Petition of CSAA Insurance Exchange

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Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

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A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with

34-2022-00321738-CU-PT-GDS: Petition of CSAA Insurance Exchange 04/20/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss in Department 8D

a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

****NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT WILL MOVE TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 25 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION*****

Tentative Ruling:

Respondent CSAA Insurance Exchange’s (“Respondent” or “CSAA”) motion to dismiss selfrepresented claimant Harold Rucker’s (“Claimant”) arbitration proceedings is ruled on as set forth herein.

Claimant filed a singled-spaced, 10-page opposition. California Rules of Court rule 2.108, subdivision (1) states that the lines of each page must be one and one-half spaced or doublespaced. When spaced appropriately, Defendant’s opposition exceeds the page limits as provided under California Rules of Court rule 3.1113, subdivision (d). Claimant has also filed two Supplemental Declarations in response to Respondent’s reply, which the Court considers to be unauthorized sur-replies. In its discretion, the Court has considered Claimant’s opposition as well as the unauthorized sur-replies, to the extent that they do not raise new arguments or submit new evidence.

Because the sur-replies submit some of the same exhibits and similar arguments as the filings submitted in Opposition, the Court does not provide for additional briefing by Respondent. In the future, Claimant is advised to comply with California Rules of Court and seek leave of court for pages beyond the limit, and to not file unauthorized sur-replies.

Factual Background

This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 12, 2018, wherein Claimant’s vehicle was rear-ended by an uninsured motorist. Claimant made a “formal demand for Arbitration” on April 1, 2020. (McFadden Decl., ¶ 2, Exhibit 14.) On June 14, 2022, Respondent filed a Petition for Case Number (Uninsured Motorist Arbitration).

Initial Selection of Arbitrator and Arbitration Dates

In August 2022, Claimant’s former counsel, Bradley Bowles, and Respondent’s counsel exchanges proposals for arbitrators, and the parties eventually retained John Harris (“Harris”) as arbitrator on February 16, 2023, with arbitration set for June 13, 2023. (Id. at ¶¶ 2-4, Exhibits, 2,

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3.) Mr. Bowles’s representation of Claimant ended in April 2023, and Respondent agreed to Claimant’s request to a postpone the arbitration date. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Following the parties’ unsuccessful settlement negotiations, in June 2024, Respondent requested a new arbitration date, which Claimant refused. (Ibid.)

On August 27, 2024, Respondent filed a motion to compel arbitration, which this Court (Judge Krueger) granted on October 1, 2024, ordering the parties to meet and confer to select an arbitrator and for the arbitration to take place no later than July 31, 2025. (Oct. 1, 2024 Minute Order; McFadden Decl., ¶ 6.)

Claimant retained counsel Michelle Jenni in December 2024, and the parties agreed to use Harris “as binding arbitrator” by stipulation dated December 4, 2024. (McFadden Decl., ¶ 7.) On February 25, 2025, Ms. Jenni informed Respondent that her representation of Claimant ended and Claimant was again representing himself. (Id. at ¶ 8.)

On March 3, 2025, Respondent’s counsel emailed claimant indicating that an arbitration hearing before Harris was set for July 24, 2025. (Id. at ¶ 9.)

On April 15, 2025, Claimant served a substitution of attorney, naming Mark Swartz as his counsel; however, on April 22, 2025, Respondent learned that Mr. Swartz ended his representation of Claimant. (Id. at ¶ 10.)

Claimant subsequently refused to participate in arbitration proceedings with Harris serving as arbitrator on the basis that Harris had failed to provide necessary disclosures. (Id. at ¶ 11, Exhibit 9.) Notwithstanding Harris’s insistence that he complied with all disclosure requirements, Harris withdrew as arbitrator due to Claimant’s refusal to participate in arbitration proceedings. (Id. at ¶ 12, Exhibit 10.)

Stipulation to Extend Date for Arbitration

On June 23, 2025, the Court (Judge Sueyoshi) granted Plaintiff’s ex parte motion to extend the date by which arbitration shall occur. In opposition, Respondent represented that they were agreeable to extend the deadline to complete arbitration to September 5, 2025. The Court ordered: “Arbitration must be completed no later than September 5, 2025.” (June 23, 2025 Minute Order.)

Selection of New Arbitrator

By letter dated June 3, 2025, Respondent proposed three new arbitrators to Claimant, and Claimant subsequently advised Respondent that he would provide a list of suitable arbitrators by June 9, 2025. (McFadden Decl., ¶ 13.) After receiving no further response from Claimant, Respondent brought a motion to appoint an arbitrator on June 17, 2025. (Id. at ¶ 18.)

