Mark Signa et al vs The Regents of the University of CA et al

Except as herein granted, the motion is otherwise denied. (6) On or before 5 p.m. on June 3, 2026, defendant The Regents of the University of California shall file a public version of the amended appendix of evidence lodged conditionally under seal on February 25, 2026, in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication in the Tiffany Little matter, that redacts exhibits 4, 6 through 13, 16 through 25, and 30 through 37, only. No other exhibit, or material contained in any exhibit, apart from exhibits 4, 6 through 13, 16 through 25, and 30 through 37, shall be redacted from that public version of defendant's amended appendix of evidence.

Further, exhibits 4, 6 through 13, 16 through 25, and 30 through 37 to the amended appendix of evidence lodged by defendant on February 25, 2026, shall remain lodged under seal pending the determination of defendant's motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication as to plaintiff Tiffany Little's complaint. (7) On or before 5 p.m. on June 3, 2026, defendant The Regents of the University of California shall file a public version of the amended appendix of evidence lodged conditionally under seal on February 25, 2026, in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication against Michael Little's complaint, that redacts exhibits 3 through 5, 7, 8, 11 through 16, 18, and 22 through 29, only.

No other exhibit, or material contained in any exhibit, apart from exhibits 3 through 5, 7, 8, 11 through 16, 18, and 22 through 29, shall be redacted from that public version of defendant's amended appendix of evidence. Further, exhibits 3 through 5, 7, 8, 11 through 16, 18, and 22 through 29 to the amended appendix of evidence lodged by defendant on February 25, 2026, shall remain lodged under seal pending the determination of defendant's motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication against plaintiff Michael Little's complaint. (8) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendant The Regents of the University of California to seal exhibits in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication against the complaint of plaintiff Matthew Stern is granted as to exhibits 3, 4, 7 through 9, and 16, only.

Except as herein granted, the motion is otherwise denied. (9) On or before 5 p.m. on June 3, 2026, defendant The Regents of the University of California shall file a public version of the amended appendix of evidence lodged conditionally under seal on February 25, 2026, in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, motion for summary adjudication in the Matthew Stern matter, that redacts exhibits 3, 4, 7 through 9, and 16, only. No other exhibit, or material contained in any other exhibit, apart from exhibits 3, 4, 7 through 9, and 16, shall be redacted from that public redacted version of defendant's amended appendix of evidence.

Further, exhibits 3, 4, 7 through 9, and 16 to the amended appendix of evidence lodged by defendant on February 25, 2026, shall remain lodged under seal pending the determination of defendant's motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication in the Matthew Stern matter. (10) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendant The Regents of the University of California's motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, motion for summary adjudication against plaintiff Ryan Smith's complaint is denied. (11) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of plaintiffs Mark Signa, Michael Little, Tiffany Little, Matthew Stern, and Jonathan Reyes to consolidate cases for all purposes including trial is granted.

This case no. 18CV05728, shall be consolidated with Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV01431 entitled Michael Little, et al. v. The Regents of the University of California, et al., Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV04418 entitled Matthew Stern v. The Regents of the University of California, et al., and Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV02586 entitled Jonathan Lee Reyes v. The Regents of the University of California,

et al., for trial. This case is designated as the lead case. The parties shall file all documents in the lead case. The parties are ordered to appear at the hearing to discuss future proceedings in accordance with this ruling. Background: On November 21, 2018, plaintiff Mark Signa (Signa) filed their original complaint in this case against defendants The Regents of the University of California (the Regents) and the University of California Santa Barbara Police Department (UCSB-PD) Chief Dustin Olson (Olson), asserting four causes of action: (1) violation of Title 42 United States Code section 1983 - denial of first amendment rights; (2) violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act; (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (4) violation of Labor Code section 1102.5.

Briefly, Signa alleges in their complaint that they have been employed as a police officer by the Regents since 1990, and that the Regents and UCSB-PD retaliated against Signa after Signa voiced concerns about purported misconduct within the UCSB-PD. On February 4, 2019, Signa filed their operative first amended complaint (the Signa FAC), alleging two causes of action: (1) violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act and (2) violation of Labor Code Section 1102.5. On February 22, 2019, the Regents and Olson filed an answer to the Signa FAC, generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-seven affirmative defenses.

On May 22, 2019, the court ordered a stay of this case pending the exhaustion of administrative remedies by Signa. The court lifted the stay on January 21, 2021. On September 17, 2021, the court adopted its tentative ruling on a motion of the Regents to transfer and consolidate with this case (the Signa Action) for pre-trial purposes only, the following matters: (1) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV01431 entitled Michael Little, et al. v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Little Action); (2) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV04418 entitled Matthew Stern v.

The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Stern Action); (3) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV02586 entitled Jonathan Lee Reyes v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Reyes Action); (4) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV01625 entitled John Doe v. The Regents of the University of California Santa Barbara, et al. (the Smith Action); and (5) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 21CV01256 entitled Ryan Hashimoto v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Hashimoto Action).

On February 26, 2025, the court entered judgment in favor of the Regents, the UCSB-PD, and the University of California Santa Barbara, and against plaintiff Ryan Hashimoto, as to the complaint filed in the Hashimoto Action. Relevant here, on January 22, 2026, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, motion for summary adjudication against the Signa FAC (the Regents Signa Motion), and separately filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, motion for summary adjudication against the complaint of Matthew Stern (Stern) filed in the Stern Action (the Regents Stern Motion).

The Regents Signa Motion and the Regents Stern Motion were calendared for hearing on April 24, 2026. On January 26, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint of plaintiff Tiffany Little (T Little) filed in the Little Action, and separately filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, motion for summary adjudication against the complaint of plaintiff Michael Little (M Little) in the Little Action (collectively, the Regents Little Motions).

The Regents Little Motions were calendared for hearing on May 1, 2026. T Little and M Little have filed opposition to the Regents Little Motions. On February 10, Olson filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, against the Signa FAC (the Olson Motion). On February 11, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint filed by plaintiff Ryan Smith (Smith) in the Smith Action (the Regents Smith Motion). On February 13, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint filed by plaintiff Jonathan Lee Reyes (Reyes) in the Reyes Action (the Regents Reyes Motion).

On February 19, defendant David Millard (Millard) filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, against the complaint filed by Stern in the Stern Action (the Millard Motion.) The Olson Motion, the Regents Smith Motion, the Regents Reyes Motion, and the Millard Motion were

calendared for hearing on May 15, 2026. On March 16, the Regents filed an ex parte application for an order to set the hearing on the Regents Smith Motion on May 8, 2026, to allow that motion to be heard no later than 30 days before trial. On March 18, the court signed and entered an order granting that application, and moved the hearing on the Regents Smith Motion to May 8, 2026. On April 3, Stern filed their opposition to the Regents Stern Motion. On April 11, the court signed, and on April 13 filed, an order approving a stipulation by the parties to continue the hearing on the Regents Stern Motion to May 8, 2026, and the hearing on the Regents Signa Motion to May 15, 2026.

The Regents Smith Motion remained calendared for hearing on May 8. The Olson Motion, the Regents Reyes Motion, and the Millard Motion remained calendared for hearing on May 15, 2026. On April 17, Smith filed their opposition to the Regents Smith Motion. On April 21, Signa filed their opposition to the Regents Signa Motion. On April 24, Signa filed opposition to the Olson Motion, Reyes filed opposition to the Regents Reyes Motion, and Stern filed opposition to the Millard Motion. On May 1, the court issued a minute order (the May 1 Order), continuing the hearing on the Regents Little Motions to June 12, 2026, as a result of the lodging by the Regents of material submitted as a basis for adjudication of those motions conditionally under seal without having filed an appropriate motion for an order placing those materials under seal, or the entry of any such order.

The court set a hearing on any motion for an order to file the materials lodged conditionally under seal in support of the Regents Little Motions on May 29, 2026, and a briefing schedule that requires any such motion to be filed and served on or before May 11, among other things. On May 8, after a hearing, the court issued a minute order (the May 8 Order), continuing the hearing on the Regents Smith Motion to May 29, 2026, and the hearing on the Regents Stern Motion to June 12, 2026, as a result of the lodging by the Regents of material submitted as a basis for adjudication of those motions conditionally under seal without having filed an appropriate motion for an order placing those materials under seal.

The May 8 Order also requires that any motion for an order to place under seal the materials lodged by the Regents as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Smith Motion be filed and served on or before May 11, 2026; set a briefing schedule for oppositions and replies as to that motion; and set a hearing on any such motion on May 22, 2026. As to the materials lodged by the Regents conditionally under seal in support of the Regents Stern Motion, the May 8 Order set a hearing date for any motion to place those materials under seal on May 29, 2026.

On May 11, the Regents separately filed: (1) a motion for an order to file under seal the exhibits lodged by the Regents in support of the Regents Signa Motion (the Signa Motion to Seal); (2) a motion for an order to file under seal the exhibits lodged by the Regents in support of the Regents Reyes Motion (the Reyes Motion to Seal); (3) a motion for an order to file under seal the exhibits lodged by the Regents in support of the Regents Little Motions (the Little Motion to Seal); (4) a motion for an order to file under seal the exhibits lodged by the Regents in support of the Regents Smith Motion (the Smith Motion to Seal); and (5) a motion for an order to file under seal the exhibits lodged by the Regents in support of the Regents Stern Motion (the Stern Motion to Seal).

On May 15, after a hearing, the court issued a minute order adopting its tentative ruling denying the Olson Motion and the Millard Motion. Further, the court continued the Regents Signa Motion and the Regents Reyes Motion to June 5, 2026, to allow time to resolve the Signa Motion to Seal and the Reyes Motion to Seal. Also on May 15, after the deadline prescribed in the May 8 Order, Smith filed an opposition to the Smith Motion to Seal. On May 18, M Little and T Little filed an opposition to the Little Motion to Seal; Stern filed an opposition to the Stern Motion to Seal; Signa filed an opposition to the Signa Motion to Seal; and Reyes filed an opposition to the Reyes Motion to Seal.

On May 20, Signa, M Little, T Little, Reyes, and Stern (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed an ex parte application for an order shortening time for a hearing on a forthcoming motion to consolidate the Signa Action, the Little Action, the

Reyes Action, and the Stern Action (collectively, the Actions) for trial. On May 21, after a hearing, the court granted that application, set the hearing on that motion on May 29, 2026, and ordered that any opposition to that motion be filed no later than May 27. On May 21, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their motion for an order consolidating the Actions for all purposes including trial (the Motion to Consolidate). On May 22, the court continued the hearing on the Smith Motion to Seal to May 29, 2026.

On May 27, the Regents filed an opposition to the Motion to Consolidate with the court. Analysis: (1) Smith Motion to Seal California has "long recognized a common law right of access to public documents, including court records." (Overstock.com, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 471, 483 (Overstock); see also McGuire v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1685, 1687 ["Court records are open to the public unless they are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute or are protected by the court itself due to the necessity of confidentiality."].) "California law also recognizes a constitutional right of access, grounded in the First Amendment, to court proceedings and court documents. [Citation.] 'A strong presumption exists in favor of public access to court records in ordinary civil trials. [Citation.]

That is because "the public has an interest, in all civil cases, in observing and assessing the performance of its public judicial system, and that interest strongly supports a general right of access in ordinary civil cases."' [Citation.] Because orders to seal court records implicate the public's right of access under the First Amendment, such orders are subject to ongoing judicial scrutiny, including at the trial court level." (In re Marriage of Tamir (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1078.) California Rules of Court, rules 2.550 and 2.551 "apply to records sealed or proposed to be sealed by court order." (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 2.550(a)(1).) Those rules "do not apply to records that are required to be kept confidential by law." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(a)(2).) "[T]he rules do apply to discovery materials that are used at trial or submitted as a basis for adjudication of matters other than discovery motions or proceedings." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(a)(3).) "A record must not be filed under seal without a court order. The court must not permit a record to be filed under seal based solely on the agreement or stipulation of the parties." (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 2.551(a).) "A party requesting that a record be filed under seal must file a motion or an application for an order sealing the record. The motion or application must be accompanied by a memorandum and a declaration containing facts sufficient to justify the sealing." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.551(b)(1).) "A copy of the motion or application must be served on all parties that have appeared in the case. Unless the court orders otherwise, any party that already has access to the records to be placed under seal must be served with a complete, unredacted version of all papers as well as a redacted version." (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 2.551(b)(2).) The proofs of service submitted with the Smith Motion to Seal, and the filing by Smith of an opposition to that motion, indicate that a copy of that motion was properly served. "[A] reasoned decision about sealing . . . records cannot be made without identifying and weighing the competing interests and concerns. Such a process is impossible without (1) identifying the specific information claimed to be entitled to such treatment; (2) identifying the nature of the harm threatened by disclosure; and (3) identifying and accounting for countervailing considerations.

The burden of presenting information sufficient to accomplish the first two steps is logically placed upon the party seeking the sealing of the documents, who is presumptively in the best position to know what disclosures will harm him and how. This means at a minimum that the party seeking to seal documents, or maintain them under seal, must come forward with a specific enumeration of the facts sought to be withheld and specific reasons for withholding them." (H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 879, 894.)

The Smith Motion to Seal seeks an order placing under seal "exhibits numbered 1-23 which were filed in support of the [Regents Smith Motion]." (Notice at p. 4, ll. 4-10 & P. 1.) In that motion, the Regents asserts that on February 13, 2026, it filed an Amended Appendix of Evidence (the Smith Amended Appendix) "which sought to lodge a copy of the exhibits numbered 1-23 under seal...." (Memorandum at p. 4, ll. 20-22.) A copy of the Smith

Amended Appendix filed by the Regents in the public record on February 13, 2026, is attached to the declaration of the Regents' counsel, Jaqueline Orozco (attorney Orozco), submitted in support of the Smith Motion to Seal. (Orozco Dec., P. 4 & exhibit 2.) As a threshold matter, though attorney Orozco's declaration, and the court's records, show that the Regents filed a public redacted version of the Smith Amended Appendix on February 13, 2026, the Regents did not lodge the Smith Amended Appendix conditionally under seal on that date, notwithstanding the filing by the Regents of a notice of lodging of that appendix on February 13.

Instead, court records reflect that the Regents lodged a complete, unredacted version of the Smith Amended Appendix conditionally under seal on February 25, 2026, by delivering a flash drive containing that record to the Clerk of the Court. In addition, the court's copy of the unredacted version of the Smith Amended Appendix lodged by the Regents conditionally under seal on February 25, 2026, does not include a proof of service. Therefore, the date on which the Regents served any party with a complete, unredacted version of the Smith Amended Appendix is unclear.

Absent a dispute, the court assumes without deciding that the Regents has timely and properly served the parties with a copy of the unredacted version of the Smith Amended Appendix. Court records also reflect that on February 11, 2026, the Regents filed a public redacted version of an appendix of evidence in support of the Regents Smith Motion that also identifies exhibits numbered 1 through 23. Though the Regents also filed a notice of lodging of that appendix on that same date, the court has no record showing that the Regents lodged an unredacted version of that appendix conditionally under seal.

Under the circumstances present here, and as the Smith Motion to Seal describes and is directed to only those exhibits that are identified and described in the public redacted version of the Smith Amended Appendix filed by the Regents on February 13, the court understands the Smith Amended Appendix to supersede and replace the prior appendix of evidence filed by the Regents on February 11, 2026. For these reasons, the court considers only the Smith Amended Appendix, and the exhibits attached to those documents, and not any prior version of that document.

The public redacted version of the Smith Amended Appendix identifies only 23 exhibits, and the title of each exhibit. (See also Orozco Dec., exhibit 2.) Therefore, the present record reflects, without dispute, that the Smith Motion to Seal seeks an order placing under seal all of the exhibits submitted by the Regents as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Smith Motion. The court's review of the unredacted version of the Smith Amended Appendix shows that those exhibits include over 1,000 pages of material. (Feb. 25, 2026, Lodged Smith Amended Appendix at pdf pp. 9-1056.) "[T]he notice of a motion, other than for a new trial, must state when, and the grounds upon which it will be made, and the papers, if any, upon which it is to be based." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 1010.) "A notice of motion must state in the opening paragraph the nature of the order being sought and the grounds for issuance of the order." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(a).) "The purpose of the notice requirements 'is to cause the moving party to "sufficiently define the issues for the information and attention of the adverse party and the court." ' [Citations.]" (Kinda v. Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1277 (Kinda).) "As a general rule, the trial court may consider only the grounds stated in the notice of motion." (Luri v.

Greenwald (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125.) Though the notice of the Smith Motion to Seal states the nature of the order sought by the Regents, and the papers on which that motion is based, wholly absent from that notice are the grounds for issuance of that order. For these reasons, the notice of the Smith Motion to Seal is deficient. Though the court, generally, may not consider any grounds not stated in the notice of the Smith Motion to Seal for all reasons discussed above, "it may be sufficient that the supporting papers contain the grounds for the relief sought, even if the notice does not. [Citations.]

It also may be sufficient if the omitted issue, or ground for relief, was raised without objection before the trial court." (Kinda, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1277.) The opposition of Smith does not raise any objection to any deficiencies in the notice of the Smith Motion to Seal, including those described above. In addition, the supporting memorandum contains the grounds for the order sought in that motion. For these reasons, the court will consider the grounds set forth in the memorandum submitted in support of the Smith Motion to Seal.

The sole ground asserted in that memorandum is that the Regents Smith Motion addresses allegations that concern conduct of law enforcement personnel and subsequent workplace or internal affairs investigation files of

peace officers which are confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a). (Memorandum at p. 4.) In support, attorney Orozco states, in a conclusory manner, that the Regents Smith Motion "references and includes exhibits that are law enforcement personnel records or contain information from workplace investigations, including Internal Affairs investigations, performed by [the Regents] and maintained by the [UCSB-PD] all of which are designated as confidential." (Orozco Dec., P. 5; see also Memorandum at p. 4.)

Attorney Orozco further states that those exhibits "are subject to Penal Code sections 832.5, 832.7, 832.8 and Evidence Code sections 1043, 1044, 1045." (Orozco Dec., P. 6; see also Memorandum at pp. 4 & 6.) The court is "not obliged to accept the [Orozco] declaration[] as dispositive." (In re Providian Credit Card Cases (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 292, 301 (Providian).) Though the Smith Motion to Seal includes a blanket request for an order sealing all of the exhibits submitted as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Smith Motion, the motion fails to present any information, evidence, or reasoned argument showing, on a point-by-point basis as to each specific exhibit to the Smith Amended Appendix, why each of exhibits is confidential under Penal Code sections 832.5, 832.7, and 832.8, or Evidence Code sections 1043, 1044, and 1045.

To the extent the Regents contends that some portion of each exhibits contains or reflects information that is confidential under those statutes, the Smith Motion to Seal also fails to present any information or evidence showing where any such purportedly confidential information appears in each exhibit. By failing to present any information, evidence, or reasoned argument showing why each specific exhibit or portions of any exhibit are confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7, the Regents has effectively shifted its burden to the court, which requires the court to review over 1,000 pages of material to determine which, if any, exhibit attached to the Smith Amended Appendix is, as attorney Orozco contends, a law enforcement personnel record and why; and to determine which, if any, exhibit contains information from workplace or internal affairs investigations and why.

