CITADEL 29, LP vs WILLIFORD, et al.

26CV002655: CITADEL 29, LP vs WILLIFORD, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 8D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to “Public Notice – Civil Division – Wednesday Law and Motion Calendar” any oral arguments regarding this tentative ruling will be heard in Department 8D, located at 500 G Street, Sacramento, CA, the Hon. Julie G. Yap presiding. Should argument be requested by either party, the requesting party must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615, by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing, request the hearing, and notify the opposing party of the location and time of hearing pursuant to Local Rule 1.06.

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26CV002655: CITADEL 29, LP vs WILLIFORD, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 8D

or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 25 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION****

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant CSAA Insurance Exchange’s (“Defendant”) Demurrer to Plaintiff Citadel 29, LP’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint is ruled upon as follows.

Factual Background

This action arises out of an apartment fire which occurred at 2929 Edison Avenue, Sacramento, California 95821 (“the Property”) a multi-family apartment complex owned by Plaintiff. (Compl., ¶¶ 8, 10-11.) The complaint alleges that on July 10, 2025, Defendant Lennifer Detrice Williford’s ex-husband may have started a fire (or caused a fire to start) on Defendant Williford’s patio. (Compl., ¶¶ 10-17.) Defendant Williford maintained a liability insurance policy with Defendant at the time of the fire. (Compl., ¶ 3.) Following the fire, Plaintiff made a claim to Defendant CSAA. (Compl., ¶ 22.) However, Defendant refused to tender policy limits. (Compl., ¶ 23.)

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges causes of action for breach of contract against Defendant Williford, negligence against Defendant Williford, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against Defendant CSAA Insurance.

Defendant now demurs to the entire action on the ground that there has been a misjoinder of parties and to Plaintiff’s third cause of action on the ground that the cause of action fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.

Plaintiff opposes.

Legal Standard

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV002655: CITADEL 29, LP vs WILLIFORD, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 8D

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.)

A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. §452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111- 1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318; William S.

Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1616, fn. 2.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . . we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action – not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

Discussion

Defendant demurs to the entire action on the grounds that a plaintiff may not sue both the insurer and the insured in the same action, citing to Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 23 Cal.3d 880, 891. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the cases cited by Defendant do not stand for the proposition that an insurer cannot be joined with the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV002655: CITADEL 29, LP vs WILLIFORD, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 8D

insured, as the cases pertain to claims brought by third-party claimants that lacked contractual privity with the insurer. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that it is an additional insured on the policy and thus, within contractual privity with Defendant.

The California Supreme Court in Royal Globe Ins. Co. held:

Finally, we agree with defendant that plaintiff may not sue both the insurer and the insured in the same lawsuit. Section 1155 of the Evidence Code provides that evidence of insurance is inadmissible to prove negligence or wrongdoing. The obvious purpose of the provision is to prevent the prejudicial use of evidence of liability insurance in an action against an insured. (See, e.g., Citti v. Bava (1928) 204 Cal. 136, 139 [266 P. 954]; Rising v. Veatch (1931) 117 Cal.App. 404, 406 [3 P.2d 1023].) A joint trial against the insured for negligence and against the insurer for violating its duties under subdivision (h) would obviously violate both the letter and spirit of the section.

(Ibid.)

The Second District Court of Appeals clarified in Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co., Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 193 with respect to plaintiffs that are not strangers to the insurance policy:

A practice guide explains why an insured and insurer usually may not be sued in the same action. “Generally, an insurer may not be joined as a party-defendant in the underlying action against the insured by the injured third party. The fact that an insurer has agreed to indemnify the insured for any judgment rendered in the action does not make the insurer a proper party. Liability insurance is not a contract for the benefit of the injured party so as to allow it to sue the insurer directly.” (Emphasis deleted.) (Croskey, et al., Cal.

Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation (The Rutter Group 2001) ¶ 15.44.) Ocean, which is not an injured third party, is suing Ranger for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant. An additional insured has standing to sue an insurer for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant. (Id., at ¶ 12:56; San Diego Housing Com. v. Industrial Indemnity Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 526, 536, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 393.)

Ranger cites no cases in which Royal Globe's holding has been applied to other than an injured third party claimant nor any case in which a suit by an additional insured against an insured and the insurer was found to be a misjoinder. Respondent cites Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Mazon (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 862, 865, 204 Cal.Rptr. 885 and Zahn v. Canadian Indem. Co. (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV002655: CITADEL 29, LP vs WILLIFORD, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 8D

509, 513–514, 129 Cal.Rptr. 286 in support of its proposition that an insurer may not be joined in an action against the insured. Both those cases involved a bad faith claim by an injured third-party claimant under a policy issued to the alleged tortfeasor. In the case at bar, the injured third party claimants would be the tenants, who are no longer involved as a settlement was reached with them. If Ocean is an additional insured, then it is a first party.

(Id., at p. 200.)

The court in Royal Surplus noted that the complaint gave rise to two possibilities for liability: (1) either the defendant failed to obtain insurance as required by contract; or (2) the insurer failed to defend and indemnify the plaintiff. (Id. at p. 202.) The Court concluded that there might be prejudice to the insured if the insurer remains in the action, but there might be possible prejudice to the owner/Plaintiff if it was not. (Id. at p. 203.) However, the Court concluded that the most of the issues alleges against the insurer and the insured concerned coverage issues and that these issues were “inextricably intertwined.” As such, while the Court acknowledged that there was a degree of prejudice to the insurer, if the issues were litigated separately, two different juries may come to different results. (Id., at pp. 202-203.)

As such, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling that sustained the demurrer on the grounds of misjoinder. (Id. at p. 204.)

Here, unlike in Royal Surplus, Plaintiff does not allege potential liability against Defendant Williford for her failure to obtain sufficient insurance coverage. Further, it does not appear that the primary dispute against both defendants arises from coverage issues. As such, unlike in Royal Surplus, there is no real prejudice to Plaintiff should the bad faith action follow its case against Defendant Williford. While the Court does not find that the caselaw establishes definitively that Plaintiff may not bring an action against both Defendant Williford and her insurer in the same action, the Court also does not find that the claims against the two defendants are so inextricably intertwined that they could not proceed separately.

As in Royal Surplus, there is some degree of prejudice to Defendant by permitting litigation to proceed against it in the same case as the underlying issues relating to causation for the fire.

Plaintiff cites to Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 304 and Century Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 922, 949 in support of its proposition that where some contractual privity exists, joinder is proper. However, the allegations in the operative Complaint do not allege such contractual privity. Specifically, while Plaintiff points to Exhibit 1 to the Complaint, the Lease between Plaintiff and Defendant Williford, and the provision that Plaintiff was required to maintain a renter’s or

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV002655: CITADEL 29, LP vs WILLIFORD, et al. 06/08/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 8D

liability insurance policy that names Plaintiff as an additional insured, Plaintiff fails to allege that such a policy exists or the terms of such a policy to support contractual privity or a cause of action based on such alleged contractual privity.

Therefore, based on the foregoing, the Court will SUSTAIN Defendant’s demurrer, with leave to amend.

Disposition

As set forth above, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s third cause of action is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend.

Plaintiff may file and serve an amended complaint no later than June 18, 2026. Although not required by statute or court rule, Plaintiff is directed to present the clerk a copy of this ruling at the time of filing the First Amended Complaint. Defendant may file and serve a response within 30 days of service of the First Amended Complaint, 35 days if served by mail.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.