PATIL vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION

arbitration agreement that states, in pertinent part:

“PLEASE READ THIS SECTION IN ITS ENTIRETY AS IT AFFECTS YOUR RIGHTS[.]

If you purchased or leased your Hyundai vehicle in the State of California, you and we, Hyundai Motor America, each agree that any claim or disputes between us (including between you and any of our affiliated companies) related to or arising out of your vehicle purchase, advertising for the vehicle, use of your vehicle, the performance of the vehicle, and service relating to the vehicle, the vehicle warranty, representations in the warranty, or duties contemplated under the warranty ... shall be resolved by binding arbitration at either your or our election, even if the claim is initially filed in a court of law.” (Declaration of Ali Ameripour (“Ameripour Decl.”) ¶ 3, Ex. 3, at p. 13.)

Additionally, Hyundai asserts that “on or about March 27, 2021, Plaintiff enrolled their Vehicle in Bluelink services.” (Declaration of Vijay Rao (“Rao Decl.”), ¶ 4.) The Court must stop here to address the date Hyundai cites in its moving papers and the supporting declaration of Vijay Rao because the Complaint alleges the Subject Vehicle was not leased until April 22, 2024. Yet, Hyundai asserts that Plaintiff enrolled in Bluelink services nearly three years earlier.

Hyundai continues that in order to enroll in Hyundai’s Bluelink services, customers must agree to the then-effective Bluelink Connected Services Agreement (the “CSA”), the terms and conditions of which also include a binding arbitration provision. (Rao Decl., ¶¶ 3, 5; Ex. 2.) The arbitration provision in the CSA provides, in part:

“Hyundai and you agree to arbitrate any and all disputes and claims between us arising out of or relating to this Agreement, Connected Services, Connected Services Systems, Service Plans, the Vehicle, use of the sites, or products, services, or programs you purchase, enroll in or seek product/service support for, whether you are a Visitor or Customer, via the sites or through mobile application, except any disputes or claims which under governing law are not subject to arbitration, to the maximum extent permitted by applicable law. This agreement to arbitrate is intended to be broadly interpreted and to make all disputes and claims between us subject to arbitration to the fullest extent permitted by law.

[]

The agreement to arbitrate otherwise includes, but is not limited to: claims based in contract, tort, warranty, statute, fraud, misrepresentation or any other legal

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV007356: PATIL vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

theory; claims that arose before this or any prior Agreement (including, but not limited to, claims relating to advertising) []

(Rao Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 2, at p. 21.)

Hyundai moves to compel arbitration and stay the present litigation pending the arbitration results pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281 and the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”), on the basis that Plaintiff is bound by the arbitration clause contained in the Warranty and the CSA. Hyundai argues Plaintiff’s claims fall squarely within the scope of the arbitration clauses and, as a result, Plaintiff’s claims should be stayed pending arbitration.

Legal Standard

California has a public policy that encourages arbitrations, and courts have repeatedly approved and upheld arbitration clauses. (See, e.g., Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasé (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9 [California has a “strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution”]; Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 707 [California’s statutory scheme “evidence[s] a strong public policy in favor of arbitrations [as a] favored method of resolving disputes”]; Gross v. Recabaren (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 771, 775; Berman v. Dean Witter Co. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 999, 1003; Greenfield v. Mosley (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 735, 744.)

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy, the Court shall order the parties to arbitrate the matter if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) the right to compel arbitration was waived by the petitioner; (b) grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement; or, (c) a party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)

Section 2 of the FAA is essentially the same:

“A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV007356: PATIL vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

(9 U.S.C. §2.)

“Under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.” (Sparks v. Del Mar Child and Family Svcs. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517.) “Absent a clear agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, courts will not infer that the right to a jury trial has been waived.” (Id. at 1518.)

“In a petition to compel arbitration, the party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.] The party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense, including that an arbitration provision is invalid or otherwise not enforceable.” (Brinkley v. Monterey Financial Servs., Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 314, 325.)