For these and all further reasons discussed above, the Regents has wholly failed to meet its burden to show why each of the 23 exhibits attached to the Smith Amended Appendix is confidential pursuant to Penal Code sections 832.5, 832.7, and 832.8, or Evidence Code sections 1043, 1044, and 1045. (Providian, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 301 [noting that, as to the issue presented in that case, "it was defendants' burden to prove the existence of trade secrets [citations], and to overcome the presumption in favor of public access."].)

The failure by the Regents to meet its burden justifies a denial of the Smith Motion to Seal for all reasons discussed above. Notwithstanding the Regents' failure to present any information or evidence, on a point-by-point basis, explaining why each exhibit is confidential, contains confidential information, or is required to be kept confidential pursuant to the statutory provisions cited in attorney Orozco's declaration and above, the court has conducted its own review of the exhibits attached to the Smith Amended Appendix.

For all reasons discussed herein, the court will grant the Smith Motion to Seal as to exhibits 3 and 17 through 21, only, and will otherwise deny that motion. Considering the nature of the confidentiality protection claimed by the Regents as to exhibits 1 through 23 of the Smith Amended Appendix which remain lodged conditionally under seal, the court's "discussion of those documents must be circumspect." (Providian, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 303.) (a) Exhibits 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 22 Relevant here based on the sole ground stated in the Regents' memorandum and attorney Orozco's declaration, "[i]n 1978, the California Legislature codified the privileges and procedures surrounding what had come to be known as ' Pitchess motions' ... through the enactment of Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 and Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045." (City of Santa Cruz v.

Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 81 & fns. 3, 4.) "Those sections create a statutory scheme making [certain law enforcement personnel] records confidential and subject to discovery only through the procedure set out in the Evidence Code." (Riverside County Sheriff's Dept. v. Stiglitz (2014) 60 Cal.4th 624, 630.) Penal Code section 832.7, which "creates a general privilege and then carves out a limited exception" (City of Hemet v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1427 (City of Hemet)), provides that "the personnel records of peace officers and custodial officers and records maintained by a state or local agency pursuant to [Penal Code] [s]ection 832.5, or information obtained from these records, are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding except by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046 of the

Evidence Code[]" (Pen. Code, Sec. 832.7, subd. (a)). The public redacted version of the Smith Amended Appendix describes exhibits 11 through 16 and 22 as: (exhibit 11) "Pertinent Pages from the Certified Copy of the Transcript of the Deposition of Plaintiff, Taken on March 20, 2025"; (exhibit 12) "Pertinent Pages from the Certified Copy of the Transcript of the Deposition of David Millard, Taken on June 19, 2024"; (exhibit 13) "Pertinent Pages of Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's Special Interrogatories, Set One, Served on October 4, 2021"; (exhibit 14) "Plaintiff's Supplemental Responses to Defendant's Special Interrogatories, Set One, Served on December 10, 2025"; (exhibit 15) "Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's Requests for Production, Set One, Served on October 4, 2021"; (exhibit 16) "Plaintiff's Supplemental Responses to Defendant's Requests for Production, Set One, Served on December 10, 2025; and (exhibit 22) "Defendant's Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Production, Set One, Served on October 1, 2021". (Orozco Dec., exhibit 2 at p. 5.) "[P]eace officer personnel records include only the types of information enumerated in [Penal Code] section 832.8." (Commission on Peace Officer Standards & Training v.

Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 278, 293; see also Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. Superior Court (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 268, 292 (Pasadena).) Penal Code section 832.8 states: "'Personnel records' means any file maintained under that individual's name by his or her employing agency and containing records relating to any of the following: "(1) Personal data, including marital status, family members, educational and employment history, home addresses, or similar information. "(2) Medical history. "(3) Election of employee benefits. "(4) Employee advancement, appraisal, or discipline. "(5) Complaints, or investigations of complaints, concerning an event or transaction in which he or she participated, or which he or she perceived, and pertaining to the manner in which he or she performed his or her duties. "(6) Any other information the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." (Pen.

Code, Sec. 832.8, subd. (a)(1)-(6).) The court's review of exhibits 11 through 16 and 22 shows, without dispute by the Regents, that those exhibits consist of excerpts from the transcripts of the depositions of Smith and Millard, and the discovery responses of Smith and the Regents, each of which appear to have been generated during this litigation. Considering that exhibits 11 through 16 and 22, on their face, consist of discovery materials generated during this litigation, and as the Smith Motion to Seal presents no information, evidence, or argument showing why those materials contain the type of information described in Penal Code section 832.8, the Smith Motion to Seal, and the court's review, does not show that exhibits 11 through 16 and 22 are personnel records or confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 2.550 and 2.551, a "record" includes "all or a portion of any document, paper, exhibit, transcript, or other thing filed or lodged with the court, by electronic means or otherwise." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(b)(1).) The Smith Motion to Seal also does not present any information specifically identifying where any purportedly confidential information of the type described in Penal Code section 832.8, subdivision (a), appears in exhibits 11 through 16 or 22, or explain why that information is required to be kept confidential.

Those exhibits also do not show, on their face, that they contain law enforcement personnel files as attorney Orozco asserts. To the extent the Regents contend that the entirety of each of those exhibits is confidential because some limited portion reflects information appearing in a personnel record, it would appear that the Smith Motion to Seal seeks to "extend the statute beyond its limited purpose." (Pasadena, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 293.) Also relevant here, Penal Code section 832.5 provides: "Each department or agency in this state that employs peace officers shall establish a procedure to investigate complaints by members of the public against the personnel of these departments or agencies, and shall make a written description of the procedure available to the public." (Pen.

Code, Sec. 832.5, subd. (a).) "All complaints retained pursuant to [subdivision (b)] may be maintained either in the peace or custodial officer's general personnel file or in a separate file designated by the

department or agency as provided by department or agency policy, in accordance with all applicable requirements of law." (Pen. Code, Sec. 832.5, subd. (b).) The Smith Motion to Seal also fails to show, for the same or similar reasons discussed above, why the discovery materials contained in exhibits 11 through 16 and 22 are records maintained by the Regents or UCSB-PD pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code section 832.5. Those exhibits also do not show, on their face, that they are records maintained pursuant to that statute.

For these and the reasons further discussed above, the court questions the credibility of the statements contained in attorney Orozco's declaration. The confidentiality protections provided under Penal Code section 832.7 also apply to "information obtained from" the "personnel records of peace officers and custodial officers and records maintained by a state or local agency pursuant to Section 832.5...." (Pen. Code, Sec. 832.7, subd. (a).) The Smith Motion to Seal also presents no evidence, information, or reasoned argument showing why any information contained in exhibit 11 was obtained by Smith from a personnel record or record maintained pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5.

For example, the court's review of that exhibit shows that it reflects Smith's own observations and complaints regarding the matters at issue in the Smith Action. (See, e.g., Lodged Smith Amended Appendix, exhibit 11 at pp. 36-40, 49-57, 68-73, 76-79, 81-84, 86-88.) Further, exhibit 11 does not show, on its face, what, if any, information was obtained by Smith from the personnel records of a peace officer or any record maintained by the Regents or UCSB-PD pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5. Even if the Regents could provide evidence or information showing that any specific information contained in exhibit 11 was obtained by Smith from a peace officer's personnel record or a record maintained by the Regents or the UCSB-PD pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5, the Smith Motion to Seal fails, for all reasons discussed above, to present that evidence, or to show where that information appears in that exhibit.

The same reasoning and analysis apply to exhibits 12 through 16 and 22, which also consist of discovery materials ostensibly generated during this litigation, and which do not show, on their face, that any information contained those materials was obtained from a personnel record or records maintained pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5. (See, e.g., Lodged Smith Amended Appendix, exhibit 12 at pp. 17, 58; exhibit 13 at pp. 15-31; exhibit 14 at pp. 2-3; exhibit 15 at pp. 2-4; exhibit 16 at p. 2; exhibit 22 at p. 5.)

The Smith Motion to Seal also fails to present any evidence or information showing why a discovery response in which the responding party agrees to produce documents, or states that no responsive documents exist, reflects information obtained from the types of records described in Penal Code section 832.7. (See, e.g., exhibit 22 at pp. 4, 7.) In addition, the Regents does not appear to dispute that the personnel records of peace officers, records maintained by the Regents or UCSB-PD pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5, or information obtained from those records, may not be disclosed "except by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code." (Pen.

Code, Sec. 832.7, subd. (a).) Though exhibits 11 through 16 and 22 consist of discovery materials generated during this litigation, the Smith Motion to Seal does not address whether any written motion was required to be filed, or was filed, by the party seeking the discovery reflected in those exhibits. (See Evid. Code, Sec. 1043, subd. (a).) Court records also do not show that any written motion pursuant to Evidence Code section 1043 was filed with the court. For these additional reasons, the court views the Regent's and its counsel's representations "with considerable skepticism ... ." (Providian, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 309.)

For all reasons discussed above, the Smith Motion to Seal fails to show why exhibits 11 through 16 and 22 are confidential, or required to be kept confidential, pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(a)(2).) The Smith Motion to Seal also asserts that the confidentiality of peace officer records under Penal Code section 832.7 gives rise to an overriding interest in protecting exhibits 11 through 16 and 22 from disclosure, which will be prejudiced if those records are not sealed because this case is likely to be subject to public scrutiny; it is not uncommon for officers to receive harsh public criticism; the exhibits would be disclosed without going through the process set forth in the " Pitchess statutes"; and any public disclosure of those exhibits could jeopardize a fair and unbiased analysis of the evidence and the security of all individuals involved. (Motion at pp. 6-7.)

The Regents also asserts that the proposed sealing of exhibits 11 through 16 and 22 is narrowly tailored, and that no less restrictive means exists. In support of that assertion, attorney Orozco states that "[r]edaction alone will not achieve the confidentiality of personnel records of peace officers because unredacted information and

statements is sufficient to infer the identity of officers involved." (Orozco Dec., P. 7.) "Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(c).) "The court may order that a record be filed under seal only if it expressly finds facts that establish: "(1) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record; "(2) The overriding interest supports sealing the record; "(3) A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed; "(4) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and "(5) No less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest." (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d)(1)-(5); see also Sander v. State Bar of California (2013) 58 Cal.4th 300, 319, fn. 7.) Further, "[a]n order sealing the record must: "(A) Specifically state the facts that support the findings; and "(B) Direct the sealing of only those documents and pages, or, if reasonably practicable, portions of those documents and pages, that contain the material that needs to be placed under seal. All other portions of each document or page must be included in the public file." (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 2.550(e)(1)(A), (B).) The same or similar reasoning and analysis apply. Apart from the contentions further discussed above, the Smith Motion to Seal fails to present any information, evidence, or reasoned argument showing the existence of any overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to exhibits 11 through 16 and 22, or any information contained in those exhibits. Because that motion fails to identify any specific information contained in exhibits 11 through 16 and 22 that is confidential, or where that information appears, the Regents has also failed to meet its burden to show why the proposed sealing of the entirety of those exhibits is narrowly tailored.

Furthermore, the general assertion that this case may be subject to public scrutiny or public criticism, without more, "calls for speculation." (In re Willon (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1100.) For example, the Smith Motion to Seal presents no information, evidence, or reasoned argument showing "(1) the nature and extent of the publicity, (2) the amount of information already in the public domain, (3) the existence of prejudicial information not yet released to the public, (4) the size of the county from which prospective jurors will be drawn, and (5) whether potential voir dire or other measures could eliminate any prejudice caused by the publicity." (People v.

Jackson (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1025.) That motion also fails to show, with appropriate citations to the record, why any exhibit contains information that is "highly prejudicial." (Ibid.) For these reasons, the Smith Motion to Seal fails to show "[a] substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed[.]" (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d)(3).) "[T]he public has an interest, in all civil cases, in observing and assessing the performance of its public judicial system, and that interest strongly supports a general right of access in ordinary civil cases." (NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v.

Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1210, original italics.) For all reasons discussed above, the general and conclusory points and arguments advanced in the Smith Motion to Seal, which lack credibility and the specificity required under court rules, fail to show the existence of an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to exhibits 11 through 16 and 22, or why the proposed sealing of those exhibits in their entirety is narrowly tailored. For these same reasons, that motion also fails to show any prejudice to an overriding interest, or why there exists no less restrictive means to achieve any purported overriding interest in those exhibits.

For these and all further reasons discussed above, and as the Smith Motion to Seal does not present any information or evidence that would support the express findings required under California Rules of Court, rule 2.550 to seal all or any part of exhibits 11 through 16 and 22, the court will deny the Smith Motion to Seal as to those exhibits. (b) Exhibit 2 The Smith Amended Appendix describes exhibit 2 as "Plaintiff Ryan Smith's Complaint, Filed on March 27, 2019". (Orozco Dec., exhibit 2 at p. 4.)

The same reasoning and analysis apply. For all reasons discussed above, the Smith Motion to Seal fails to show why exhibit 2 is a personnel record or a record maintained by the Regents or UCSB-PD pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5, or why that exhibit, or any information contained in that exhibit, is confidential, or required to be kept confidential, pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7.

The undisputed available information and evidence also shows that Smith filed their complaint in the public record of the Smith Action. The public version of that complaint does not include any redactions. In addition, though Smith is named as "John Doe" in their complaint, the Regents do not appear to dispute that Smith's name was publicly disclosed after the filing of that pleading, including by the Regents and Smith in this proceeding. Smith contends in their opposition that the Regents has failed to meet its burden to show why any exhibit, or information contained in an exhibit, is confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7, and that the Regents' reliance on that statute is misplaced. (See Opp. at pp. 5-6.)

Notwithstanding whether the opposition of Smith was filed timely, the court construes that opposition as an express waiver of the confidentiality protections provided under Penal Code section 832.7 as to any information regarding Smith that is contained in exhibit 2. (Pasadena, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 274, 293-294 [discussing waiver as to personnel information appearing in a report concerning an officer-involved shooting].) As further discussed above, though Smith cannot waive any confidentiality protections as to any peace officer other than Smith (Pasadena, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 293-294), the Smith Motion to Seal fails, for the same reasons discussed above, to identify any specific information contained in exhibit 2 that is confidential or required to be kept confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7, or where that information appears in that exhibit.

There also exists some question as to whether the Regents, by its conduct, has waived any confidentiality protection as to exhibit 2. "Waiver refers to the act, or the consequences of the act, of one side. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right after full knowledge of the facts and depends upon the intention of one party only. Waiver does not require any act or conduct by the other party." (DRG/Beverly Hills, Ltd. v. Chopstix Dim Sum Cafe & Takeout III, Ltd. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 54, 59.)

Relevant here, "[f]iling a document makes it a part of the permanent court file, whereas lodging a document makes it only temporarily a court record." (Mao's Kitchen, Inc. v. Mundy (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 132, 150 (Mao's Kitchen); see also Overstock, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 487, fn. 8.) Because exhibit 2 was filed and not lodged with the court, the information contained in that document has been made available to any member of the public who consults the court's file since 2019. (See Mao's Kitchen, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 150 [general discussion].)

The Smith Motion to Seal presents no information or evidence to indicate or suggest that Smith inadvertently or mistakenly filed their complaint in the public record instead of lodging that pleading confidentially under seal. Instead, the present record shows or suggests that Smith intended to publicly disclose any confidential information contained in exhibit 2. Even if the public filing of the complaint in the Smith Action is not, in itself, sufficient to show an express waiver of any statutory confidentiality protections, Smith's conduct in this proceeding as further described above, suggests that Smith has chosen to waive those protections as to that record. (Berkeley Police Assn. v.

City of Berkeley (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 385, 406, fn. 22.) Furthermore, though "the confidentiality privilege is possessed both by the agency and the subject officer[]" (City of Hemet, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1430, original italics), the Smith Motion to Seal presents no evidence or information showing that the Regents did not know that exhibit 2 was filed by Smith in the public record without redaction. The Smith Motion to Seal also does not explain why the Regents was prevented from filing a motion for an order placing exhibit 2 under seal pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code section 832.7.

There is also no information or evidence to suggest that the Regents, acting through its counsel, did not know that exhibit 2 would become part of the court's permanent file or would be accessible to the public once that pleading was filed, including in regard to any purportedly confidential information contained in that record. A waiver may arise from "an act which, according to its natural import, is so inconsistent with an intent to enforce the right as to induce a reasonable belief that such right has been relinquished." (Rheem Mfg.

Co. v. U. S. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 621, 626.) To the extent it can be implied from the Regent's conduct in this litigation further described above, that the Regents waived the confidentiality protection provided under Penal Code section 832.7 concerning any information contained in exhibit 2, there also exists some question as to whether that waiver extends to other exhibits to the extent they contain that same information. Even if the Regents could provide evidence or information that identifies any specific information contained in

exhibit 2 which the Regents contend is subject to the statutory confidentiality protections discussed above, and that the Regents has not waived those protections by its conduct in this litigation, the Smith Motion to Seal does not present any such evidence or information as further discussed above. That motion also fails to specifically identify where any such information appears in exhibit 2, or why that specific information cannot be redacted for the reasons asserted by attorney Orozco and described above.

Apart from the contentions described above, the Smith Motion to Seal also fails, for the same reasons discussed herein, to identify the existence of an overriding interest in exhibit 2 that overcomes the right of public access to that document. Considering that exhibit 2 has been accessible to the public since 2019, the Smith Motion to Seal also fails to show why there exists any substantial probability of prejudice if that record is not sealed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d)(3).) The court also notes that exhibit 2 contains general allegations regarding the status of the Regents and UCSB-PD; the relationship between those parties; whether venue and jurisdiction is proper or appropriate; the exhaustion of administrative remedies; the dates of plaintiff's employment; and the damages sought by plaintiff. (Lodged Smith Amended Appendix, exhibit 2, P.P. 2-3, 9-14, 15, & pp. 35-36.)

Wholly absent from the Smith Motion to Seal is any information, evidence, or argument showing why those matters are or are confidential or required to be kept confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7. For these reasons, the Smith Motion to Seal fails to show that there exist no less restrictive means to achieve any overriding interest in that exhibit. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule, 2.550(d)(5).) "[T]he trial courts can, and should, view overly inclusive sealing efforts with a jaundiced eye, and impose sanctions as appropriate." (Overstock, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 500.)

For all reasons discussed above, and as the court does not credit the representation that exhibit 2 is a personnel record or record maintained pursuant to Penal Code 832.5 that is confidential or required to be kept confidential under Penal Code section 832.7, the Regents has failed to meet its burden to show why exhibit 2, or any portion of that document, is confidential. Therefore, the court will deny the Smith Motion to Seal as to that exhibit. (c) Exhibits 1, 4, and 23 The Smith Amended Appendix describes exhibit 1 as the "Federated University Police Officers Association Agreement dated July 1, 2017 to December 31, 2020" (the FUPOA Agreement). (Orozco Dec., exhibit 2 at p. 4.)

