PAULEEN BAJWA & MCKELLAR ENTERPRISES vs RAS AUTOMOTIVE INC

Discussion

Defendants' Motion for Order Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 664.6 adjudicating that the case has settled and directing execution of a settlement agreement is DENIED for the reasons set forth below.

Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 664.6 provides a summary procedure for enforcement of a settlement only where the parties stipulate either orally before the court or in a writing signed by the parties. (See Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 664.6(a).)

Defendants rely on a series of text messages exchanged between Defendant Vik Randhawa and Sunny Bajwa in May and June 2024. The text messages submitted do not establish a writing signed by all parties to this action within the meaning of Sec. 664.6. The messages do not contain signatures or other sufficiently clear indicia that all parties adopted the texts as their electronic signatures for purposes of finalizing a settlement under Sec. 664.6. The record also reflects that the messages contemplated future drafting of a settlement agreement by counsel.

In addition, the present record does not establish that all material settlement terms were agreed upon in a form enforceable under Sec. 664.6. The text messages identify, at most, payment of $65,000 and delivery of a generator. The subsequent draft agreement and the parties' later communications reflect disputes concerning additional terms, including release language, dismissal procedures, timing and conditions of performance, and other substantive provisions. The Court may interpret terms to which the parties actually agreed, but it may not create material settlement terms. (See Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 809.)

The Court also notes Defendants' filing in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, of which judicial notice has been taken, stated that "[t]he parties were never able to resolve the disagreement over the language of the written settlement document" and that "[t]he agreement is therefore not yet executed." (Pl.'s RJN Ex. A, at pdf p. 9.) Those statements further undermine Defendants' request for relief under Sec. 664.6.

b) Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Answer Defendants ask to file a supplemental answer, contending, "The grounds for the motion are that the parties hereto in a series of texts negotiated a settlement of this action in June through November 2024 so that a trial of the original action is no longer appropriate and would be a waste of the courts judicial time." While leave to amend or supplement pleadings is liberally granted, the Court finds that Defendants have not acted with reasonable diligence.

Defendants contend that the parties reached a settlement in 2024, yet waited until 2026--after discovery closed and on the eve of dispositive motion practice and trial--to seek leave to assert that defense formally. Defendants' explanation does not adequately justify the delay, and the record reflects that Defendants continued to actively litigate the case during this period. Allowing the proposed supplemental answer at this stage would result in substantial prejudice to Plaintiff, including potential reopening of discovery and disruption of the trial schedule.

Furthermore, Defendants' evidentiary showing in support of the alleged settlement for this particular motion is inadequate, consisting largely of attorney argument rather than competent evidence from a party with personal knowledge. But even accepting the authenticity of the text exchanges (by looking to the Randhawa Declaration filed on April 1, 2026, verifying exhibits for the opposition to the motion for summary judgment), the agreement would still not be considered a legally enforceable contract. Defendant Randhawa's June 20, 2024 text response read in full, "65k offer accepted I will have my lawyer draft the settlement [sic]" (Randhawa 4/1/26 Decl. in Verifying Exhibits at Exh. 1, pdf p. 8 [emphasis added].)

Where one party "contends that the parties did not enter into a contract because they had not signed a final written agreement," the opposing party must prove "both of the following: [P.]

1. That the parties understood and agreed to the terms of the agreement; and [P.]

2. That the parties agreed to be bound before a written agreement was completed and signed." (CACI No. 306 [emphasis added].)

The ensuing text exchanges between the parties in November confirm that the parties did not intend to be bound before a written agreement was signed. (See Randhawa 4/1/26 Decl. Verifying Exhibits at Exh. 1, pdf p. 8.) Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.

c) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or Summary Adjudication Requests for Judicial Notice The parties' unopposed requests for judicial notice are GRANTED. The Court takes judicial notice of the existence and filing of the document, but not the truth of hearsay matters asserted therein except to the extent they constitute statements of a party in this proceeding. (See Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113; Arce v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 482-484; Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 752-761, as modified on denial of reh'g (Apr. 16, 2013); Valerio v. Andrew Youngquist Construction (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271, as modified (Dec. 3, 2002).)

The Parties' Objections Both sides have filed objections. Because the allegedly problematic evidence is immaterial to the Court's ruling, the Court declines to rule on the objections. (See Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 437c(q).)

Legal Standards A "party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact . . . ." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) "A prima facie showing is one sufficient to support the position of the party in question." (Id. at p. 851.) A plaintiff meets their burden "of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c(p)(1).) Once the plaintiff satisfies that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant, who must show "that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto." (Ibid.)

"Because of the drastic nature of the summary judgment procedure and the importance of safeguarding the adverse party's right to a trial, the moving party must make a strong showing. His affidavits are strictly construed and the opposing party's are liberally construed." (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038.) All doubts as to whether any material, triable issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment or adjudication. (Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 562.) Thus, evidence that is equivocal or from which conflicting inferences may be drawn is insufficient to meet the movant's burden. (Anderson v. Metalclad Insulation Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 297.)

In addition to moving for summary judgment, "[a] party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c(f)(1).) A motion for summary adjudication proceeds in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437(f)(2).)

