Petition: Confirm Arbitration
examination." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2032.510, subd. (a).) The court is not convinced, even though it is permissible, that it was reasonable or necessary to have a paid nurse attend and observe the DME. Plaintiff's attorney, or support staff, could have simply attended and recorded the examination. The $1,005.00 for the DME observer will be taxed.
Pre-Judgment Interest
By way of the initial motion papers, defendants sought to strike prejudgment interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum. Since filing the initial motion papers, defendants have waived that argument, so it need not be addressed. (Karpov decl., P. 35 & Exh. P.)
Trial Technician
Defendants next argue that plaintiff is not entitled to $4,750.00 in costs for a technician that was not present at trial and did not offer any tech support. Defendants argue that plaintiff's counsel used his own computer to edit and prepare deposition videos that were played for the jury, and that plaintiff did not utilize any exhibits at trial other than copies in binders or an ELMO to project items.
In opposition, plaintiff argues that defendants' argument is "pure speculation," and that: "Technical support is frequently provided remotely via cloud-based tools and background labor. The requested amount of $950.00 per day covers the labor required to ensure that the electronic presentations and complex video clips played for the jury functioned seamlessly without 'glitches.' " (Opp., p. 15, ll. 16-21.)
The court is very familiar with both cases cited relative to tech costs: Science Applications Internat. Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1095, and the latter case of Bender v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 968. The costs are discretionary pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(4).
Conspicuously absent from plaintiff's opposition is a description of what their technician actually did for the days charged. Because plaintiff has failed to adequately show that the work performed by the technician was reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, rather than merely convenient or beneficial, the costs will not be allowed.
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Defendants next challenge $17,368.46, listed under Models, Blowups and Photocopies of Exhibits, incurred from Time Code Pro Sync Program for deposition video preparations of all the witnesses that testified in the case, including experts that neither testified at trial nor had their videos played for the jury.
Plaintiff argues that these costs are allowed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(a)(13), which provides: "Models, the enlargements of exhibits and photocopies of exhibits, and the electronic presentation of exhibits, including costs of rental equipment and electronic formatting, may be allowed if they were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact."
The court does recognize that there is a split in authority as to whether "fees are not authorized for exhibits not used at trial," (Ladas, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 775) or whether "costs incurred in preparing models, blowups, and photocopies of exhibits may be awarded under section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(13), even if these materials were not used at trial." (Segal v. ASICS America Corp. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 659, 667 (Segal).)
While the court tends to agree with Segal, the facts at hand are distinguishable. In the present case, "video synchronization," which process is not adequately explained by plaintiff, appears to have been unnecessary and excessive. Witnesses were made available for trial testimony and deposition transcripts could have been used if impeachment was called for. $17,368.46 for video synchronization will not be allowed.
Defendants also challenge $5,305.57 under this category, claiming that the printing costs lack any information or invoices supporting that the costs were related to trial exhibits. In opposition, plaintiff provides invoices supporting the assertion that the costs were incurred. (Karpov decl., P.P. 26, 27 & Exhs. I-K.) Plaintiff argues that they are allowable costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(13). Allowable costs include: "Models, the enlargements of exhibits and photocopies of exhibits, and the electronic presentation of exhibits, including costs of rental equipment and electronic formatting, may be allowed if they were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1033.5, subd. (a)(13).)
The court finds that the exhibits were reasonably helpful to aid the jury and the $5,305.57 will be allowed.
Travel Costs
Defendants next challenge $1,050.21 for parking, mileage, and hotel costs. In opposition, plaintiff argues that the costs are discretionary pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(4), which is set forth above. In her opposition, plaintiff cites Ladas in support of her argument. However, Ladas does not help plaintiff, as it holds: "The only travel expenses authorized by section 1033.5 are those to attend depositions. (Sec. 1033.5, subd. (a)(3).) Routine expenses for local travel by attorneys or other firm employees are not reasonably necessary to the conduct of litigation." (Ladas, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 775-776.) The travel costs will not be allowed.
Tentative Ruling: Jay Gill vs Falk & Blacksberg Inc et al
Tentative Ruling: Jay Gill vs Falk & Blacksberg Inc et al
Case Number
Case Type Civil Law & Motion
Hearing Date / Time Fri, 05/29/2026 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings Petition: Confirm Arbitration
Tentative Ruling
For all reasons stated herein, on or before June 26, 2026, the parties shall file a joint statement that (1) attaches a true and correct copy of the judgment entered in the San Luis Obispo Superior Court action, Jay Gill v. Hysen-Johnson Ford, Inc., et al., 21CV-0728 (SLO Action), and (2) sets forth the parties' respective positions on how this judgment and the recent ruling on plaintiff's petition to vacate in the SLO Action impacts defendants' petition in this action. The hearing on defendants' petition to confirm arbitration is continued to July 31, 2026.
Background:
On December 23, 2021, plaintiff Jay Gill (Gill) initiated this action by filing a complaint against defendants Falk & Blacksberg, Inc., dba Perry Ford Mazda Santa Barbara, Falk Properties Santa Barbara, LLC, and Deborah Falk Properties Santa Barbara LLC (collectively, Defendants).
On February 8, 2022, Gill filed his operative first amended complaint (FAC) setting forth three causes of action for: (1) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, real estate purchase agreement; (2) breach of contract, asset purchase agreement; (3) breach of good faith and fair dealing, asset purchase agreement.
As alleged in the FAC: Gill sought to enter exclusive and unique automotive markets currently occupied by Defendants in Santa Barbara and San Luis Obispo. (FAC, P.P. 1-4) Defendants agreed to sell Gill certain automotive sales operations in these geographic areas. (Ibid.)
The deal is comprised of four agreements: (1) a real estate purchase agreement relating to the Perry Ford and Perry Mazda automobile dealerships in Santa Barbara, (2) an asset purchase agreement relating to the Perry Ford and Perry Mazda automobile dealerships in Santa Barbara (collectively, the Santa Barbara Agreements), (3) a real estate purchase agreement relating to the Perry Ford Lincoln San Luis Obispo dealership, and (4) an asset purchase agreement relating to the Perry Ford Lincoln San Luis Obispo dealership (collectively, the SLO Agreements). (Ibid.)
The Santa Barbara Agreements are at issue in this action. (FAC, P. 4) The SLO Agreements are subject to a separate but related specific performance action filed by Gill in San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, Case No. 21CV-0728 (the SLO Action). (Ibid.)