It is the court's understanding, based on its review of the FUPOA Agreement, that exhibit 1 concerns employment relations. (Lodged Smith Amended Appendix, exhibit 1 at pdf pp. 10-12.) The same or similar reasoning and analysis apply. For the same reasons discussed above, the Smith Motion to Seal fails to present any information, evidence, or argument showing why exhibit 1 is a personnel record that contains the type of information set forth in Penal Code section 832.8, or why that document is maintained by the Regents pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5.

The court's own review shows that exhibit 1, on its face, is not a personnel record or record maintained pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5. Furthermore, the Smith Motion to Seal fails to present any information or evidence showing why exhibit 1 contains any information obtained from the types of records described in Penal Code section 832.7. In addition, and for the same reasons described above, the Regents has failed to meet its burden to show the existence of an overriding interest in exhibit 1 that overcomes the right to public access and supports sealing that record.

As the Smith Motion to Seal seeks to place the entire document contained in exhibit 1 under seal, that motion also fails to show, for the same reasons discussed above, why the proposed sealing of that entire exhibit is narrowly tailored, or why no less restrictive means exist. The same reasoning and analysis apply to the Regents' "WPP" and the "UCSB-PD Policy Manual" attached to the lodged Smith Amended Appendix as exhibits 4 and 23. For all further reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Smith Motion to Seal as to exhibits 1, 4, and 23. (d) Exhibits 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 The Smith Amended Appendix describes exhibits 5 through 10 as (exhibit 5) "Mr.

Horton's Correspondence, Dated October 26, 2018; (exhibit 6) "Correspondence to Smith and Mr. Horton, Dated July 17, 2019"; (exhibit 7) "Unsigned Whistleblower Retaliation Complaint Form Submitted by Mr. Horton on July 19, 2019"; (exhibit 8) "Correspondence to Smith and Mr. Horton, Dated August 1, 2019"; (exhibit 9) "Email Correspondence to Mr.

Horton, Dated August 1, 2019"; and (exhibit 10) "Smith's Signed Whistleblower Retaliation Complaint Form, Dated July 19, 2019". (Orozco Dec., exhibit 2 at pdf pp. 4-5.) Public records filed in the Smith Action reflect, without dispute, that as of December 2017, Smith was no longer employed with the UCSB-PD. (See Smith Complaint, P.P. 15 & 20.) Though the personnel records of a peace officer "do not cease being such after the officer's retirement", the Smith Motion to Seal presents no information or evidence showing why exhibits 5 through 10 were "generated while the officer [was] employed by" the Regents or UCSB-PD. (Davis v.

City of Sacramento (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 393, 400.) In addition, the dates of exhibits 5 through 10 show or suggest that those documents were generated after Smith was no longer employed with the UCSB-PD. The Smith Motion to Seal presents no information or evidence showing why exhibits 5 through 10, or any part of those exhibits, were generated while Smith was employed by the Regents or UCSB-PD, notwithstanding the dates of those documents. For these additional reasons, the Smith Motion to Seal fails to show why exhibits 5 through 10 are personnel records pursuant to Penal Code section 832.8.

Exhibits 5 through 10 also do not show, on their face, that those documents were maintained by either the Regents or the UCSB-PD pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the Regents has failed to meet its burden to show that exhibits 5 through 10 are confidential or required to be kept confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7. For the same or similar reasons discussed above, the Smith Motion to Seal also fails to identify any overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to exhibits 5 through 10.

Moreover, the Smith Motion to Seal does not present any information identifying what, if any, specific information contained in those exhibits is confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7, where that information appears, or why that information cannot be redacted from those records. For these reasons, the Smith Motion to Seal fails to show that the proposed sealing of exhibits 5 through 10 is narrowly tailored. For all reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Smith Motion to Seal as to exhibits 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. (e) Exhibits 3, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21 Though the Regents has, for the reasons discussed above, failed to meet its burden to show, on a point-by-point basis with supporting information, evidence, and argument, why each exhibit to the Smith Amended Appendix is a personnel record or record maintained by the Regents or UCSB-PD pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5, or confidential or required to be kept confidential under Penal Code section 832.7, it appears to the court, based on its own review, that exhibits 3 and 17 through 21 are or may be personnel records as further discussed below.

Though exhibits 3 and 17 through 21 do not show, on their face, that they are records maintained by the Regents or the UCSB-PD pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5, those exhibits appear to be files maintained under the name of an individual employed by the Regents and UCSB-PD, and which contain records relating to the information described in Penal Code section 832.8, subdivision (a). (See Pen. Code, Sec. 832.8, subd. (a)(4), (5), & (6).) Notwithstanding whether Smith has waived any confidentiality protections provided under Penal Code section 832.7 as to exhibits 3 and 17 through 21, there is no evidence or information to suggest that the Regents has waived those protections as to those specific exhibits.

The opposition of Smith also does not present any information, evidence, or argument showing why exhibits 3 and 17 through 21 are subject to the limited exceptions set forth in Penal Code section 832.7. (See Pen. Code, Sec. 832.7, subds. (a) [describing the "investigations or proceedings" to which that section does not apply] & (b)(1)-(13) [describing categories of records which "shall not be confidential"]; see also Becerra v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 897, 915-916 [discussing amendments to section 832.7 providing that "the confidentiality of officer personnel records is subject to a newly added subdivision (b)...."].)

For all reasons discussed above, the court's review of exhibits 3 and 17 through 21 to the Smith Amended Appendix indicates or suggests that those documents are personnel records as that term is defined in Penal Code section 832.8, and that those exhibits are required to be kept confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a). For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will grant the Smith Motion to Seal as to exhibits 3 and 17 through 21, only. The court's ruling as to exhibits 3 and 17 through 21 to the Smith Amended Appendix is for the purpose of

determining the Smith Motion to Seal, only. The court does not determine, at this stage of the proceedings, whether those exhibits, or any other exhibit that the Regents seeks to place under seal in this proceeding, are confidential for purposes of trial. (f) Procedural Matters The May 8 Order requires that "any motion to seal any material lodged conditionally under seal as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Smith Motion include a notification of whether any lodged record is to be filed unsealed in the event that motion is denied." (See Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 2.551(b)(6).) In its reply to the opposition of Smith, the Regents states: "Should the Court be inclined to deny The Regents' motion to seal, The Regents respectfully request that the Court Order The Regents to publicly file the exhibits in support of [the Regents Smith Motion] that are currently lodged with the Court ...." (Reply at p. 4, ll. 13-17.) For all reasons discussed above and in the May 8 Order, the court will order the Regents to file a public redacted version of the Smith Amended Appendix, that redacts only exhibits 3 and 17 through 21, which are the only exhibits that the court will order to be placed under seal for purposes of adjudicating the Regents Smith Motion, and which does not include any redactions to exhibits 1, 2, 4 through 16, 22, and 23 of the Smith Amended Appendix, or any material contained in those exhibits. (2) Signa Motion to Seal The Signa Motion to Seal seeks an order placing under seal exhibits 1 through 9 submitted by the Regents as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Signa Motion.

In support, attorney Orozco states that on February 2, 2026, the Regents filed an "Amended Appendix of Evidence" (the Signa Amended Appendix) which sought to lodge a copy of the exhibits numbered 1 through 9 under seal. (Orozco Dec., P. 4.) Attached to attorney Orozco's declaration is a copy of the public redacted version of the Signa Amended Appendix filed by the Regents on February 2, 2026, as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Signa Motion. (Orozco Dec., exhibit 2.) Court records reflect that the Regents also filed an appendix of evidence in support of the Regents Signa Motion on January 22, 2026, and did not lodge a complete, unredacted version of that appendix.

As further discussed above, the Regents did not lodge a complete, unredacted version of the Signa Amended Appendix conditionally under seal until February 25, 2026, when the Regents delivered the flash drive described above to the Clerk of the Court. That flash drive also contains the complete, unredacted version of the Signa Amended Appendix. Though the unredacted Signa Amended Appendix lodged with the court on February 25 also does not include a proof of service, the court will, for all reasons discussed above, assume without deciding that the Regents has timely and properly served that document on all parties.

For the same reasons discussed above, the court understands the Signa Amended Appendix to supersede and replace the former version of that appendix filed by the Regents in support of the Regents Signa Motion on January 22, and will consider only those exhibits which are attached to the lodged Signa Amended Appendix, and not any exhibits attached to any prior version of that document. As the public redacted version of the Signa Amended Appendix identifies exhibits numbered 1 through 9 only, the Signa Motion to Seal also seeks an order placing under seal all of the exhibits submitted as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Signa Motion.

The court's review of the lodged Signa Amended Appendix shows that those exhibits contain nearly 400 pages of material. (Lodged Signa Amended Appendix at pdf pp. 8-404.) The notice of the Signa Motion to Seal is identical or nearly identical to the notice of the Smith Motion to Seal, and is also deficient for the same reasons discussed above. As Signa's opposition to the Signa Motion to Seal does not address or raise any objection to any deficiencies in that notice, the court will consider the grounds asserted in the supporting memorandum submitted by the Regents.

The memorandum submitted in support of the Signa Motion to Seal, and the separately filed declaration of attorney Orozco also submitted in support of that motion, is identical or nearly identical to the memorandum and declaration submitted in support of the Smith Motion to Seal, and presents the same, sole ground for the order sought by the Regents as further discussed above. Therefore, the same reasoning and analysis apply here. The public redacted version of the Signa Amended Appendix, a copy of which is attached to the separately filed declaration of attorney Orozco, describes the exhibits to that document as (exhibit 1) "Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint for Violations of the California Whistleblower Act and Labor Code Section 1102.5, filed on February 4,

2019"; (exhibit 2) "Pertinent Pages from the Certified Copy of the Transcript of Plaintiff's Deposition, Volume No. 1, Taken on October 25, 2023"; (exhibit 3) "Pertinent Pages from the Certified Copy of the Transcript of Plaintiff's Deposition, Volume No. 2, Taken on October 27, 2023"; (exhibit 4) "Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's Requests for Production, Set One, served on May 2, 2019, and Pertinent Documents Produced by Plaintiff with its Response"; (exhibit 5) "Pertinent Pages from the Certified Copy of the Transcript of David Millard's Deposition, Taken on June 19, 2024"; (exhibit 6) "Defendant's Special Interrogatories, Set One, to Plaintiff, Served on May 25, 2021"; (exhibit 7) "Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's Special Interrogatories, Set One, Served on July 22, 2021"; (exhibit 8) "Pertinent Pages from the Certified Copy of the Transcript of Dustin Olson's Deposition, Volume No. 1, Taken on April 6, 2023"; and (exhibit 9) "Defendant's Supplemental Responses to Plaintiff's Request for Production, Set One, Served on June 11, 2024 and Pertinent Documents Produced by Defendant with its Response". (Orozco Dec., exhibit 2 at p. 4.)

The same reasoning and analysis apply to exhibit 1 of the Signa Amended Appendix. The Signa Motion to Seal also fails to explain, for the same reasons discussed above, why exhibit 1 is a personnel record pursuant to Penal Code section 832.8 or a record maintained pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5. That motion also fails to present any information specifically identifying any information contained in exhibit 1 that the Regents contend is confidential under Penal Code section 832.7, or where that information appears in that exhibit.

Further, the Regents do not appear to dispute that exhibit 1 was also filed in the public record by Signa without redaction. The Signa Motion to Seal presents no information or evidence to show why the filing of exhibit 1 in the public record or without any redactions, was inadvertent or mistaken; why the Regents did not know that exhibit 1 was filed in the public record; or why the Regents was prevented from seeking an order placing that exhibit under seal to the extent the Regents contends that pleading contains information that is confidential or required to be kept confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7.

For the same reasons discussed above, the Signa Motion to Seal similarly fails to present information showing the existence of an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to exhibit 1 and that supports sealing the record; why a substantial probability exists that any overriding interest will be prejudiced if exhibit 1 is not sealed; why the proposed sealing of the entirety of exhibit 1 is narrowly tailored; or why no less restrictive means, such as redaction, exists to achieve any overriding interest.

For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Signa Motion to Seal as to exhibit 1 of the Signa Amended Appendix. The court's review of exhibits 2 through 9 of the Signa Amended Appendix shows that those documents, on their face, also consist of discovery materials generated during this litigation. Therefore, the same reasoning and analysis apply here. For the same or similar reasons further discussed above, the Signa Motion to Seal fails to present any information, evidence, or reasoned argument showing why exhibits 2 through 9 of the Signa Amended Appendix are confidential, or required to be kept confidential, pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7.

The Signa Motion to Seal also and for the same reasons discussed above, does not present any information or evidence showing the existence of an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to exhibits 2 through 9; a substantial probability of prejudice if those exhibits are not sealed; or that the proposed sealing of all portions of those exhibits is narrowly tailored. Further discussed above, there is no information or evidence showing that any written motion as described in Evidence Code section 1043 was filed with the court in connection with any of the discovery materials contained in exhibits 2 through 9 of the Signa Amended Appendix.

For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Signa Motion to Seal as to those exhibits. The May 8 Order requires that the Signa Motion to Seal also include the notification described above in regard to whether any lodged exhibit is to be filed unsealed in the event that motion is denied. The Regents' reply to the opposition of Signa includes the identical statement described above, in which the Regents request that, should the court deny the Signa Motion to Seal, the court order the Regents to publicly file the exhibits attached to the Signa Amended Appendix. (See Reply at p. 4, ll. 11-15.)

For the same reasons discussed above and in the May 8 Order, the court will order the Regents to file the Signa Amended Appendix lodged conditionally under seal on February 25, unsealed and without any redactions to any exhibit or material contained in any exhibit. (3) Reyes Motion to Seal

The Reyes Motion to Seal requests an order placing under seal exhibits numbered 1 through 9 submitted by the Regents as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Reyes Motion. Though the present record reflects that the Regents filed a public redacted version of an appendix of evidence submitted in support of the Regents Reyes Motion (the Reyes Appendix) on February 13, 2026, the Regents did not lodge a complete, unredacted version of that appendix until February 25, 2026, when the flash drive further described above, which also contains a complete, unredacted version of the Reyes Appendix, was delivered to the court.

Absent a dispute, the court will, for all reasons discussed above, assume without deciding that the Regents have timely and properly served a complete, unredacted version of the Reyes Appendix. As the public redacted version of the Reyes Appendix filed by the Regents on February 13, identifies exhibits numbered 1 through 9 only, the available information shows that the Reyes Motion to Seal also seeks to place under seal all of the exhibits submitted as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Reyes Motion, which include over 600 pages of material. (Lodged Reyes Appendix at pdf pp. 8-653.)

The Reyes Motion to Seal is also supported by a declaration of attorney Orozco which contains the same statements and representations as those contained in the declarations submitted in support of the Smith Motion to Seal and the Signa Motion to Seal further discussed above. The Reyes Motion to Seal and the notice of that motion are also identical or nearly identical to the Smith Motion to Seal and the Signa Motion to Seal, and include the same deficiencies further discussed above. In addition, the memorandum submitted in support of the Reyes Motion to Seal is identical or nearly identical to the memorandum submitted in support of the Smith Motion to Seal and the memorandum submitted in support of the Signa Motion to Seal, and includes the same sole ground for issuance of an order placing under seal the exhibits attached to the Reyes Appendix.

Therefore, the same reasoning and analysis apply here. The public redacted version of the Reyes Appendix describes the exhibits to that document as (exhibit 1) "Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the Defendant and the Federated University Police Officers Association for the Period Between July 1, 2017 - December 31, 2020"; (exhibit 2) "Plaintiff's Complaint for Violations of the California Whistleblower Act and Labor Code section 1102.5, filed on May 17, 2019"; (exhibit 3) "Pertinent Pages from the Certified Copy of the Transcript of Plaintiff's Deposition, Taken on June 5, 2024"; (exhibit 4) "Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's Requests for Production, Set One, dated August 12, 2021 and Pertinent Documents Produced by Plaintiff with its Response"; (exhibit 5) "Defendant's Supplemental Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Production, Set One, Dated June 11, 2024 and Pertinent Documents Produced by Defendant with its Response"; (exhibit 6) "Defendant's Special Interrogatories, Set One"; (exhibit 7) "Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's Special Interrogatories, Set One"; (exhibit 8) "Administrative Order 2/9/17-01"; and (exhibit 9) "Defendant's WPP That Took Effect on May 1, 2015". (Orozco Dec., exhibit 2 at pp. 4-5.)

As to exhibit 2 to the Reyes Appendix, which is also a pleading filed in the public record in 2019 without redaction, the same reasoning and analysis set forth above apply here. For the same reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Reyes Motion to Seal as to exhibit 2 to the Reyes Appendix. As to exhibits 1 and 9 of the Reyes Appendix, the same reasoning and analysis in regard to exhibits 1, 4, and 23 of the Smith Amended Appendix apply here. For those same reasons, the court will deny the Reyes Motion to Seal as to exhibits 1 and 9 of the Reyes Appendix.

Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Reyes Appendix are discovery materials which appear to have been generated during this litigation. For the same reasons further discussed above as to exhibits 11 through 16 and 22 of the Smith Amended Appendix, and considering that no written motion pursuant to Evidence Code section 1043 appears to have been filed with the court prior to obtaining the discovery reflected in exhibits 3 through 7 to the Reyes Appendix, the court will also deny the Reyes Motion to Seal as to those exhibits.

Apart from the general and conclusory points further discussed above, the Reyes Motion to Seal also presents no information, evidence, or reasoned argument explaining why exhibit 8 to the Reyes Appendix was maintained under any individual's name; contains the information enumerated in Penal Code section 832.8, subdivision (a); or was maintained by the Regents or UCSB-PD pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5. In addition, and based on the court's own review of exhibit 8, that document, on its face, does not appear to be a personnel record or a record maintained pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5.

For the same reasons discussed above, even if the Regents could provide information showing that exhibit 8 is

subject to the confidentiality protections provided under Penal Code section 832.7, the Reyes Motion to Seal presents no reasoned argument identifying what, if any, information contained in exhibit 8 of the Reyes Appendix was obtained from the type of records described in that statute, or where that information appears. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the Reyes Motion to Seal also fails to show why exhibit 8 of the Reyes Appendix is, or must be kept, confidential under Penal Code section 832.7.

The Reyes Motion to Seal also fails to present any information, evidence, or reasoned argument showing the existence of an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to any of the exhibits attached to the Reyes Appendix; a substantial probability of prejudice if those exhibits are not sealed; or that the proposed sealing of the entirety of those exhibits is narrowly tailored. For these additional reasons, the court will deny the Reyes Motion to Seal as to exhibits 1 through 9 of the Reyes Appendix.

The reply of the Regents to Reyes' opposition to the Reyes Motion to Seal also states that, to the extent the court denies that motion, the Regents "request that the Court Order The Regents to publicly file the exhibits in support of [the Regents Reyes Motion] that are currently lodged with the Court...." (Reply at p. 4, ll. 13-15.) Therefore, and for the same reasons further discussed above, the court will order the Regents to file the Reyes Appendix lodged conditionally under seal on February 25, unsealed and without any redactions to any exhibit or information contained in any exhibit. (4) Little Motion to Seal The Little Motion to Seal seeks to place under seal exhibits numbered 1 through 47 of the amended appendix of exhibits filed by the Regents on February 3, 2026, as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Little Motion as to the complaint filed by T Little (the T Little Amended Appendix), and exhibits numbered 1 through 41 of the amended appendix of evidence separately filed by the Regents on that same date in support of the Regents Little Motion as to the complaint filed by M Little (the M Little Amended Appendix). (Orozco Dec., P.P. 4-5.)