A written agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, consistent with standard contract principles. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2; Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 787.) Included among these is the long-accepted rule that ambiguities in an arbitration agreement, as in any other type of contract, must be interpreted against the drafting party. (Victoria v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 734, 739, 745-747.)

Nonsignatories generally may not compel contractual arbitration. (See JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236-1237.) However, there are exceptions where arbitration agreements may be enforced by a non-signatory. Nonparties asserting a party’s rights must show some basis for extending the agreement to them. (Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1715, 1728.) Further, a “third party” non-signatory may enforce an arbitration agreement only through the grounds available under state contract law, such as agency, alter ego, or intended benefit. (See Arthur Andersen LLP v.

Carlisle (2009) 556 U.S. 624, 631.) Under California law, a nonsignatory may assert a third-party beneficiary theory. (See, e.g., Thornton v. Career Training Center, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 116.) Nonsignatories may also enforce arbitration agreements through the doctrine of equitable estoppel (see, e.g., Molecular Analytical Systems v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 696 [claims asserted against non-signatory “intimately intertwined” with contract containing arbitration clause]).

Discussion

Hyundai alleges Plaintiff’s claims against it are subject to arbitration pursuant to the Warranty Booklet, which includes the arbitration agreement set forth above and which

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV007356: PATIL vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

also sets forth the following language:

“This agreement to arbitrate is intended to be broadly interpreted and to make all disputes and claims between us (including our affiliated companies) relating to or arising out of your vehicle purchase, use or performance of your vehicle, or the vehicle warranty subject to arbitration to the maximum extent permitted by law.

IF YOU PURCHASED OR LEASED YOUR VEHICLE IN CALIFORNIA, YOUR WARRANTY IS MADE SUBJECT TO THE TERMS OF THIS BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION. BY USING THE VEHICLE, OR REQUESTING OR ACCEPTING BENEFITS UNDER THIS WARRANTY, INCLUDING HAVING ANY REPAIRS PERFORMED UNDER WARRANTY, YOU AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THESE TERMS. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH THESE TERMS, PLEASE CONTACT US AT OPT-OUT@HMAUSA.COM WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF YOUR PURCHASE OR LEASE TO OPT-OUT OF THIS ARBITRATION PROVISION.” (Ameripour Decl., Ex. 3, at pp. 13-14.)

Hyundai argues that, given that Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle in California, is bringing this action pursuant to the warranty, and has alleged that repairs have been performed under the warranty, the arbitration provision in the Warranty Booklet applies. Further, Hyundai argues that Plaintiff is equitably estopped from asserting that the lack of a signature on the Warranty Booklet precludes arbitration, because Plaintiff is asserting claims directly under the warranty. (Motion at 11:18-13:17.)

The Court finds Hyundai has failed to show that an agreement to arbitrate exists pursuant to the Warranty Booklet. Neither Hyundai, nor Plaintiff, signed the Warranty Booklet. In fact, there is no signature line in the Warranty Booklet for any party to sign to accept the terms. The Warranty Booklet simply explains the terms of the warranty, with an opt-out option if the buyer so chooses. There is also no evidence Plaintiff signed an acknowledgment of receipt of the Warranty Booklet, nor is there evidence the Warranty Booklet was even presented to Plaintiff prior to, or after, purchase.

Rather, Hyundai simply attaches the Warranty Booklet as an exhibit to defense counsel’s declaration, which states only that the Warranty Booklet is a “true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s Owner’s Handbook & Warranty Information” as asserted by Hyundai’s counsel. (Ameripour Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 3.) Counsel’s statement lacks foundation. Counsel does not establish any foundation as to how he has personal knowledge that the Warranty Booklet was Plaintiff’s Warranty for the Subject Vehicle, nor does he attach or refer to any information upon which he relied in making this assertion.

There is no declaration by a representative of Hyundai or a Hyundai dealership stating that the Warranty Booklet was, in fact, provided to Plaintiff or that it is provided to all Hyundai purchasers,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV007356: PATIL vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

or that the Warranty Booklet is even applicable to Plaintiff’s vehicle.

