Angela Ramirez vs. Pacific Gas & Electric Company

On May 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the motion. The Court’s records indicate no other opposing documents were filed at that time.

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However, the Court noted the opening paragraph of the opposing memorandum referenced a separate statement of material disputed facts and declarations. On May 24, 2024, Defendant filed reply documents, including a reply to Plaintiff’s separate statement and objections to evidence in opposition. Based on this indication that Plaintiff had apparently served, but not filed, opposing documents other than a memorandum, the Court on May 29, 2024 (after issuance of its tentative ruling the prior date), continued the hearing to July 2, 2024, and directed Plaintiff to file unaltered copies of the missing documents that had been previously served (but not previously filed) no later than June 5, 2024.

On May 28, 2024 (the same date as the Court’s tentative ruling preceding its May 29, 2024 order), Plaintiff filed an opposing separate statement and a declaration from Dow W. Patten along with proofs of service indicating these documents were previously served on May 15, 2024. At that time, Plaintiff also filed a declaration from Plaintiff Angela Ramirez in opposition to the motion. However, the declaration, on its face, was not signed by Plaintiff until May 24, 2024, despite the deadline of May 15, 2024 for opposing papers.. In its tentative ruling issued on July 16, 2024, the Court indicated it would not consider Plaintiff’s declaration on grounds the evidence indicated that while Plaintiff may have previously served an unsigned copy of the declaration (which is no evidence at all), the declaration was not actually signed until May 24, 2024.

On July 18, 2024, after hearing oral arguments and taking the matter under submission, the Court issued a final ruling vacating the portion of its tentative ruling stating the Court would not consider Plaintiff’s declaration. The Court affirmed the remaining portions of the tentative ruling but continued the hearing for further consideration of Plaintiff’s declaration and its impact on the merits of the motion. The Court granted Defendant leave to file a supplemental reply by August 5, 2024.

Having considered the additional evidence presented in Plaintiff’s declaration and the supplemental papers filed by Defendant, the Court now rules as follows:

Standards for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the Court engages in a three-step process. First, the issues framed by the pleadings must be identified since the pleadings themselves define the scope of what may be addressed via a motion for summary judgment/adjudication (FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381- 382) and the evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to such a motion may not create triable issues beyond the scope of the pleadings, nor are they a substitute for filing amended pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

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Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its initial burden of production. A defendant moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that [the defendant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1301.) This burden may be met by establishing either that one or more elements of a cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ.

Proc. §437c(p)(2).) A defendant cannot successfully shift the burden to a plaintiff by merely suggesting the possibility that the latter cannot prove his/her case but must make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.) If a plaintiff pleads several theories of liability against the defendant, then the latter has the burden of demonstrating there are no material facts requiring trial on any of them. A moving defendant whose evidence omits facts as to any theory of liability effectively permits that portion of the complaint to be unchallenged and even where no opposition is presented, a moving defendant must still make a showing sufficient to eliminate all triable issues of fact. (Wright v.

Stang Manufacturing Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1228; see also Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 397.)

A plaintiff opposing summary judgment/adjudication has no evidentiary burden unless the moving defendant has first met its initial burden. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; see also Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1151- 1152; Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085-1086.) If a moving defendant has met its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to show the existence of a material factual issue as to the cause of action alleged or the defense to it. (Code Civ.

Proc. §437c(p)(2); see also, Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) Only where the moving defendant makes the requisite initial showing does a court need to examine the opposition papers to determine if the latter demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) The opposing party must present admissible evidence and may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleading. (Id.)

In ruling on the motion, a court must construe the evidence of the opposing party liberally and that of the moving party strictly, resolving any doubts in the opposing party’s favor. (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874; Cortez v. Vogt (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 917, 925-926; see also, Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Brown v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. As noted above, CRC Rule 3.1350(b) explicitly mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for

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punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1) provides in its entirety:

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for [punitive] damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for [punitive] damages, or an issue of duty. (Underline added for emphasis.)