Copies of the public redacted versions of the T Little Amended Appendix and the M Little Amended Appendix filed by the Regents on February 3, are attached to the supporting declaration of attorney Orozco. (Orozco Dec., exhibits 2 & 3.) The court has no record showing that the Regents filed any appendix of evidence in support of the Regents Little Motion on February 3, 2026. Instead, court records reflect that on February 4, 2026, the Regents filed an amended appendix of evidence in support of the Regents Little Motion as against the M Little Complaint, which the court understands to be the M Little Amended Appendix described above, and an amended appendix of evidence in support of the Regents Little Motion as against the T Little Complaint, which court understands to be the T Little Amended Appendix referenced above.

The present record also reflects that the Regents did not lodge complete, unredacted versions of the T Little Amended Appendix or the M Little Amended Appendix conditionally under seal until February 25, 2026, in the manner further discussed above. In addition, and for the same reasons discussed above, the court understands the T Little Amended Appendix to supersede any prior version of that appendix filed by the Regents, and the M Little Amended Appendix to supersede any prior version of that appendix.

The Little Motion to Seal, including the notice and the separately filed declaration of attorney Orozco, is identical or nearly identical to the motions further discussed above, and advances the same sole ground for the issuance of an order placing under seal the exhibits submitted by the Regents as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Little Motion. Therefore, the same reasoning and analysis apply here. For example, though the court's review of the exhibits attached to the lodged T Little Amended Appendix and M Little Amended Appendix shows that those exhibits consist of nearly 2,000 pages of material, wholly absent from the Little Motion to Seal is any information, evidence, or reasoned argument showing, on a point-by-point basis with appropriate citations to the record, why each exhibit or information contained in any exhibit is confidential or required to be kept confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7.

Instead, and in the same manner discussed above, the Regents has placed the burden on the court to review each page of those materials to determine whether any exhibit, in whole or in part, is confidential or required to be kept confidential under Penal Code section 832.7. Though there exists, for all reasons discussed above, sufficient grounds to deny the Little Motion to Seal based on the failure by the Regents to meet its burden as to any of the exhibits attached to the T Little Amended

Appendix or the M Little Amended Appendix, the court has conducted its own review of those exhibits. Based on the court's review of the exhibits attached to the T Little Amended Appendix, and the allegations of the complaint filed in the public record of the Little Action which indicate that T Little remains employed with the UCSB-PD, it appears that exhibits 4, 6 through 13, 16 through 25, and 30 through 37 to the T Little Amended Appendix are personnel records for purposes of subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 832.8.

As Penal Code section 832.7 provides that those personnel records are confidential and shall not be disclosed in this proceeding except by discovery pursuant to sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code (Pen. Code, Sec. 832.7, subd. (a)), the court will grant the Little Motion to Seal as to exhibits 4, 6 through 13, 16 through 25, and 30 through 37 to the T Little Amended Appendix, only. For the same reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Little Motion to Seal as to exhibits 1 through 3, 5, 14, 15, 29, and 38 through 47 to the T Little Amended Appendix.

As to exhibits 26, 27, and 28, the public redacted version of the T Little Amended Appendix states that those exhibits, which are not included with the lodged unredacted version of that appendix, were "intentionally omitted". (Orozco Dec., exhibit 2 at p. 7.) Therefore, the Little Motion to Seal is moot as to those exhibits. In addition, and for the same or similar reasons discussed above, the court will grant the Little Motion to Seal as to exhibits 3 through 5, 7, 8, 11 through 16, 18, and 22 through 29 to the M Little Amended Appendix, only.

For those same reasons, and as available information and evidence indicates or suggests that documents dated or generated after March 20, 2020, are not files maintained in the name of a peace officer or records maintained pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5, the court will deny the Little Motion to Seal as to exhibits 1, 2, 6, 9, 10, 19, 20, 21, and 30 through 41 to the M Little Amended Appendix. The public redacted version of that appendix shows that exhibit 17 has been omitted by the Regents. (Orozco Dec., exhibit 3 at p. 7.)

In its reply to the opposition of M Little and T Little to the Little Motion to Seal, the Regents states: "Should the Court be inclined to deny [the Little Motion to Seal], The Regents respectfully request that the Court Order The Regents to publicly file the exhibits in support of [the Regents Little Motions] that are currently lodged with the Court...." (Reply at p. 4, ll. 21-25.) For the same reasons discussed above, the court will order the Regents to file a public redacted version of the lodged T Little Amended Appendix, that includes redactions to exhibits 4, 6 through 13, 16 through 25, and 30 through 37, only.

Further, the court will order the Regents to file a public redacted version of the lodged M Little Amended Appendix that redacts exhibits 3 through 5, 7, 8, 11 through 16, 18, and 22 through 29, only. No other exhibit to the T Little Amended Appendix or the M Little Amended Appendix, or material contained in any exhibit, apart from the exhibits described above, shall be redacted from the public versions of the T Little Amended Appendix or the M Little Amended Appendix. (5) Stern Motion to Seal The Stern Motion to Seal also seeks an order placing under seal all of the exhibits to an amended appendix of evidence (the Stern Amended Appendix) filed by the Regents in support of the Regents Stern Motion.

The public redacted version of the Stern Amended Appendix was filed by the Regents on February 4, 2026. The Regents lodged the complete, unredacted version of the Stern Amended Appendix conditionally under seal on February 25, 2026, in the same manner described above. As to any prior version of the Stern Amended Appendix that was filed by the Regents in support of the Regents Stern Motion, including the appendix filed on January 22, 2026, the same reasoning and analysis apply. The court's review of the lodged Stern Amended Appendix shows that its exhibits are numbered 1 through 16, and consist of over 800 pages of material. (Lodged Stern Amended Appendix at pdf pp. 9-834.)

The Stern Motion to Seal and the separately filed supporting declaration of attorney Orozco, are identical in substance to the motions and declarations further described above, and advance the same sole ground for the issuance of an order placing under seal exhibits 1 through 16 of the Stern Amended Appendix. Therefore, the same reasoning and analysis apply. Though the Stern Motion to Seal fails, for all reasons discussed above, to show why any exhibit, or information appearing in any exhibit, to the Stern Amended Appendix is confidential or required to be kept confidential under Penal Code section 832.7, the court has conducted its own review of those exhibits.

Based on that review, and for the same reasons discussed above, the court will grant the Stern Motion to Seal as to exhibits 3, 4, 7 through 9, and 16 to the Stern Amended Appendix, only, and will otherwise deny that motion as to exhibits 1, 2, 5, 6, and

10 through 15. In its reply to the opposition of Stern, the Regents states: "Should the Court be inclined to deny The Regents' motion to seal, The Regents respectfully request that the Court Order The Regents to publicly file the exhibits in support of [the Regents Stern Motion] that are currently lodged with the Court...." (Reply at p. 4, ll. 13-15.) For the same reasons discussed above, the court will order the Regents to file a public redacted version of the lodged Stern Amended Appendix that redacts exhibits 3, 4, 7 through 9, and 16, only.

No other exhibit to the Stern Amended Appendix, or material contained in any other exhibit, apart from the exhibits described above, shall be redacted from that public version of the Stern Amended Appendix. (6) Regents Smith Motion "A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (a)(1).) "A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.

A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. [P.] A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. " (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (f)(1)-(2).) "The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute." (Aguilar v.

Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).) The party moving for summary judgment "bears the burden of persuasion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Id. at p. 845.) Relevant here, a defendant meets that burden by showing "that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (p)(2).) "In reviewing a defense summary judgment, we apply the traditional three-step analysis ..., that is, we (1) identify the pleaded issues, (2) determine if the defense has negated an element of the plaintiff's case or established a complete defense, and if and only if so, (3) determine if the plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact." (Meddock v.

County of Yolo (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 170, 175, fn. omitted.) The Regents Smith Motion seeks summary adjudication of 25 issues, which are set forth in the notice of that motion. (Notice at pp. 4-8.) The separate statement filed by the Regents in support of the Regents Smith Moton sets forth 133 material facts that, according to the Regents, relate to "all causes of action" asserted in the complaint filed by Smith and each issue that is the subject of the Regents Smith Motion, "and that could make a difference in the disposition of the motion." (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(a)(2); see also Sep. Stmt. at pp. 4-43.) " '[T]he separate statement effectively concedes the materiality of whatever facts are included. Thus, if a triable issue is raised as to any of the facts in [the Regents'] separate statement, the motion must be denied!' [Citation.]" (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252 (Nazir), original italics.) The issues which are the subject of the Regents Smith Motion include that Smith "failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a verified complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and obtaining a notice of right to sue." (Notice at p. 6, P. 14; see also P. 15 [punctuation and capitalization unchanged]; Sep.

Stmt. at p. 33, issue "F"; p. 36, issue "O"; p. 37, issues "R" & "S"; see also Memorandum at pp. 21-23 [asserting that that the evidence shows that Smith failed to exhaust administrative remedies].) The material facts that relate to that issue include that Smith "has not produced any evidence that he ever filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing ... or Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ... and received a right to sue letter before filing this action." (Sep. Stmt., Undisputed Material Fact [UMF] no. 103.)

"A motion for summary judgment must be supported by evidence, and it is the moving party who bears the initial burden of producing evidence." (Boyle v. CertainTeed Corp. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 645, 655.) "A burden of production entails only the presentation of 'evidence.' [Citation.]" (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) Each of the material facts set forth in the Regents' separate statement that the Regents contends are undisputed "shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (b)(1); see also subd. (f)(2) ["[a] motion for summary judgment ... shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment"].) The evidence referenced in the separate statement that supports the material fact set forth above includes the responses and supplemental responses of Smith to the Regents' set one special interrogatories and requests for production of documents. (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 103 & evidence cited therein; Smith Amended Appendix, exhibits 13-16.) "[S]ummary judgment law in California requires the defendant to present evidence, and not simply point out through argument, that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain the needed evidence." (Lona v.

Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 110, original italics.) "The defendant may ... present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence--as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing." (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.) Even if the Regents Smith Motion is sufficient to show that, on the date of the discovery responses on which the Regents rely to support the material fact stated above and set forth in the separate statement, Smith did not possess evidence regarding that material fact, the motion fails to present any information, evidence, or reasoned argument showing why Smith cannot reasonably obtain necessary evidence, any admissions by Smith during discovery, or that Smith has discovered nothing in regard to that material fact.

The Regents Smith Motion also concedes, for all reasons discussed above, that the following material facts relate to the causes of action and issues that are the subject of that motion: Smith "has not ... produced any evidence that any complaints by the individual defendants made against [Smith] 'on or around May or June of 2017' were made under oath or penalty of perjury[]"; Smith "has not established that any complaint of misconduct filed against him was accepted by UCSB-PD and involved a complaint..."; and Smith claims "with no evidence that 'no investigation was ever conducted...." (Sep.

Stmt., UMF nos. 108, 109, 111 & evidence cited therein.) The same reasoning and analysis applies to those material facts. Because the Regents Smith Motion, for all reasons discussed above, does not show that Smith cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence in regard to the causes of action or issues that are the subject of that motion, the Regents has failed to meet its burden to show, with supporting evidence, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the Regents is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to those causes of actions and issues.

The Regents Smith Motion also asserts that the alleged protected disclosures by Smith at issue in the Smith Action involve personnel matters and not protected whistleblowing. (Memorandum at pp. 25-26.) For this reason, the Regents argue, Smith cannot establish a violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act (the Act). The Act, codified as Government Code section 8547, et seq., "prohibits retaliation against state employees who 'report waste, fraud, abuse of authority, violation of law, or threat to public health' [Citation.]

The Act authorizes 'an action for damages' to redress acts of retaliation. [Citation.]" (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 882.) Pursuant to Government Code section 8547.2, a "protected disclosure" is "a good faith communication, including a communication based on, or when carrying out, job duties, that discloses or demonstrates an intention to disclose information that may evidence either of the following circumstances: "(A) An improper governmental activity. "(B) A condition that may significantly threaten the health or safety of employees or the public if the disclosure or intention to disclose was made for the purpose of remedying that condition." (Gov.

Code, Sec. 8547.2, subd. (e)(1)(A), (B).) Under Government Code section 8547.2, "'[i]mproper governmental activity' means an activity by a state agency

or by an employee that is undertaken in the performance of the employee's duties, undertaken inside a state office, or, if undertaken outside a state office by the employee, directly relates to state government, whether or not that activity is within the scope of their employment, and that meets any of the following criteria: "(A) The activity is in violation of any state or federal law or regulation, including, but not limited to, corruption, malfeasance, bribery, theft of government property, fraudulent claims, fraud, coercion, conversion, malicious prosecution, misuse of government property, misuse of state expenditures, including allocations, loans, or grants, or willful omission to perform duty. "(B) The activity is in violation of an executive order of the Governor, a California Rule of Court, or any policy or procedure mandated by the State Administrative Manual or State Contracting Manual. "(C) The activity is economically wasteful, involves gross misconduct, incompetency, or inefficiency." (Gov.

Code, Sec. 8547.2, subd. (c)(1)(A)-(C).) Relevant here, "any person who intentionally engages in acts of reprisal, retaliation, threats, coercion, or similar acts against a university employee, including an officer or faculty member, or applicant for employment for having made a protected disclosure shall be liable in an action for damages brought against him or her by the injured party." (Gov. Code, Sec. 8547.10, subd. (c).) "Complaints made 'in the context of internal administrative or personnel actions, rather than in the context of legal violations' do not constitute protected whistleblowing. [Citations.] 'To exalt these exclusively internal personnel disclosures with whistleblower status would create all sorts of mischief.

Most damagingly, it would thrust the judiciary into micromanaging employment practices and create a legion of undeserving protected "whistleblowers" arising from the routine workings and communications of the job site.' [Citation.]" (Levi v. Regents of University of California (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 892, 904.) The Regents do not dispute that the alleged protected disclosures at issue include or concern "how officers were handling sexual assault cases", "one officer's contact with sexual assault victims outside of assigned calls for service[]", "misconduct by officer [Hashimoto] for creating inappropriate cartoon videos of ...

University of California Santa Barbara officials, citizens and victims of crime[]", and "another officer spending too much time at a student housing residence hall." (Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 34-39 & 43; Memorandum at p. 25.) Apart from generally asserting, in a conclusory manner, that the alleged protected disclosure made by Smith concern or consist of internal administrative or personnel actions, the Regents Smith Motion fails to explain why the nature or subject of those concerns do not implicate any alleged abuse of authority, violations of law, or any threat to public health.

Instead, a reasonable trier of fact could find, based on the material facts and evidence presented here, that the disclosures at issue implicate or concern improper activity for purposes of the Act, and that Smith's communications regarding those concerns were made in good faith. In addition, Smith presents evidence of reports made by Smith which Smith contends they reasonably believed constitute or concern unlawful or improper activity, including as to the matters described above and in the Regents' separate statement. (See Resp.

Sep. Stmt., Additional Material Fact no. 2; Smith Appendix of Evidence, exhibit A at p. 82, 95, 108, 109.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the evidence and information presented here gives rise to competing inferences as to whether, based on the content or subject of the reports made by Smith, those disclosures are protected pursuant to the Act. "[S]ummary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (c).) Furthermore, even if the Regents could meet its initial burden to show that any protected disclosures by Smith were not a contributing factor to any alleged acts of retaliation by the Regents against Smith, the available evidence and information is, for present purposes, sufficient to give rise to an inference of retaliation. "Both direct and circumstantial evidence can be used to show an employer's intent to retaliate. 'Direct evidence of retaliation may consist of remarks made by decisionmakers displaying a retaliatory motive. [Citation.]' [Citation.]

Circumstantial evidence typically relates to such factors as the plaintiff's job performance, the timing of events, and how the plaintiff was treated in comparison to other workers." (Colarossi v. Coty US Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1153.) The parties do not dispute, or reasonably dispute, that Smith was placed on administrative leave on June 15,

2017. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 68 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].) Considering the dates of the reports made by Smith disclosed by the Regents' supporting separate statement (see, e.g., Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 43, 45, 57), and the timing of those reports in relation to the date Smith was placed on administrative leave, among other factors, a reasonable trier of fact could find, based on competing inferences that arise from the evidence and information presented by the parties and notwithstanding whether the Regents can show the existence of a legitimate reason to place Smith on leave or that its actions were justified, that there existed an intent to retaliate. (See Scheer v.

Regents of the University of California (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 904, 917-918 [general discussion].) In evaluating the evidence presented by the parties on summary judgment, " '[w]e accept as true the facts ... in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them.' [Citation.] And we must 'view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff[] ...' and 'liberally construe plaintiff['s] evidentiary submissions and strictly scrutinize defendant's own evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff['s] favor.' " (Nazir, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 254.)

The court may not weigh the evidence to determine whose version is more likely true. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) Though the examples provided herein are intended to be illustrative and not exhaustive, for all reasons discussed above, the present record gives rise to conflicting or competing inferences including as to whether the reports made by Smith constitute protected disclosures pursuant to the Act, and whether the Regents intentionally engaged in any acts of retaliation against Smith based on those disclosures, and which raise a triable issue of material fact.

For these reasons, the court will deny the Regents Smith Motion. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subds. (c), (f)(1); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 845; Gov. Code, Sec. 8547.10, subd. (e).) The Regents' request for judicial notice: The court will grant the request of the Regents for judicial notice of the complaint filed by Smith in the Smith Action. (Regents RJN, P. 1; Evid. Code, Sec. 452, subd. (d)(1).) Evidentiary objections: In its reply to the opposition of Smith to the Regents Smith Motion, the Regents submit objections to material contained in Smith's declaration and the declaration of Smith's counsel, Peter Horton, submitted in support of Smith's opposition; and to exhibits H, K, O, and P to attorney Horton's declaration. "In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (q).) As the Regents Smith Motion fails, for all reasons discussed above, to shift the burden to Smith, the court need not consider the evidentiary objections raised by the Regents. Even if the burden shifted to Smith to raise a triable issue of fact, the court does not deem the evidence to which the Regents have raised objections to be material to its disposition of the Regents Smith Motion under the circumstances present here. Smith's notice of new authority and additional evidence or, in the alternative, request to continue hearing: Court records reflect that on May 13, 2026, Smith filed a notice of new authority and additional evidence, or in the alternative, request to continue the hearing on the Regents Smith Motion.

As the court will deny that motion for all reasons discussed herein, it is not necessary for the court to consider Smith's notice and request. (7) Motion to Consolidate The Motion to Consolidate is brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (a), which provides: "When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 1048, subd. (a); see Notice of Motion to Consolidate at p. 1, ll. 7-11.) In support of the Motion to Consolidate, Plaintiffs' counsel, Jaime Keeton, states that the Actions involve overlapping parties, witnesses, documentary evidence, legal claims, and factual allegations that arise from alleged retaliation within the UCSB-PD, and that multiple supervisory personnel identified in the Actions overlap across the cases, including Olson, Millard, Gregory Smorodinsky (Smorodinsky), Robert Romero (Romero), Cathy Farley (Farley), and Gregory Pierce (Pierce). (Keeton Dec., P.P. 2-9.)