Issue 1: Plaintiff is entitled to judgment on its claim for breach of contract (2nd cause of action) because Defendants breached the Modesto Sale and Purchase Agreement ("Modesto Agreement") when they failed to submit the necessary escrow documents as required and stated that they did not intend to perform, thereby damaging Plaintiff. "A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty." Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c(f)(1). A breach of contract claim "requires a showing of '(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.' [Citations.]" (D'Arrigo Bros. of California v. United Farmworkers of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 790, 800 [emphasis added].)

Here, Plaintiff's separate statement on Issue 1 completely fails to address damages. (See Pl.'s SUF Nos. 1-33.) "A plaintiff can obtain summary adjudication of a cause of action only by proving 'each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on that cause of action.' As damages are an element of a breach of contract cause of action [citation], a plaintiff cannot obtain judgment on a breach of contract cause of action in an amount of damages to be determined later." (Paramount Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 226, 241.) Because of the failure to address damages, the request for summary adjudication on Issue 1 fails.

Issue 2: Plaintiff is entitled to judgment on its claim for false promise, fraudulent inducement and false pretenses (first cause of action). In reliance on Defendants' assertion that Defendants would not perform the Modesto Agreement until Plaintiff executed a lease for Big O'Tires Sonora, although not legally required by the parties' written agreement, Plaintiff executed a lease for the Big O'Tires Sonora. Despite the lease, Defendants continued to refuse to consummate the Modesto Agreement. "The elements of promissory fraud (i.e., of fraud or deceit based on a promise made without any intention of performing it) are: (1) a promise made regarding a material fact without any intention of performing it; (2) the existence of the intent not to perform at the time the promise was made; (3) intent to deceive or induce the promisee to enter into a transaction; (4) reasonable reliance by the promisee; (5) nonperformance by the party making the promise; and (6) resulting damage to the promise." (Behnke v.

State Farm General Ins. Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1453 [emphases added].)

Plaintiff's argument on this cause of action again fails to address damages and therefore is insufficient to meet the initial burden for summary adjudication. (See Pl.'s SUF Nos. 34-41.) In addition, the element of intent is not addressed in the separate statement. To find in Plaintiff's favor on this issue, the Court would need to draw inferences in favor of the moving party, which is contrary to the legal standards governing summary judgment. (See supra.) Realistically, intent is heavily dependent on credibility determinations, and the Court may not weigh credibility when granting summary judgment or summary adjudication. (See Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.)

Issue 3: Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment on its claim for specific performance (third cause of action) because Defendants breached the Modesto Agreement, a real property transaction, for which monetary damages are insufficient. Despite Defendants' breach, Plaintiff was at all times ready, willing and able to perform the written contract. " 'Specific performance of a contract may be decreed whenever: (1) its terms are sufficiently definite; (2) consideration is adequate; (3) there is substantial similarity of the requested performance to the contractual terms; (4) there is mutuality of remedies; and (5) plaintiff's legal remedy is inadequate. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Union Oil Co. of California v.

Greka Energy Corp. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 129, 134.) For a commercial property, there is a rebuttable presumption "that the breach of an agreement to transfer real property cannot be adequately relieved by pecuniary compensation." (Civ. Code, Sec. 3387.) Defendants did not attempt to rebut that presumption.

With that noted, specific performance involves equitable considerations. Here, the Plaintiff has asked for both "damages in an amount subject to proof at trial" because of the breach of the Modesto Agreement (see Compl. P. 61) as well as specific performance (see Compl. P. 66). And again, in this motion, Plaintiff asked for judgment on the breach of contract cause of action as well as for specific performance. The dueling, mutually exclusive requests are self-defeating because they undermine the Court's ability to equitably find that only specific performance is sufficient to make Plaintiff whole. Consequently, the Court does not find it appropriate to grant specific performance based on summary adjudication.

Issue 4: Plaintiff is entitled to declaratory judgment (fourth cause of action) because the Modesto Agreement, which was fully executed on May 2, 2025, is valid and enforceable and clearly sets forth the parties' rights and obligations. The Court declines to summarily adjudicate this issue because it would not resolve any cause of action in the case. The Court declaring that the Modesto Agreement is "valid and enforceable" and "clearly sets forth the parties' rights and obligations" is not helpful. Neither party disputes the language in the Modesto Agreement itself. Rather, the question arises from outside the contract--i.e., from the alleged oral agreement regarding Sonoma. But this is not the issue that Plaintiff has articulated.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, is DENIED in its entirety.

CV-24-003630 - SYNCHRONY BANK vs MCELVAINE, TAYE - Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside and Vacate Default Judgment; Dismissing with Prejudice C.C.P. 473 - GRANTED, and unopposed. At Plaintiff's request and good cause existing, the Court finds that the default and default judgment entered by the Court on September 10, 2024, were obtained by extrinsic fraud and hereby sets aside and vacates same (Code of Civil Procedure 473 (d)). The Court also hereby dismisses this action with prejudice. The Court will sign the proposed order.

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA:

UD-26-000452 - GILMORE, MIKE vs SHUGARS, CRYSTAL - Defendant's Motion to Quash Service of Summons - HEARING REQUIRED