Kara Sterritt vs. Centerfolds Gold Club

Opposing counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1354(b), expressly prohibiting objections to evidence from being “restated or reargued in the separate statement.”

Opposing counsel failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(f)(4), which requires that “electronic exhibits must include electronic bookmarks with links to the first page of each exhibit and with bookmark titles that identify the exhibit number or letter and briefly describe the exhibit.”

Factual Background

This action arises out of Plaintiffs’ alleged employment with Centerfolds Dancers Inc., dba Centerfolds Gold Club (“Defendant”). Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendant on May 5, 2021. Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendant who allege Defendant: (1) discriminated against them based on race in violation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA); (2) committed hostile work environment harassment based on race/national origin in violation of the FEHA; (3) violated Labor Code section 226 (inaccurate wage statements); (4) violated Labor Code sections 200- 204 (waiting time penalties); (5) violated Labor Code section 226.8 (misclassification); (6) violated Labor Code sections 221 and 225.5 (unlawful withholding of wages; (7) failed to pay Plaintiffs minimum wage; (8) violated Labor Code section 351 (unlawful tip pooling; and (9) failed to pay overtime.

Plaintiffs also assert a cause of action for penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”). Plaintiff also allege violations of Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq.

On January 19, 2022, the Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer, without leave to amend on Plaintiffs’ fifth, sixth, eighth, and tenth causes of action. (1/19/2022 Minute Order.)

This matter is currently set for trial on July 13, 2026.

Moving Papers. Plaintiffs move for summary adjudication on the grounds that no meritorious affirmative defense exists with respect to their fifth cause of action for misclassification, and there is no genuine dispute as to any material facts as to the specified affirmative defenses. In support, Plaintiffs present Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) Nos. 1-48.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00300185-CU-OE-GDS: Kara Sterritt vs. Centerfolds Gold Club 05/06/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 8D

In Plaintiffs’ separate statement of undisputed material days, Plaintiffs list out three issues for summary adjudication. However, none of these issues are identified in Plaintiffs’ notice of motion, as required by CRC Rule 3.1350(b) and (h). Plaintiff’s notice of motion identifies as the sole ground for summary adjudication “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material facts as to the specified affirmative defenses, and Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Accordingly, as Plaintiffs have failed to identify the issues presented for summary adjudication in their notice of motion, the Court will treat all 48 of Plaintiffs’ UMFs as presented in support of Plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication. As such, the existence of a single triable issue of material fact in connection with any of UMF Nos. 1- 48 will mandate denial of the entire motion.[1] (See Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506, 522 [“Because a dispute as to any one of these facts means there was a dispute as to a concededly material fact, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.”]; see also Gonzales v.

Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1546 [noting that there is sound reason for the rule that adjudication of particular issues or sub-issues must be clear in the motion as “the opposing party may have decided to raise only one triable issue of fact in order to defeat the motion, without intending to concede the other issues” and “[i]t would be unfair to grant a summary adjudication order unless the opposing party was on notice that an issue-by-issue adjudication might be ordered if summary judgment was denied”].)

Opposition. Defendant opposes, arguing that there is a triable issue of fact regarding whether Gold Club Centerfolds was Plaintiffs’ employer because: (1) Plaintiffs did not provide labor or services “for remuneration” within the meaning of Labor Code section 2775(b)(1); (2) Plaintiffs performed in 2019, after the ruling in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903, but before AB 5 took effect, and thus the governing standard is S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341 (“Borello”); (3) Labor Code section 2776 removes the business-to-business exception from the ABC test; (4) the fine artist exception of Labor Code section 2778 provides an additional independent basis for applying Borello; (5) Labor Code section 2775(b)(3) provides that where the ABC test “cannot be applied to a particular context,” classification “shall instead be governed by” Borello; and (6) Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the ABC test.

Standards for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

In ruling on a motion for summary adjudication, the Court engages in a three-step process. First, the issues framed by the pleadings must be identified since the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00300185-CU-OE-GDS: Kara Sterritt vs. Centerfolds Gold Club 05/06/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 8D

pleadings themselves define the scope of what may be addressed via a motion for summary adjudication (FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382) and the evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to such a motion may not create triable issues beyond the scope of the pleadings, nor are they a substitute for filing amended pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its initial burden of production. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(1) explains that a plaintiff or crosscomplainant moving for summary adjudication “[meets] his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action” and only when “the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden” does the burden shift to the defendant or cross-defendant “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” A party opposing summary adjudication has no evidentiary burden unless the moving party has first met his/her initial burden. (Binder v.

Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; see also Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1151-1152; Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085-1086.)

Only where the moving party makes the requisite initial showing does a court need to examine the opposition papers to determine if the latter demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment/adjudication. (Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) The opposing party must present admissible evidence and may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleading. (Id.)

In ruling on the motion, a court must construe the evidence of the opposing party liberally and that of the moving party strictly, resolving any doubts in the opposing party’s favor. (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874; Cortez v. Vogt (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 917, 925-926; see also, Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Brown v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. One of these differences is found in CRC Rule 3.1350(b), which mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1) provides in its entirety:

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for [punitive] damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for [punitive] damages, or an issue of duty.

(Underline added for emphasis.)

Finally, before turning to the specific issues raised by this motion and the oppositions, the Court reminds the parties of the “Golden Rule” of summary judgment/adjudication: “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (See, Zimmerman, Rosenfeld v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 (italics in original).) Moreover, according to Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Nazir, at 252 (citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1).)

That said, the Court now turns to the specific contentions advanced in support of and opposition to this motion for summary adjudication.

Objections to Evidence

Defendant’s objections to Plaintiffs’ evidence are ruled upon as follows:  Objection nos. 1-3 to the declaration of Crystal Mohsin are sustained; objection no. 4 is overruled.  Objections nos. 1-2 to the declaration of Kara Sterritt are sustained to the extent the asserted statements made are being offered for the truth of the matter asserted; objection no. 3 is sustained to the extent facts are asserted upon information and belief without a basis for personal knowledge; objection no.4 is overruled.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00300185-CU-OE-GDS: Kara Sterritt vs. Centerfolds Gold Club 05/06/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 8D

 Objection no. 1 to the declaration of Essence Dews is sustained to the extent facts are asserted upon information and belief without a basis for personal knowledge; objection nos. 2 is overruled to the extent that it is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; objection no. 3 is overruled.

Defendant’s objection to the evidence attached to the reply brief filed by Plaintiff Dews on February 27, 2026 is sustained. The Court will not consider these exhibits, or any arguments made in connection thereto, as it is generally improper to introduce evidence on reply. (See Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(b)(4) [“The reply shall not include any new evidentiary matter, additional material facts, or separate statement submitted with the reply and not presented in the moving papers or opposing papers.”].)

Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice is denied as the subject documents are not the proper subjects of judicial notice. Even if they were, judicial notice of exhibits would be limited to their existence and would not extend to their contents. (See, e.g., Steed v. Department of Consumer Affairs (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 112, 120-121; Bach v. McNelis (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 852, 865 [“There exists a mistaken notion that this means taking judicial notice of the existence of facts asserted in every document of a court file, including pleadings and affidavits. ... A court may take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, but can only take judicial notice of the truth of facts asserted in documents such as orders, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and judgments.” (See also, Evid. Code §§ 450, 451, 452.)

Defendant’s unopposed request for judicial notice is granted for the purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (See Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d); see also Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein].)

Discussion

Plaintiffs move for summary adjudication of their fifth cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 226.8.

Plaintiffs’ Initial Burden. The threshold question here is whether the moving papers are sufficient to meet Plaintiffs’ initial burden under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) and if not, summary adjudication must be denied regardless of whether the opposition presented evidence showing a triable issue of material fact.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00300185-CU-OE-GDS: Kara Sterritt vs. Centerfolds Gold Club 05/06/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 8D

UMF No. 1 states that Plaintiff Kara Sterritt (“Sterritt”) “an African American woman, began her employment with” Defendant “or about November 1, 2018.” The cited deposition of Sterritt makes no reference to her race. Further, the cited testimony does not refer to employment with Defendant; rather, Plaintiff testified that she “got a position at another strip club” and started dancing there in November. (Sterritt Dep. At 29:19- 30:4.) Therefore, the Court is not persuaded that UMF No. 1 is actually supported by the evidence cited by Plaintiffs. The Court notes that while not dispositive, the cited testimony provides that Sterritt started work in November, but makes no reference to the date.