It is attorney Keeton's professional

judgment that separate trials would require substantial duplication of witness testimony, documentary evidence, expert testimony, motion practice, and court resources, and would create a risk of inconsistent factual findings and verdicts. (Keeton Dec., P. 16.) Attorney Keeton asserts that consolidation for all purposes, including trial, would promote judicial economy and avoid unnecessary costs and delay. (Keeton Dec., P. 17.) Attorney Keeton further states that, at the trial confirmation conference held on August 8, 2025, the parties discussed that the related actions might be subject to consolidation for trial. (Keeton Dec., P. 11.)

On May 6, 2026, attorney Keeton emailed defense counsel regarding consolidation of the Actions for trial. (Keeton Dec., P. 12 & exhibit A.) Defense counsel did not respond. (Keeton Dec., P. 12.) On May 14, 2026, attorney Keeton sent follow-up correspondence to defense counsel regarding consolidation. (Keeton Dec., P. 13 & exhibit B.) On May 14, 2026, attorney Daphne Anneet responded, stating that defendants were "adamantly opposed" to consolidation for trial and that consolidation would create prejudice and confusion. (Keeton Dec., P. 14 & exhibit C.)

In the memorandum submitted in support of the Motion to Consolidate, Plaintiffs assert that the Actions were each brought by a current or former officer of the UCSB-PD; that each of the Actions asserts claims for violations of the Act and Labor Code section 1102.5; that the Actions each name the Regents as the primary defendant; and that the Actions arise from a common pattern of alleged institutional retaliation wherein each of the Plaintiffs reported misconduct by the same supervisory personnel within UCSB-PD, and thereafter suffered adverse employment actions.

Plaintiffs also assert that Olson is a defendant in the Signa Action; Millard is a defendant in the Little, Reyes, and Stern Actions; Smorodinsky is a defendant in the Little and Reyes Actions; Romero, Farley, and Pierce are defendants in the Little Action; that those individuals served in the same supervisory hierarchy at USCB-PD during the same period of time; and that those individuals will be witnesses in all four trials regardless of the manner in which the Actions are structured. The common questions of fact claimed by Plaintiffs concern the policies, practices, and culture of the UCSB-PD during the relevant period; the roles and conduct of its supervisory personnel including Olson, Millard, Smorodinsky, Romero, Farley, and Pierce; the pattern of UCSB-PD management responses to officers' reports of misconduct; the alleged adverse employment actions taken against each of the Plaintiffs; and the causal connection between Plaintiffs' protected disclosures and those adverse actions.

Plaintiffs assert that the common questions of law include the elements of a cause of action under the Act and Labor Code section 1102.5; what constitutes a protected disclosure under each of those statutes; causation standards; and the defenses available to the Regents as a public employer. Plaintiffs assert that those questions and issues are identical in all four cases. Plaintiffs further assert that, if the Actions are not consolidated for trial, the same institutional witnesses would testify in four separate proceedings and cover the same ground; the same documentary evidence would be authenticated and admitted repeatedly; the same expert witnesses would appear multiple times; and the same attorneys would appear for the same parties in four proceedings, resulting in waste and the possibility of inconsistent adjudications and verdicts if the Actions were tried separately.

In its opposition to the Motion to Consolidate, the Regents asserts that the Actions involve or arise from distinct and different factual circumstances concerning alleged protected disclosures, adverse employment actions, decisionmakers, timelines, and retaliatory conduct such that liability in each case will require each of the Plaintiffs to independently establish the elements of their claims, and individualized determinations and matters of proof concerning the protected activity at issue, causation, and whether there exist legitimate reasons justify each decision at issue.

The Regents further assert that, because Signa was a member of the supervisory hierarch at the UCSB-PD, consolidation will place the factual and legal arguments in opposition, requiring the Regents to respond concurrently to allegations made by and against the UCSB-PD leadership team. The Regents further asserts that consolidation would create substantial jury confusion and trial management issues, because the jury would be required to simultaneously evaluate multiple plaintiffs and defendants, different alleged protected disclosures and employment actions, separate timelines, and distinct damage claims.

Because several individual defendants are named in some actions but not others, the Regents contends, there exists a substantial risk that the evidence could improperly influence the jury's consideration of unrelated claims.

For those reasons, the Regents argues, consolidation would increase the burdens, complexities, and length of trial, and complicate trial administration. In addition, the Regents contend that, because Plaintiffs did not raise the issue of consolidation until May 2026, after the close of discovery, the Regents will suffer prejudice if the Actions are consolidated because its trial preparation is well underway, and because the Regents will be required to restructure or begin anew its trial preparation and strategies in the weeks before trial.

The Regents further contend that the Motion to Consolidate is untimely, that Plaintiffs have failed to explain the delay in filing that motion, and that the Actions are subject to mandatory dismissal which the Regents will address in a separate motion to dismiss the Actions. "Consolidation under Code of Civil Procedure section 1048 is permissive, and it is for the trial court to determine whether the consolidation is for all purposes or for trial only." (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1149.) "[T]he question of consolidation should be submitted to the court's discretion." (Sales Dimensions v.

Superior Court (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 757, 764.) The court's review of the pleadings filed in each of the Actions shows that Plaintiffs each assert similar allegations regarding the hierarchy of the UCSB-PD during relevant times, including as to the identity of each supervisor of Plaintiffs, and the relationship between the individuals within UCSB-PD. Those pleadings also include similar allegations in regard to the conduct of Plaintiffs, Olson, Millard, Farley, and Romero, among others, during relevant times; the complaints or reports made by Plaintiffs and the involvement of the individuals identified above in response to those alleged complaints or reports; whether the conduct of each of the Plaintiffs constitutes protected activity for purposes of the Act; and whether any conduct by the Regents or UCSB-PD constitutes retaliation under the Act as to each of the Plaintiffs; among other things.

If the allegations of Plaintiffs' respective pleadings are proven, the Motion to Consolidate is sufficient to show the existence of predominant and significant threshold questions of fact regarding the matters further described above, which are common to the Actions. The available information and evidence, including the court's own records, also show that the pleadings filed by each of the Plaintiffs assert the same causes of action for violation of the Act and of Labor Code section 1102.5. Furthermore, the present record shows or suggests that if separate trials of the Actions are conducted, the same witnesses, including experts, would testify regarding the matters described above, the same deposition testimony would be introduced regarding those matters, and the same or similar evidence would be presented by the parties.

There also exists a possibility of inconsistent rulings regarding the matters, issues, and claims described above. For these reasons, the court finds that consolidation of the Actions for trial would enhance efficiency and avoid inconsistent adjudications. (See Todd-Stenberg v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 976, 978-980 (Todd-Stenberg).) As to the Regents' assertion that the Motion to Consolidate is untimely, the Regents do not present any legal authority which prescribes any deadline for ordering consolidation, or showing why a case may not be consolidated on the eve of trial, as the Regents contend.

The court is also unaware of any such legal authority. Instead, Plaintiffs are only required to show that the Actions involve "a common question of law or fact...." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1048, subd. (a).) Moreover, and as briefly noted above, court records reflect that the Regents filed a motion for an order transferring and consolidating the Actions for pretrial purposes (the Regents Motion) on July 8, 2021, which the court granted on September 17, 2021. In the Regents Motion, which was also brought pursuant to subdivision (a) of Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, the Regents argued that the Actions "clearly meet" the requirement that the matters "share a common question of fact or law." (July 8, 2021, Motion at p. 17, ll. 11-13.)

In support of the Regents Motion, the Regents represented to the court, among other things, that the Actions "involve some combination of the same individuals (including parties and witnesses), all of whom are or were employed as police officers at UCSB by The Regents, including but not limited to Signa, Olson, Smith, Millard, Romero, Savaglio, Rothermel, the Littles, Siegel, Farley, Pierce, Smorodinsky, Stern, Reyes, Sheehey, and Hashimoto[]"; that the Regents "is a named defendant in all six actions, Olson is a defendant in three, Millard is a defendant in three, Smorodinsky is a defendant in two, and Signa, the Littles, and Hashimoto are all defendants in one case"; that "Plaintiffs allege that one or more other officers, including some of the other Plaintiffs,

committed various forms of misconduct, and that all of them experienced retaliation as a result; that the Actions "allege employment claims" against the Regents and "will almost certainly share many of the same legal issues[]"; and that the existence of the same factual questions means that the court "will have to issue rulings on many of the exact same or similar legal issues" such that consolidation "will assure that the Court's rulings are consistent across all" of the Actions. (July 8, 2021, Motion at p. 9, ll. 4-7; p. 17, l. 14-p. 18, l. 1; p. 18, ll. 9-11; p. 20, ll. 5-8.)

Those points are similar to, if not the same as, those advanced in the present Motion to Consolidate. Though the court recognizes that the Regents Motion sought an order consolidating the Actions for pretrial purposes only, wholly absent from the opposition of the Regents to the present Motion to Consolidate is any information or evidence showing what, if any, of the common questions of law, fact, or circumstances described in the Regents Motion have changed, or why there no longer exist any common questions of law or fact.

Furthermore, the Regents Motion and the present opposition of the Regents rely on the matters "alleged" by Plaintiffs in the Actions to argue different points. (See, e.g., Opp. at p. 5, ll. 15-19; p. 9, ll. 5-8; p. 11, ll. 6-8 & 11-20.) In addition, and as noted in the court's May 15, 2026, minute order, the Regent's counsel informed the court at the August 8, 2025, trial confirmation conference held in this case, that they have contemplated consolidating the cases in which Plaintiffs are represented by the DRE law firm. (See also Aug. 8, 2025, Minute Order.)

The present record reflects that Signa, T Little, M Little, Reyes, and Stern are represented by that law firm. Based on the parties' agreement, the court set the Signa Action for a 15 day jury trial to commence on June 18, 2026, without any objection by the Regents, and noted that the time estimate for trial of that action and "those considered in consolidation" is 15 days. (Ibid.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court questions the present assertion by the Regents that the Actions are different and distinct.

Even if the Regents could present information or evidence showing that the common questions of law or fact pending before the court as of the filing of the Regents Motion have changed, "[t]he fact that evidence in the one case might not [be] admissible in the other does not bar a consolidation. [Citation.] Nor does the fact that all the parties are not the same." (Jud Whitehead Heater Co. v. Obler (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 861, 867.) The court also notes that the Actions involve only four plaintiffs, and will require four separate trials.

Even if the court were to credit the Regents' assertion that Plaintiffs' respective claims each require individualized proof regarding the alleged protected disclosures, adverse employment actions, or involved supervisors, the opposition of the Regents does not explain why the same deposition testimony would not be introduced, why the same expert witnesses would not be called, or why the same evidence would not be presented. (See Todd-Stenberg, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 979.) The opposition of the Regents also does not explain why the jury cannot be provided with "a separate binder of evidence and separate chronologies prepared on each plaintiff." (Todd-Stenberg, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 980.)

The opposition also does not show why the preparation of appropriate jury instructions would be insufficient to cure any potential prejudice or avoid misleading the jury. (See, e.g., Pilliod v. Monsanto Co. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 591, 637 [general discussion]; Shivers v. Van Loben Sels (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 286, 290 [noting that "the principles of law applicable to each of the consolidated cases could well have been stated in a few, simple, readily understandable instructions."].) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court is not persuaded that consolidation of the Actions for trial will confuse each of the cases or the jury. (Todd-Stenberg, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 980.)

The Regents also fail to explain why any prejudice that may arise from its engagement in another trial is peculiar or different from the typical circumstances which routinely arise in litigation, generally, or why the Regents must prepare its present witness examinations, evidentiary objections, pretrial motions, exhibit designations, or trial themes "anew". (See also Los Angeles City High School Dist. of Los Angeles County v. Swensen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 574, 583 [finding no abuse of discretion notwithstanding claim of prejudice].)

As to the assertion that the Actions are subject to mandatory dismissal pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 583.310 and 583.360, the court will determine that issue upon the filing and service of an appropriate motion by the Regents. The remaining arguments advanced by the Regents do not persuade the court that consolidation of the Actions for trial is not appropriate or warranted under the circumstances present here. Instead, the court finds that for all

reasons discussed above, consolidation is warranted. For all reasons discussed above, the present record is sufficient to show that the Actions involve common questions of fact and law. For these reasons, and to avoid inconsistent results, unnecessary costs and delay resulting from the introduction of the same evidence, and promote the efficient use of judicial resources, the court will grant the Motion to Consolidate, and order the Actions consolidated for purposes of trial, with the Signa Action designated as the lead case. All documents filed in the consolidated matters shall be filed in the lead case. Noted above, a 15 day jury trial is set to commence in the Signa Action on June 18, 2026. The court will order the parties to appear at the hearing to discuss future proceedings.

Tentative Ruling: Mark Signa et al vs The Regents of the University of CA et al Tentative Ruling: Mark Signa et al vs The Regents of the University of CA et al Case Number

Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Fri, 05/22/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Motion to Seal Tentative Ruling The motion to seal records set by the Court on May 8, 2026, for this hearing is continued to May 29, 2026.

Tentative Ruling: Mark Signa et al vs The Regents of the University of CA et al Tentative Ruling: Mark Signa et al vs The Regents of the University of CA et al Case Number

Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Fri, 05/15/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Motions for Summary Judgment Tentative Ruling (1) For the reasons stated herein, the motions of defendant The Regents of the University of California for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication against plaintiff Mark Signa's complaint (filed on January 22, 2026), and for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication against plaintiff Jonathan Lee Reyes' complaint (filed on February 13, 2026), are each continued to June 5, 2026. (2) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendant Dustin Olson for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication against the first amended complaint of plaintiff Mark Signa is granted, in part as to the second cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 asserted against defendant Dustin Olson, only.

Except as herein granted, the motion is otherwise denied. (3) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendant David Millard for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication against the complaint of plaintiff Matthew Stern is granted, in part as to the second cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 asserted against defendant David Millard, only. Except as herein granted, the motion is otherwise denied.

(4) All parties are ordered to appear at the hearing to discuss the procedural matters described herein. Background: Plaintiff Mark Signa (Signa) filed their original complaint in this case against defendants The Regents of the University of California (the Regents) and the University of California Santa Barbara Police Department (UCSB-PD) Chief Dustin Olson (Olson) on November 21, 2018, asserting four causes of action: (1) violation of Title 42 United States Code section 1983 - denial of first amendment rights; (2) violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act; (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (4) violation of Labor Code section 1102.5.

Briefly, in the complaint, Signa alleges that they have been employed as a police officer by the Regents since 1990, and that they were retaliated against after voicing concerns about purportedly illegal or improper conduct within the UCSB-PD. On February 4, 2019, Signa filed their operative first amended complaint (the Signa FAC), alleging two causes of action: (1) violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act and (2) violation of Labor Code Section 1102.5. On February 22, 2019, the Regents and Olson filed an answer to the Signa FAC, generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-seven affirmative defenses.

On May 22, 2019, the court ordered a stay of this case pending Signa's exhaustion of administrative remedies. The court lifted the stay on January 21, 2021. On September 17, 2021, the court adopted its tentative ruling on the motion of the Regents to transfer to this department and consolidate with this case (the Signa Action) for pre-trial purposes only, the following matters: (1) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV01431 entitled Michael Little, et al. v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Little Action); (2) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV04418 entitled Matthew Stern v.

The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Stern Action); (3) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV02586 entitled Jonathan Lee Reyes v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Reyes Action); (4) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV01625 entitled John Doe v. The Regents of the University of California Santa Barbara, et al. (the Smith Action); and (5) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 21CV01256 entitled Ryan Hashimoto v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Hashimoto Action).

On February 26, 2025, the court entered judgment in favor of the Regents, the UCSB-PD, and the University of California Santa Barbara, and against plaintiff Ryan Hashimoto, as to the complaint filed in the Hashimoto Action. The lengthy procedural history of these actions reflects that on January 22, 2026, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the Signa FAC (the Regents Signa Motion), and separately filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint filed by plaintiff Matthew Stern (Stern) in the Stern Action (the Regents Stern Motion).

The Regents Signa Motion and the Regents Stern Motion were calendared for hearing on April 24, 2026. On January 26, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint of plaintiff Tiffany Little (T Little) in the Little Action, and separately filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint of plaintiff Michael Little (M Little) in the Little Action (collectively, the Regents Little Motions). The Regents Little Motions were calendared for hearing on May 1, 2026.

T Little and M Little have filed opposition to the Regents Little Motions. On February 10, Olson filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, against the Signa FAC (the Olson Motion). On February 11, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint filed by plaintiff Ryan Smith (Smith) in the Smith Action (the Regents Smith Motion). On February 13, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint filed by plaintiff Jonathan Lee Reyes (Reyes) in the Reyes Action (the Regents Reyes Motion).

On February 19, defendant David Millard (Millard) filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, against the complaint filed by Stern in the Stern Action (the Millard Motion.) The Olson Motion, the Regents Smith Motion, the Regents Reyes Motion, and the Millard Motion were calendared for hearing on May 15, 2026.

On March 16, the Regents filed an ex parte application for an order to set the hearing on the Regents Smith Motion to May 8, 2026, to allow that motion to be heard no later than 30 days before trial. On March 18, the court signed and entered an order granting that application, moving the hearing on the Regents Smith Motion to May 8, 2026. On April 3, Stern filed their opposition to the Regents Stern Motion. On April 11, the court signed, and on April 13 filed, an order approving a stipulation by the parties to continue the hearing on the Regents Stern Motion to May 8, 2026, and the hearing on the Regents Signa Motion to May 15, 2026.

The Regents Smith Motion remained calendared for hearing on May 8. The Olson Motion, the Regents Reyes Motion, and the Millard Motion remained calendared for hearing on May 15, 2026. On April 17, Smith filed their opposition to the Regents Smith Motion. On April 21, Signa filed their opposition to the Regents Signa Motion. On April 24, Signa filed opposition to the Olson Motion, Reyes filed opposition to the Regents Reyes Motion, and Stern filed opposition to the Millard Motion. On May 1, the court issued a minute order (the May 1 Order), continuing the hearing on the Regents Little Motions to June 12, 2026, due to the lodging by the Regents of material submitted as a basis for adjudication of those motions conditionally under seal without having filed an appropriate motion to seal those materials, or the entry of a sealing order.

Pursuant to the May Order, the court set a hearing on any motion for an order to file those lodged materials under seal on May 29, 2026. The court also set a briefing schedule, requiring that any sealing motion be filed and served on or before May 11, among other things. On May 8, the court issued a minute order (the May 8 Order), continuing the hearing on the Regents Smith Motion to May 29, 2026, and the hearing on the Regents Stern Motion to June 12, 2026, also due to the lodging by the Regents of material submitted as a basis for adjudication of those motions conditionally under seal without filing an appropriate motion to seal those materials.