Finally, before turning to the specific issues raised by this motion and the oppositions, the Court reminds the parties of the “Golden Rule” of summary judgment/adjudication: “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (See, Zimmerman, Rosenfeld v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 (italics in original).) Moreover, according to Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Nazir, at 252 (citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1).)

That said, the Court now turns to the specific contentions advanced in support of and opposition to this motion.

Discussion

Defendant first argues Plaintiff cannot prevail on the second, third and fourth causes of action for discrimination and retaliation because Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case for discrimination or retaliation.

As to claims for discrimination, under the three-part test developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1972) 411 U.S. 792: '(1) The complainant must establish a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the employer must offer a legitimate reason for his actions; (3) the complainant must prove that this reason was a pretext to mask an illegal motive.” (Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2001) 88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 68.)

“In cases alleging employment discrimination, [courts] . . . us[e] a three-step process that is based on the burden-shifting test that was established by the United States Supreme Court for trials of employment discrimination claims in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792.” (Serri v. Santa Clara Univ. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 860.) “This test 'reflects the

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principle that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is rare, and that such claims must usually be proved circumstantially. Thus, by successive steps of increasingly narrow focus, the test allows discrimination to be inferred from facts that create a reasonable likelihood of bias and are not satisfactorily explained.’“ (Ibid. [quoting Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354].)

At trial, under the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, “the plaintiff may raise a presumption of discrimination by presenting a ‘prima facie case’, the components of which vary depending upon the nature of the claim, but typically require evidence that ‘(1) [the plaintiff] was a member of a protected class, (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) [the plaintiff] suffered an adverse employment action, . . . and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” (Reeves v.

Safeway Stores (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 95, 111-112 quoting Guz,, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 355.) The employer may then dispel the presumption “by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. At that point the presumption disappears.” (Id. at p. 112.) “The plaintiff must then have the opportunity to attack the employer's proffered reasons as pretexts for discrimination, or to offer any other evidence of discriminatory motive.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 356.)

“The McDonnell Douglas framework is modified in the summary judgment context. In a summary judgment motion . . . 'the employer, as the moving party, has the initial burden to present admissible evidence showing either that one or more elements of plaintiff's prima facie case is lacking or that the adverse employment action was based upon legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors.' [Citation.]” (Serri, supra, at 861; accord Jones v. Dep't of Corrections (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1379.) “If the employer meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the employee to 'demonstrate a triable issue by producing substantial evidence that the employer's stated reasons were . . . pretextual, . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the employer engaged in intentional discrimination . . . .” (Serri, supra, at 861.)

To that end, where the employer meets its burden to show that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment action, the employee has the burden to show pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. [citations omitted].” (Mokler v. County of Orange (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 121, 140.) The employee is required to produce “substantial responsive evidence that the employer’s showing was untrue or pretextual” thereby raising at least an inference of discrimination.” (Hersant v.

California Dept. of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1004-1005.) “The employee cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent or competent.” (Id. at 1002.) The employee must “set forth specific facts demonstrating such weaknesses, implausibilities, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons that a reasonable fact-finder could rationally find them unworthy of credence.” (Cucuzza v.

City of

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Santa Clara (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038.)

In the present motion, Defendant argues Plaintiff will be unable to present evidence that Defendant had a discriminatory motive or to establish a causal link between Plaintiff’s complaints of discrimination and the alleged adverse actions. Thus, Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot satisfy an essential element of the claims for discrimination and retaliation.

Defendant indicates that Plaintiff’s claims for discrimination and retaliation are based on an alleged disparaging comment made by Plaintiff’s former supervisor and statements made to Plaintiff claiming that Defendant retaliated against four other co-workers who made complaints. (UMF Nos. 42, 47.) Defendant argues Plaintiff will be unable to submit evidence of these contentions at trial on grounds Plaintiff lacks personal knowledge and/or the statements are hearsay. In support of the asserted UMFs relating to Defendant’s argument, Defendant cites and relies upon deposition testimony given by Plaintiff herself.

