2025 OSC.) It ordered Defendant to file a written response to that OSC. (Ibid.) Defendant did not file a written response by the deadline. (Id. at ¶ 13.)
At the November 14, 2025, hearing on the OSC, Hon. Andrew Sweet directed the clerk to enter Defendant’s default. (Haevernick Dec., ¶ 15 & Ex. B.) This ruling was based on her disregard of court orders, her continuing indications that she was not going to follow the law, her incessant meritless nonsense filings, and her abusive conduct toward the Court. (See Haevernick Dec., Ex. C.) The other defendants in this case were already in default by this time. (See Aug. 28, 2024 Entry of Default [later set aside as to Thieriot in her personal capacity only]; Haevernick Dec., ¶ 2.)
Defendant filed a motion to vacate the entry of her default in November 2025, which the Court denied in February 2026. (Haevernick Dec., ¶¶ 18-20 & Ex. E.) It found that Thieriot’s “default arose from a long pattern of deliberate, repeated misconduct, not excusable neglect[,]” and that the motion was procedurally defective for failure to include a proposed answer. (Id. at Ex. E, p. 2.) The Court entered a default judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $3,782,465.90 on March 20, 2026 following a prove-up hearing held that day. (Id. at ¶ 21 & Ex. F.) Plaintiff has recorded an abstract of judgment, which secured the judgment through a lien on Defendant’s property within Marin County. (Id. at ¶ 23 & Ex. G; see Code Civ. Proc., §§ 697.310, 697.340, subd. (a).)
The case was reassigned to Hon. Mark Andrew Talamantes on January 1, 2026. The Court now considers (1) Defendant’s motion to vacate the default and the default judgment, and (2) her “Motion to Expunge Lien, Vacate Judgment, Declare Void Orders, and Order Restitution.”
Procedure
In connection with the motion to vacate the default and the default judgment, Defendant filed two sets of moving papers, one on March 23 and one on April 8, and a “supplemental declaration” on April 1. Her papers are voluminous and confusing in content.
Defendant presents no authority for the idea that a litigant can file a completely new set of moving papers (including a notice of motion, a brief, a supporting declaration, and a proposed order, all of which appear in her March 23 submission) and the same issue while a motion is pending. Defendant files sur documents without authorization from the court, cluttering the record, and increasing the burden on the Court and the opposing party. Her conduct makes it difficult to follow her motion request. Her “supplemental declaration” filed on April 1, and the April 8 second round of moving papers April 1 are not considered. (Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(3)); the court is responsible for providing “the orderly conduct of proceedings before it.”
On May 18, 2026, Defendant filed a document entitled “Memorandum Regarding Void Proceedings, Void Defaults, Void Judgment, and Expungement of Liens.” This appears to be a supplemental sur document to support the moving papers. The filing is untimely and not considered. She filed complete sets of moving papers in connection with both motions on March 23 and April 13 respectively. Submitting additional arguments and/or evidence in support of a motion weeks after the day the motion is filed, outside of a reply brief, is improper.
Similarly, on April 29, 2026, Defendant filed a voluminous 47-page submission entitled “Supplemental Points and Authority.” To the extent Defendant wanted this material to be considered in connection with one of her two motions (she does not identify which motion it is meant to “supplement”), she should have included it in her moving papers or her reply. The Court is not considering this filing.
Plaintiff’s requests for judicial notice are granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
II. MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT
A. LEGAL STANDARD
In order “ ‘to promote the determination of actions on their merits[,]’ ” Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) (hereafter “Section 473(b)”) provides for discretionary relief from default. (Martin Potts & Associates, Inc. v. Corsair, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 432, 439 [quoting Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 839].) Specifically, “[t]he court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) A motion for discretionary relief “shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.” (Ibid.)
The movant bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that relief under Section 473(b) is warranted. (Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1410; Kendall v. Barker (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 619, 624.) The movant’s showing must consist of specific facts showing that one of the statutory conditions (i.e., mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect) is present and actually caused his default. (Code Civ. Proc., section 473, subd. (b); Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶¶ 5:310 [citing Hopkins & Carley, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1410]; Hodge Sheet Metal Products v. Palm Springs Riviera Hotel (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 653, 657 [quoting Baratti v. Baratti (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 917, 921]; Martin Potts, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th 432, 442.)
A motion for relief from default under Section 473(b) “shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)
B. DISCUSSION
Defendant’s moving papers do not describe any circumstance that amounted to “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” and caused the entry of her default. The Court entered the default based on her misconduct throughout the litigation and the fact that the Court did not see any reasonable possibility that her behavior would change. (See Haevernick Dec., Exs. C [transcript of the hearing at which the Court ordered her default entered], E [order on her first motion to vacate: “Her default arose from a long pattern of deliberate, repeated misconduct.”].) It was not based on lack of an answer or other participation in the case. It was a terminating sanction based on egregious litigation misconduct, including willful disobedience of a court order regarding discovery. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subds. (d)(1), (d)(4).)