Among other things, the court ordered that any motion for an order sealing materials lodged conditionally under seal as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Smith Motion must be filed and served on or before May 11, 2026, and calendared any such motion for hearing on May 22, 2026. As to the Regents Stern Motion, the court ordered that any motion for an order sealing any material lodged conditionally under seal as a basis for adjudication of that motion be heard on May 29, 2026. On May 11, the Regents separately filed: (1) a motion for an order to file under seal exhibits lodged in support of the Regents Signa Motion (the Signa Motion to Seal); (2) a motion for an order to file under seal exhibits lodged in support of the Regents Reyes Motion (the Reyes Motion to Seal); (3) a motion for an order to file under seal exhibits lodged in support of the Regents Little Motions (the Little Motion to Seal); (4) a motion for an order to file under seal exhibits lodged in support of the Regents Smith Motion (the Smith Motion to Seal); and (5) a motion for an order to file under seal exhibits lodged in support of the Regents Stern Motion (the Stern Motion to Seal).

The Signa Motion to Seal, and the Reyes Motion to Seal are calendared for hearing on May 29, 2026. Analysis: (1) The Regents Signa Motion and Regents Reyes Motion As the materials which are the subject of the Signa Motion to Seal and the Reyes Motion to Seal were lodged conditionally under seal by the Regents as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Signa Motion and the Regents Reyes Motion, the court will need to resolve the Signa Motion to Seal and the Reyes Motion to Seal first. For these reasons, and to allow sufficient time to resolve those motions, the court will continue the hearing on the Regents Signa Motion and the Regents Reyes Motion to June 5, 2026. (2) The Olson Motion "A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (a)(1).) "A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in

Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. [P.] A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. " (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (f)(1)-(2).) "The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).) The party moving for summary judgment "bears the burden of persuasion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Id. at p. 845.)

Relevant here, a defendant meets that burden by showing "that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (p)(2).) "In reviewing a defense summary judgment, we apply the traditional three-step analysis ..., that is, we (1) identify the pleaded issues, (2) determine if the defense has negated an element of the plaintiff's case or established a complete defense, and if and only if so, (3) determine if the plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact." (Meddock v.

County of Yolo (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 170, 175, fn. omitted.) The notice of the Olson Motion identifies four issues of which adjudication is sought by Olson. (Notice at pp. 3-4.) "Issue One" is stated as "Signa's first cause of action under Government Code [section] 8547.10 ... fails because these claims are based upon personnel management decisions that Olson undertook, which cannot lead to individual liability as a matter of law." (Notice at p. 3, ll. 20-23.) "Issue Two" is stated as "Signa's second cause of action under Labor Code [section] 1102.5 ... fails because these claims are based upon personnel management decisions that Olson undertook, which cannot lead to individual liability as a matter of law." (Notice at p. 3, ll. 24-26.) "Issue Three" is stated as "Signa's first cause of action for whistleblower retaliation under [Government Code section] 8547.10 fails because even if Signa could state a prima facie case, clear and convincing evidence confirms that Olson reasonably believed that all personnel actions he took in relation to Signa were justified by the evidence they had before him so Olson is entitled to judgment pursuant to [section] 8547.10, [subdivision] (d)". (Notice at p. 3, l. 27-p. 4, l. 3.) "Issue Four" is stated as "Signa's second cause of action for whistleblower retaliation under [Labor Code section] 1102.5 fails because this claim cannot be asserted against an individual defendant as a matter of law." (Notice at p. 4, ll. 4-6.) (a) Issue Two and Issue Four "[T]he operative pleading frames the issues for purposes of summary judgment and a defendant need address only the claim(s) alleged and need not anticipate new, unpled claim." (Restivo v.

City of Petaluma (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 267, 279.) In the Signa FAC, Signa asserts a second cause of action against Olson for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5. Noted above, Issue Two and Issue Four seek summary adjudication of the issues described above in regard to that cause of action. In the Olson Motion, Olson argues that the second cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 asserted in the Signa FAC arises from, or is premised exclusively on, fundamental or traditional personnel management actions, decisions, or functions, and that the complaints of Signa are directly aimed at Olson's management of the UC-PD, for which Olson, as an individual supervisor, cannot be held personally liable under the plain language of Labor Code section 1102.5.

The opposition of Signa to the Olson Motion asserts that the plain text of Labor Code section 1102.5, as amended effective January 1, 2014, and pursuant to other enactments in 2021, shows that personal liability may be imposed upon supervisory agents such as Olson under that statute. Based on the undisputed material facts (the UMF) set forth in the supporting separate statement of Olson, and Signa's responding separate statement, it is undisputed that Signa was employed with the UCSB-PD from March 12, 1990, until March 1, 2019. (Resp.

Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 1 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].) Olson served as the UCSB-PD Chief of Police from November 2, 2009, to March 14, 2019. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 2 & evidence cited therein.) On April 16, 2014, Signa was promoted to Lieutenant at UCSB-PD. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 3 & evidence cited therein.)

As a Lieutenant, Signa reported to Assistant Chief Cathy Farley, who was his direct supervisor. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 4 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].) Farley directed Signa to "cc" Farley on all emails to Olson. (Resp. Sep. Smt., UMF no. 34 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].) Allegations of wrongdoing by Olson are included in paragraph 59 of the Signa FAC. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 25 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].)

In April 2016, UCSB filed a complaint against two officers who had provided alcohol to a minor at UCSB and engaged in a sexual assault, and the allegation was investigated by UCSB-PD's Internal Affairs (IA) Department (the IA Investigation). (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 8 & evidence cited therein.) A Sergeant whom Signa supervised and who became "close personal friends" with Olson (the Favored Sergeant), was also a "close friend" of those two officers, and even though he was "intimately familiar with" their conduct with the underage student, the Favored Sergeant was not investigated because he was friends with "the highest levels of UCSB-PD leadership." (Resp.

Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 6, 8 & evidence cited therein.) Olson "openly expressed that he desired the ... IA Investigation to go away as quietly as possible." (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 12 & evidence cited therein.) Signa "vocalized concerns" about certain officers such as the Favored Sergeant receiving favored treatment. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 13 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].) Officers confided in Signa that they were afraid to express concerns about the Favored Sergeant's "improper and possibly illegal" conduct to upper management for fear of retaliation. (Resp.

Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 14 & evidence cited therein.) In August 2016, Signa had lunch with Olson and others during which Romero criticized Signa's leadership style. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 26 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].) Signa also "vocalized concerns" about "dick jokes" made at a meeting on May 21, 2017, the Favored Sergeant's improper use of UCSB-PD's funds and resources, leadership's obstruction of investigation into the Favored Sergeant's misconduct, supervisor meetings that took too long, and January 17, 2017 approval of expenses for members of the "Good Ole Boys" club but not for non-members. (Resp.

Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 22 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].) On May 25, 2017, Signa reported to Olson that in January 2017, certain members of UCSB-PD attended a gun show without receiving the required approval, thus their attendance was a misappropriation of public funds in violation of Penal Code section 424; and that UCSB-PD was engaging in sexual discrimination against a female officer, but Olson took no action. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 15 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].)

On May 30, 2017, Signa made the same reports to Farley that he made to Olson on May 25, 2017, but claims nothing was done. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 16 & evidence cited therein.) On June 19, 2017, a female officer submitted a "letter of complaint" regarding Smith's extramarital affair, hit-and-run coverup, improper Code 3 driving orders, and misuse of UCSB-PD's resources to visit his extramarital lover. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 17 & evidence cited therein.) On June 19, 2017, Signa reported to Farley that the Favored Sergeant had lied about his extramarital relationship and complained that Signa had not been involved in the 2017 investigation of the Favored Sergeant even though Signa had information to offer. (Resp.

Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 18 & evidence cited therein.) In late 2017, the IA investigation of the Favored Sergeant was closed, and Signa alleges the investigation was done quickly so the Favored Sergeant's next employer (the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services) would not learn of it. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 19 & evidence cited therein.) Signa alleges that Olson and upper management believed the Favored Sergeant getting alternative employment was the "easiest solution" and that Olson and others made "several negative comments" about the Favored Sergeant. (Resp.

Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 20 & evidence cited therein.) On December 13, 2017, Signa met with Olson, Farley, and Millard and told them that the Favored Sergeant's continued presence at UCSB-PD was viewed as intimidation, but nothing was done. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 23 & evidence cited therein.) Signa was "falsely accused of creating conflict" because Olson spoke to a subordinate of Signa then invited her to lunch while excluding Signa, and was excluded from UCSB-PD social events. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF nos.

38, 40 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].) The above summary is not intended to be exhaustive, and the court has considered all admissible evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to the Olson Motion. Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b), provides: "An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information ...to a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance ...." (Lab.

Code, Sec. 1102.5, subd. (b).) The Olson Motion presents a legal issue in regard to whether that statute imposes liability for damages in a civil action for clams brought by employees, such as Signa, against supervisors acting on behalf of their employers in their individual capacity, such as Olson. There exists no clear definition of the phrase, "any person acting on behalf of the employer," to determine whether individual liability may be imposed in a civil action seeking monetary damages brought pursuant to Labor Code section 1102.5.

The court finds it helpful to examine the implementing provisions of that statute, which are contained in the same chapter. "We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment...." (People v. Porter (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 927, 934-935.) As to civil penalties under Labor Code section 1102.5, "an employer is liable for a civil penalty ... for each violation of this section to be awarded to the employee who was retaliated against." (Lab.

Code, Sec. 1102.5, subd. (f)(1).) That language suggests that only employers may be liable for civil penalties. As to the burden of proof in civil actions for damages, "once it has been demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that an activity proscribed by [s]ection 1102.5 was a contributing factor in the alleged prohibited action against the employee, the employer shall have the burden of proof to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged action would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee had not engaged in activities protected by Section 1102.5." (Lab.

Code, Sec. 1102.6.) These provisions demonstrate that the employer is the party with the burden of proof in a civil action for damages. As to the recovery of civil damages, "[n]othing in this chapter shall prevent the injured employee from recovering damages from his employer for injury suffered through a violation of this chapter." (Lab. Code, Sec. 1105.) This provision, by its plain language, applies in the context of civil litigation as between an employee and employer only. By comparison, as to criminal penalties, "[a]n employer or any other person or entity that violates this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable, in the case of an individual, by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year or a fine ...." (Lab.

Code, Sec. 1103.) The text of Labor Code section 1103 indicates that, as to criminal penalties, other persons or entities, in addition to the employer, can be found guilty of such misdemeanors and subject to fines and imprisonment. (Ibid.) The parties do not cite, and the court is unaware of, any published California decision addressing whether supervisors may be held individually liable for their own violations of Labor Code section 1102.5, in a civil action for damages. However, "most district courts that have addressed the issue have held that section 1102.5 does not impose individual liability on supervisors." (Mewawalla v.

Middleman (N.D. Cal. 2022) 601 F.Supp.3d 574, 608.) According to one district court, "the alleged violations under Section 1102.5 are predicated upon an employer/employee relationship ... [and] [t]he relevant portions of the statute clearly indicate that the statute is meant to establish prohibited activity by employers, rather than individuals." (Vierria v. California Highway Patrol (E.D. Cal. 2009) 644 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1244.) Another district court concluded: "The language of the statute on which plaintiff relies does not include clear language imposing individual liability, but rather uses the kind of language consistently associated with imposition of liability on an employer alone." (Tillery v.

Lollis (E.D. Cal., Aug. 13, 2015) 2015 WL 4873111, at *10; see also Vera v. Con-way Freight, Inc. (C.D. Cal., Apr. 6, 2015) 2015 WL 1546178, at *1 ["The statutory text, structure, and legislative history all indicate that only employers--not individual employees--are liable for violations of the statute."]; Conner v. Aviation Serv. of Chevron U.S.A. (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2014) 2014 WL 5768727, at *5 ["Plaintiffs have failed to point to any authority that establishes that individual liability exists for violations of Section 1102.5 ...."].)

The motion cites cases which interpret the term "person" in the context of retaliation and discrimination claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). In Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines P'ship (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1173, the court held in the context of FEHA that an "employer is liable for retaliation under section 12940, subdivision (h), but nonemployer individuals are not personally liable for their role in that retaliation." Similarly, in Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 643, the court held that "FEHA, like similar federal statutes, allows persons to sue and hold liable their employers, but not individuals."

Noted above, Signa argues that certain amendments to or enactments of Labor Code section 1102.5 operate to expand liability under the statute to the employer's supervisory agents acting on behalf of that employer. Signa contends that any other interpretation would render amendments to the statute surplusage. The court has carefully considered the points and arguments advanced by the parties in support of and in opposition to the Olson Motion, and the text of the relevant statutes as further discussed above.

After considering the parties' respective arguments, relevant legal authorities, and the statutory language, the court concludes that Labor Code sections 1102.5 and 1102.6, do not authorize civil actions by employees against non-employer-supervisors in their individual capacities. The court further notes that Labor Code section 1102.6, which addresses the burden of proof in civil actions only, speaks in terms of suits by employees against employers. (See Lab. Code, Sec. 1102.6.) As further discussed above, that statute does not mention a burden of proof in a civil action brought against a nonemployer individual who is alleged to have violated Labor Code section 1102.5.

In addition, though the provision addressing criminal penalties was amended in 2013 to include liability for "[a]n employer or any other person or entity," the civil action provision under Labor Code section 1102.6 and the civil damages provision under Labor Code section 1105 were not similarly amended. (See, e.g., Lab. Code, Sec.Sec. 1102.6, 1103, & 1105.) In each instance, civil liability is discussed in terms of liability of the employer, and not of a supervisory employee acting in their individual capacity. (See Lab.

Code, Sec.Sec. 1102.5, subd. (f)(1),1102.6, 1105.) To evaluate a statutory amendment, the court "must explore whether the amendment changed or merely clarified existing law." (Carter v. California Dep't of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 922.) "While an intention to change the law is usually inferred from a material change in the language of the statute, a consideration of the surrounding circumstances may indicate, on the other hand, that the amendment was merely the result of a legislative attempt to clarify the true meaning of the statute." (Dep't of Corr. & Rehab. v.

Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 911, 917-18.) "[T]he plain language of [section] 1102.5 and the legislative history of the 2013 amendment do not demonstrate an expansion of liability to permit whistleblowers to seek money damages from non-employers. To the contrary, the legislature's decision not to amend [section] 1105 to allow recovery of damages from anyone other than employers forecloses Plaintiff's theory, particularly when the legislature did amend [section] 1103 to impose criminal liability on non-employer individuals." (Dawson v.

Caregard Warranty Service, Inc. (C.D. Cal., Jan. 12, 2024) 2024 WL 661198, at *6.) For all reasons discussed above, the Olson Motion shows that the second cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 asserted in the Signa FAC, to the extent that cause of action is directed to Olson in an individual capacity, fails as a matter of law. Therefore, the court will grant the Olson Motion as to the second cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 asserted in the Signa FAC as to Olson, only. (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (f)(1).) (b) Issue One and Issue Three Issue One and Issue Three are relevant to the first cause of action for violation of Government Code section 8547, et seq., asserted against Olson in the Signa FAC. "The California Whistleblower Protection Act [the Act] ... prohibits retaliation against state employees who 'report waste, fraud, abuse of authority, violation of law, or threat to public health' [Citation.] The Act authorizes 'an action for damages' to redress acts of retaliation. [Citation.]" (Miklosy v.

Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 882.) Relevant here, the section 8547.10 of the Act provides that "any person who intentionally engages in acts of reprisal, retaliation, threats, coercion, or similar acts against a university employee, including an officer or faculty member, or applicant for employment for having made a protected disclosure shall be liable in an action for damages brought against him or her by the injured party." (Gov. Code, Sec. 8547.10, subd. (c).) "This section is

not intended to prevent a manager or supervisor from taking, directing others to take, recommending, or approving any personnel action or from taking or failing to take a personnel action with respect to any university employee, including an officer or faculty member, or applicant for employment if the manager or supervisor reasonably believes any action or inaction is justified on the basis of evidence separate and apart from the fact that the person has made a protected disclosure." (Gov. Code, Sec. 8547.10, subd. (d).) "In any civil action ... once it has been demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that an activity protected by [the Act] was a contributing factor in the alleged retaliation against a former, current, or prospective employee, the burden of proof shall be on the supervisor, manager, or appointing power to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged action would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee had not engaged in protected disclosures or refused an illegal order." (Gov.

Code, Sec. 8547.10, subd. (e).) "Government Code section 8547.10, subdivision (e), rather than McDonnell Douglas, provides the relevant framework for analyzing claims under Government Code section 8547.10." (Scheer v. Regents of the University of California (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 904, 916 (Scheer).) Though, unlike Labor Code sections 1102.5 and 1102.6, Government Code section 8547.10 expressly provides for supervisor liability in an action brought by an affected employee, the present record shows, for all reasons discussed below, the existence of triable issues of material fact that preclude summary adjudication as to the first cause of action asserted against Olson in the Signa FAC.

In evaluating the evidence presented by the parties on summary judgment, " '[w]e accept as true the facts ... in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them.' [Citation.] And we must 'view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff[] ...' and 'liberally construe plaintiff['s] evidentiary submissions and strictly scrutinize defendant's own evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff['s] favor.' " (Nazir v.

United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 254 (Nazir).) To resolve a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, the court may not weigh the evidence to determine whose version is more likely true. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) The material facts set forth in the supporting separate statement include that in August 2016, Signa had lunch with Olson and others, during which Signa's leadership style was criticized. (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 26.) Though Signa does not effectively dispute that fact, the supporting separate statement also includes the following material fact: "In written discovery, Signa admitted that Olson 'did not say anything' during the August 2016 lunch." (Sep.

Stmt., UMF no. 27.) The responding separate statement of Signa shows that, though at the time of Signa's written discovery responses, it was Signa's recollection that Olson did not speak at the August 2016 lunch described above, there exists evidence, including that submitted in support of the Olson Motion, which shows that Olson "discussed Signa's leadership style" during the August 2016 lunch, and that "[a]ny comments that we made were part of our efforts to improve management of the officers at UCSB-PD." (Olson Appendix of Evidence, Olson Dec., P. 8.)

Furthermore, to the extent the Olson Motion relies on the responses of Signa to written discovery, "summary judgment law in California requires the defendant to present evidence, and not simply point out through argument, that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain the needed evidence." (Lona v. Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 110, original italics.) The facts set forth in the supporting separate statement also include that written discovery shows that what Signa alleges to be "verbally abusive" conduct by Olson during a December 13, 2017, meeting "amounted to Olson interrupting, raising his voice, and being argumentative." (Sep.

Stmt., UMF no. 31.) In support of their opposition to the Olson Motion, Signa submits a declaration of their counsel, Jaime Keeton (attorney Keeton). Attached to the Keeton declaration is a "Confidential Personnel Investigation Report" ostensibly authored by Kramer Workplace Investigation, and dated May 26, 2022. That report notes that "during the management meeting on December 13, 2017, when [Signa] started to explain to Chief Olson what some of the Officers were saying about Sergeant Smith, Chief Olson yelled at Lieutenant Signa and talked over him." (Keeton Dec., exhibit A at p. 8.)

