JUAN JUAREZ AN INDIVIDUAL AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED vs B & S PLASTICS INC

minimum wages, timely pay wages, reimburse business expenses, pay accrued vacation, provide accurate, itemized wage statement, and failure to provide compliant meal and rest periods. Plaintiff further asserted a derivative claim for violation of the Unfair Competition Law. This matter is titled Juarez v. B & S Plastics, Inc., Case No. 2024CUOE027766 (the “Juarez Action”). It was originally assigned to the Honorable Mark S. Borrell in Department 40. A First Amended Complaint was filed on January 3, 2025. The operative Second Amended Complaint was filed on March 21, 2025.

On March 20, 2025, a matter titled Arciniega v. B & S Plastics, Inc., Case No. 2025CUOE040882, also a wage-and-hour matter, was filed (the “Arciniega Action”), and was assigned to the Honorable Carla J. Ortega in Department 41. On June 2, 2025, the Arciniega Action was reassigned to Department J4.

On September 24, 2025, the cases were consolidated and the Juarez Action was designated the lead case.

Post-consolidation, the Court has rejected attempts to file another amended complaint, first on December 22, 2025, and again on January 30, 2026.

No trial date has been set.

The motions at issue concern discovery propounded by counsel for plaintiff Arciniega. Although the motion was filed as a single motion, it seeks further responses to both special interrogatories and requests for production of documents. It was filed on March 26, 2026. Defendant filed its opposition on May 28, 2026. Plaintiff’s reply was filed on June 3, 2026.

Plaintiff seeks further responses to the discovery requests at issue on various grounds. First, he argues that the requests are narrowly tailored. They seek information relating to Defendant’s workforce, timekeeping systems, payroll practices, and companywide policies, which are relevant to evaluate the existence of uniform policies and practices, the scope of the potential violations, and the propriety of class treatment. Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s objections are without merit and seeks an order compelling further responses and payment of sanctions in the amount of $8,250.

Defendant argues in opposition that the motion violates the Court’s controlling Case Management Order, which limits pre-certification discovery to class certification issues only; mandates a specific Belaire-West opt-out procedure with a third-party administrator for class contact information, requires unique numbering and redaction of payroll records, and directs the parties to use an Information Discovery Conference for scope purposes. Plaintiff has ignored the order as if it does not apply to him.

Second, Defendant argues that the Arciniega Action is not the lead action since the case has been consolidated with the Juarez Action, yet Arciniega’s counsel filed the motion alone and proceeded without involving Juarez’s counsel.

2024CUOE027766: JUAN JUAREZ AN INDIVIDUAL AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED vs B & S PLASTICS INC

Third, Defendant argues that the operative pleading in the consolidated action is not clear. The Court has rejected the attempted filing of an amended complaint by Arciniega’s counsel on two occasions. The scope of discovery remains unclear until this issue is resolved.

Fourth, Defendant argues that precertification discovery on the merits of class claims is not permitted. The discovery here seeks wholesale production of payroll, timekeeping, and policy records, which Defendant considers to be merits discovery untethered to any specific certification factor.

Fifth, Plaintiff has ignored the court-ordered process for obtaining the contact information of putative class members.

Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel has failed to adequately meet and confer.

Accordingly, Defendant seeks an order denying the motion and ordering Plaintiff and/or his counsel of record to pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $9,002.50.

Plaintiff responds that Defendant does not address the merits of the motion and instead relies on a series of procedural issues that arose “long after the discovery was propounded,” and which was propounded before consolidation. Plaintiff asserts that the adequacy of Defendant’s responses must be evaluated “based on the circumstances existing at the time they were served, not on subsequent disputes concerning consolidation, the filing of a consolidated complaint, designation of a lead plaintiff, or the applicability of a case management order entered in a different department.” Plaintiff argues that it is not clear that the Case Management Order remained operative following consolidation, and that Defendant’s position is based on an assumption.

Even if the Case Management Order remains operative, it permits class-certification discovery. Plaintiff argues that the discovery is relevant to certification, contrary to Defendant’s claim otherwise.

As for Defendant’s privacy argument, Plaintiff proposed a Belaire-West procedure during meet-and-confer efforts. Defendant omitted to include those facts in its opposition. Defendant cannot privacy concerns after rejecting Plainitff’s efforts to assuage those concerns.

Plaintiff further responds that Defendant has presented no authority supporting the argument that his right to discovery was extinguished by the designation of the Juarez Actin as the lead case. Forcing Plaintiff to restart discovery would lead to an absurd result. Further, Defendant never sought a protective order.

Finally, Plaintiff responds that it is defense counsel who has failed to meet and confer in good faith to avoid this motion.

