Demurrer to Plaintiff Shawn Skillern MD’s Second Amended Complaint
2025CUBC052305: SHAWN SKILLERN, MD vs JAMES TURKEN, et al. 06/09/2026 in Department 21 Demurrer to Plaintiff Shawn Skillern MD's Second Amended Complaint
Tentative Rulings. Parties and counsel appearing for oral argument should address the tentative decision. Parties may submit on the tentative decision by email, with a copy to all other parties in the matter, to courtroom21@ventura.courts.ca.gov before 8:00 a.m. on the day set for the hearing, with a subject line that includes SUBMISSION ON TENTATIVE, Case Number, Title and Party. If fewer than all parties submit on the tentative, the hearing will proceed, and the tentative ruling is subject to change. The clerk cannot advise if you should still appear or not. The decision of whether to appear for a hearing is to be made by the parties and their counsel. (Dept. 21 Rules & Procedures, p. 4, § II.I.)
The following is a statement of the Courts tentative ruling. The Court may adopt, modify or reject the tentative ruling after hearing. The tentative ruling has no legal effect unless and until adopted by the Court.
Motion: By Defendant James Turken (Turken) and Defendant/Cross-Complainant Norton Rose Fulbright (Defendant or NRF) (collectively, Defendants):
(1) Demurrer to the SAC (opposed)
Tentative Ruling:
Defendants request for judicial notice is GRANTED. (Evid. Code, § 452.) Judicial notice is taken of the original complaint and the first amended Complaint.
Defendants demurrer is OVERRULED. Sufficient facts are stated to support the second cause of action for breach of contract.
Defendants to answer the Second Amended Complaint within 10 days.
Defendants to give notice of this Courts ruling.
Discussion:
Judicial Notice
Defendants request judicial notice of the original complaint and the first amended complaint. These items are subject to judicial notice. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) Judicial notice may be taken of the existence of documents in the courts file, but not hearsay statements set forth therein; rather, judicial notice may only be taken of the existence of the records, the fact that they contain certain statements, the truth of the Courts factual findings (that are the result of an
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2025CUBC052305: SHAWN SKILLERN, MD vs JAMES TURKEN, et al.
adversarial hearing) and rulings, and the dates when the records were filed. (See Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882.)
Accordingly, Defendants request for judicial notice is GRANTED.
Demurrer
The moving party demurs to the second cause of action for breach of contract pursuant to section 430.10, subdivision (e).
The elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiffs performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendants breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff. (Reichert v. General Ins. Co. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 822, 830.)
The first element of a cause of action for breach of contract is the existence of a contract. The Court previously sustained the demurrer to the first cause of action solely due to the failure to allege the existence of a contract. Plaintiff corrected this omission in the FAC. Via the demurrer to the FAC the Court found that the terms of the alleged oral and written modifications were missing.
Now, as correctly stated by Plaintiff, the SAC states a claim for breach of contract against NRF based on the same overbilling theory that the Court already found sufficient.1 In the SAC, Plaintiff continues to plead facts related to overbilling. Plaintiff describes charging higher rates than promised, increasing rates in violation of the agreement, charging for clerical and secretarial functions at attorney rates, duplicative charges, and overbilling/issuing inflated bills. (SAC, ¶ 37.) These allegations are sufficient to plead the terms of the modification and breach.
Next, the SAC is not a sham pleading. If anything, the SAC appears to do what the Court asked essentially clarify the alleged oral modifications. As noted in the opposition The SAC explains that Turken made his oral promise in or around February 2021, prior to and as an inducement for SKILLERNs decision to continue his representation through NRF. (Exhibit 2 at ¶ 37.) That is a personal, pre-engagement assumption of an obligation, made on independent consideration personal to Turken (i.e. Plaintiff agreed to follow Turken rather than seek other counsel (Id. at ¶ 38.) This appears to be sufficient for purposes of demurrer.
Further, the arguments made as to Turken are not persuasive. As argued in the opposition The facts alleged in the SAC support this conclusion at the time of the February 2021 promise. The relationship being negotiated was personal between Plaintiff and Turken. Plaintiff was Turkens client at Greenspoon Marder before NRF was involved. (Exhibit 2 at ¶¶ 9-10.). Turken then made his offer to Plaintiff, which asked Skillern to leave Greenspoon Marder and follow Turken as his client. (Id.) This promise was framed personally: if SKILLERN agreed to remain with TURKEN as his client at NRF, TURKEN would ensure the discounted rates. (Id. at ¶ 37.) The request was to stay with Turken individually, the consideration ran personally through Turken, 1 As noted in the previous demurrer Melican v. Regents of University of California (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168
stated that [i]t is well settled a pleader must state with certainty the facts constituting a breach of contract. ([Citations].) (Melican v. Regents of University of California (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 174, emphasis added.)
2025CUBC052305: SHAWN SKILLERN, MD vs JAMES TURKEN, et al.
and Plaintiffs obligation was to follow Turken and retain Turken. (Id. at ¶ 38.) On demurrer, these allegations must be accepted as true, and they describe a personal promise. This argument is compelling.
Finally, the Court notes that the argument relating to the integration clause (and the agent argument) should not be considered again as they were previously raised and not found to be persuasive. Even if the Court were inclined to considered the arguments again, a valid argument has been made that Turkens prior promise is a collateral/independent agreement that is not excluded.
In sum, the facts stated are sufficient to support the cause of action for breach of contract. Thus, the demurrer is overruled.
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