Similarly, UMF No. 2 states that Plaintiff Essence Dews (“Dews”) “an African American woman, began her employment with” Defendant “on or about August 31, 2019.” The cited deposition testimony of Dews states that she “dance[d] at Centerfolds” “in 2019.” The Court is not persuaded that the evidence cited establishes either Dews’ race, employment, or that she started on or about August 31, 2019.

UMF No. 3 provides that William Shelton is a manager for Defendant. The cited testimony does not support the statement that Mr. Shelton is a manager. Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded that the entirety of UMF No. 3 is supported by the cited evidence.

UMF No. 4 states that Mark Boyles is the CEO for Defendant. However, the cited testimony does not provide that Mr. Boyles holds such a position. Similarly, UMF Nos. 5 and 11 refer to Mr. Boyles as CEO, with no evidence supporting this assertion. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently supported the assertion the Mr. Boyles is the CEO for Defendant, and thus UMF Nos. 4, 5, and 11 are also not sufficiently supported.

UMF No. 7 states that Jason Brush is the general manager for Defendant, but cites to no evidence which supports this claim. Plaintiffs’ separate statement further asserts that Mr. Brush is the general manager with respect to UMF Nos. 8, 30, 31, 38, and 41, which are similarly unsupported.

UMF No. 9 asserts that Eric Lee is a manager for Defendant, but as with the above UMFs, does not provide any testimony supporting this claim. UMF No. 10 makes this same assertion without supporting evidence. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently establish the entirety of these UMFs for the purposes of their initial burden.

UMF 11 states that “Mark Boyles, could not recall a single night when the club operated

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00300185-CU-OE-GDS: Kara Sterritt vs. Centerfolds Gold Club 05/06/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 8D

without dancers.” The cited testimony of Mr. Boyles states that it was possible that there might be some nights where there are no dancers. Based on this explicit testimony, the Court finds that UMF No. 11 is not supported by the cited evidence.

UMF No. 15 relies entirely upon Exhibit H in support. As noted above, the Court has denied Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice, including as to Exhibit H. Accordingly, UMF No. 15 is without evidentiary support.

Similarly, UMF No. 16 relies entirely upon Exhibits I and J, which were also the subjects of Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice, which the Court denied. This UMF is also without any evidentiary support. The Court notes that Plaintiffs provide no information regarding when the purported advertisements were collected.

UMF No. 20 states that “Centerfolds retains exclusive ownership of all images, sounds, and performances and, as such, has the unrestricted right to film, photograph, record, or otherwise capture Plaintiffs’ image, voice, and/or performance, without compensation to Plaintiffs,” citing to the “Performance License Agreement” signed by Plaintiffs. The agreement states that Defendant “may film, photograph, video or otherwise record Licensee's image, voice, and/or performances, and expressly agrees thereto and transfers and assigns to CDI and The Gold Club exclusive ownership of such images, sounds, and performances, and all rights thereto.” (Ex.

K, p. 9.) The Court is not persuaded that the language of the agreement provides Defendant with the unrestricted right to film or record Plaintiffs, for example outside of the club. Nor does the agreement state that Defendant “retains exclusive ownership of all images, sounds, and performances,” with no limitation as to time or place. The Court finds that the evidence presented does not support the text of UMF No. 20 as drafted and submitted to the Court.

UMF No. 32 provides that Plaintiffs regularly tipped the bouncers and DJs at the end of their shifts, “amounting to approximately twenty (20) percent of their earned tips from that shift.” However, the testimony of Sterritt cited in support provides that the 20% was paid out to the manager, not the bouncer/DJ. Dews’ deposition testimony refers only to bouncers, and Dews’ declaration further states that the tips to “DJs, bouncers, and house moms” amounted to about 20%. Accordingly, the evidence presented does not support the entirety of UMF No.

32.

UMF No. 33 identifies a witness, Eric Gerber as a security guard for Defendant from 2018-2019. The cited testimony does not establish that Mr. Gerber was a security guard for Defendant from 2018-2019. Accordingly, this UMF is without sufficient support. UMF No. 34 again identifies Mr. Gerber as a security guard for Defendant, but does not

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00300185-CU-OE-GDS: Kara Sterritt vs. Centerfolds Gold Club 05/06/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 8D

provide evidence supporting this claim. Therefore, this UMF is without sufficient evidentiary support.