Under the totality of the circumstances present here, the evidence and information described above gives rise to conflicting inferences as to whether Olson intentionally engaged in any reprisals, threats, or coercion of Signa.

(Gov. Code, Sec. 8547.10, subd. (c); Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (c) ["summary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact."].) The court also notes that the appendix of evidence filed by Olson in support of the Olson Motion contains redactions, without Olson having lodged any unredacted documents conditionally under seal, and without a pending motion to seal or entry of an order sealing any redacted material. (See, e.g., Olson Dec., P.P. 7 & 9-10; Appendix of Evidence, exhibit 1 at pdf pp. 17-24 & 26; exhibit 4 at pdf pp. 60-61, 65-71, 73-79; exhibit 5 at pdf pp. 115-119, 123-126, 128, 130-132, 134-151, 156-167, 173.)

The court does not consider any redacted material. " '[T]he separate statement effectively concedes the materiality of whatever facts are included. Thus, if a triable issue is raised as to any of the facts in your separate statement, the motion must be denied!' [Citation.]" (Nazir, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 252, original italics.) Though the examples provided above are intended to be illustrative and not exhaustive, the existence of triable issues of material fact as further discussed above, requires the court to deny summary adjudication of the first cause of action asserted in the Signa FAC as to Olson.

The available evidence and information also shows that, after Signa reported concerns about the IA investigation, the Favored Sergeant's status, purportedly unsafe practices, an alleged romantic relationship with a subordinate officer, and a purported cover up of a hit and run, among other concerns, Signa was transferred or reassigned from Patrol Lieutenant to Administrative Lieutenant. (Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 13, 15, 16, 18, 22, 24, & 28; Resp. Sep. Stmt., Additional Material Fact no. 6 & 7.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, including the timing of the events at issue, a reasonable trier of fact could find, based on competing inferences that arise from the evidence and information presented by the parties, and notwithstanding whether Olson can show that any adverse employment action was based on a legitimate reason or whether Olson reasonably believed their actions were justified, that the evidence is sufficient to suggest an intent to retaliate. (Scheer, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 917-918 [general discussion].)

For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Olson Motion to the extent that motion seeks summary adjudication of the second cause of action asserted in the Signa FAC. The court will also, for all reasons discussed above, deny the Olson Motion to the extent it seeks summary judgment as to entirety of the Signa FAC. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subds. (c), (f)(1); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 845; Gov. Code, Sec. 8547.10, subd. (e).) (c) Evidentiary Objections Olson has filed objections to material contained in the Signa declaration filed in support of Signa's opposition to the Olson Motion. "In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (q).) As the Olson Motion fails, for all reasons discussed above, to shift the burden to Signa, the court need not consider the material to which Olson has asserted objections. Furthermore, written objections to evidence must follow the format set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b). Though the written objections of Olson identify the document at issue, cite the location of each of the matters to which Olson asserts an objection, and quote or set forth the objectional material, the same objections are asserted to multiple statements appearing in each paragraph of the Signa declaration objected to by Olson.

The manner in which the purportedly objectionable material is set forth forces the court to effectively guess whether Olson objects to the cited matters as a whole or only in part, and which objection is directed to which statement within each stated paragraph number. For these reasons, there exists sufficient grounds for the court to disregard those objections. (Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 [a trial court may decline ruling on improperly formatted objections].) (3) The Millard Motion The Millard Motion is directed to the complaint filed by Stern in the Stern Action (the Stern Complaint), which asserts the same two causes of action against Millard for violation of the Act and for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5.

The Millard Motion also identifies four issues of which adjudication is sought. (Notice at pp. 3-4.) "Issue One" is stated as "Stern's first cause of action under [sic] fails because these claims are based upon personnel management decisions that Millard undertook, which cannot lead to individual liability as a matter of law."(Notice at p. 3, ll. 20-22.) "Issue Two" is stated as "Sterns's second cause of action for whistleblower retaliation under [Labor Code section] 1102.5 fails because these claims are based upon personnel management decisions that Millard undertook, which cannot lead to individual liability as a matter of law." (Notice at p. 3, ll. 23-25.) "Issue Three" is stated as "Stern's first cause of action for whistleblower retaliation under [Government Code section] 8547.10 fails because even if Stern could state a prima facie case, clear and convincing evidence confirms that Millard reasonably believed that all personnel actions he took in relation to Stern were justified by the evidence they had before him so he is entitled to judgment pursuant to [section] 8547.10, [subdivision] (d)". (Notice at p. 3, l. 26-p. 4, l. 2.) "Issue Four" is stated as "Stern's second cause of action for whistleblower retaliation under [Labor Code section] 1102.5 fails because this claim cannot be asserted against Millard defendant as a matter of law." (Notice at p. 4, ll. 3-4.)

As a threshold matter, the court notes that the appendix of evidence filed by Millard in support of the Millard Motion also includes redactions, without an unredacted copy of the appendix having been lodged or any motion to seal having been filed as to that evidence. For the reasons further discussed above, the court does not consider redacted material. Based on the supporting and responding separate statements, respectively, of Millard and Stern, it is undisputed that Stern was employed as a law enforcement officer at the UCSB-PD from May 2005 to the present. (Resp.

Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 1 & evidence cited therein.) Millard began his employment with UCSB-PD on January 16, 2001, and served as Lieutenant at UCSB-PD from October 2013 to March 22, 2021. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 4 & evidence cited therein.) Stern's past and current managers and supervisors at UCSB-PD include Millard. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 2 & evidence cited therein.) As to Issue Two and Issue Four stated in the Millard Motion and described above, the same reasoning and analysis apply. For the same reasons discussed above, the second cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 asserted in the Stern Complaint against Millard in an individual capacity, fails as a matter of law.

Therefore, the court will grant the Millard Motion as to the request for summary adjudication of the second cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 asserted in the Stern Complaint as against Millard, only. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (f)(1).) As to Issue One and Issue Three, there exist triable issues of material fact precluding summary adjudication as to those issues. The material facts set forth in the Millard supporting separate statement include that "Millard played no role in the March 2017 process for the selection of officers for the corporal specialty assignments and instructor positions, including the Taser Instructor." (Sep.

Stmt., UMF no. 32.) In support, Millard states that they "played no role in evaluation and ranking of the letters of interest for the Corporal specialty assignment", that "Sergeants reviewed the letters of interest and made their recommendations to ... Olson", and that Millard "played no role in the evaluation and ranking of the letters of interest for the taser instructor position...." (Millard Dec., P.P. 24-25.) Stern presents evidence showing that Millard compiled scores of applicants for corporal specialty assignments on August 15, 2017. (Olson Dec., P. 22.)

That evidence is sufficient to give rise to a competing inference as to whether Millard played a role in process of selecting officers for corporal specialty assignments prior to that date. The same reasoning and analysis apply in regard to UMF nos. 33 and 38 contained in Millard's supporting separate statement. The available information and evidence also indicates or suggests that when or after Stern reported alleged officer misconduct, among other things, and reported what Stern alleges to be retaliatory conduct towards Stern, the UCSB-PD initiated an internal investigation of Stern; placed Stern on administrative leave; and suspended Stern. (Sep.

Stmt., UMF nos. 10-25.) There is also information or evidence which shows or suggests that, after a union meeting led by Stern during which concerns about Millard's leadership were raised, Millard publicly berated

Stern and accused him of being out of uniform. (Sep. Stmt. UMF nos. 58 & 60; Resp. Sep. Stmt., Additional Material Fact no. 4 & evidence cited therein.) "We view the evidence in a light favorable to the party opposing summary judgment or summary adjudication, liberally construing that party's evidence while strictly scrutinizing the moving party's showing, and we resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of the opposing party." (Bakos v. Roach (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 390, 396.) The same or similar reasoning and analysis apply.

Though the above is not provided as an exhaustive list, for all reasons discussed above, the evidence offered by the parties is sufficient to give rise to a triable issue, based on competing or conflicting inferences, in regard to whether there existed a retaliatory motive. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Millard Motion to the extent it seeks summary adjudication of the first cause of action for violation of the Act alleged in the Stern Complaint. (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (c).) The same reasoning and analysis applies to the request for summary judgment as to the Stern Complaint. Evidentiary objections: Millard has filed objections to material contained in the Stern declaration and attorney Keeton's declaration. The same reasoning and analysis apply. (4) Procedural Matters Court records reflect that, pursuant to the court's minute order dated September 17, 2021, this case (the Signa Action) is consolidated with the Little Action, the Stern Action, the Reyes Action, and the Smith Action, for pre-trial purposes only, with all documents to be separately filed in any case files to which they might relate.

The court further ordered that, "[f]or the motions or other matters requiring hearings, the moving party is directed to include the following language below the document title: [P.] 'This matter is being calendared and heard in the lead case only. Cases are consolidated for pretrial and not all purposes.'" (Sept. 17, 2021, Minute Order.) The court's minute order dated August 8, 2025, reflects that, at the trial confirmation conference held on that day, defendant's counsel informed the court that they have contemplated consolidating the cases in which the plaintiffs are represented by the Dre Law firm.

The court also noted in that minute order, that the cases were consolidated for pretrial purposes only, and that no documents have been submitted to make it a true consolidation for trial. Based on the parties' agreement, the court set the Smith Action for jury trial to commence on June 8, 2026, and the Signa Action for a 15 day jury trial to commence on June 18, 2026. Court records reflect that, though the matters described above were consolidated for pretrial purposes only, no party has filed a motion to consolidate the matters for all purposes, including trial. (See Villa Zinfandel, LLC v.

Bearman (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 848, 862-863 [general discussion].) As a result, there appears to be some confusion as to what cases, apart from the Smith Action and the Signa Action, will proceed to trial and when. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will order the parties to appear at the hearing to discuss the status of trial.

Tentative Ruling: Mark Signa et al vs The Regents of the University of CA et al Tentative Ruling: Mark Signa et al vs The Regents of the University of CA et al Case Number

Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Fri, 06/05/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Motions for Summary Judgment Tentative Ruling (1) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendant The Regents of the University of California for summary judgment, or in the alternative, motion for summary adjudication against plaintiff Mark Signa's

complaint is denied. (2) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendant The Regents of the University of California for summary judgment or, in the alternative, motion for summary adjudication against plaintiff Jonathan Lee Reyes' complaint is denied. Background: As a preliminary matter, the court notes that on September 17, 2021, after a hearing, the court issued an order granting a motion filed in this case (the Signa Action) on July 8, 2021, by the Regents of the University of California (the Regents).

That motion sought an order transferring and consolidating with the Signa Action for pre-trial purposes only, the following cases: Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV01431 entitled Michael Little, et al. v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Little Action); Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV01625 entitled John Doe v. The Regents of the University of California Santa Barbara, et al. (the Smith Action); Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV02586 entitled Jonathan Lee Reyes v.

The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Reyes Action); Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV04418 entitled Matthew Stern v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Stern Action); and Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 21CV01256 entitled Ryan Hashimoto v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Hashimoto Action). On February 26, 2026, the court entered judgment in favor of the Regents, the University of California Santa Barbara Police Department (UCSB-PD), and the University of California Santa Barbara, as against the complaint filed by plaintiff Ryan Hashimoto in the Hashimoto Action.

On May 20, 2026, plaintiffs Mark Signa (Signa), Michael Little, Tiffany Little, Jonathan Lee Reyes (Reyes), and Matthew Stern (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed an ex parte application for an order shortening time for a hearing on a forthcoming motion by Plaintiffs to consolidate the Signa Action, the Little Action, the Reyes Action, and the Stern Action (collectively, the Actions) for all purposes including trial. On May 21, after a hearing, the court granted that application, set the hearing on that forthcoming motion for May 29, 2026, and ordered that any opposition to that motion be filed no later than May 27.

On May 21, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their motion for an order consolidating the Actions for all purposes including trial (the Motion to Consolidate). On May 27, the Regents filed an opposition to the Motion to Consolidate. On May 28, defendants Dustin Olson (Olson), Cathy Farley (Farley), David Millard (Millard), Robert Romero (Romero), Gregory Pierce (Pierce), and Gregory Smorodinsky (Smorodinsky) filed an opposition to the Motion to Consolidate. On May 29, 2026, after a hearing, the court issued a minute order (the May 29 Order) pursuant to which the court, among other orders, adopted its tentative ruling granting the Motion to Consolidate of Plaintiffs.

Relevant here, t he first amended complaint filed by Signa on February 4, 2019, is the operative pleading in the Signa Action. Briefly, in the Signa FAC, Signa alleges that he has been continuously employed by the UCSB-PD since 1990, has a stellar record of performance and service at UCSB-PD, and was promoted to Lieutenant on April 6, 2014. Olson is the Chief of Police. Signa was the supervisor of officer Ryan Smith (Smith). Signa further alleges that they vocalized concerns about the impropriety or appearance of impropriety of a custom, practice, or policy through which certain UCSB-PD officers, including Smith, received favored status and were immune from any negative or critical feedback, investigations, or disciplinary action.

In addition, UCSB-PD implemented an unwritten policy, practice, or procedure of retaliating against any employee of UCSB-PD who made any report that accused Smith of any form of misconduct. Signa also made reports of misconduct, misappropriation of public funds, sexual discrimination, harassment, and other purportedly illegal behavior or misconduct to Olson and other individuals within the leadership of UCSB-PD. As a result of Signa vocalizing their concerns including in regard to the customs, practices, and policies of the UCSB-PD, Signa was subjected to harassment, discrimination, and retaliation within the UCSB-PD.

On May 31, 2018, Signa made a formal complaint with human resources regarding Signa's concerns and the retaliation, and on June 19, 2018, submitted two internal whistleblower complaints through the University of California, Santa Barbara system. No further action has been taken on those matters.

The Signa FAC asserts two causes of action against defendants Olson and the Regents: (1) violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act and (2) violation of Labor Code Section 1102.5. On February 22, 2019, the Regents and Olson filed an answer to the Signa FAC, generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-seven affirmative defenses. Also relevant here, on May 17, 2019, Reyes filed in the Reyes Action, a complaint (the Reyes Complaint) against defendants the Regents, Smorodinsky, and Millard, asserting two causes of action: (1) violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act and (2) violation of Labor Code Section 1102.5.

Briefly, in the operative Reyes Complaint, Reyes alleges that they are employed by the Regents as a police officer, and worked under managers and supervisors who include, among other individuals, Olson, Millard, and Smorodinsky. The complaint further alleges that the Regents retaliated against Reyes based on complaints made by Reyes concerning, among other things, whether a trainee was qualified for release from field training with full arrest authority; Reyes' request to Millard to see Reyes' scores for a sergeant position for which Reyes had applied; Reyes' disagreement with a yearly review of Reyes submitted by Smorodinsky who had only supervised Reyes for three months; a grievance submitted by Reyes regarding a negative performance review; and for opposing retaliation.

On January 22, 2026, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, motion for summary adjudication against the Signa FAC (the Regents Signa Motion), which was calendared for hearing on April 24, 2026. On February 13, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint filed by Reyes in the Reyes Action (the Regents Reyes Motion). That motion was calendared for hearing on May 15, 2026. On April 11, the court signed, and on April 13 filed, an order pursuant to which the court, among other orders, granted approval of a stipulation by the parties to continue the hearing on the Regents Signa Motion to May 15, 2026.

The Regents Reyes Motion remained calendared for hearing on May 15, 2026. On April 21, Signa filed an opposition to the Regents Signa Motion. On April 24, Reyes filed an opposition to the Regents Reyes Motion. On May 11, the Regents filed a motion for an order placing under seal the exhibits lodged by the Regents conditionally under seal as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Signa Motion (the Signa Motion to Seal), and separately filed a motion for an order placing under seal the exhibits lodged by the Regents conditionally under seal as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Reyes Motion (the Reyes Motion to Seal).

The Signa Motion to Seal and Reyes Motion to Seal were calendared for hearing on May 29. On May 15, after a hearing, the court issued a minute order in which the court, among other orders, continued the Regents Signa Motion and the Regents Reyes Motion to June 5, 2026, to allow time to first resolve the Signa Motion to Seal and the Reyes Motion to Seal. On May 18, Signa and Reyes separately filed their respective oppositions to the Signa Motion to Seal and the Reyes Motion to Seal. Pursuant to the May 29 Order described above, the court denied the Signa Motion to Seal and the Reyes Motion to Seal, and ordered the Regents to, on or before 5 p.m. on June 3, 2026, file unsealed the amended appendix of evidence filed on February 2, 2026, in support of the Regents Signa Motion (the Signa Amended Appendix), the complete version of which was lodged conditionally under seal by the Regents on February 25, 2026; and the amended appendix of evidence filed on February 13, 2026, in support of the Regents Reyes Motion (the Reyes Amended Appendix), the complete version of which was lodged conditionally under seal by the Regents also on February 25.

On June 3, the Regents filed unsealed the Reyes Amended Appendix, which includes five volumes of exhibits, and the Signa Amended Appendix. Analysis: (1) The Regents Signa Motion "A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no

merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (a)(1).) "A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.

A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. [P.] A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. " (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (f)(1)-(2).) "The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute." (Aguilar v.

Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).) The party moving for summary judgment "bears the burden of persuasion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Id. at p. 845.) Relevant here, a defendant meets that burden by showing "that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (p)(2).) "In reviewing a defense summary judgment, we apply the traditional three-step analysis ..., that is, we (1) identify the pleaded issues, (2) determine if the defense has negated an element of the plaintiff's case or established a complete defense, and if and only if so, (3) determine if the plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact." (Meddock v.

County of Yolo (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 170, 175, fn. omitted.) The Regents Signa Motion seeks an order granting summary judgment in favor of the Regents as against the Signa FAC, and alternatively seeks summary adjudication of 13 issues set forth in the notice of that motion. (Notice at pp. 4-6.) The separate statement filed by the Regents in support of that motion sets forth 71 material facts that relate to "all causes of action" asserted in the Signa FAC, to each issue that is the subject of the Regents Signa Motion, and "that could make a difference in the disposition of the motion." (Sep.

Stmt. at pp. 4-19 [material fact nos. 1 through 17 as to "all causes of action"] & pp. pp. 19-24 [incorporating material facts numbered 1 through 71 as to each issue]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(a)(2).) For all reasons discussed herein, even if the Regents could carry its initial burden of production (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850), the present record reflects the existence of triable issues of material fact which preclude the granting of the Regents Signa Motion for all reasons discussed herein.

As a threshold matter, and for the reasons discussed in the May 29 Order, the court considers only the Signa Amended Appendix. Pursuant to the May 29 Order, the Regents were required to file the Signa Amended Appendix unsealed and without any redactions to any material contained in any exhibit. The court's review of the Signa Amended Appendix that was filed unsealed on June 3, shows that the exhibits to that appendix contain redactions to material or information appearing in the exhibits. (See Signa Amended Appendix at pdf pp. 303-306, 308-312, 314-320, 322-324, 330-331, 334-337, 339-341, 349-360, 362, 363, 365-368, 370-371, 374-386.)