On July 7, 2025, the Court (Judge Yap) granted Respondent’s motion to appoint an arbitrator in

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accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.6, setting forth the following procedures:

• The Parties shall each file and serve a list of five proposed arbitrators no later than July 18, 2025. Failure to file and serve by this date may result in the Court not including any of the Party’s proposed arbitrator on its list.

• The Court shall provide the Parties with a list of five arbitrators, comprised from the arbitrators proposed by the Parties.

• Within five days of receipt of the list from the Court, the Parties shall jointly select an arbitrator, whether or not the arbitrator is on the Court’s list.

• If the Parties fail to select an arbitrator within the five-day period, the Court shall appoint the arbitrator from its list, referenced in #2.

(July 7, 2025 Minute Order.) The Court set the matter for further proceedings on July 28, 2025 to follow-up on any outstanding issues regarding selection of the arbitrator in accordance with the Court’s order.[1] (Ibid.) Based on the submissions of the parties, on July 21, 2025, the Court (Judge Yap) provided the Parties with a list of five arbitrators, the first three from Claimant’s list and the first two from Respondent’s list. (July 21, 2025 Minute Order.)

On July 28, 2025, the Court held the hearing to select the arbitrator, as the Parties were not able to agree to an arbitrator. Based on a random selection process, Brad Thomas (“Thomas”) was appointed. (July 28, 2025 Minute Order.)

Subsequently, Thomas advised the parties that he does not conduct arbitrations with unrepresented litigants (McFadden Decl., ¶ 18, Exhibit 15, p. 7). On July 31, 2025, a Senior Arbitration Case Manager from Judicate West wrote: “Based on Mr. Rucker’s emails regarding his notice of disqualification and his Pro Per Status, I am noticing that we will not be moving forward at this time.” (Rucker Decl., Exhibit 1.)

Subsequent Motions and Arbitrator Proposals

On August 5, 2025, Claimant filed an “Ex Parte Application for Order Extending Arbitration Deadline.” On August 6, 2025, the Court (Judge Sueyoshi) denied the motion without prejudice to filing a noticed motions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1005(b). The Court noted that the application was nearly identical to one of the orders that Claimed sought by ex parte application on July 24, 2025, which the Court had also denied with the following explanation: “To the extent Claimant now requests a further extension beyond that sought by his prior application, he shall make such request by noticed motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1005(b).

Upon filing such motion, Claimant may request via ex parte application, to advance the hearing date if the next regularly available hearing date is too distant in relation to the current deadline. Claimant shall not delay in making such motion.” (Aug. 6, 2025 Minute

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Order.)

Respondent then proposed retired Judge Brown as arbitrator, who was available to conduct arbitration proceedings before the September 5, 2025 deadline to complete arbitration. (McFadden Decl., ¶ 18.) Respondent asserts that Claimant did not respond to this proposal and did not commence arbitration prior to the deadline. (Ibid.) Claimant declares that he “explicitly rejected Judge Brown as a potential arbitrator on August 16, 2024, a full year before CSAA now claims they proposed him.” (Rucker Decl., ¶ 7.)

On August 21, 2025, Claimant filed an ex-parte application for an order shortening time to hear the motion to extent arbitration deadline and to appoint a new arbitrator. On August 22, 2025, the Court denied the application without prejudice to its resubmission, noting that Claimant’s declaration failed “to state that service was made no later than 10:00 a.m. on August 21, 2025, the court day before the hearing as required by Rule 3.1203(a) and 3.1204(b) of the California Rules of Court.”

On August 27, 2025, the Court (Judge Sueyoshi) granted, in part, Claimant’s August 26, 2025 ex parte application and advanced the hearing on Claimant’s already filed motion to extend arbitration deadline and for selection of new arbitrator to September 20, 2025. The Court noted that Claimant remained responsible for serving an amended notice and a copy of the order. (Aug. 27, 2025 Minute Order.) On August 29, 2025, the Court (Judge Sueyoshi) denied Claimant’s ex parte application “for emergency relief and clarification.” The Court confirmed the hearing date of September 30, 2025. (Aug. 29, 2025 Minute Order.)

On September 15, 2025, Claimant filed a “Notice of Withdrawal of Motions (Without Prejudice),” which included the following language:

The Claimant, Harold J. Rucker Jr., hereby voluntarily withdraws the following motions previously filed in this action:

Motion to Extend the Arbitration Deadline — scheduled for a hearing on September 30, 2025, in Dept 53 at 1:30 pm.

