Respondent's Motion to Strike (SLAPP)
CV-26-003831 - MALDONADOPADILLA, PAOLA vs COELHO, KELLEY MARIE - Respondent's Motion to Strike (SLAPP) Petition for Civil Harassment Order - GRANTED in full.
DISCLOSURE/NOTE: The Court is familiar with Respondent Coelho as she has been involved in two other separate unsuccessful petitions for civil harassment restraining orders. Those cases were related to each other, but do not appear to be legally related to this case. The Court gives no consideration to the facts in those cases. Prior to the bringing of this petition, Petitioner's current counsel attempted to engage me (Judge Mayne) on the main courthouse steps to express his support for my rulings in the other two cases. I did not engage with him and left the area.
CONSIDERATION OF THE OPPOSITION Petitioner was self-represented. At the prior hearing, her current counsel appeared but did not file a notice of appearance. He also appeared to make a general appearance. The Opposition was signed by Petitioner only on May 28, 2026. On June 5, 2026, counsel subbed in with a substitution of attorney form. On June 5, 2026, Petitioner's counsel filed an "adoption of prior pleadings of petitioner." Under these circumstances, accepting the Opposition as filed is either mandatory or discretionary. If it is discretionary, I choose to consider it.
STANDARD An anti?SLAPP motion is evaluated under a two’step process. First, the moving party must establish that the challenged claims arise from protected activity--i.e., acts in furtherance of the constitutional right of petition or free speech, including statements or writings made in judicial proceedings or in connection with issues under review by a court. If that burden is met, the analysis proceeds to step two, where the burden shifts to the plaintiff or petitioner to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits by presenting legally sufficient claims supported by admissible evidence. (See Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.)
Courts construe protected activity broadly at step one. (See Brodeur v. Atlas Entertainment, Inc. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 665, 674 ["[I}t is ... beyond dispute that the anti-SLAPP statute, including the scope of the term "public interest," is to be construed broadly."].) Claims predicated on litigation conduct, declarations, discovery responses, and court rulings generally fall squarely within the statute. The "illegality exception" is narrow and applies only where the defendant's conduct is conceded to be illegal or conclusively shown to be illegal as a matter of law. The Court can strike a cause of an action or factual allegations or both. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5 th 376, 488.)
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INITIAL ALLEGATIONS Petitioner alleges that after a meeting at her home in 2023 where Respondent attempted to glean closed session information from a public agency Petitioner served on, Respondent began a pattern of harassment. That included: publishing false and defamatory statements about her and her non-profit organization. The specifics of the false statements are unstated. Petitioner further alleges that people "associated with the respondent" were outside her residence watching or recording her. Further, unfamiliar vehicles were parked near her home and left "abruptly." She further alleges that Respondent had appeared at one her public events and engaged in "disruptive or intimidating behavior." A CAD log attached to the petition indicates that Petitioner told police that Respondent had come and recorded her house.
RESPONDENT'S CONTENTIONS Respondent - and Petitioner in Opposition- appear to agree that the non-profit referenced is the Family Advocacy & Resources Alliance, which Petitioner manages. Petitioner's statements are vague as to specifics, and this made Respondent's efforts to identify potentially protected speech more difficult. But Respondent contends that any statements made were a matter of public interest on a public forum regarding the non-profit activities of FARA. These are alleged to be protected statements under section 425.16(c).
Respondent attaches a demand letter ostensibly from Petitioner to Respondent identifying several allegedly defamatory statements, addressed further below. Most of the items covered by the demand letter cover protected speech - one of them is that Respondent called for an audit of all non-profits and specifically FARA in the city of Turlock. This is a First Amendment-protected petitioning of the government. On the other hand, allegations that Petitioner fabricated a crime, if false and partly based on non-public information, may be defamatory, and defamatory statements may be a part of a pattern of harassment. (E.G. v. M.L. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5 th 688, 701.)
PETITIONER'S OPPOSITION There is no declaration, but the Opposition is verified. Respondent treats the factual assertions as a declaration, as does the Court. However, assertions of what the initial Petition says are not new factual assertions that can be considered if they are not in the Petition. I spent a significant amount of time attempting to reconcile the claims of the Opposition and the initial pleadings. I failed to do so.
The following portions of the verified Opposition do not appear to have a factual basis (the opposition does not have page numbers listed): "Petitioner presented evidence that Respondent repeatedly appeared near Peititioner's residence in various vehicles over an extended period of time..." (Opp. p.3, ll.6-8) "Petitioner additionally presented evidence that Respondent repeatedly contacted Petitioner through calls, messages, and social media communications after Petitioner attempted to distance herself from Respondent." (p.3, ll. 13-15) "The Petition further alleges conduct directed toward Petitioner's family members, including repeated appearances near Petitioner's adult son's workplace and conduct that caused fear and emotional distress with the household." (p.3, ll. 17-20) "Petitioner additionally submitted corroborating witness declarations from family members and other individuals who personally observed portions of the conduct." (p.4. ll. 8-10)
The following allegation is vague, does not contain a time frame, and does not explain what happened: "Petitioner also alleges that Respondent obtained and transmitted confidential information concerning Petitioner's minor child in a manner Petitioner reasonably perceived as intimidating and threatening." (p.3 ll. 21-24)
ANALYSIS The first prong of the analysis is whether protected speech is implicated. Both sides agree that it is. The Court cannot consider protected speech and the burden shifts to Petitioner to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of her civil harassment claim. Petitioner has fallen well short of this requirement. The evidence submitted consists largely of conclusory allegations, lacks sufficient admissible evidentiary support, and lacks the detail required to find a likelihood of success by the clear and convincing evidence standard by demonstrating a pattern of harassment. Further, the Court must find a substantial risk of future harm and the lack of detail on the timing of these events disables it from finding such a risk. (Russell v. Douvan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4 th 399, 401.)
The petition for civil harassment restraining orders is STRICKEN pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 425.16. The June 24, 2026 hearing is vacated. Respondent shall file and serve any motion for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 425.16, subdivision (c), within the time permitted by law. Respondent to submit a proposed order within five court days that conforms to this ruling.
The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:
CV-25-004260 - SHOLES, CAMERON vs TURLOCK RV CENTER INC - Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication - DENIED. Plaintiff filed this action on May 1, 2025. Plaintiff asserts three causes of action: (1) a breach of contract claim,