In Norcia v. Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC (9th Cir. 2017) 845 F.3d 1279, the Ninth Circuit found that an arbitration provision in Samsung’s warranty handbook with an opt-out provision was not enforceable as to the plaintiff. After analyzing California law, the Court found that the plaintiff did not “expressly assent to any agreement in the brochure. Nor did [plaintiff] sign the brochure or otherwise act in a manner that would show ‘his intent to use his silence, or failure to opt out, as a means of accepting the arbitration agreement. [citation.]

Under California law, an offeree’s inaction after receipt of an offer is generally insufficient to form a contract. [citation]. Therefore, Samsung’s offer to arbitrate all disputes with [plaintiff] ‘cannot be turned into an agreement because the person to whom it is made or sent makes no reply, even though the offer states that silence will be taken as consent,’ id., unless an exception to this general rule applies.” (Id. at 1286.) The Ninth Circuit further reasoned, “Nor would a reasonable person understand that receiving the seller’s warranty and failing to opt out of an arbitration provision contained within the warranty constituted assent to a provision requiring arbitration of all claims against the seller, including claims not involving the warranty.” (Id. at 1290.)

Here, too, the same analysis applies. The Warranty Booklet does not operate as a contract with an enforceable arbitration agreement.

Further, “[l]anguage in a written warranty agreement is ‘contractual’ in the sense that it creates binding, legal obligations on the seller, but a warranty does not impose binding obligations on the buyer. (See Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 830.) Rather, warranty law “focuses on the seller’s behavior and obligation—his or her affirmations, promises, and descriptions of the goods—all of which help define what the seller in essence agreed to sell.” (Weinstat v. Dentsply Internat., Inc. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1228.)

The Warranty Booklet is thus not a contract in the traditional sense, and again, warranties, unlike contracts, do not impose binding obligations on the buyer. A warranty is the seller’s affirmation regarding the quality of the subject vehicle. Indeed, the relevant provisions of the Song-Beverly Act that authorize a cause of action for breach of express warranty contain definitions of express warranties that make clear that the warranty is a promise or affirmation by the seller as to the quality of goods it is selling, not a contract binding the buyer. (Civ.

Code § 1791.2.)

Additionally, Hyundai argues it may compel arbitration under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Hyundai argues that even if the Warranty Booklet lacks Plaintiff’s signature, Plaintiff has received a direct benefit from the Warranty, and therefore cannot avoid the arbitration clause. The Court is not persuaded by Hyundai’s argument that equitable estoppel applies here. Hyundai is a party to the Warranty and thus not a nonsignatory third party. (See Molecular Analytical Systems v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc. (2010)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV007356: PATIL vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

186 Cal.App.4th 696, 706 [“By relying on contract terms in a claim against a nonsignatory defendant, even if not exclusively, a plaintiff may be equitably estopped from repudiating the arbitration clause contained in that agreement”]; see also Boucher v. Alliance Title Company, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 262, 272; Goldman v. KPMG, LLP (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 209, 220.) Further, as noted above, the Warranty Booklet is not a contract in the traditional sense, so Plaintiff is attempting to enforce only parts of the contract while disclaiming others.

The Court concludes that Hyundai fails to show that an agreement to arbitrate exists pursuant to the Warranty Booklet or that equitable estoppel applies. Having concluded as such, the Court need not consider Plaintiff’s unconscionability arguments.

In the alternative, Hyundai moves to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration provision contained in the CSA, which states, in pertinent part:

“Hyundai and you agree to arbitrate any and all disputes and claims between us arising out of or relating to this Agreement, Connected Services, Connected Services Systems, Service Plans, the Vehicle, use of the sites, or products, services, or programs you purchase, enroll in or seek product/service support for, whether you are a Visitor or Customer, via the sites or through mobile application, except any disputes or claims which under governing law are not subject to arbitration, to the maximum extent permitted by applicable law.