Motion to Disqualify Arbitrator — scheduled for a hearing on December 15, 2025, in Dept 53 at 1:30 pm.

These withdrawals are made without prejudice. The Claimant reserves the right to re-file any of the withdrawn motions in the future, should the need arise. This withdrawal shall be entered in the clerk’s register and shall be effective for all purposes upon entry.

(Notice of Withdrawal of Motions, filed Sept. 15, 2025.)

Further Communications between the Parties

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On September 5, 2025, at approximately 10:58 a.m., Respondent sent an email, setting forth the following:

Mr. Rucker,

I just received your latest voicemail indicating you were going to submit another counteroffer. Please be advised that CSAA has made its decision that $150,000.00 is the offer and its deadline is still 5pm today.

You accepted that offer yesterday via both a voicemail and email. If you want to settle this case, please return the signed release and let us know the amount of the attorney lien so we can order the settlement check(s). Any further counteroffer at this point will be respectfully declined.

Thank you.

(Rucker Supp. Decl,, Exhibit A.) Later that day, at approximately 1:01 p.m., Respondent sent a further email, setting forth the following:

CSAA respectfully declines your latest counteroffer. They continue to offer $150,000.00 to resolve your claim until 5:00pm today. I have attached another copy of the release for your signature and return. If the release is not signed and returned by 5pm PST today, CSAA reserves all of its rights which including moving for the dismissal of your claim without any payment to you. A return of the signed release via email is acceptable, if followed via U.S. mail of the original signed release.

As for the lien by your attorney, CSAA will protect your former attorney’s lien by either including the Bowles Verna firm on the settlement check of $150,000.00, or, as you requested, will withhold the amount of the lien, which we believe to be $31,181.25, until you can resolve your dispute over that amount with your former attorney. If that is still your preference, CSAA will send you a check for the difference, which is $118,818.75 and await the resolution of your dispute with your former attorneys for the disbursement of the balance of the settlement.

(Rucker Decl., Exhibit 2.) On September 8, 2025, Respondent another email, setting forth the following:

Mr. Rucker,

As stated in my email of Friday, September 5, 2025, the terms of the settlement were clear. A signed release would have secured the settlement for $150,000.00. Anything less was not an agreement to resolve your case and CSAA reserved its rights as previously advised, including moving the court to dismiss the claim.

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CSAA did not threaten to file a motion to dismiss in effort to get you to sign CSAA's release and settle your case. CSAA merely responded to a question from you regarding what may occur if the deadline of September 5, 2025, expired and we had not resolved the case.

(Rucker Supp. Decl., Exhibit 1.)

Claimant contends that Respondent had “[n]o legitimate basis to hold my UM benefits hostage and demand ransom. Mr. McFadden’s continual obstinate conduct and refusal to adhere to statutory law appears to be driven by some sort of discriminatory and prejudicial animus toward me.” (Rucker Decl., ¶ 9.)

Federal Action

Claimant filed a federal complaint against CSAA seeking to stay arbitration proceedings. It appears that, at some point, a Second Amended Complaint was filed, and on January 9, 2026, Respondent acknowledged receipt of an email copy, but asserted that it considered it procedurally defective. (Rucker Supp. Decl., Exhibit B.) On February 24, 2026, Claimant requested that the clerk enter a default against Respondent. (Rucker Supp. Decl., Exhibit D.)

Pending Motion

Respondent now moves to dismiss the arbitration proceedings for Claimant’s failure to commence the same prior to April 1, 2025.

Claimant opposes.

Discussion

Respondent argues that Claimant has engaged in a pattern of delay that has prevented arbitration from moving forward. Because over five years have elapsed since Claimant demanded arbitration on April 1, 2020, Respondent argues that the claim should be dismissed under Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (i)(2).

In opposition, Claimant declares that the facts establish estoppel, waiver, impossibility, impracticality, and/or futility to excuse his noncompliance with the statutory timeframe under Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (i)(2)(B)(3). Claimant’s asserts that Respondent acted in bad faith to purposefully run out the clock on Claimant’s five-year statutory arbitration deadline. Claimant’s allegations of Respondent’s bad-faith tactics are numerous and summarized as follows: (1) Respondent colluded with his former attorneys Mr.