Defendant contends that the Court did not make findings of “willfulness” and “proportionality” and did not consider lesser sanctions before imposing a terminating sanction. This argument appears irrelevant to the instant motion, but the Court addresses it regardless. Defendant is directed to the transcript of the November 14, 2025 hearing. (Heavernick Dec., Ex. C.) There, Hon. Judge Sweet stated that she refused to obey lawful court orders (id. at 8:2-5), persisted in making false statements of law despite very clear indications that she was wrong (id. at 9:11-15), and was simply “following rules of her own making” in complete disregard of the law and the Court’s orders (id. at 9:20-21).
Judge Sweet stated that he had never, in his entire career, come across someone so blatantly disrespectful to a judicial officer (id. at 6:28-7:4), and that the evidence before him indicated that Thieriot “[was] not going to comply with the law or this court’s orders” (id. at 9:25-26). These are findings that her behavior was willful. Regarding proportionality and consideration of a lesser sanction, Defendant is directed to Judge Sweet’s comments that the matter was terminated due to her in court. (Id. at 11:19-27; 12:13-16.)
Defendants unsupported argument that she was “denied meaningful participation while appearing and presenting defenses” and that this violated her constitutional right to due process is meritless. She had every opportunity to participate in this case. She had the opportunity to hire a lawyer. She refused to participate in a manner that complied with lawful court orders. She forfeited the opportunity to defend the lawsuit against her through her own willful conduct, after being given many chances to course-correct and after being warned that plaintiffs would be granted judgment should her lack of professionalism continue.
For similar reasons, Defendant’s request for relief based on equitable principles is unavailing. She relies on Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, where the Supreme Court discussed equitable relief from a default and resulting default judgment based on “extrinsic mistake – a term broadly applied when circumstances extrinsic to the litigation have unfairly cost a party a hearing on the merits.” (8 Cal.4th 975, 981.)
Defendant was not unfairly deprived of a hearing on the merits. She did not follow the rules that applicable equally to all litigants, whether they are in pro per or represented by qualified counsel, and abide by court orders. The doctrine of equitable relief based on extrinsic mistake applies where the defaulting party’s excusable neglect has cost her a chance to defend her case and so is inapplicable to Defendant’s circumstances. (Mechling v. Asbestos Defendants (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1241, 1246.)
The motion to vacate the default judgment is DENIED.
III. MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIEN, VACATE JUDGMENT, DECLARE VOID ORDERS, AND ORDER RESTITUTION
Defendant seeks an order expunging the lien that arose against her property in Marin County when Plaintiff recorded his abstract of judgment in this case. A judgment lien created by an abstract of judgment “can be extinguished only by the recording of an acknowledgment of satisfaction of the underlying judgment or by the judgment creditor’s release of the lien[.]” (Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Charlton (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1070 [emphasis in original].) “There is no statutory procedure for ‘expunging’ an abstract of judgment.” (Ibid.; see also Longview Internat., Inc. v. Stirling (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 985, 988 [a “motion to expunge the judgment lien is not authorized by any statute”].)
Beyond the request for an order expunging the lien, this motion seeks the same relief this defendant has already sought. The November 2025 motion to vacate the default was denied, and now her instant motion to vacate the default and the default judgment is also DENIED.
Plaintiff is to lodge the order.
Parties must comply with Marin County Superior Court Local Rules, Rule 2.10(A), (B), which provides that if a party wants to present oral argument, the party must contact the Court at (415) 444-7046 and all opposing parties by 4:00 p.m. the court day preceding the scheduled hearing. Notice may be by telephone or in person to all other parties that argument is being requested (i.e., it is not necessary to speak with counsel or parties directly.) Unless the Court and all parties have been notified of a request to present oral argument, no oral argument will be permitted except by order of the Court. In the event no party requests oral argument in accordance with Rule 2.10(B), the tentative ruling shall become the order of the court.
IT IS ORDERED that evidentiary hearings shall be in-person in Department L. For routine appearances, the parties may access Department L for video conference via a link on the court website. Kindly turn your camera on when your case is called and make sure the party or lawyer making the appearance is properly identified on the screen.
FURTHER ORDERED that the parties are responsible for ensuring that they have a good connection and that they are available for the hearing while using the virtual remote courtroom. If the connection is inadequate, the Court may proceed with the hearing in the party’s absence. If it is determined that you are diving your car during the hearing, you will be removed from the virtual courtroom. (Yes, this happens).