YANG vs LOYA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

24CV008747: YANG vs LOYA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Amended Motion to Compel Further Responses to Demands for Production, Set One in Department 16D

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Loya Casualty Insurance Company’s (“Loya”) motion to compel intervenor Chavez’s further responses to Requests for Production, Set One, and the production of responsive documents is ruled upon as follows.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties must at the time oral argument is requested notify the clerk and the opposing party of the specific discovery requests that will be addressed at the hearing. The parties are also reminded that pursuant to local rules, only limited oral argument is permitted on law and motion matters. ***

Both moving and opposing counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1110(b)(4).

Factual Background

This action arises out of a 2018 motor vehicle accident in which plaintiff Yang was injured by a vehicle driven by Mr. Chavez, an insured of Loya. Plaintiff Yang subsequently demanded Mr. Chavez’s $15,000 policy limits and after trial in April 2023, plaintiff was awarded over $1.7 Million in damages. The total outstanding judgment is now claimed to exceed $2.5 Million. In 2024, Mr. Chavez assigned to plaintiff Yang all claims and causes of action he had based on Loya’s failure to settle plaintiff’s claims within his policy limits, including claims or causes of action for “insurance protection, indemnification, breach of contract, negligence, fiduciary breach, Consumer Protection Act violations, violations of the [sic], bad faith, and attorneys fees.” (Compl., ¶8.)

The Court granted Mr. Chavez’s motion to intervene in October 2025 and in January 2026, the complaint in intervention was filed. In it, Mr. Chavez seeks inter alia recovery of non-assignable claims for emotional distress and punitive damages. Trial is currently set for 7/28/2026.

In January 2026, defendant Loya propounded a first set of Requests for Production to intervenor Chavez, consisting of 25 separate requests, responses to which were due in

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early March 2026. In late March 2026, intervenor Chavez served his untimely responses to same. At issue here are the latter’s responses to Request for Production Nos. 12-14 and 20, which seek the following:

12. All COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and any other PERSON (other than YOUR attorneys in this action) regarding the ACCIDENT.

13. All COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and any other PERSON (other than YOUR attorneys in this action) regarding the CLAIM.

14. All COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and any other PERSON (other than YOUR attorneys in this action) regarding the UNDERLYING ACTION.

20. All DOCUMENTS evidencing, constituting, or reflecting any agreement between YOU and Leslie Yang regarding any claims asserted by either of you against LOYA, including any agreements that relate to assignment of claims or allocation of recovery.

Intervenor Chavez’s untimely March 2026 responses to these four requests were essentially identical. In response to Request Nos. 12-14 and 20, he stated:

Responding Party is in possession of documents responsive to this request and will produce all documents pertaining to this request within Responding Party’s possession, custody, and control. See Exhibits A through N. Investigation and discovery are continuing. Responding Party reserves the right to supplement this response should additional information responsive to this demand become available.

His response to Request No. 20 similarly provided the following:

Responding Party is in possession of documents responsive to this request and will produce all documents pertaining to this request within Responding Party’s possession, custody, and control. See Exhibits [sic] N. Investigation and discovery are continuing. Responding Party reserves the right to supplement this response should additional information responsive to this demand become available.

Moving Papers. Defendant Loya claims it had no choice but to bring this motion due to intervenor Chavez’s refusal “to produce documents directly relevant to key issues in this case, including his financial interest in this case and his emotional distress claim.” (Mov. MPA, p.5:2-4.) According to the moving papers, Loya served requests seeking “basic documents, including any agreement between [plaintiff] Yang and Chavez about how

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they intend to allocate any recovery against Loya,” as well as other communications between them but Chavez has “refused to produce any of the requested documents or communications, arguing in meet-and-confer that they are privileged and irrelevant.” (Id., at p.5:16-21.) Loya emphasizes that Chavez “did not assert any objections” in response to the subject requests, resulting in their waiver but regardless, Loya maintains that “any agreement between Chavez and Yang is clearly not a privileged communication” and “evidence that Chavez will receive a cut of Yang’s damages is clearly relevant” to (1) Chavez’s emotional distress claim because it will show he is profiting from his involvement and (2) his credibility as a witness stemming from his financial stake in plaintiff Yang’s $1.75 million claim against Loya. (Id., at p.5:21-p.6:1.)

The moving papers further assert that Chavez has not even tried to explain how “his belated assertion of the common interest doctrine could apply to protect any of these documents from disclosure.” (Id., at p.6:1-3.) Defendant Loya also requests an award of $3,000 in monetary sanctions.

