Ruiz v. Tayrien

the hearing and requested further briefing to address these issues. Defendants subsequently

filed a supplemental opening brief, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental opposition brief, and

Defendants filed a supplemental reply. The question is now properly before the Court. Having

fully considered all the submitted papers, the Court rules as follows:

Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiff asserts objections to Defendant’s material facts in its separate statement. The

objections are improper—they address the facts rather than the evidence. Objections may be

made only to evidence. California Rules of Court, rules 3.1352 and 3.1354 both state they apply

to “objections to evidence,” and Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(5) also

refers to “[e]videntiary objections.” Separate statements are not evidence. (Jackson v. County of

Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 178, fn. 4.) Because undisputed facts and argument are

not evidence, they cannot be objected to. Since these “evidentiary” objections are improper,

they are overruled.

Analysis

The first cause of action for negligence is only brought against Defendant James for his

role as the negligent driver in the accident who was allegedly under the influence of “Duster” at

the time of the accident. (FAC, ¶¶10-33.) James is Maria and Steven’s adult child. (Tayrien

Decl., ¶12.) This motion is not brought by James, but rather only by Maria and Steven.

The second cause of action for negligence is pled against Steven and Maria. Plaintiff

alleges Steven and Maria owned the vehicle James drove at the time of the accident (a black

2009 M3 BMW) and breached their respective duties owed to Plaintiff by (1) not securing the

keys to the vehicle to prevent James from taking and using the vehicle; (2) not monitoring

James’ access to their vehicle knowing he was involved in an accident in the week prior to the

July 3, 2022 accident involving Plaintiffs; and (3) by not taking all reasonable and precautionary

actions to prevent James, a known bad, negligent, and/or dangerous driver access to the keys

and/or the ability to drive their vehicle. (FAC, ¶¶35-36; see also ¶20.) Plaintiffs cite these

allegations and contend that this is not a typical negligent entrustment case. Rather, they

contend Steven and Maria had a duty to affirmatively prevent James from accessing and driving

the vehicle due to their knowledge of his background.

The motion is supported by 28 material facts (UFs); declarations of Plaintiff Maria and counsel;

Defendants Steven and Maria’s written discovery responses; and title to the vehicle Defendant

James was driving at the time of the accident.

Defendant Maria declares she lives at a specified address in Highland, California, with

her husband Steven. She is not the registered owner of the vehicle, is not on title, and has no

ownership interest. Maria attaches a copy of title showing Steven as sole owner. (Tayrien Decl.,

¶3; Exh. A.)

Maria further declares in or around early 2021, approximately 18 months prior to the

incident, Steven disconnected the battery of the vehicle, rendering it inoperable. The vehicle’s

registration and insurance were allowed to lapse because it was no longer drivable or being

used. From that time through the date of the incident, Maria believed the vehicle was inoperable

and could not be started or driven. To her knowledge, the vehicle was not operated during this

period. (Tayrien Decl., ¶¶4-5.)

Maria further declares prior to the incident, she did not give her son James express

permission to use or operate the vehicle. Maria also did not give implied permission since she

had no reason to believe the vehicle could be driven given its inoperable condition. Steven

never gave James permission, implied or otherwise, to use or operate the vehicle. While James,

as a member of their household, theoretically had physical access to the keys if he searched for

them, this did not imply permission due to the inoperable condition. (Tayrien Decl., ¶6.)

Maria further declares she was unaware James had made the vehicle operable or had

taken it on July 3, 2022 until after the incident occurred. Maria did not take specific steps to

secure the vehicle because she believed it was inoperable. Prior to the incident, Maria was not

aware James had any issues with drug use or intoxication while driving. She did not know he

would operate any vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants. Steven was equally

unaware. (Tayrien Decl., ¶¶7-9.)

