Johnson v. Hopkins

3

On March 20, 2026, Plaintiff filed an Acknowledgement of Satisfaction of Judgment indicating that the judgment has been satisfied in full. Accordingly, this motion is moot and is off calendar.

4. 25CV07011, Johnson v. Hopkins

Defendant Shannon Hopkins moves for an order striking the allegations for punitive damages in the complaint filed by Plaintiff Laurellee Johnson.

The complaint alleges that Hopkins drove a vehicle through a red light and into Johnson’s vehicle. Johnson alleges the impact caused severe property damage and physical injuries, and that after the accident Hopkins accelerated through another red light in an attempt to flee the scene and avoid liability. As a result, Johnson was left injured at the scene, bereft of medical assistance for an extended period of time which exacerbated Johnson’s physical and emotional injuries. The complaint alleges Hopkins was stopped a mile away by police officers and others. Complaint filed 10/8/2025, Exemplary Damages Attachment.

To obtain punitive damages at trial, a plaintiff must prove the defendant “has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” CC § 3294.

“Malice” is conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. CC § 3294(c)(1). “Oppression” is despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights. CC § 3294(c)(2). “Fraud” is also defined but is not pertinent here.

Hopkins argues the complaint does not plead facts to support a finding of oppression, fraud, or malice because it does not allege Hopkins intentionally collided with Johnson; and, at most, it alleges gross negligence, which is insufficient for punitive damages. Hopkins argues that allegations that she fled the scene are not true, in that she “was simply trying to find a safe place to pull over as to not block traffic or otherwise cause a new hazard.” Cited in support of these factual allegations are declarations executed by Hopkins and her spouse. Opp. at 6.

The facts asserted in the Opposition supported by declarations are irrelevant to this sort of motion to strike. Hopkins’ counsel knows this, so in the Reply she tries to avoid the accusation that she interposed patently improper material by writing the facts are simply for “context”. Reply at 1. This isn’t true. The extraneous facts were not provided for ‘context;’ counsel used them to argue there was no malice or oppression. Motion at 6. This extrinsic evidence is obviously improper. Weil & Brown, et al., California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial ¶¶ 7::169 ff. (Rutter: 2025). Neither opposing counsel nor the court should have to waste time addressing it.

There are two arguments actually based on the complaint.

The first is that generally we ought not to allow plaintiffs to plead anything they like in order to claim punitive damages. Reply at 1-2; 2-3. But, within the limits imposed by (i) rules of professional responsibility and (ii) the risk of sanctions for frivolous pleadings (CCP §128.7 (b)(3)), that is indeed the system we have. Figuring out the truth of allegations comes later in the process.

Secondly, Hopkins makes this argument that the complaint in this case is inadequate:

Plaintiff’s Complaint makes speculative allegations on Defendant’s state of mind that she deliberately and intentionally fled in order to leave Plaintiff ‘injured and alone.’ These are simply conclusory allegations plead that, given the substantive changes to section 3294 since Taylor, fall short of the necessary factual showing that defendant acted with “despicable" conduct, which require a showing of “base," “vile," or “contemptible" acts. It simply does not rise to that level here. As cited above, even proof of recklessness is insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages

Memo at 6-7.

This is just conclusory. There is no argument. It is not true that there are no “ultimate facts” supporting punitives (Memo at 6): indeed, Hopkins sets some of them out in her moving papers. Memo at 6:4-8. Complaints are construed liberally, CCP § 452, and assumed to be true in these sorts of motions to strike. Today’s IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193. There is enough in the complaint to support the request for punitive damages based on oppression and malice. Complaint filed 10/8/2025, Exemplary Damages Attachment.

The motion is DENIED. Defendant must file an answer to the complaint within 10 days of the service of this order.

Plaintiff’s counsel must submit a written order to the court consistent with this ruling and in compliance with Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312. The signature block should read as follows: Curtis E.A. Karnow (Ret.) Judge of the Superior Court (Sonoma) on Assignment

5. SCV-273480, Boyd v. Cotati Rohnert Park Unified School District

1. Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production

Plaintiff Victor Boyd moves for an order compelling Defendant Cotati Rohnert Park Unified School District (the District) to serve further responses to Boyd’s Request for Production of Documents, Set Two, Requests Nos. 23, 24, 25, 26, 30. Boyd requests sanctions against the District’s counsel, Mark Peters, in the amount of $5,350.00.

a. Timeliness of response

Boyd argues the District’s responses are untimely such that any objections are waived.

Here an extension was granted with responses due November 10, 2025. Boyd inquired about the responses when they had not been received by November 12. Krankemann decl., ¶6. Defendant indicated that the responses were mailed on November 10. Id. When Boyd had still not received responses by November 17, the District provided a copy by email. Id., ¶6, Exhibit G. Defendant’s Response to Requests for Production are dated November 10, 2025. Id., Exhibit H. The postmark on