However, Defendant’s argument, insofar as it is reliant upon the deposition testimony of Plaintiff herself, is insufficient to establish grounds for summary judgment/adjudication as it does not demonstrate that the elements of the cause of action cannot be established. Defendant must support its argument with admissions or other admissible evidence showing that “plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854, 865-66.)

It is not enough for Defendant to show merely that Plaintiff “has no evidence” on a key element of Plaintiff’s claim. Defendant must also produce evidence showing that Plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support that claim. (Gaggero v. Uma (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891; Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010) 185 Cal.App.th 799, 808.) Relying on a plaintiff’s deposition testimony that they are not aware of certain facts is not alone sufficient to establish that the plaintiff cannot obtain evidence to support its claim. (See e.g.

Villa v. McFerren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 748.) Even if it is assumed that Plaintiff would be unable to testify directly as to the comments on grounds of hearsay, Defendant has not established that Plaintiff could not introduce other evidence beyond her own testimony of the disparaging comments or retaliation, such as by calling other witnesses with personal knowledge who could directly testify regarding the disparaging comments and retaliation or by introducing documents demonstrating other employees were the subject of retaliatory adverse actions after making complaints.

Defendant also argues that any evidence of the above disparaging comment and retaliation is barred by a stipulation purportedly prohibiting Plaintiff from relying on evidence of actions that occurred before Defendant filed a bankruptcy petition on January 29, 2019. (UMF Nos. 1, 9.) Defendant’s argument is not sufficiently supported by its alleged UMFs or the evidence upon which they rely. Specifically, the language of the bankruptcy stipulation provided in support of UMF No. 9 references “that Ramirez’s allegations in the State Court Action are limited to alleged acts or omissions that occurred after the Petition Date . . . .” (Stonehouse Decl., Ex.

D.) Given that the stipulation recites the purpose of the bankruptcy “Plan Injunction” of prohibiting “pre-petition claims,” the reasonable interpretation of this provision is that Plaintiff cannot prosecute claims arising from “acts or omissions” that occurred prior to the filing of the petition.

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(Id.) Nothing in Defendant’s evidence or the asserted UMFs indicates that Plaintiff is prohibited from relying on evidence that may have occurred pre-petition but is offered only in support of claims that arise from post-petition adverse actions. By its very nature, a claim arising from an alleged adverse action that occurred post-petition cannot be reasonably characterized as a “prepetition claim” encompassed by the stipulation.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Defendant failed to meet the initial burden to demonstrate Plaintiff will be unable to present evidence to establish a prima facie case for discrimination or retaliation.

Defendant next contends it is entitled to summary judgment on all causes of action because the undisputed facts demonstrate Defendant had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the differences in the pay, reviews, and promotions of Plaintiff and other employees.

Defendant asserts there is only one non-Hispanic male employee, “Employee 1”, who performed the same work as Plaintiff and can be used as a basis for Plaintiff’s equal pay, discrimination, and retaliation claims. (UMF Nos. 54-57.) Both Plaintiff and Employee 1 were originally hired as Electric Contract Specialists and later transferred to positions as Sourcing Specialists. (UMF Nos. 14, 17, 54.)

Defendant hired Plaintiff on November 16, 2015 with a starting pay of $72,000, which was slightly below the midpoint base salary for Electric Contract Specialist at that time. (UMF Nos. 14-16, 26, 28.) “Defendant determined Plaintiff’s starting Base Pay in the same manner it determined the starting Base Pay for other Electric Contract Specialists in 2015, by looking at the following factors: expected Contribution over time based on prior experience and education; Pay Range for the role, which is largely driven by PG&E’s budget; and Internal Equity based on the Base Pay and qualifications of other employees in the same role.” (UMF No. 20.)

Defendant assessed Plaintiff’s expected work contribution by comparing Plaintiff’s work experience and education to the minimum and desirable qualifications for the position. (UMF Nos. 21-25.) Defendant assessed Plaintiff’s internal equity by comparing Plaintiff’s qualifications to other Electric Contract Specialists already employed by Defendant. (UMF No. 28.)