Maria further declares although James was involved in an accident on July 2, 2022 while driving

Maria’s car, she did not consider that to show he was a bad, negligent, or dangerous

driver. There were no citations issued to James, and she had no reason to believe the accident

was from recklessness or intoxication. Maria and Steven were aware of James’s prior offenses,

including a juvenile petition for shooting at an inhabited dwelling in 2018, petty theft in 2015,

shoplifting in 2017, and reckless driving in 2019. The reckless driving incident resulted in

multiple warrants for James’s failure to appear and was resolved in January 2021 with a plea to

a lesser offense. Since those resolutions, Maria and James did not consider James a

dangerous driver or that he required restricted access to the vehicle. The non-driving offenses

were juvenile matters without adult convictions and did not involve vehicles, intoxication, or

violence towards others. (Tayrien Decl., ¶¶10-11.)

Maria further declares although James resided at the home as an adult, he did not have general

authority to use family vehicles without asking for permission. Maria first learned of the incident

when a bystander at the scene used James’ cell phone to call Maria. The accident did not occur

at night, and Maria did not observe James start or operate the vehicle. (Tayrien Decl., ¶12.)

In verified written discovery responses, Steven and Maria each stated much the

same. (Responses to Special Interrogatory Nos. 1, 18 [Nangano Decl., Exhs. C, E]; Responses

to Form Interrogatory No. 17.1 [Nangano Decl., Exh. D].) As indicated above, Plaintiffs asserts

improper evidentiary objections to Defendants’ material facts. Nevertheless, in the body of the

opposition brief Plaintiff correctly observes that interrogatory responses may only be asserted

against the responding party. (Code Civ. Proc., §2030.410.) Here, Defendants are seek to use

their own discovery responses against Plaintiff—which appears improper. Nevertheless, as the

same assertions are made in Maria’s declaration the objection is of no consequence. Plaintiff

does not dispute that neither Steven nor Maria gave James express or implied permission to use

the vehicle. (UF 7, 8, undisputed.)

The opposition is supported by the declaration of counsel authenticating Steven’s death

certificate.

Steven’s death. As a threshold issue, Plaintiffs argue Defendant Steven lacks standing to bring

this motion because he is deceased. Plaintiffs’ counsel indicate they learned only recently on

April 7, 2026 that Steven died in mid-December 2025. (Schade Decl., Exh. A.) Plaintiffs indicate

they have not had the opportunity to substitute in Steven’s estate as the proper Defendant in this

case.

A cause of action against a decedent may be asserted against the decedent’s personal

representative or, to the extent provided by statute, against the decedent’s successor in

interest. (Code Civ. Proc., §377.40.) Therefore, technically Steven’s personal representative or

successor in interest should be substituted in his stead. It would be unreasonable to deny the

motion on this ground, as the analysis is exactly the same regardless of whether Steven or his

personal representative/successor seeks summary judgment. Plaintiffs cite no authority that the

motion cannot proceed on its merits now. The result is the same either way. If Plaintiffs for

some reason fail or refuse to substitute Steven’s personal representative then the case must be

dismissed against Steven anyway since he is no longer a proper party in light of his death.

Negligent entrustment. “Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or

injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the

operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or

operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.” (Veh. Code,

§17150.)

The Court of Appeal addressed negligent entrustment claims in Syah v. Johnson (1996) 247

Cal.App.2d 534 (disapproved on other grounds in Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148):

The doctrine of "negligent entrustment" is clearly distinguishable from the theory of "vicarious

liability." Negligent entrustment is a common law liability doctrine. [Citation.] Conversely, the

obligation of a lending owner of an automobile is one of statutory liability. [Citation.] An owner of

an automobile may be independently negligent in entrusting it to an incompetent

driver. [Citation.] California is one of several states which recognizes the liability of an

automobile owner who has entrusted a car to an incompetent, reckless, or inexperienced driver,

and has supplemented the common law doctrine of negligent entrustment by enactment of a

specific consent statute. (See 163 A.L.R. 1418; Veh. Code, §§17150-17157.)

(Id. at pp. 538-539.)

