Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Default Judgment; Dismissing with Prejudice C.C.P. 473
terms; (4) there is mutuality of remedies; and (5) plaintiff's legal remedy is inadequate. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Union Oil Co. of California v. Greka Energy Corp. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 129, 134.)
For a commercial property, there is a rebuttable presumption "that the breach of an agreement to transfer real property cannot be adequately relieved by pecuniary compensation." (Civ. Code, Sec. 3387.) Defendants did not attempt to rebut that presumption.
With that noted, specific performance involves equitable considerations. Here, the Plaintiff has asked for both "damages in an amount subject to proof at trial" because of the breach of the Modesto Agreement (see Compl. P. 61) as well as specific performance (see Compl. P. 66). And again, in this motion, Plaintiff asked for judgment on the breach of contract cause of action as well as for specific performance. The dueling, mutually exclusive requests are self-defeating because they undermine the Court's ability to equitably find that only specific performance is sufficient to make Plaintiff whole. Consequently, the Court does not find it appropriate to grant specific performance based on summary adjudication.
Issue 4: Plaintiff is entitled to declaratory judgment (fourth cause of action) because the Modesto Agreement, which was fully executed on May 2, 2025, is valid and enforceable and clearly sets forth the parties' rights and obligations. The Court declines to summarily adjudicate this issue because it would not resolve any cause of action in the case. The Court declaring that the Modesto Agreement is "valid and enforceable" and "clearly sets forth the parties' rights and obligations" is not helpful. Neither party disputes the language in the Modesto Agreement itself. Rather, the question arises from outside the contract--i.e., from the alleged oral agreement regarding Sonoma. But this is not the issue that Plaintiff has articulated.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, is DENIED in its entirety.
CV-24-003630 - SYNCHRONY BANK vs MCELVAINE, TAYE - Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Default Judgment; Dismissing with Prejudice C.C.P. 473 - GRANTED, and unopposed. At Plaintiff's request and good cause existing, the Court finds that the default and default judgment entered by the Court on September 10, 2024, were obtained by extrinsic fraud and hereby sets aside and vacates same (Code of Civil Procedure 473 (d)). The Court also hereby dismisses this action with prejudice. The Court will sign the proposed order.
The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA: UD-26-000452 - GILMORE, MIKE vs SHUGARS, CRYSTAL - Defendant's Motion to Quash Service of Summons - HEARING REQUIRED
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