Defendant hired Employee 1 on September 26, 2016, with a starting base pay of $80,000, which was above the midpoint base salary for Electric Contract Specialists at that time. (UMF Nos. 17- 19, 34, 37.) Defendant used the same process for assessing Employee 1 and determining Employee 1’s starting base pay. (UMF Nos. 29-37.) In conducting its assessment, Defendant determined both Plaintiff and Employee 1 met the minimum qualifications but that Employee 1 met at least 3 more of the desirable qualifications, and had qualifications and experience that was more heavily weighted, including a bachelor degree and direct experience working with Defendant as a contractor. (UMF Nos. 22-23, 24-25, 30-33.)

In March 2018, Plaintiff and Employee 1 were transferred to the Electric Sourcing Operations

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(“Sourcing”) team. (UMF Nos. 54-56.) Plaintiff does not believe her supervisor on the Sourcing team discriminated against her and “does not recall being subjected to hyper scrutiny of her work, public criticism, rejection of her work, low scoring of her work and not being invited to education ‘field trips’ after moving to the Sourcing team.” (UMF Nos. 58-59.) Plaintiff and Employee 1 received one performance review from their Sourcing supervisor. (UMF Nos. 62- 64.) The Sourcing supervisor utilized guidelines in a 2018 Performance Rating Quick Guide to determine Plaintiff and Employee 1’s performance ratings. (UMF No. 65.) “The Guide states that employees are evaluated in two areas: (1) Goals and (2) Competencies.” (UMF No. 66.)

Based on factors other than gender, race, and Plaintiff’s protected complaints, the Sourcing supervisor rated Employee 1 higher than Plaintiff and recommended Employee 1 for a promotion. (UMF Nos. 67-79, 83.)

Plaintiff argues that the above undisputed material facts are insufficient to establish Defendant had legitimate, non-pretextual reasons for the difference in Plaintiff’s pay and the failure to promote Plaintiff. While as a general matter, it may be that cases involving employment discrimination and retaliations are rarely appropriate for summary judgment (Nazir v. Untied Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 286), based on the undisputed material facts presented here, the Court finds Defendant has satisfied its initial burden to demonstrate its actions were based on legitimate, non-pretextual reasons.

Based on the above, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to present admissible evidence raising a triable issue of material fact. An opposing separate statement must cite to facts and evidence for such evidence to be considered by the Court. (See Bacoka v. Best Buy Stores, L.P. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 126, 131, n.1.)

In its prior ruling on July 18, 2024, the Court previously resolved some of the issues raised by Plaintiff’s opposition, as follows:

“Plaintiff disputes UMF Nos. 27, 36, 84 on grounds Plaintiff has noticed the deposition of Mr. Hecker to obtain evidence regarding Mr. Hecker’s credibility. Evidence that Plaintiff has scheduled a future deposition is not sufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact. Plaintiff also disputes UMF Nos. 41, 42 with a reference to “Imm Decl., ¶ “. However, no declaration from Imm was submitted in support of the opposition.

The Court previously continued the hearing from February 14, 2024 to May 29, 2024 to permit Plaintiff an opportunity to obtain additional evidence, including to depose Hecker and Imm. (Minute Order, 02/14/2024.) “If, after granting a continuance to allow specified additional discovery, the court determines that the party seeking summary judgment has unreasonably failed to allow the discovery to be conducted, the court shall grant a continuance to permit the discovery to go forward or deny the motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication.”

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(Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(i).) Here, Plaintiff does not contend Defendant unreasonably failed to permit the requested discovery. Rather, Plaintiff submits evidence that Plaintiff was unable to conduct the discovery to Counsel’s trial calendar, Counsel’s workload with other cases, and Counsel’s decision to take a vacation “for the first time in nearly a decade.” (Patten Decl., ¶¶ 5-7.) The Court is not persuaded the prior continuance granted by this Court provided Plaintiff insufficient time to complete necessary discovery or that Plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient diligence and justification for why it has still not completed the discovery it claims it needs.