For these reasons, the Regents have failed to comply with the May 29 Order. Further, the court does not consider any redacted material or information. The issues that are the subject of the Regents Signa Motion include that Signa's "alleged protected activities were not a contributing factor to any alleged adverse employment action suffered by [Signa]", and that "Signa cannot establish that the protected activity was a contributing factor to any alleged adverse employment action as it was remote in time or not in proximity." (Notice at pp. 4-5, P. 6 & p. 5, P. 7.)

For these reasons, the Regents Signa Motion argues, the first cause of action for violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act asserted in the Signa FAC "lacks merit...." (Ibid.; see also Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (p)(2).) For the reasons discussed above, the Regents Signa Motion concedes that each of the 71 material facts set forth in the supporting separate statement relate and are material to the issues described above. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 19 [incorporating "undisputed material facts numbered one (1) through 71."] & 22, issues "H", "I" [same].) " '[T]he separate statement effectively concedes the materiality of whatever facts are included.

Thus, if a triable issue is raised as to any of the facts in [the Regents'] separate statement, the motion must be denied!' [Citation.]"

(Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252 (Nazir), original italics.) "The California Whistleblower Protection Act [the Act] ... prohibits retaliation against state employees who 'report waste, fraud, abuse of authority, violation of law, or threat to public health' [Citation.] The Act authorizes 'an action for damages' to redress acts of retaliation. [Citation.]" (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 882.) Relevant here, section 8547 of the Act provides that "any person who intentionally engages in acts of reprisal, retaliation, threats, coercion, or similar acts against a university employee, including an officer or faculty member, or applicant for employment for having made a protected disclosure shall be liable in an action for damages brought against him or her by the injured party." (Gov.

Code, Sec. 8547.10, subd. (c).) "Government Code section 8547.10, subdivision (e), rather than [McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792], provides the relevant framework for analyzing claims under Government Code section 8547.10." (Scheer v. Regents of the University of California (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 904, 916 (Scheer).) "In any civil action ... once it has been demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that an activity protected by [the Act] was a contributing factor in the alleged retaliation against a former, current, or prospective employee, the burden of proof shall be on the supervisor, manager, or appointing power to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged action would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee had not engaged in protected disclosures or refused an illegal order." (Gov.

Code, Sec. 8547.10, subd. (e).) "Both direct and circumstantial evidence can be used to show an employer's intent to retaliate. 'Direct evidence of retaliation may consist of remarks made by decisionmakers displaying a retaliatory motive. [Citation.]' [Citation.] Circumstantial evidence typically relates to such factors as the plaintiff's job performance, the timing of events, and how the plaintiff was treated in comparison to other workers." (Colarossi v. Coty US Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1153.)

When evaluating the evidence presented by the parties on summary judgment, " '[w]e accept as true the facts ... in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them.' [Citation.] And we must 'view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff[] ...' and 'liberally construe plaintiff['s] evidentiary submissions and strictly scrutinize defendant's own evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff['s] favor.' " (Nazir, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 254.)

The court may not weigh the evidence to determine whose version is more likely true. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) The information and evidence contained in the parties' respective supporting and responding separate statements shows that on April 16, 2014, Signa was promoted to Lieutenant at UCSB-PD. (Sep. Stmt., Undisputed Material Fact or "UMF" no. 7 & evidence cited therein.) In April and August 2016, Signa discussed with Olson, Millard, and Assistant Chief Farley, his concerns about a "botched" or "sham" internal affairs investigation that occurred in 2016 concerning the conduct of two former UCSB-PD officers, which Signa contends did not include information that was intentionally omitted by the personnel responsible for overseeing or conducting that investigation and was allowed to be "dropped" when both officers resigned. (Sep.

Stmt., UMF nos. 4, 9-10, 12-14 & evidence cited therein [not disputed or reasonably disputed on these points].) In May 2016, Signa received an abusive phone call from Millard. (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 53 & evidence cited therein.) From May 2016 to June 2018, Signa was excluded from lunches with Olson, Millard, and Sergeant Romero where business was discussed and decisions made. (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 54 & evidence cited therein.) In August 2016, Signa met with Olson, Farley, Millard, and Sergeant Romero, during which Signa's leadership style was discussed and Sergeant Romero made false accusations that were damaging to Signa. (Sep.

Stmt., UMF nos. 16, 55 & evidence cited therein.) On January 1, 2017, Signa was reassigned from Patrol Lieutenant to Administrative Lieutenant, with Millard being reassigned from Administrative Lieutenant to Patrol Lieutenant. (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 35 & evidence cited therein.) On May 25, 2017, Signa reported to Olson a possible misappropriation of funds and violation of Penal Code section 424 when UCSB-PD officers attended a "Shot Show" in Las Vegas, the approval for which was given by

a sergeant who Signa believed did not have authority to approve that request. (Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 17-20 & evidence cited therein [not disputed or reasonably disputed on these points].) During a meeting with Olson on that same day, Signa also expressed his belief that UCSB-PD failed to respond to reports of sexual harassment against female officers. (Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 21-22 & evidence cited therein [not disputed or reasonably disputed on these points].) On May 21, 2017, Signa was assigned to a minor position at a major event that was normally assigned to a corporal or sergeant. (Sep.

Stmt., UMF no. 57 & evidence cited therein.) On May 30, 2017, Signa reported to Farley the same information in regard to the possible misappropriation of funds by officers who attended the "Shot Show" in Las Vegas that Signa had previously reported to Olson. (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 24 & evidence cited therein.) On June 19 and December 13, 2017, Signa advised Farley of Signa's belief that a 2017 internal affairs investigation into Smith was improper and not impartial, and that officers believed Smith was protected by those in leadership positions at UCSB-PD. (Sep.

Stmt., UMF nos. 27, 29-30 & evidence cited therein [not disputed or reasonably disputed on these points].) Also on December 13, 2017, Signa repeated the same information to Olson and Millard, including the negative impacts of Smith's continued presence at UCSB-PD and Smith's dishonesty regarding his relationship with another officer. (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 31-32 & evidence cited therein.) Also on June 19, 2017, Signa was excluded from an investigation involving an officer supervised by Signa even though Signa had knowledge and involvement with the issues. (Sep.

Stmt., UMF no. 58 & evidence cited therein.) On June 20, 2017, Signa was excluded by Millard from a team meeting Signa was involved with, and chastised by Farley for notifying patrol of Signa's on-call status. (Sep. Smt., UMF no. 59 & evidence cited therein.) During a meeting with Farley on July 29, 2017, a process of interfering and attempting to prevent Signa's involvement with public relationship programs Signa had created and had been working on for several years began. (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 60 & evidence cited therein.)

On August 18, 2017, Millard and Olson approached Signa's staff without Signa's knowledge, intentionally excluding Signa. (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 61 & evidence cited therein.) On December 13, 2017, while attempting to advise of employee complaints, fears and issues, Signa was verbally abused by Olson, Millard, and Farley. (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 62 & evidence cited therein.) On June 19, 2018, Signa called the Ethics Point Hotline to report the purported retaliation by Olson, Farley, and Millard. (Sep.

Stmt., UMF no. 41 & evidence cited therein.) In November 2018, Signa was excluded from a large raise given to lieutenants. (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 68.) The USCB-PD business officer informed Signa that the decision to exclude him from the November 2018 salary increase was "intentional". (Ibid.; see also Regents Amended Appendix of Evidence, exhibit 7 at p. 19, ll. 1-2; Resp. Sep. Stmt., Additional Material Fact no. 5 & evidence cited therein.) On March 1, 2019, Signa retired from the UCSB-PD. (Sep.

Stmt., UMF no. 2 & evidence cited therein.) Considering the timing of the events described above in relation to, among other things, the timing of the concerns and reports raised or expressed by Signa, the available evidence and information gives rise to competing or conflicting inference as to whether the Regents acted with an intent to retaliate against Signa. For example, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude, based on the timing of relevant events and notwithstanding whether the Regents can show the existence of a legitimate reason for any of its actions, that the reasons stated by the Regents were pretextual, and that the evidence is sufficient to show the existence of a retaliatory motive. (See Scheer, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 917-918.)

The Signa Motion to Seal also argues that the first cause of action asserted in the Signa FAC lacks merit because "Signa's reports to Defendant of alleged violations did not disclose "improper government activity" since Signa failed to identify, let alone establish, that any state or federal laws or regulations were violated by these reported incidents nor has Signa shown any conduct that violated any Executive order of the Governor, a California Rule of Court, or any policy or procedure mandated by the State Administrative Manual or State Contracting Manual, or was economically wasteful, involves gross misconduct, incompetency, or inefficiency[]"; that "Signa's reports to Defendant of alleged violations did not disclose "improper government activity" since they

merely disclosed possible violations of internal policies, which in one instance did not exist, and which are not protected even if the policies are of a government entity[]"; that "Signa's reports to Defendant of alleged violations did not involve a "protected disclosure" were not a "good faith communication" did not involve disclosures of an "improper governmental activity" and were not intended for the purposes of remedying any condition that threatened the health or safety of employees or the public as the activities did not threaten such things[]"; and that "Signa had no reasonable belief that illegal conduct was occurring, as Signa did not witness most of the alleged conduct and could not reasonably believe those facts constituted illegal conduct." (Notice at p. 4, P.P. 1-4.)

For the same reasons discussed above, the Regents concedes that each of the facts set forth in its supporting separate statement relate and are material to the issues described above. (Sep. Stmt. at p. 20, issues "C", "D" [incorporating undisputed material facts number 1 through 71] & p. 21, issues "E" and "F" [same].) Pursuant to Government Code section 8547.2, a "protected disclosure" is "a good faith communication, including a communication based on, or when carrying out, job duties, that discloses or demonstrates an intention to disclose information that may evidence either of the following circumstances: "(A) An improper governmental activity. "(B) A condition that may significantly threaten the health or safety of employees or the public if the disclosure or intention to disclose was made for the purpose of remedying that condition." (Gov.

Code, Sec. 8547.2, subd. (e)(1)(A), (B).) Under Government Code section 8547.2, "'[i]mproper governmental activity' means an activity by a state agency or by an employee that is undertaken in the performance of the employee's duties, undertaken inside a state office, or, if undertaken outside a state office by the employee, directly relates to state government, whether or not that activity is within the scope of their employment, and that meets any of the following criteria: "(A) The activity is in violation of any state or federal law or regulation, including, but not limited to, corruption, malfeasance, bribery, theft of government property, fraudulent claims, fraud, coercion, conversion, malicious prosecution, misuse of government property, misuse of state expenditures, including allocations, loans, or grants, or willful omission to perform duty. "(B) The activity is in violation of an executive order of the Governor, a California Rule of Court, or any policy or procedure mandated by the State Administrative Manual or State Contracting Manual. "(C) The activity is economically wasteful, involves gross misconduct, incompetency, or inefficiency." (Gov.

Code, Sec. 8547.2, subd. (c)(1)(A)-(C).) "Complaints made 'in the context of internal administrative or personnel actions, rather than in the context of legal violations' do not constitute protected whistleblowing. [Citations.] 'To exalt these exclusively internal personnel disclosures with whistleblower status would create all sorts of mischief. Most damagingly, it would thrust the judiciary into micromanaging employment practices and create a legion of undeserving protected "whistleblowers" arising from the routine workings and communications of the job site.' [Citation.]" (Levi v.

Regents of University of California (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 892, 904.) The Regents does not appear to dispute that the alleged protected disclosures at issue, as those issues are set forth in the separate statement, include Signa's concerns about or reports of a purported misappropriation of funds in violation of Penal Code section 424, and a purported failure by UCSB-PD to respond to reports of sexual harassment against female officers. (Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 17-20, 21-22, & 24; see also Memorandum at pp. 12-13.)

A reasonable trier of fact could conclude from the nature or subject of the concerns raised or disclosed by Signa, that those disclosures relate to or implicate a misuse or waste of state expenditures, violations of law, or a threat to the safety of other employees. The Regents Signa Motion also does not explain why a reasonable trier of fact could not infer, from the information and evidence presented here, that Signa's disclosures were made for the purpose of remedying the purported conditions described above.

Instead, a reasonable trier of fact could find, based on the material facts and evidence presented here, that the disclosures at issue implicate or concern improper activity under the Act, and that Signa's communications regarding those concerns were made in good faith.

For these and all further reasons discussed above, there exist triable issues of fact, including competing inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence presented here, which the Regents Signa Motion concedes are material to each of the issues that are the subject of that motion. "[S]ummary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (c).) Therefore, the court will deny the Regents Signa Motion. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subds. (c), (f)(1); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 845; Gov. Code, Sec. 8547.10, subd. (e).) The Regents' request for judicial notice: The court will grant the request of the Regents for judicial notice of the Signa FAC. (Regents RJN at p. 3, P. 1; Evid. Code, Sec. 452, subd. (d)(1).) Evidentiary objections: The Regents submit written objections to material contained in the declaration of Signa submitted in support of Signa's opposition to the Regents Signa Motion. "In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (q).) California Rules of Court provide: "Each written objection must be numbered consecutively and must: "(1) Identify the name of the document in which the specific material objected to is located; "(2) State the exhibit, title, page, and line number of the material objected to; "(3) Quote or set forth the objectionable statement or material; and "(4) State the grounds for each objection to that statement or material." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b)(1)-(4).) "Written objections to evidence must follow one of the ... two formats" set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354. (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b).) Though the written objections of the Regents identify the document where the material objected to is located and quote the objectionable material, those written objections fail to follow the format set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354. For example, instead of stating the page and line number of the material objected to, the Regents raise the same multiple objections to the same multiple statements contained in each paragraph of the Signa declaration cited in the written objections.

The manner in which the written objections of the Regents is formatted effectively forces the court to guess whether the Regents contends that all or only some statements within each cited paragraph are objectionable, and why. As the written objections submitted by the Regents do not, for all reasons discussed above, comply with the formatting rules set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354, the court disregards those objections. (Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 (Hodjat) [a trial court may decline ruling on improperly formatted objections].) (2) The Regents Reyes Motion The Regents Reyes Motion seeks summary adjudication or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of 12 issues which are stated in the notice of that motion. (Notice at pp. 4-12.)

The separate statement submitted in support of that motion sets forth 93 facts which, for the same reasons discussed above, relate and are material to each of the issues stated in the Regents Reyes Motion. (Sep. Stmt. at pp. 20-25 [incorporating each material fact numbered 1 through 93].) For the same reasons discussed above and in the May 29 Order, the court considers only the Reyes Amended Appendix. The courts review of the Reyes Amended Appendix also shows that appendix includes redactions to information or material appearing in the attached exhibits, in violation of the May 29 Order as further discussed above. (Reyes Amended Appendix, Volume 3 at pdf pp. 16-44, 47-48, 51-55; Volume 4 at pdf pp. 7, 9, 11-22, 24, 27, 29, 31, 33-56; Volume 5 at pdf pp. 7-17, 23-25, 28, 31, 39-109.)

In addition, and for the reasons discussed above, the court does not consider any redacted material. The same reasoning and analysis set forth above applies here. For example, the issues which are the subject of the Regents Reyes Motion include that the reports made by Reyes concerning the alleged violations at issue did

not disclose "improper government activity" for the same or similar reasons as those asserted in the Regents Signa Motion; that those reports do not involve any protected disclosure and were not a good faith communication for the same or similar reasons discussed above; and that Reyes could not have had a reasonable belief that illegal conduct was occurring. (Notice at pp. 4-5, P.P. 1-3.) The Regents Reyes Motion concedes that the facts material to the issues described above include that from June 15 to June 23, 2017, Reyes, as a "Field Training Officer" or "FTO", assigned a trainee; that during that time, Reyes prepared Daily Observation Reports or "DOR" related to the trainee which rates that trainee's performance; that in the DOR, Reyes noted, among other things, concerns about the trainee's failure to control the movement of a suspect and that the trainee struggled with handcuffing an individual during an arrest; that Reyes did not recommend the trainee be allowed to move to the next phase known as the "Ghost Phase"; that on June 27, 2017, UCSB-PD issued a memorandum that the trainee had completed field training; that on June 29, 2017, Reyes sent correspondence to the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training or "POST" documenting Reyes' concerns related to the release of a trainee and the trainee's performance; and that Reyes claims the Regents violated Penal Code section 832 because "it was 'an unsafe work practice to release of an unqualified officer with full arrest authority was (sic) a threat to the safety of the public and the University.'" (Sep.

Stmt., Undisputed Material Fact or "UMF" nos. 13, 24-28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 37, 51 & evidence cited therein [not disputed or reasonably disputed on these points].) For the same or similar reasons further discussed above, and considering the provisions of Penal Code section 832, there exist triable issues of fact, including competing inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence presented, in regard to whether the concerns or reports of Reyes constitute a protected disclosure under Government Code section 8547.2, subdivision (e)(1)(B), and whether the communications of Reyes described above were made in good faith for the purpose of remedying those concerns.

In addition, though the material facts which relate to the issues and causes of action that are the subject of the Regents Reyes Motion include that at the time Reyes wrote to POST, "he never informed Olson, Farley, Millard, or the FTO Supervisor, Sergeant Pierce, of his alleged concerns about the trainee[]", the available evidence and information, including that presented by Reyes, gives rise to an inference that Millard was aware of the concerns raised by Reyes, and that Millard, Olson, and Sergeant Pierce were aware or knew of those concerns whether they were communicated by Reyes directly or in a different manner. (See Sep.

Stmt., UMF nos. 3 & 43-44; Resp. Sep. Stmt., Additional Material Fact nos. 1-2 & evidence cited therein [dec. of counsel Jaime Keeton, exhibit A at pdf p. 16; Reyes dec., P. 6].) For all reasons discussed above, there exist triable issues of fact, including competing inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence presented by the parties, that preclude the granting of the Regents Reyes Motion as to each issue that is the subject of that motion. Therefore, the court will deny that motion including as to the request for summary judgment.

The Regents' request for judicial notice: The court will grant the request of the Regents for judicial notice of the complaint filed by Reyes in the Reyes Action. (Regents RJN at p. 4, P. 1; Evid. Code, Sec. 452, subd. (d)(1).) Evidentiary objections: The Regents has filed with the court, written objections to material contained in the declaration of Reyes submitted in support of their opposition to the Regents Reyes Motion. "In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (q).) The written objections of the Regents to material contained in the Reyes declaration are formatted in the same manner as the written objections to the Signa declaration further discussed above. For example, instead of stating the page and line number of the material objected to, the Regents raise the same multiple objections to the same multiple statements contained in each cited paragraph of the Reyes declaration, which effectively forces the court to determine whether all or only some statements within each cited paragraph are objectionable, and why.

The same reasoning and analysis apply to the written objections submitted by the Regents in support of their

reply to Reyes' opposition to the Regents Reyes Motion. For the same reasons discussed above, those written objections fail to follow the format set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b). Notwithstanding that the written objections submitted by the Regents fail to comply with court rules, the court will overrule objection no.

4. As to the remaining objections, the court, for the same reasons discussed above, disregards those objections. (Hodjat, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 8.)

Tentative Ruling: Ana Miranda Mendoza et al vs Rich & Famous Inc et al Tentative Ruling: Ana Miranda Mendoza et al vs Rich & Famous Inc et al