Opposition. Intervenor Chavez opposes, arguing that this motion should be denied because “it seeks relief far broader than the discovery statutes allow” and the dispute here “concerns, at most, two narrow categories [of documents]: (1) an alleged separate ‘allocation agreement’ that Chavez has represented does not exist, and (2) attorney communications between counsel for parties aligned in prosecuting claims against Loya.” (Opp., p.1:22-25.) The opposition further asserts that Loya is not entitled to an order compelling production of non-existent documents, nor may it use broadly worded requests for “communications” to obtain privileged attorney-client communications, attorney work product, litigation strategy, and common-interest materials exchanged by counsel for aligned parties. (Id., at p.1:26-p.2:1.)

The opposition concludes with its own request for “alternative relief,” asking that any relief granted here be limited to the following:

1. A verified supplemental response to RFP [sic] No. 20 confirming, after diligent search and reasonable inquiry, whether any separate allocation agreement exists and whether any nonprivileged responsive document is being withheld; 2. A privilege log for any documents withheld on the basis of attorney-client privilege, attorney work product, or common-interest protection, sufficient to identify the date, author, recipients, general subject matter, and asserted protection without revealing privileged content; and 3. If necessary, a targeted procedure for review of specific privilege-log entries after the parties meet and confer regarding any disputed entries. (Opp., pp.9-10.)

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According to intervenor Chavez, “[t]his limited approach protects Loya’s legitimate discovery interests while preserving privileged and work-product materials.” (Id., at p.10:6-7.) Chavez also contends monetary sanctions are not warranted here.

The Court finds that the opposition here consists solely of a single filed document that is 115 pages in length and is styled as “Intervenor Ernesto Chavez’s Opposition to Defendant Loya Casualty Insurance Company’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Demands for Production, Set One, and Request for Monetary Sanctions.” (See, Intervenor’s Opp., filed 5/27/2026.) Upon review, this document appears to be nothing more than a memorandum of points & authorities followed by several “exhibits” attached directly to the memorandum.

Importantly for ruling on the present motion, intervenor Chavez’s opposition does not include any declaration attesting to any facts at all or even a declaration which purports to authenticate any of the aforementioned “exhibits.” As a result, intervenor Chavez provides no admissible evidence whatsoever that even attempts to establish an adequate factual foundation for Chavez’s arguments that some or all of the documents encompassed by the Requests for Production at issue are privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure on the various grounds mentioned above (even if objections had been timely asserted in response to the Requests for Production at issue).

Also, while adding nothing to intervenor’s opposition in any event, the Court notes that the final “exhibit” attached to the opposition purports to be intervenor Chavez’s “First Amended Responses” to defendant Loya’s Request for Production Nos. 12-14 and 20, which document is dated 5/27/2026 and purports to assert a variety of previously unasserted objections to these four (4) requests as well as altering Chavez’s original statements of compliance included in his untimely March 2026 responses to Loya’s Requests for Production.

Again, while this “exhibit” adds nothing to intervenor’s opposition, even assuming arguendo such “First Amended Responses” were served on 5/27/2026, such service does not render the present motion to compel “moot” because as Code of Civil Procedure §1005.5 specifically provides that a motion is deemed made at the time it is filed and served and Chavez’s purported “First Amended Responses” could not have been served until well after this motion to compel was filed and served on 5/11/2026.

Reply. In the reply, defendant Loya asserts this motion should be granted because (1) no privileged communications or work product relating to litigation strategy are sought; (2) Request Nos. 12-14 clearly asked intervenor Chavez to produce “negotiations or communications” between his attorney and plaintiff Yang’s; (3) the terms of and communications regarding any potential allocation agreement are discoverable regardless of how they were memorialized; (4) negotiations about the assignment or allocation are “necessarily adverse, not protected by common interest, and do not reveal litigation strategy;” and (5) even if the common interest doctrine applied to such

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communications, Chavez waived the right to assert this doctrine by failing to timely object on such grounds and/or to provide a privilege log relative to the responsive documents.

General Legal Standards for Discovery

“[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. §2017.010.) “In the absence of contrary court order, a civil litigant’s right to discovery is broad...[and] statutes governing discovery ‘must be construed liberally in favor of disclosure unless the request is clearly improper by virtue of well-established causes for denial.’ [Citation.]” (Williams v.

Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541; see also Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 378 [“disclosure is a matter of right unless statutory or public policy considerations clearly prohibit it”].) Nevertheless, while civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless. (Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1039 [citing Calcor Space Facility v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223].) It cannot be based on pure speculation. (Digital Music News LLC v.

Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216, 227.)

The party seeking to resist discovery based upon objections has the burden to justify its objections. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255 [citing Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 220-221].) Indeed, in the discovery context, information is relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. [Citations omitted.] Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612 [emphasis in original].) “Any doubts regarding relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the discovery.” (Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98.)

Additionally, with respect to requests for production such as those at issue in this motion, Code of Civil Procedure §2031.310(a) provides:

On receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply: [¶] (1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete. [¶] (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate. [¶] (3) An objection in the response is without

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merit or too general.

To obtain further responses to requests for production, the initial burden is on the moving party to show both relevance to the subject matter and specific facts justifying discovery. (Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117; Code Civ. Proc. §2031.310 [requiring a showing of “good cause” for production of documents].) Once good cause is established by the moving party, the burden then shifts to the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure. (Hartbrodt v. Burke (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 168, 172-174.) The party asserting objections to discovery generally bears the burden of justifying and supporting the objections. (See, e.g., Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 549-550.)

Code of Civil Procedure §2031.320 separately authorizes a motion to compel compliance where a party has already agreed to provide in whole or in part the production of documents or other materials for inspection, copying, testing, etc. but thereafter fails to provide such production in accordance with that party’s earlier statement of compliance. Unlike a motion to compel further responses under §2031.310, a motion to compel compliance under §2031.320 does not require the moving party to “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” Instead, the moving party need only show the opposing party’s agreement to produce in whole or in part the documents or other materials sought by the request(s) and the opposing party’s failure to comply with such agreement to produce in whole or in part.

Discussion

Request Nos. 12-14. As noted above, these three requests are very similar in that they seek “[a]ll COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and any other PERSON (other than YOUR attorneys in this action) regarding the ACCIDENT,” “regarding the CLAIM,” and “regarding the UNDERLYING ACTION.” Likewise, intervenor Chavez’s (untimely) responses to these three requests were identical:

Responding Party is in possession of documents responsive to this request and will produce all documents pertaining to this request within Responding Party’s possession, custody, and control. See Exhibits A through N. Investigation and discovery are continuing. Responding Party reserves the right to supplement this response should additional information responsive to this demand become available.

While it appears the referenced “Exhibits A through N” were in fact produced to

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defendant Loya in compliance with Chavez’s responses to these three requests, defendant Loya asserts that intervenor Chavez’s production impermissibly excluded any and all communications between his attorneys and plaintiff Yang’s attorneys despite such communications being clearly responsive to these three requests and despite Chavez timely asserting no objection to the production of such communications.

First, the Court agrees that such communications between the attorneys for Chavez and plaintiff Yang are plainly responsive to these three requests and in fact, given the nature of these requests as being expressly limited to communications “regarding the ACCIDENT,” “the CLAIM,” and “the UNDERLYING ACTION,” it could be said that these three requests are primarily intended to obtain any and all communications which Chavez and Yang’s attorneys had relative to “the ACCIDENT,” “the CLAIM,” and “the UNDERLYING ACTION.” As such, any suggestion by the opposition that these three requests cannot or should not be construed as encompassing those communications exchanged between for counsel for Chavez and plaintiff Yang ignores the plain language of these requests and therefore, defies logic.

The Court also finds that such communications between the attorneys for Chavez and plaintiff Yang easily satisfy California’s liberal standard for discovery, including not only those matters which are themselves legally relevant to the subject matter of the pending litigation but also those matters which are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. As explained in the preceding section, a matter is (in the absence of a valid objection) relevant and subject to discovery if “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement,” regardless of its admissibility (Lipton v.

Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1611- 1612 [emphasis in original]) and any doubts regarding relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the discovery (Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at 98.) Additionally, the relevance and discoverability of such communications between the attorneys for Chavez and plaintiff Yang is heightened by the fact each of these requests is expressly limited to those communication which relate to “the ACCIDENT,” “the CLAIM,” and “the UNDERLYING ACTION,” all of which have a logical and indisputable bearing on the present litigation.