This agreement to arbitrate is intended to be broadly interpreted and to make all disputes and claims between us subject to arbitration to the fullest extent permitted by law. However, any dispute you or we may have relating to copyrights or other intellectual property shall not be governed by this agreement to arbitrate. For the avoidance of doubt, this means that any claims you or we may have relating to intellectual property rights against the other, including injunctive and other relief sought, may be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction.

The agreement to arbitrate otherwise includes, but is not limited to:

claims based in contract, tort, warranty, statute, fraud, misrepresentation or any other legal theory; claims that arose before this or any prior Agreement (including, but not limited to, claims relating to advertising); claims that are currently the subject of purported class action litigation in which you are not a member of a certified class; claims relating to your vehicle for which you seek product or service support via the sites; claims arising out of or relating to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act; claims relating to your data privacy or information security; and claims that may arise after the termination of this Agreement.”

(Rao Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 2 (italics added.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV007356: PATIL vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

Hyundai has also failed to show mutual assent to the CSA. The Declaration of Vijay Rao, the Director of Connected Ops & Owner Apps/Web for Hyundai, merely describes the process by which customers agree to the CSA upon enrolling their vehicle in Bluelink service. (Rao Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5.) Exhibit 1 is the acknowledgment checkbox screen that Plaintiff “would have seen when [Plaintiff] activated Bluelink services” and Exhibit 2 is the CSA “that was in effect at that time.” (Rao Decl. ¶ 5, Exhibits 1-2.)

These documents are generic, and not specific to Plaintiff. Hyundai did not show Plaintiff checked the box, or otherwise “signed” or agreed to the CSA. While Rao contends that “[o]n March 27, 2021, Plaintiff enrolled their Vehicle in Bluelink services,” this statement lacks foundation. (Rao Decl. ¶ 4.) Moreover, as noted above, Rao asserts this occurred three years before Plaintiff even leased the Vehicle. Rao does not state he has personal knowledge that Plaintiff enrolled in the Bluelink service at the time of lease, nor does he attach or refer to any information upon which he relied in making this assertion.

Further, Exhibit 1, entitled “Complimentary Subscription,” states: “Your Hyundai includes 3 years of complimentary Blue Link services which offers a suite of safety and convenience features. This subscription includes the Connected Care, Remote and Guidance packages.” (Rao Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. 1.) The evidence suggests the subscription is voluntary or optional, and therefore the Court cannot assume that Plaintiff chose to enroll in the service when she leased the Subject Vehicle. Thus, Hyundai has failed to show that Plaintiff agreed to the terms and conditions of the CSA, including the arbitration provision. But even assuming Hyundai showed mutual assent, Hyundai failed to show the arbitration provision in the CSA covers Plaintiff’s claims in this action.

Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege any defect or breach of warranty related to the Bluelink services. Even if Hyundai had shown that Plaintiff actually enrolled in that service, it has not shown that the arbitration clause in the CSA would apply to Plaintiff’s claims. While that clause does cover disputes and claims regarding “this Agreement, Connected Services, Connected Services Systems, Service Plans, the Vehicle, use of the sites, or products, services, or programs you purchase, enroll in or seek product/service support for,” the reference to “the Vehicle” is at best an ambiguous reference.

Any ambiguities in the CSA are construed against the drafter, which is the Hyundai in this case. (Victoria v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 734, 739, 745-747.) Here, the Court must read the reference to “the Vehicle” as having some connection to the Bluelink services. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are outside the scope of the CSA.

Because Hyundai has failed to show that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate the claims, the Court need not reach Plaintiff’s arguments regarding unconscionability.

Conclusion

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV007356: PATIL vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

Based on the foregoing, Hyundai’s motion to compel arbitration is DENIED.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Hyundai is directed to contact Plaintiff and advise of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If Hyundai is unable to contact Plaintiff prior to hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, or further notice is required.

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16030877014 To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID 16030877014. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

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Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.pdf.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV007356: PATIL vs HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA., A CORPORATION 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.