UMF No 39 states that “Centerfolds managed how long dancers stayed in the locker room, and dancers were only allowed to be in the locker room for a little bit of time. If dancers spent too long in the locker room, Centerfolds would send someone to the locker room and tell them to get on the floor or leave.” In support, Plaintiffs cite to the depositions of Mr. Brush and Dews, and the declaration of Sterritt. The deposition of Mr. Brush states that if a dancer was “often in the back of the club,” and it was “a constant thing,” they would be asked “why they’re here, you know, why would you be paying money?” The cited pages from the deposition of Dews (pp. 205-206) are not included in Plaintiffs’ compendium of evidence.

The declaration of Sterritt states that dancers would be told to go out on the floor or leave the locker room, but does not state the dancers could only stay in the locker rooms for “a little bit of time.” The Court is not persuaded that the cited evidence supports the purported fact that dancers were only permitted to be in the locker room for a short time or that they were told to leave the premises (as opposed to the locker room).

Triable Issues Exist. Even if Plaintiffs had satisfied their initial burden of production and successfully shifted the burden to Defendant, there are triable issues of material fact which preclude summary adjudication given that the evidence offered in opposition must be construed liberally while the moving party’s evidence is construed strictly and any doubts to be resolved against granting the motion. (See, e.g., Brown v. FSR Brokerage, Inc., supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at 773.)

UMF No. 10 asserts that Defendant “hires dancers to entertain customers.” In opposition, Defendant cites to the declaration of Gerald Glazer, who attests that Defendant does not employ or pay any dancers. (See Glazer Decl., ¶¶ 4-15; see also Dews Depo., 71:17-72:5; Moore Decl., ¶ 7; Brush Depo., 24:15-20; Boyles Depo., 23:9- 18.) Therefore, construing the evidence liberally in favor of the non-moving party, the Court finds this to be sufficient to raise a triable material fact as to whether the dancers who perform at the club were “hired” by Defendant. This further raises a triable issue of material fact with respect to UMF Nos. 13, 24, and 48.

UMF No. 27 asserts that Defendant sets the “customer entry prices for the club.” In opposition, Defendant cites to the declaration of Mr. Glazer, which provides that Defendant does not sell entry tickets to customers or set prices for any entry tickets. As the evidence must be construed liberally in favor of the opposition, this Court finds a triable issue of fact in connection with Issue 27’s assertion that Defendant set ticket prices.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00300185-CU-OE-GDS: Kara Sterritt vs. Centerfolds Gold Club 05/06/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Adjudication in Department 8D

UMF No. 48 states that “During the time Plaintiffs worked as dancers at Centerfolds, they did not dance anywhere else.” Defendant opposes, citing to the depositions of Sterritt and Dews, in which they testified continued performing at other venues during the time period they danced at Centerfolds. (See Sterritt Depo., 43:21-46:20; 75:13-19; Dews Depo., 23:18-26:20.) Construing the evidence liberally in favor of the non-moving party, this evidence is sufficient to raise an issue of triable material fact with respect to whether Plaintiffs danced at any other venues during the time period they were dancing at the club.

Disposition

Because Plaintiffs failed to satisfy their initial burden of production with respect to UMF Nos. 1-5, 7-11, 15, 16, 20, 30-34, 38, 39, and 41 the motion for summary adjudication must be denied regardless of whether the opposition presented evidence showing a triable issue of material fact. Moreover, as set forth above, the Court has found that triable issues of fact exist as to UMF Nos. 10, 13, 24, 27, and 48.

For the reasons explained above, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication must be DENIED.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, Defendant shall prepare an appropriate order which conforms to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(g).

[1] The Court notes that, for the reasons set forth below, such interpretation does not

materially impact the disposition of the motion, as Plaintiffs fail to meet their initial burden on a number of proffered UMFs, and Defendant has raised triable issues regarding a number of UMFs with respect to UMFs included under each proffered “issue” in the Separate Statement. Indeed, Plaintiffs incorporated all the UMFs as to Issue No 1 (UMF Nos. 1-16) into Issue No. 2, and likewise incorporated all the UMFs as to Issues No. 1 and No. 2 (UMF Nos. 1-46) into Issue No. 3.