Moreover, defendant Loya has satisfied its initial burden of showing the “good cause” required by Code of Civil Procedure §2031.310(b) insofar as this burden is, in the absence of a legitimate claim of privilege or other protection from discovery, met by “a fact-specific showing of relevance” (see, e.g., TBG Insurance Services Corporation v. Superior Court (Zieminski) (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448) and the responsive communications is likely to show the existence and/or nature of any agreement between intervenor Chavez and plaintiff Yang with respect to the present litigation, the motivation

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for Chavez’s intervention and participation in this litigation, the nature and extent of damages Chavez may have suffered, and his credibility as a witness. Additionally, the fact that such communications are likely not available from other sources also tends to support the finding of “good cause” justifying these discovery requests.

According to the opposition, the communications responsive to Request Nos. 12-14 are “privileged attorney-client communications” and/or shielded from discovery as “attorney work product, litigation strategy, and common-interest materials exchanged by counsel for aligned parties” (Opp., p.1:26-p.2:1) and thus, further responses to these requests should not be compelled. These arguments fail for a variety of reasons.

First, according to the moving papers, intervenor Chavez failed to provide timely responses to defendant Loya’s Requests for Production and nowhere does the opposition appear to dispute this. And even if the opposition had disputed defendant’s contention that intervenor failed to timely respond and object to the Requests for Production, intervenor would have been required to supply admissible evidence of the same, which it did not do here. Thus, under Code of Civil Procedure §2031.300(a), intervenor Chavez is deemed to have waived any and all objections to all requests including Request Nos. 12-14, including objections purportedly based on privilege and on the protection for attorney work product.

While §2031.300(a) makes no specific mention of objections based on the protection of “litigation strategy” or “common-interest materials,” objections on such grounds and any other grounds are also deemed waived because no exception is specified for them. Notably, §2031.300(a) specifies the means by which Chavez could have sought relief from the statutory waiver of all objections to Request Nos. 12-14, but Chavez neither sought nor obtained such relief.

Second, aside from intervenor Chavez’s complete waiver of all objections by operation of law discussed in the preceding paragraph, it is undisputed that intervenor Chavez also did not attempt to assert any objections at all in his eventual but untimely responses to Request Nos. 12-14, much less any objection based on the protections for attorney-client communications, the attorney work product, “litigation strategy,” and/or “common-interest materials exchanged by counsel for aligned parties.” While doing so would not have avoided intervenor’s waiver of objections for failing to timely respond, such proposed objections could have been served in connection with a concurrent motion seeking relief from the waiver of objections. Again, the failure to assert any objections on these grounds amounts to a waiver of any protections from disclosure that may otherwise be available under California law and consequently, the Court need not consider in connection with Request Nos. 12-14 the opposition’s arguments about the communications between Chavez and Yang’s counsel being “privileged attorney-client communications” and/or shielded from discovery as “attorney work product, litigation

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strategy, and common-interest materials exchanged by counsel for aligned parties.” (Opp., p.1:26-p.2:1.)

Third, even if intervenor Chavez had timely asserted in response to Request Nos. 12-14 objections based on the protections for attorney-client communications, the attorney work product, “litigation strategy,” and/or “common-interest materials exchanged by counsel for aligned parties” (which intervenor failed to do), none of these alleged privileges or protections from disclosure justifies denial of this motion. As shown above, the party resisting discovery bears the burden of justifying its objection to the discovery (Fairmont Ins.

Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 255 [citing Coy v. Superior Court, supra, 58 Cal.2d at 220-221]) and more specifically, when a party seeks to avoid discovery based on privilege including the attorney-client privilege, that same party has the burden of showing those facts necessary to establish the existence of the privilege asserted (Venture Law Group v. Superior Court (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 96, 102; see also OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 874, 894 [party asserting privilege must present facts sufficient to make a prima facie showing privilege]).

Although the opposition proffers several arguments about why the “communications” sought by Request Nos. 12-14 are protected from discovery by virtue of the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work product doctrine, the opposition includes no evidence at all, much less admissible evidence sufficient to establish a proper factual foundation for this Court to conclude that any or all of the communications encompassed by Request Nos. 12-14 are indeed protected from disclosure based on either the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work product doctrine.

Thus, even if intervenor had asserted the same objections in a timely original response, intervenor’s opposition papers fail to satisfy his burden to justify these objections in response to the present motion. Without some preliminary evidentiary showing that the communications at issue fall within these asserted protections, this Court would remain unable to deny this motion based on Chavez’s assertion of either the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine.