Bowles and Mr. Swartz, making it necessary for Claimant to seek new counsel, which was impeded by Respondent’s asserted misconduct (Opp’n at p. 1); (2) Respondent sabotaged and blocked the UM arbitration by objecting to “Harris applying their 2023 Admissions” (Opp’n at 2); (3) Respondent wrongfully conditioned a settlement with Claimant on Claimant’s release of his rights under

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Civil Code section 1542, which Claimant argues violates Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (h); (4) Respondent wrongfully demanded that Claimant settle his uninsured motorist claim for $150,000 or Respondent would file this motion to dismiss; (5) Respondent delayed arbitration by using Harris as an arbitrator, who ultimately withdrew due to Claimant being selfrepresented; and (6) Respondent refused to stipulate to extend arbitration after Harris’s withdrawal as arbitrator. Claimant also opposes on the grounds that Respondent’s motion is procedurally defective for failing to satisfy the meet-and-confer requirements of Code Civil Procedure section 2016.040.

Insurance Code section 11580.2 governs uninsured motorist claims and, provides, in relevant part: “Any arbitration instituted pursuant to this section shall be concluded . . . within five years from the institution of the arbitration proceeding.” (Ins. Code, § 11580.2, subd. (i)(2)(A).) Insurance Code section 11580.2(i)(3) further provides: “The doctrines of estoppel, waiver, impossibility, impracticality, and futility apply to excuse a party’s noncompliance with the statutory timeframe, as determined by the court.” “‘[T]he burden of prosecution [of arbitration] is always with the plaintiff or claimant.’” (Santangelo v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 804, 817.)

In this case, the undisputed evidence before the Court is that Claimant formally demanded arbitration on April 1, 2020. Consistent with the parties’ subsequent agreement, on June 23, 2025, the Court (Judge Sueyoshi) ordered that arbitration must be completed no later than September 5, 2025. It is undisputed that the arbitration has not been completed, and on February 2, 2026, Respondent moved to dismiss. As such, absent any applicable exception under the doctrines of estoppel, waiver, impossibility, impracticality, and futility, the statutory timeline has passed and the matter must be dismissed.

Based on the evidence before it, the court does not find sufficient facts to excuse Claimant’s failure to comply with the statutory five-year deadline (as extended by agreement of the Parties). To the extent Claimant alleges Respondent wrongfully delayed arbitration through collusion with Claimant’s own counsel, Claimant’s only evidence of alleged collusion—beyond conclusory assertions—consists of a letter from Swartz to Claimant (Opp’n., Exhibit AA) explaining a discovery stipulation with Respondent’s counsel regarding the admissibility of treatment notes and inadmissibility of certain doctors’ opinions regarding causation.

To the extent Claimant presents responses to request for admission and contends that Respondent objected to application of such admissions, the Court does not find, on the record before it, that Respondent’s objections to or position regarding the use of certain discovery responses in arbitration supports excuse for noncompliance with the statutory deadline.

Claimant’s arguments regarding the proposed settlement agreement with Respondent are equally unsubstantiated insofar as Claimant alleges Respondent acted in bad faith to delay arbitration. To the extent Claimant disagreed with the terms of a proposed settlement with Respondent or contends that such terms were unlawful, this does not explain Claimant’s failure to move his arbitration case to completion within the five-year period.[2] Indeed, the Court notes that the

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settlement discussions at issue appeared to occur in the days immediately preceding and including September 5, 2025, and that the negotiations ended on September 5, 2025. This was the final day to complete the arbitration in accordance with the statutory deadline. As such, Claimant’s issues with the terms of the settlement do not establish facts to support estoppel, waiver, impossibility, impracticability, or futility.[3]

Similarly, the Court does not find that any evidence shows that Claimant’s filing of a separate federal action that may be related to this case supports any doctrine that would excuse Claimant’s noncompliance with the statutory deadline.

Claimant also blames Respondent for delaying arbitration in appointing Thomas as an arbitrator and for Thomas’s subsequent withdrawal as arbitrator. Thomas was selected as arbitrator only after Respondent moved to appoint an arbitrator in 2025. While the Court agrees that Thomas’s withdrawal was beyond Claimant’s control, it was certainly within Claimant’s control to ensure that arbitration was completed within the five-year deadline and to take the steps to do so. While Claimant asserts that “[Respondent’s] consecutive withdrawing arbitrators was more evidence court intervention was necessary to facilitate UM arbitration,” (Opp’n., p. 4.), the evidence shows that Harris withdrew due to Claimant’s refusal to participate in arbitration (see McFadden Decl., Exhibit 10), and Claimant concedes that he did not agree to retaining Judge Brown as an arbitrator after Thomas withdrew (Opp’n., p. 4).