II. Legal Standard: Motions to Compel Further Responses

“In the absence of contrary court order, a civil litigant's right to discovery is broad.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541 (Williams).) Any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to the subject matter of the action or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible

2024CUOE027766: JUAN JUAREZ AN INDIVIDUAL AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED vs B & S PLASTICS INC

evidence is discoverable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) “[D]isclosure is a matter of right unless statutory or public policy considerations clearly prohibit it[.]” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 541 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].) The party resisting a discovery request has the burden of justifying any objections to the request. (Id.)

Upon receipt of a discovery response that is evasive or incomplete, or to which meritless or general objections have been made, the propounding party may file a motion to compel a further response. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (a), 2031.310, subd. (a).) The motion must be accompanied by a meet-and-confer declaration (Id., §§ 2016.040, 2030.300, subd. (b), 2031.310, subd. (b), 2033.290, subd. (b)) and a separate statement. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345, subd. (a).) A motion to compel further responses to discovery must be noticed within 45 days of service of verified responses. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (c), 2031.310, subd. (c).)

The failure or refusal to respond to discovery and the making of meritless objections, without substantial justification, are misuses of the discovery process for which a court must impose sanctions against a party and/or the party’s attorney, unless some other circumstance makes the imposition of sanctions unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2023.010, 223.030, subd. (a), 2030.300, subd. (d), 2031.310, subd. (h), 2033.290, subd. (d).)

III. Application

The parties fail to address the timeliness of the motion.1 The discovery at issue was served on April 17, 2025, and the verified responses thereto were served on June 24, 2025, by email. (Nabiev Decl., ¶¶ 3-4 and Exhs. 1-2.) The 45th day thereafter was Friday, August 8, 2025. Adding two court days for electronic service yields a motion-filing deadline of August 12, 2025. However, the Court stayed formal discovery in the matter in its July 23, 2025, Case Management Order. That stay on formal discovery was lifted as to class certification discovery only on September 24, 2025, when the Court consolidated the two actions. (Frusetta Decl., ¶¶ 1-2 and Exhs. 1-2.)

As of July 23, 2025, 29 days of the 45-day period had elapsed. Once the stay was lifted on September 24, 2025, the 45-day period continued running. Seventeen days later was Saturday, October 11, 2025, as a result of which the deadline was extended to Monday, October 13th. (Code Civ. Proc., § 12a, subd. (a).) Extending that by two court days to account for electronic service (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6, subd. (a)(3)(B) yields a filing deadline of October 15, 2025. This motion was not noticed until March 26, 2026.

Hence, it is not timely, and the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on it other than to deny it. (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410 [“We do not believe the 45–day limitation is ‘jurisdictional’ in the fundamental sense, but is only “jurisdictional” in the sense that it renders the court without authority to rule on motions to compel other than to deny them.”].) Even if the 45-day time period began anew upon the lifting of the discovery stay on September 24, 2025, the filing deadline would have run on November 13, 2025, after accounting for extensions for intervening court holidays and electronic service.

The parties’ meet-and-confer correspondence does not begin until December 29, 2025, well after either deadline had run and contains no reference to any extensions granted before

1 The motion is actually two motions. Counsel is admonished to file separate motions and pay separate

filing fees when different types of discovery request are involved, as is the case here.

2024CUOE027766: JUAN JUAREZ AN INDIVIDUAL AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED vs B & S PLASTICS INC

October 15 or November 13, 2025. Plaintiff’s counsel appears to have first begun meeting and conferring on December 29th when he stated, “[S]ince discovery is now lifted on class certification issues, I think we need to meet and confer based on your prior responses.”2 (Frusetta Decl., Exh. 6.)

Because Plaintiff failed to timely notice his motion, the Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on it. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (c), 2031.310, subd. (c); Sexton, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1410.)

IV.

Disposition

For the reasons stated herein, the motion is denied.

Counsel for Defendant is to give notice of the Court’s ruling.

2 Although Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that the meet and confer correspondence between him and defense counsel is attached to his declaration as Exhibit 3 (Nabiev Decl., ¶ 6), Exhibit 3 does not contain any such correspondence but rather contains duplicate sets of the discovery responses at issue. Copies of at least some of the meet and confer communications appear to be attached to defense counsel’s declaration. The communications begin on December 29, 2025. Other communications are dated on December 30, 2025; January 9, 16, 20, 21, 23, 26, and 30, 2026; February 6, 13, 17, 26, and 27, 2026; and March 10, 16, 18, 20, 23, 24, and 25, 2026. (Frusetta Decl., ¶ 8 and Exh. 6.)

Counsel did attach the meet-and-confer correspondence to his supplemental declaration, submitted with Plaintiff’s reply memorandum. There is nothing in the supplemental declaration that established extensions of the deadline prior to the relevant dates. (Naviev Supp. Decl., ¶ 4 and Exh. 4.)

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