With respect to the “common interest” doctrine on which intervenor Chavez relies, the moving papers correctly point out that a party seeking to rely on this doctrine does not satisfy its burden to justify a claim of privilege merely by showing that a confidential communication took place between parties who purportedly share a common interest. (OXY Resources California LLC, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at 890.) Instead, the party seeking to invoke the common interest doctrine “must first establish that the communicated information would otherwise be protected from disclosure by a claim of privilege. For example, the content of the communication may comprise information shared in confidence by a client with his or her attorney, a legal opinion formed and advice given by the lawyer in the course of the attorney-client relationship, or a writing

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reflecting an attorney's impressions, conclusions, or theories. [Citations.]” (Id.) Only if this threshold showing is made must the Court then consider whether there was any waiver of the protection by virtue of disclosing the information to a party outside the attorney-client relationship. (Id.) However, as already noted, intervenor Chavez has included in the opposition no declaration or other admissible evidence purporting to satisfy his initial burden with respect to the common interest doctrine claimed to shield from disclosure the communications responsive to Request Nos. 12-14.

Thus, even if intervenor had timely asserted such an objection (which he did not do), the opposition papers do not satisfy intervenor’s burden to justify this objection. Without first making a prima facie factual showing that the responsive communications are potentially protected under the common interest doctrine, intervenor Chavez’s bald assertion that these communications are beyond the scope of permissible discovery rings hollow and as a result, this Court remains unable to conclude that any or all of the communications responsive to Request Nos. 12-14 are not subject to disclosure by virtue of the common interest doctrine.

In the end, intervenor Chavez has for each of the foregoing reasons failed not only to carry his burden of justifying his purported objections to these requests but also to demonstrate sufficient grounds for an order denying this motion relative to these three requests, or any portion thereof. Consequently, the Court will grant this motion and order intervenor Chavez to provide further responses, without objections, to defendant Loya’s Request Nos. 12-14.

Furthermore, because (1) intervenor Chavez’s initial late-March 2026 responses to Request Nos. 12-14 asserts no objections at all and unqualifiedly states he “will produce all documents” in his possession, custody or control which are responsive to these requests; (2) intervenor Chavez has failed to substantiate his belated assertions that additional responsive communications between his and plaintiff Yang’s attorneys are actually protected from discovery as “privileged attorney-client communications” and/or “attorney work product, litigation strategy, and common-interest materials exchanged by counsel for aligned parties;” and (3) trial is currently set for 7/28/2026, the Court shall also order intervenor Chavez to produce any and all additional responsive communications in his possession, custody or control to defendant Loya.

Request No.

20. This request seeks “[a]ll DOCUMENTS evidencing, constituting, or reflecting any agreement between YOU and Leslie Yang regarding any claims asserted by either of you against LOYA, including any agreements that relate to assignment of claims or allocation of recovery.” In his response to this request, intervenor Chavez stated:

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Responding Party is in possession of documents responsive to this request and will produce all documents pertaining to this request within Responding Party’s possession, custody, and control. See Exhibits [sic] N. Investigation and discovery are continuing. Responding Party reserves the right to supplement this response should additional information responsive to this demand become available.

According to defendant Loya’s moving separate statement, an “allocation agreement” between intervenor Chavez and plaintiff Yang exists but Chavez has refused to produce it despite asserting no objections at all in response to Request No.

20. Defendant Loya asserts that intervenor Chavez initially indicated he was “not aware of any separate ‘allocation agreement’ document” but then argued that such an agreement was “not relevant,” while also refusing to produce any “communications, discussions, or negotiations regarding allocation.” Defendant Loya claims that more recently, Chavez has insisted no allocation agreement exists but this is inconsistent with plaintiff Yang’s own statement that “[a]ny agreements pertaining to allocation of recovery will not be produced.” Additionally, Loya points out that Request No. 20 is not limited to the “allocation agreement” if any but also encompasses “[a]ll DOCUMENTS evidencing, constituting, or reflecting [such an] agreement” (underline added for emphasis), thereby justifying a further response to this request and the production of all additional responsive documents.

The moving separate statement further contends that intervenor Chavez cannot now argue the documents responsive to Request No. 20 are “not relevant” given that he timely asserted no objection on such ground and that an allocation agreement would in any event be “directly relevant to numerous key issues in the case” including Chavez’s own claim of emotional distress from the underlying judgment against him as well as his credibility as a witness against Loya. Likewise, defendant Loya argues that Chavez’s belated assertion that the allocation agreement is protected from disclosure by virtue of the attorney-client privilege, attorney work product doctrine, and/or common interest doctrine fails because Chavez failed to timely assert any objection on such grounds and such objections would not apply to the documents responsive to Request No.