Claimant presents no evidence that he diligently took steps for the appointment of a new arbitrator. To the extent that Claimant believes his motions to extend the arbitration deadline or to disqualify the arbitrator addressed such relief, Claimant himself withdrew his motion to extend the arbitration deadline, which had been advanced to be heard on September 30, 2025, as well as the motion to disqualify arbitrator. Even if the Court tolled the time preceding the September 30, 2025 scheduled hearing, Claimant failed to complete arbitration within five years.

As such, the Court does not find that Claimant has demonstrated impossibility, impracticability, or futility.

That Respondent refused to stipulate to further extending the arbitration deadline beyond September 5, 2025 also does not excuse Claimant’s failure to complete arbitration within five years, as Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (i)(4) states that the parties “may” so stipulate—it does not require either party to agree to extend the deadline.

Based on the submissions of the Parties and the evidence before it, the Court determines that doctrines of estoppel, waiver, impossibility, impracticality, and futility do not apply to excuse a party’s noncompliance with the statutory timeframe.[4] The Court does not find that Respondent’s conduct frustrated or otherwise impeded Claimant’s ability to arbitrate his claims within five years.

Lastly, Claimant’s argument regarding the procedural defectiveness of the present motion under Code Civil Procedure section 2016.040 is unavailing, as that section refers to the meet-andconfer requirements under the Civil Discovery Act, which does not apply to the pending motion.

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Claimant has failed to meet his burden of completing arbitration within the five-year deadline. The Court also finds that Claimant has failed to demonstrate that his noncompliance was due estoppel, waiver, impossibility, impracticality, and/or futility under Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (i)(3). Therefore, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

Disposition

Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

Claimant’s request for a Statement of Decision is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

A party may request a Statement of Decision “to address the principal controverted issues,” and “such issues must be specified in the request.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1590.) The Court “is not required to respond point by point to the issues posed in a request for statement of decision. The court’s statement of decision is sufficient if it fairly discloses the court’s determination as to the ultimate facts and material issues in the case.” (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 983.) “[A] court is not expected to make findings with regard to “detailed evidentiary facts or to make minute findings as to individual items of evidence.”” (Ibid. [quoting Nunes Turfgrass, Inc. v.

Vaughan-Jackin Seed Co. (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1518, 1525].) Any decision by the Court not to address a point raised in the Request for Statement of Decision should not be interpreted to mean that the Court agrees with the point raised or the party’s interpretation of the evidence.

Claimant’s request asks the Court to provide a legal analysis of five issues that are not necessarily at issue in the current motion or necessary to the Court’s resolution of the motion. To the extent Claimant requests the Court to address its analysis of the facts and law as it relates to the impact of the terms of the settlement offer, Respondent’s conduct in the litigation/arbitration as it applies to the application of Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (i), the application of Code of Civil Procedure section 1016.040, and the doctrine of equitable tolling, the Court has addressed those issues herein as necessary to the Court’s resolution of the motion before it. To the extent the tentative ruling is adopted, the Court will deem the ruling its Statement of Decision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 632.

Respondent shall prepare a proposed order and judgment in accordance with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.

[1] On July 16, 2025, Claimant filed a motion for reconsideration and “Motion to Extend

Deadline for Arbitrator Selection.” On July 24, 2025, the Court (Judge Sueyoshi) advanced the hearing on the motion for reconsideration to be heard on August 30, 2025. The Court denied the motion on August 20, 2025. (Aug. 20, 2025 Minute Order.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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to pay the $150,000 partial settlement that it already admitted it owed (the amount Claimant accepted on September 4, 2025)” is beyond the scope of Respondent’s motion to dismiss. Moreover, the Court notes that it does not appear that the Parties had reached agreement regarding the terms of any settlement, as Claimant did not agree to the release proposed by Respondent (and contends that such a release would be unlawful). [3] The Court need not and does not address the propriety of the terms of the settlement offer. The

Court does not find Claimant’s citation to Padideh v. Moradi (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 418, persuasive to his argument regarding the application of an “unclean-hands” argument, as there is no evidence that Claimant’s noncompliance with the statutory timeframe was a result of Respondent’s settlement position, or as set forth herein, any other conduct of Respondent. [4] The Court does not find Claimant’s citation to Spear v. California State Auto. Assn (1992) 2

Cal.4th 1035, persuasive to his arguments or position, as the California Supreme Court addressed the time a cause of action accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations, not the application of the five-year statutory deadline set forth in Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (i). Further, the Spear Court also addressed circumstances where the insurer refused to arbitrate, which is contrary to the facts before this Court.