"It is generally recognized that one who places or entrusts his motor vehicle in the hands of one

whom he knows, or from the circumstances is charged with knowing, is incompetent or unfit to

drive, may be held liable for an injury inflicted by the use made thereof by that driver, provided

the plaintiff can establish that the injury complained of was proximately caused by the driver's

disqualification, incompetency, inexperience or recklessness . . . .

"Liability for the negligence of the incompetent driver to whom an automobile is entrusted does

not arise out of the relationship of the parties, but from the act of entrustment of the motor

vehicle, with permission to operate the same, to one whose incompetency, inexperience, or

recklessness is known or should have been known by the owner." [Citations.]

Under the theory of "negligent entrustment," liability is imposed on vehicle owner or permitter

because of his own independent negligence and not the negligence of the driver, in the event

plaintiff can prove that the injury or death resulting therefrom was proximately caused by the

driver's incompetency.

(Id. at p. 539.)

Defendants Maria and Steven present several arguments why they are not liable for

negligent entrustment. First, Defendants argue Maria was not a registered owner of the

vehicle. Plaintiffs push back on this point by contending Defendants did not provide any

evidence showing the vehicle was not co-owned by Maria as community property by operation of

law.

However, the Court need not even address Maria’s ownership because Plaintiffs

concede that neither Maria nor Steven gave permission to James to drive the vehicle. (UF 7, 8,

undisputed.) By its very name, a claim for “negligent entrustment” requires a defendant to have

entrusted the vehicle to the driver. Plaintiffs’ failure to dispute UFs 7 and 8 means that there was

no such entrustment.

Civil Code section 1714. However, in their original opposition papers Plaintiffs argued

something more was required. Indeed, paragraphs 20 and 36 of the FAC expressly allege

Steven and Maria knew James was a dangerous driver and should have taken more steps to

stop him from driving the subject vehicle even though he did not have permission to drive

it. Plaintiffs contend they should have secured the keys, monitored his access because they

knew he was a poor driver, and taken other “reasonable and precautionary actions” to stop him

from taking the car.

The issue here is the extent of Steven and Maria’s duty. This is not a typical negligent

entrustment case. Plaintiffs argue the duty required Steven and Maria not only to withhold their

permission for James to drive the vehicle, but to take additional steps to affirmatively prevent him

from driving. James was an adult, but Plaintiffs would impose a duty on Maria and Steven to

control his behavior due to his past history (both vehicular and non-vehicular).

“Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an

injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his

or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care,

brought the injury upon himself or herself...” (Civ. Code, §1714, subd. (a).)

Civil Code section 1714 establishes a broad rule, but it is not without limits. (Brown, supra, 11

Cal.5th at p. 214.) It “imposes a general duty of care on a defendant only when it is the

defendant who has ‘“created a risk”’ of harm to the plaintiff.” (Ibid.) “The law does not impose the

same duty on a defendant who did not contribute to the risk that the plaintiff would suffer the

harm alleged.” (Ibid.) Generally, a defendant cannot be held liable in negligence for harms it did

not cause unless there are special circumstances, such as a special relationship, that give the

defendant an affirmative duty to protect the victim from another’s harm. (Id. a pp. 214, 220.)

Further, even where there is a legal basis for imposing the default duty of care—as in cases

where the defendant has increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff—courts have the power and

obligation to examine whether considerations of public policy warrant limiting that duty. (A.L. v.

Harbor Developmental Disabilities Foundation (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 477, 488 [321 Cal. Rptr.

3d 575]; Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 209, 217–219.) In Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69

Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561], our Supreme Court summarized the policy

considerations that must be balanced in determining whether to limit or excuse a defendant’s

duty of care. (Id. at pp. 112–113.) They are: “‘the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the

degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the

defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s

conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and

consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for

breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.’”

(Tavares v. Zipcar, Inc. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 219, 228-229.)