20.

Although the points & authorities in opposition assert that no “allocation agreement” exists, again the Court finds no evidentiary support for this assertion. As already discussed, the opposition includes no declaration or other admissible evidence to support Chavez’s assertion that no “allocation agreement” exists and thus, this Court is not bound by this unsubstantiated claim. Regardless, as pointed out by defendant Loya, Request No. 20 is not by its own terms limited to an “allocation agreement” but it instead encompasses any and all documents “evidencing, constituting, or reflecting” such an

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agreement. Therefore, to the extent intervenor Chavez’s response to Request No. 20 may be limited to the existence or nonexistence of an “allocation agreement” itself without regard to the existence of any and all documents “evidencing, constituting, or reflecting” such an agreement, it is evasive and incomplete so as to warrant a further response.

To the extent an “allocation agreement” may exist between intervenor Chavez and plaintiff Yang, the former cannot here argue that such agreement is beyond the scope of permissible discovery because it is “not relevant.” First, as discussed above in connection with Request Nos. 12-14, intervenor Chavez failed to provide timely responses to defendant Loya’s Requests for Production and this alone operated as statutory waiver of any and all objections to all of the requests including Request No. 20 pursuant to the express terms of Code of Civil Procedure §2031.300(a). Second, intervenor Chavez’s untimely response to Request No. 20 in late March 2026 did not even purport to assert any objection at all, much less one based on relevance, nor has Chavez either sought or obtained relief from the waiver of objections to Request No.

20. Third, aside from the failure to timely assert any objection to Request No. 20, the Court finds that the responsive documents are either legally relevant to the various issues in this case or otherwise reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence inasmuch as the responsive documents are likely to bear on the nature and extent of Chavez’s own emotional distress claim as well as his credibility as a witness at trial. Additionally, the responsive documents can be anticipated to assist defendant Loya in evaluating its case, preparing for trial and/or facilitating a settlement, regardless of the responsive documents’ admissibility at trial.

Finally, to the extent the opposition can be construed as suggesting that all documents responsive to Request No. 20 are shielded from discovery based on the protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege, attorney work product doctrine, and/or common interest doctrine, such assertion must be rejected for the same reasons discussed above in connection with Request Nos. 12-14 including but not limited to (1) intervenor Chavez’s failure to timely assert in response to Request No. 20 any objection on any of these grounds which therefore constitutes a waiver of all objections; and (2) even if such objections had been timely asserted, the opposition provides no declaration or other admissible evidence sufficient to establish the factual prerequisites necessary to substantiate any of these objections as required by intervenor’s burden.

As intervenor Chavez has failed to timely assert any objection to Request No. 20 and has also failed to provide the foundational facts necessary to substantiate the opposition’s argument that the documents responsive to this request of protected from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege, attorney work product doctrine, and/or

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV008747: YANG vs LOYA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Amended Motion to Compel Further Responses to Demands for Production, Set One in Department 16D

common interest doctrine, the Court will grant this motion and order intervenor Chavez to provide a further response, without objections, to defendant Loya’s Request No.

20. Additionally, for essentially the same reasons cited in connection with Request Nos. 12- 14, the Court also orders intervenor Chavez to produce to defendant Loya any and all other documents responsive to Request No.

20.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, Defendant Loya Casualty Insurance Company’s (“Loya”) motion to compel intervenor Chavez’s further responses to Requests for Production, Set One, along with the production of all remaining responsive documents is GRANTED.

Intervenor Chavez shall provide verified further responses, without objections, to defendant Loya’s Request Nos. 12-14 and 20, along with any and all additional responsive documents in his possession, custody or control, no later than 6/19/2026 (unless defendant Loya agrees to a later date memorialized in writing).

To the extent moving defendant may contend intervenor Chavez’s further responses to Request Nos. 12-14 and 20 and/or production of additional responsive documents are deficient for any reason, defendant may file and serve an appropriate motion only after completing the requisite meet-and-confer process “either in person, by telephone, or by videoconference,” as now expressly required by the recently amended provisions of Code of Civil Procedure §2016.040(a). (Bold added for emphasis.)

Defendant Loya’s request for monetary sanctions is DENIED. Although intervenor Chavez’s opposition papers were insufficient to defeat the present motion, the Court finds the opposition was nevertheless substantially justified under the circumstances so as to not warrant the imposition of sanctions here.

Moving party to provide notice of this ruling and file proof of service of same within five (5) court days.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)