KOO VS HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA

business information. (Goldstein Decl., ¶ 3.) Specifically, it states the documents at dispute “contain confidential and proprietary commercial information, including terms governing [Defendant]’s proprietary business information, operational structures, and financial arrangements.” (Ibid.) It also states “[u]pon information and belief, [Defendant] has maintained the confidentiality of these materials in the ordinary course of business.” (Ibid.) This is insufficient. The declaration offers no specific facts to show disclosure would result in a particularized injury. Conclusory statements that the agreements are confidential or proprietary are insufficient to justify withholding production. (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at 318.)

In its reply, Defendant argues for the first time that the agreements themselves contain confidentiality clauses. This, however, is not a basis for finding good cause. Plaintiffs’ claims rely on an alter ego theory. As such, information relating to governance, control, operational policies, and business relationships between the parties are relevant to Plaintiffs’ liability theories.

Defendant has not shown good cause for the protective order it seeks. The declaration of counsel is insufficient to show a protectable interest or an injury.

The motion is denied.

If a timely request for oral argument is made by no later than 4:30 p.m. on June 10, 2026, oral argument will be heard on June 11, 2026 at 10:00 a.m. (not 8:30 a.m.).

2. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME KOO VS HYUNDAI CVRI2404070 MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES MOTOR AMERICA Tentative Ruling:

There is no dispute Plaintiff is designated as the prevailing party under the § 998 Offer Plaintiffs accepted on 11/5/25. (Dec.Azemoon ¶ 12, Ex. “H”, § 998 Offer, p. 364 of 417.) Under Civil Code §1794(d), “[i]f the buyer prevails in an action under [the Song-Beverly Act], the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).) Thus, the only question to be determined is the amount of the award to Plaintiff.

The matter of reasonableness of a party’s attorney fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Bruckman v. Parliament Escrow Co. (1989) 190 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1062.) Fee motions should be based on detailed time records. (Crespin v. Shewry (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 259, 271.) The records should detail crucial information such as the types of issues involved, services performed, numbers of hours, billing rates, etc. (Martino v.

Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) The court is then entitled to make its own evaluation of the reasonable worth of the work done in light of the nature of the case and the credibility of counsel’s declaration, unsubstantiated by time records and billing statements. (See Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587; see also Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1394.)

In determining the reasonable amount of attorney fees, the court first determines a lodestar figure (time reasonably spent by each biller multiplied by an hourly rate that is reasonable for each biller). (Serrant v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48.) In exercising its discretion, the Court may consider all of the facts and the entire procedural history of the case in setting the amount of a reasonable attorney fee award. (Bernardi, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1394.)

A “reasonable” hourly rate is the prevailing rate charged by attorneys of similar skill and experience in the relevant community. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) Two attorneys worked on this case: 1) Nick Nita, attorney/managing partner [23 years’ experience], bills at $625 per hour; and, 2) Justin P. Wisnewski, attorney [3 years of experience], bills at $400 per hour.

In addition, three paralegals and a law clerk worked on the case, each billing at $250 per hour. Their experience ranges from two years up to eighteen years. A court may allow any expenses ordinarily billed to a client which are not included in the overhead component of the attorney’s hourly rate, including paralegal fees billed separately at the market rate. (Guinn v. Dotson (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 262, 268.) Notably, Plaintiff seeks to recover hourly rates for other staff (legal assistant, office manager, and two unspecified assistants) billing between $150 - $200 per hour. Plaintiff cites no authority for reimbursement for these other staff members, who may have performed administration tasks. Nonetheless, not all of the tasks they performed were clearly within the overhead component.

Further, HMA challenges some entries claiming they are excessive in the amount of time spent on routine tasks, duplicative, padded, and largely templated tasks. HMA suggests that the most that should be awarded is $12,000. Specifically, HMA challenge, and argues these items should not be allowed:

-Complaint (1.5 hours), which HMA argues is substantially similar to other complaints previously filed by Plaintiff’s counsel in other SBA matters; -Templated written discovery, which may increase efficiency, but Plaintiff’s counsel cannot seek premium hourly rates/excessive fees for preparing such material by multiple timekeepers; -“[L]ayered review and duplicate staffing” – use of multiple timekeepers; -Excessive time spent on routine settlement communications and ordinary case management activities (brief emails, scheduling matters, file reviews, status updates, or internal instructions), which demonstrate inefficiency and overbilling in the context of this case; -Clerical, administrative, and litigation-support tasks, which are not compensable (organizing e-files, calendaring deadlines, uploading documents, retrieving conformed copies, processing filings, preparing

proofs of service, maintaining internal databases, and preparing hearing or appearance memoranda; -Motion to compel arbitration (5.3 hours at $625 per hour), which includes “legal research”; -Fees sought for this motion (5.7 hours), which HMA claims are excessive and include speculative billing. Notably, except for the Complaint and the Motion to Compel Arbitration, HMA has not specifically challenged the time incurred, or any of these amounts. And, it is not clear that the time spent on these various tasks is excessive. It is merely HMA’s opinion that they are unreasonable. However, certain tasks are clearly administrative such as calendaring matters, receiving mail, and creating a client file. The total time spent on such tasks is 3.5, which should not be allowed. Other than calendaring matters, most of these administrative entries were made by non-paralegal staff.

In sum, Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $17,227.00 for 36.7 hours of work on the case. Considering the reduction of 3.5 hours for administrative matters at the various rates listed in the billing records ($780), the total amount for attorneys’ fees is $16,447.00.

In addition, HMA did not challenge Plaintiff’s claimed costs and expenses, which are set forth in the Memorandum of Costs filed on 3/26/26 in the amount of $834.72.

The motion is granted in the amount of $17,281.72 ($16,447.00 in attorneys’ fees plus $834.72 in costs.)

If a timely request for oral argument is made by no later than 4:30 p.m. on June 10, 2026, oral argument will be heard on June 11, 2026 at 10:00 a.m. (not 8:30 a.m.).

3. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME WHITE VS PERRIS MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT CVRI2504775 INVESTMENT GROUP, ON 1ST AMENDED COMPLAINT INC. Tentative Ruling:

To support a demand for punitive damages under Civ. Code §3294, a plaintiff must plead and prove facts demonstrating malice, oppression, or fraud as defined in Civ. Code §3294(c). The mere allegation that an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894.) “There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or malice or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of defendant, or such conscious and deliberate disregard for the interests of others that his conduct may be called willful or wonton.” (Id. at 894-95 [citation and internal quotation marks omitted’; see also G.D.