The supplemental briefing addresses these Rowland factors. Defendants argue the risk

was not foreseeable because the vehicle had been inoperable, the battery was disconnected,

and there was no reason to believe the vehicle could be started or driven. James lacked a key

and had to ask permission before using a family vehicle. Defendants concede Plaintiffs suffered

injury, but contend there was no close connection between the failure to secure the keys and the

accident. Defendants further argue there was no moral blame because they reasonably

believed the vehicle was unusable and therefore could not have anticipated James would be

able to drive it. Defendants further argue the law already requires owners to act reasonably with

respect to their vehicles, so imposing a greater duty would not prevent future harm. Defendants

further argue imposition of a duty would require extraordinary security measures such as locked

garages, hidden keys, and disabling parts beyond battery disconnection such as to impose a

great burden. Defendants further contend insurance considerations are neutral.

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue leaving motor vehicles accessible to an adult household

member with a documented, escalating history of violent and reckless conduct is unquestionably

likely to result in a traffic collision injuring third parties. Plaintiffs note James had crashed

Maria’s vehicle the day before the accident involving Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argue this placed Maria

on notice that James would access and dangerously operate an unsecured family

vehicle. Plaintiffs contend the subject vehicle was actually started and therefore could not be

characterized as truly inoperable. Plaintiffs note James’s criminal history. Plaintiffs correctly

note the accident caused injury. Plaintiffs assert a close causal connection between Maria and

Steven’s decision to leave the vehicle accessible with keys unsecured, James’s dangerous

propensities known to Maria and Steven, and the accident. Plaintiffs further argue moral blame

attaches because Defendants had knowledge of the danger but took no steps to prevent

foreseeable harm. Plaintiffs further argue requiring vehicle owners to take reasonable steps to

secure their vehicles from a household member with dangerous propensities serves the

paramount interest in public safety. Plaintiffs argue the burden would be modest: securing keys,

restricting access, or taking reasonable measures to prevent a known dangerous individual from

accessing a vehicle. Plaintiffs agree insurance considerations are neutral. Plaintiffs additionally

argue an adverse ruling would invade the jury’s province.

The only factor favoring Plaintiffs here is the certainty of injury. Removal of the battery

from the vehicle rendered this accident unforeseeable. Defendants reasonably believed James

could not drive the vehicle, so there is no connection between the conduct and the injury and no

moral blame attaches. Imposing a heightened duty would not prevent future harm because

Defendants already believed the vehicle was undrivable. Defendants correctly note Plaintiffs

would have the Court impose a “boundless” duty. Indeed, Plaintiffs ask the Court to impose

nearly absolute or strict liability and to proscribe a level of duty constituting an extreme burden

with very little increased safety benefit to the public. As indicated, both sides agree the

insurance factor is neutral.

Therefore, the Court finds there was no duty to secure the car keys for an inoperable vehicle and

grant summary adjudication on the second cause of action for negligence in favor of Defendants

Steven and Maria.

Third cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Negligent infliction of

emotional distress is not an independent tort, but the tort of negligence with its traditional

elements. (Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1072.) Since the Court finds that

Maria and Steven are not liable for negligence in failing to prevent James from driving, then this

cause of action necessarily fails as to Maria and James as well and summary judgment is

appropriate.

RULING

For all the reasons stated above, the Court rules as follows:

1. Overrules Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections to Defendants’ material facts as improper;

and

2. Grants Defendants Maria and Steven’s motion for summary judgment.

a. There is no dispute that Plaintiffs cannot maintain a negligent entrustment

theory against Maria and Steven.

b. Maria and Steven did not have a duty under Civil Code section 1714 to take

further steps to stop James from driving the subject vehicle given his past

history. The factors established in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108

do not support the existence of such a duty. The only factor favoring the

existence of a duty is the degree of certainty that Plaintiffs suffered injury. The

harm was not foreseeable; the connection between Defendants’ conduct and

the injury suffered was not close; there is no moral blame; imposition of

liability would not prevent future ham; the burden of a duty would be heavy;

and the benefit to the public would be negligible. The insurance factor is

neutral.

Evidentiary Basis:

Defendants’ Material Facts Nos. 3-24

Tayrien Decl., ¶4-14