Motion for Attorney Fees
Civil Procedure, section 2025.290(a). Plaintiff is permitted to depose Harman on matters related to the documents produced after the first session of the deposition and pursuant to the deposition notice. Plaintiff’s additional examination is limited to 3 hours. Calvary Chapel and Brodersen are permitted to depose Harman on any matter, however, their examination is limited to 2 hours. Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is DENIED.
“Except as provided in subdivision (b), or by any court order, including a case management order, a deposition examination of the witness by all counsel, other than the witness’ counsel of record, shall be limited to seven hours of total testimony. The court shall allow additional time, beyond any limits imposed by this section, if needed to fairly examine the deponent or if the deponent, another person, or any other circumstance impedes or delays the examination.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.290(a).)
Additional time is required to fairly examine Harman. Plaintiff’s counsel was unable to examine Harman regarding the 2,000 pages of documents produced after the deposition. Harman’s arguments regarding counsel having the documents from a different case and choosing to examine Harman on matters he claims are less important are not persuasive. There is no authority which abrogates a party’s discovery responsibilities based on discovery from a separate case. Further, without the responsive documents, Plaintiff’s counsel was unable to determine the import of each topic and whether he should reserve time to question Harman on undisclosed documents. Additionally, Calvary Chapel and Brodersen were unable to ask any questions during the deposition. Thus, the Court finds additional time is warranted under Code of Civil Procedure, section 2025.290(a).
The Court finds sanctions inappropriate. First, this motion is not a motion to compel answers or production of documents. Harman had already produced documents prior to Plaintiff filing her motion. Further, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to impose monetary sanctions pursuant to Section 2023.010.
9. BEVERAGE VISIONS, LLC VS. CUA MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
The Motion for Attorney Fees by Defendant in Intervention Beverage Visions, LLC against Plaintiff in Intervention Russell Geyser is GRANTED.
Movant seeks attorney fees based on the Court’s order granting their anti-SLAPP motion to strike the Complaint in Intervention of Russell Geyser.
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On 12/9/25, the Court granted movant’s anti-SLAPP motion on the grounds that the alleged conduct related to settlement of a prior dispute was protected speech and Geyser failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing because the litigation privilege applied to his allegations.
Legal Standard:
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(c)(1) provides, “Except as provided in paragraph (2), in any action subject to subdivision (b), a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs. If the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant to Section 128.5.”
However, a party who prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion which is only an “illusory” or “minimal and insignificant” victory with no “practical effect” is not entitled to recover their attorney fees. (See Lin v. City of Pleasanton (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 408, 425–426; Moran v. Endres (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 952, 954–955.)
Application:
Here, movant prevailed on its anti-SLAPP motion, which had a substantial practical effect – dismissal of the entire Complaint in Intervention against it.
Movant seeks attorney fees of $10,948 plus filing/service fees of $119.40. The request is based on counsel’s hourly rates between $540 and $660/hour, which the Court finds is reasonable for purposes of the subject motions. Movant’s attorney fees request reflects a reasonable amount of time spent on the anti-SLAPP motion and the present motion (1.5 hours).
The motion is unopposed.
The motion is granted in the amount of $11,067.40.
10. SCHWARTZ VS. BRUNSWICK CORPORATION 2023-01331323
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Plaintiff Martin Schwartz’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs is GRANTED as modified.
The court declines to rule on the Defendant’s evidentiary objections to evidence submitted by Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections to evidence submitted by Defendant on the grounds they are unnecessary to the disposition of the Motion.
Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees:
Plaintiff moves for attorneys’ fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) which states: “If the buyer prevails in an action