Even an initial request for continuance under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(h) should be supported by a showing of discovery diligence and demonstrate that the party seeking discovery was not dilatory. (See A&B Painting and Drywall, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 349, 356-357; Desaigoudar v. Meyercord (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 173, 191; Aguimatang v. California State Lottery (1991) 234 Cal. App. 3d 769, 804.) Here, the Court has already granted a continuance under section 437c(h).

At this point, the explanations provided by Counsel indicate its own prioritization of all other referenced cases and tasks over the necessity to conduct discovery in this action after having already been granted a continuance of 3 1⁄2 months specifically to conduct such discovery. Furthermore, while the Court appreciates the importance of taking vacation generally, it is clear that the timing of Counsel’s vacation was significantly ill-advised in that Counsel concedes that “[a]t the end of April until the second week of May, I took a long-planned vacation.” (Patten Decl., ¶ 7.)

Indeed, these were the final three weeks leading up the May 15, 2024 due date for Plaintiff’s opposition based upon the new May 29, 2024 hearing date. Accordingly, the Court finds that yet another continuance of this hearing is not warranted or justified.” (Minute Order, 07/18/24.)

As stated in the Court’s ruling, the above portions of the Court’s ruling were not challenged at oral argument and were affirmed in the final ruling. Accordingly, the only remaining issues for determination are whether Plaintiff’s declaration submitted in opposition presents sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of material fact.

The Court finds Plaintiff has successfully raised a triable issue of material fact as to UMF Nos. 45, 46, 62 and 63. UMF Nos. 45-46 assert Plaintiff did not complain to PG&E about race or gender discrimination during the Relevant Time Period (after the January 2019 bankruptcy petition). In response, Plaintiff submits evidence that in February 2019, Plaintiff raised concerns to Janetta Tarter (“Tarter”) regarding the Contract Management’s prior and ongoing hostile treatment because Plaintiff was concerned that certain directions would require Plaintiff to come into contact with Contract Management’s team. (Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶ 47.)

Then, in May 2019, Tarter scheduled a meeting near an office used by the Contract Management team and invited Plaintiff to discuss that meeting while also discussing Plaintiff’s Q1 performance and indicating it was below average. (Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶¶ 48-49.) Applying liberal construction, this evidence is

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sufficient to raise a triable issue as to whether Plaintiff made complaints during the Relevant Time Period and whether Plaintiff experienced discrimination and retaliation during the Relevant Time Period.

UMF No. 62 asserts that the only performance evaluation Plaintiff received during the Relevant Time Period are March 2019 Performance and Reward Statements. UMF No. 63 acknowledges Plaintiff also received a Quarterly check-in, but asserts the Quarterly check-in did not provide a qualitative review of work. Plaintiff disputes these UMFs and submits evidence that the Quarterly check-in included qualitative review, as Plaintiff was provided directions for achieving goals and areas for improvement. (Plaintiff’s Decl., ¶ 40.)

As stated above, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Nazir, at 252 (citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1).) Defendant has conceded the materiality of UMF Nos. 45, 46, 62 and 63 and Plaintiff has raised a triable dispute as to the those facts. For purposes of summary judgment, even a single disputed UMF requires denial. Thus, the motion for summary judgment must be denied.

Defendant also asserts 16 issues for summary adjudication. However, at least one of UMF Nos. 45, 46, 62 or 63 is also asserted as a material fact for issues 1-11 and 15-16. Plaintiff’s success in raising a triable issue as to those UMFs is therefore sufficient to defeat the request for summary adjudication as to those issues.

The remaining issues for adjudication (issues 12-14) seek adjudication of a “potential claim for wrongful termination.” However, the issues that may be considered on a motion for summary judgment are defined by the pleadings. (FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at pp. 381-382.) Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiff has not alleged a cause of action for wrongful termination. The Court may not grant adjudication on a cause of action that has not been raised in the pleadings. The request for adjudication on these issues is therefore denied.

Disposition

Defendant Pacific Gas & Electric’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Angela Ramirez’ second amended complaint is DENIED. Defendant’s request for summary adjudication is DENIED as to all issues for adjudication.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.